Our fellow, Dinh Hoang Thang, keeps a close eye and ear on the evolution of Vietnam away from a traditional “socialist one-party democracy.”
After the conclusion of the recent session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, former Ambassador Thang came to certain conclusions, which you can read here.
Vietnam’s Central Committee Meetings and Tô Lâm’s Visit to Pyongyang: An Outside Perspective
By Dr. Hoang Thang Dinh, Caux Round Table Fellow
Summary:
Vietnam’s political evolution entered a decisive stage with the 13th Central Committee Plenum (early October 2025) followed by General Secretary Tô Lâm’s state visit to North Korea — political moves that revealed both a consolidation of power and a search for stability amid a rapidly shifting East Asian order. While Hanoi balances relations among major powers, the real test of its leadership will lie in transforming political symbolism into practical governance and successful economic outcomes. The forthcoming 14th Party Congress will determine (i) whether Vietnam can reform its political and economic power structures and practics without losing stability — and (ii) integrate more globally while maintaining its autonomous, self-reliant, identity.
- Power Shifts and the Quest for Stability
East Asia is reconfiguring its power dynamics — from China’s many internal challenges to Japan’s evolving defense strategies and capabilities . Against this changing regional order, Vietnam has just taken three pivotal steps in its current five-year political cycle: the 13th Central Committee Plenum, General Secretary Tô Lâm’s state visit to Pyongyang, and preparations for the 14th Plenum in mid-November.
Each step serves two objectives: choosing leaders and advancing Vietnam’s stature in world affairs.
Before the 13th Plenum, Tô Lâm issued Regulation No. 365 (September 2025), elevating the Standing Secretariat to “core leadership” status — effectively adding a fifth pillar to the traditional tứ trụ (“four pillars”), forming what analysts call a Bộ Ngũ or “Pentarchy” [1].
Despite administrative streamlining elsewhere in governing institutions, the Central Committee remains at about 200 members strong, and the Politburo at 17–19 members. This equilibrium preserves collective leadership and the practice of internal balancing among factions [3].
2. Two Milestones, One Message
Hanoi’s delicate balancing act – simultaneously positioning relationships with the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea, and now North Korea—demonstrates its enduring ambition for achieving what might be called “soft multilateralism.” Importantly and in addition, with the 14th Party Congress approaching, this achievement also furthers a very important domestic objective: to strengthen Tô Lâm’s legitimacy and the influence projected by his political base.
A Vietnamese expert told BBC News that if the Pyongyang visit (Oct 9–11) was simply “to score within the communist club,” it could backfire. But if framed as “a balancing message that Vietnam can talk to all sides,” it would be a bold yet risky diplomatic act [4].
That visit, praised as occurring in a “particularly friendly atmosphere,” emphasized the solidarity of remaining socialist states. Still, it raised a deeper question: did it demonstrate diplomatic independence — or was it a gesture of self-importance compensating for slower progress with Washington?
While both sides agreed to cooperate in several sectors, real progress now depends on overcoming institutional and sanction barriers. Reuters quoted KCNA’s assessment of To Lam’s visit as merely a reaffirmation of “traditional comradeship” [5].
3. Concentrated Power with Attentive Execution
The four Central Committee plenums convened under Tô Lâm’s leadership — from the 10th to the 13th — illustrate a subtle governance model of “centralization with fine tuning” [6]. Introducing confidential voting within the Politburo — an unusual move — signals an attempt to have both firm control and participatory consensus [7].
However, system performance remains uneven. Despite administrative reforms, the hesitant response to recent typhoons exposed weak coordination among agencies and responsible officials. Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính’s public scolding of absent provincial leaders became emblematic of widespread personal inefficiency and irresponsibility in the apparatus of government[8]. The gap between having political authority and delivering good results has become Vietnam’s “Achilles Heel”.
4. Diplomacy: Symbolism delivering limited results
Tô Lâm’s Pyongyang trip symbolized ideological loyalty and political steadiness on his part [9]. Yet, with North Korea under heavy sanctions, the scope for cooperation benefiting Vietnam is narrow.
While domestic media stressed the visit’s symbolic value, such public imagery has limited practical effect as Vietnam seeks investment and deeper integration into CPTPP and RCEP. In an increasingly pragmatic world, only invoking “socialist friendship” does not impress those potential partners who prioritize performance over ideology [10].
The muted global response to Vietnam’s appeal for disaster aid after the recent typhoons highlights this gap between “socialist solidarity” and money provided when it is needed.
5. Administrative Mergers and the Two-Level Governance Test
Domestically, reforms such as consolidation of some provinces one with another and administrative streamlining were designed to cut costs and boost efficiency — but outcomes have not met expectations. Bigger, consolidated, administrative units do not guarantee better, more effective, governance.
High restructuring costs and cultural disparities have generated pushback where the reforms have been imposed. Experts suggest that true efficiency will come only through capacity-building, digital governance, and empowered local autonomy, not with just consolidation alone [11].
Ironically, once-efficient disaster-response systems slowed down after the mergers of provincial administrations. Hanoi’s decision not to release typhoon casualty figures, while appealing for aid, underscored a paradox: centralized power does not guarantee accountability or good results [12].
6. Institutional Credibility and the Implementation Gap
A political system is judged by its ability to implement, not by its scope of control. Its strength grows out of good results, not from the sweep of its legally authorized span of control. Regional surveys (2024–2025) show declining public trust in local governments due to poor crisis response and service delivery [13].
The widening gap between “political rhetoric” and “administrative outcomes” now defines Vietnam’s foundational political dilemma — reforming the system without precipitating instability.
7. Between Reform and Stability
The political landscape following the 13th Central Committee plenum reflects a model of “conditional stability”: political power remains concentrated, yet must adapt to the demands of modern governance; diplomacy remains largely symbolic, yet needs to shift gradually toward pragmatism. To what extent will the concept of “liuzhi”—a key framework for understanding how Beijing integrates Party discipline with state authority—be adopted in Hanoi’s political system? [14] Or, as analyst David Brown once observed, Vietnam’s new regime is still finding its footing—caught between freedom and discipline, stability and innovation, expectation and reform. [15]
The country now faces a dual adjustment process: consolidating political legitimacy while enhancing institutional capacity. The success of this strategy depends on whether the system can turn political symbolism into practical effectiveness—whether administrative reform can genuinely improve governance, and whether symbolic diplomacy can open new economic frontiers.
On the eve of the 14th National Congress, these questions remain unanswered. The upcoming Congress will not merely be a personnel reshuffle—it will be a test of Vietnam’s governance model: can the country remain stable while pursuing reform, and integrate globally while preserving its own identity? How can it reinforce central authority without neglecting the balance of power with local institutions? [16]
References
[1 & 3] https://fulcrum.sg/to-lam-is-institutionalising-politics-again/
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z128gPCvTnY
[4] https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/cge2e1ywd4go
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-vietnam-agree-cooperate-defence-other-fields-kcna-says-2025-10-11/
[6] https://fulcrum.sg/to-lam-is-institutionalising-politics-again/
[7] https://youtu.be/9dWd3-s1KB4?si=6LvXedt8YbOpL_Sg
[8] https://youtu.be/AioD65l4nyE?si=F3xl9pmrJLQGZs0-
[9] https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/10/10/the-message-of-the-visit-to-north-korea-that-vietnam-wants-to-send-to-major-countries/
[10] https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3328310/vietnams-leader-heads-north-korea-first-visit-18-years-rebalance-relations
[11] https://asiatimes.com/2025/08/to-lam-consolidating-hard-fast-and-forceful-rule-in-vietnam/
[12] https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/enablers-and-barriers-implementing-effective-disaster-risk-management-according-good
[13] https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/0c2ba150-f410-4cb0-994e-ad1ea812642c
[14] https://youtube.com/watch?v=B18pzEYjdwM&si=9DZCTxEq-Hbm57D9
[16] https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/09/03/vietnam-redraws-its-administrative-map/