Stephen B. Young
July 17, 2025
“If we place President Trump’s tariffs on Vietnamese goods in the context of a broader strategic picture, the U.S. and Vietnam can still find a common path through today’s tensions.”
— Stephen B. Young
This summer in Hanoi, the heat is not just from the weather but from mounting strategic pressures—both domestic and international. What is Trump’s America pursuing? Does Washington aim to impose itself on Vietnam, or is it seeking to build a long-term partnership grounded in reciprocity and balanced interests?
I. Tariffs and Strategy Go Hand in Hand
The Trump administration’s unexpected decision to impose a 20% tariff on Vietnamese exports—twice the previously negotiated rate—sent shockwaves through public opinion. Many in Vietnam see it as a trap. But is the tariff really the core issue?
At the same time that tariffs were announced, the United States also offered Vietnam its most flexible geo-strategic space since Đổi Mới (1):
- Refusing to facilitate transshipment of Chinese goods is not a severance from China, but a step toward strategic diversification. No one expects Vietnam to completely cut ties with China—geography and economics don’t allow it. But diversification is not only feasible—it’s wise.
- Allowing U.S. warships to dock at Cam Ranh Bay does not mean Vietnam is “taking sides.” The Philippines has done the same while maintaining strong trade with China. Singapore has long welcomed U.S. naval visits while being a key member of China-led RCEP.
- Signing a rare earth agreement is not about “selling off resources.” If done right, it can attract G7-level processing technology, reduce dependence on China, and end the outdated model of exporting raw materials and importing refined goods.
- Joining the Indo-Pacific supply chain does not mean abandoning the Chinese market. Rather, it enhances Vietnam’s negotiating power and achieves strategic balance.
II. A Truly Renewed Vietnam, Seen from Washington
History shows that the first strategic commitment between the U.S. and Vietnam came in October 1954, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower declared American support for the independence and economic development of the Republic of Vietnam (2).
Why did the U.S. make that pledge at such a pivotal moment? Because, as Eisenhower wrote, Americans respected Vietnamese nationalism—a resilient tradition of the people.
In his letter to Prime Minister Ngô Đình Diệm, the U.S. President expressed hope that the Vietnamese government would reflect the will of the people, act with enlightenment, and govern effectively—to earn respect domestically and globally, and to prevent any foreign ideology from being forced upon a free nation.
The word “nation” in that letter was decisive. Eisenhower acknowledged that the Vietnamese had their own traditions, values, religions, and aspirations—deserving of sovereignty, liberty, and independence, just as Americans had once demanded for themselves.
The key difference now is this: Back then, Eisenhower “picked” Saigon as a pawn on the Southeast Asian chessboard. Today, Washington “chooses” Hanoi—not as a pawn, but as a partner with weight and authority on the interregional and global chessboard (Indo-Pacific and beyond).
In that same spirit, American policymakers took close note of General Secretary Tô Lâm’s article on April 27, 2025, in which he emphasized:
“The aspiration for a peaceful, unified, and independent Vietnam is a sacred flame that has forged the national spirit over thousands of years of history…”
What stood out most to Washington was his reference to “the enduring nature of the Vietnamese nation”—a concept the U.S. has seen as the cornerstone of a lasting partnership since the beginning. Also notable was his call for national reconciliation—a sign that Vietnam is ready to enter a new historical era:
“The war is no longer a dividing line for people of the same Lạc Hồng bloodline… There is no reason for Vietnamese—sharing the same origin, all children of Mother Âu Cơ—to carry hatred or division in their hearts.”
The U.S. appreciates the General Secretary’s return to Vietnam’s cultural roots as a foundation for a future that is prosperous, globally integrated, and peacefully aligned with the international community.
Some scholars see this as signaling a new foreign and domestic policy rooted in national identity—one that does not merely react to geopolitical shifts but actively shapes Vietnam’s role in the world order.
As a senior U.S. State Department adviser recently stated:
“We welcome the Vietnamese leadership’s commitment to pursuing a harmonious path of development, aligned with the civilized world.”
III. A Harder Question: Subordination—or True Partnership?
Some voices in Vietnam are asking: “If we yield to the U.S. now, are we risking subordination?”
But perhaps the more honest question should be: “If we continue on the current path, are we truly independent?”
More critically, how can Vietnam seize this rare opportunity to shift from a nation shaped by historical circumstance to a nation that shapes history?
Beijing has long been clear about its ambition to treat Vietnam as a strategic buffer zone. China dominates supply chains, controls rare earth exports, invests in critical infrastructure—and tightens its grip through a soft-strategic vise. Every time Hanoi leans West, there are warning signals from the North: maritime incidents, stalled negotiations, and unreasonable historical and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.
In this context, recent U.S. proposals offer Vietnam a chance to redefine its national positioning. An economy seen as a mere “proxy hub” for Chinese goods will never become a global manufacturing powerhouse.
But if Hanoi pivots—just as The Economist once suggested—Vietnam can become “the Bavaria of Asia”: a hub for green tech, high-value manufacturing, and strategic neutrality.
Vietnam can:
- Attract high-quality investment from the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Europe;
- Transition from an assembly-line model to innovation and brand ownership;
- Play a key role in restructuring global supply chains.
Now is the time for the Politburo, under General Secretary Tô Lâm’s leadership, to show strategic vision and political resolve. Hesitation at this moment would be a historical setback.
Is the U.S. applying pressure? Perhaps. But with long-term thinking and skillful diplomacy, Vietnam can turn that pressure into leverage—to restructure not only trade and defense but also its institutions and governance model.
After 80 years, could this coming August become the second defining August in Vietnam’s history?
Time is running out. A slow or ambiguous response will not only forfeit trade privileges—it will erode strategic trust from G7, Quad, and ASEAN partners.
What’s at stake is not just a seat at the global table—it’s the chance to finally step out of China’s shadow and build a resilient, independent, and globally competitive economy.
CONCLUSION:
The Vietnamese people once faced colonialism, imperialism, and war with courage. Today, that same courage must take a new form: the courage to choose, to change, and to redefine Vietnam’s place in the world.
General Secretary Tô Lâm and the Politburo now hold a historic opportunity: to lift Vietnam out of China’s assembly-line orbit and into true partnership with the global democratic community.
No nation can choose its geography,
But every nation can choose its future.
Joining the world’s march toward civilization is Vietnam’s opportunity to showcase its leadership—not only in economic reform but in strategic thinking and political confidence.
If Hanoi fails to seize this moment, it may be a very long time before history offers another chance.
NOTES:
- This historic letter was drafted by Kenneth T. Young, Director of the Southeast Asia Office at the U.S. State Department. Following this family legacy, I—Stephen B. Young—wrote “Kissinger’s Betrayal: How America Lost the Vietnam War,” exposing how Kissinger never truly understood Vietnamese nationalism.
(2) According to sources close to U.S.-Vietnam negotiations, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit, Secretary of State Marco delivered a handwritten letter from President Trump to General Secretary Tô Lâm, addressing the four key areas discussed in this article.
Stephen B. Young is the Global Executive Director of the Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism, former Dean and Professor of Hamline University School of Law, and a former Assistant Dean, The Harvard Law School. He is the author of Kissinger’s Betrayal: How America Lost the Vietnam War and, with Nguyen Ngoc Huy, Tradition of Human Rights in China and Vietnam, and “The Law of Property in Vietnam’s Le Dynasty”, Journal of Asian History, 1975