Our Vietnamese correspondent has shared with me his generally optimistic report on the political environment which will shape decisions at the forthcoming Party Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party.
I note with interest the discussion of traditional Vietnamese sensitivity to the signals we mere humans get from Heaven as to our fates as time and space cycle through the years.
The Vietnamese Communist Party Today Compared with Forty Years Ago: The 14th Party Congress and the 6th Party Congress — Parallels, Divergences, and Enduring Historical Undercurrents.
Four decades after the Sixth Party Congress—an event widely regarded as having opened a historic door toward a more flexible economic order (Đổi Mới)—Vietnam once again confronts a life-defining political moment: a critical transition of power with far-reaching consequences.
Hoàng Trường
The Fourteenth Party Congress is approaching amid intensifying economic, political, and social pressures, a visible erosion of public trust, and increasingly complex factional maneuvering among highly placed officials.
The reappearance of familiar patterns in the operation of power has led many observers to pose an unsettling question: is history repeating itself—once again moving through familiar cycles of power?
A comparison between the 14th Party Congress (2026) and the 6th Party Congress (1986) reveals notable similarities, while also exposing fundamental differences that reflect both the changing times and the evolving structure and operation of totalitarian power.
I. Parallels: When Power Becomes Trapped in Bargaining
1. Deadlock and infighting among the most prominent cadres and officials
In the lead-up to the Sixth Party Congress, Lê Đức Thọ—despite advanced age and declining health—was unwilling to step aside. Phạm Văn Đồng and Trường Chinh were forced into compromise in order to prevent factional conflict from spiraling out of control. A transitional arrangement was devised: Trường Chinh would preside over the Congress, then hand over leadership to Nguyễn Văn Linh—a new figure representing the emerging reformist tendency.
Ahead of the Fourteenth Congress, a similar pattern of “forced compromise” has once again emerged. Central Committee meetings have been postponed repeatedly (three times), and personnel lists revised again and again—clear indications that no faction has yet secured overwhelming dominance.
The crucial parallel lies here: while the overall strategic direction is widely acknowledged, personnel arrangements have become the central bottleneck.
In 1986, despite fierce debate, senior leaders recognized that the centrally planned economic model had reached its limits. Likewise, by 2026, a growing consensus has formed that growth driven by land rents, privileges, and easy capital has exhausted its momentum.
The Politburo has issued Resolution 68, effectively mandating a shift in development priorities toward the private sector. Yet disagreements over who should lead this transformation have prolonged internal division for more than a year.
2. A shared denominator: erosion of social trust
From 1975 to 1986, the subsidy-based economic model plunged everyday life into severe deprivation. Public confidence deteriorated rapidly.
Today, although surface-level material conditions have changed dramatically, the psychological parallels are unmistakable:
- Businesses are exhausted by overlapping inspections and audits;
- The business environment is obstructed by fear of making mistakes and by interference from enforcement agencies lacking accountability;
- Confidence in the future is declining as opportunities are squeezed by rent-seeking power groups intent on expanding their privileges.
As in 1986, society is fatigued, and expectations for a decisive change are once again on the rise.
II. Divergences: Reversed Regional Roles and a Transformed Power Structure
1. Southern dynamism: from reform driver to controlled subordinate
At the Sixth Party Congress, southern Vietnam was the most powerful engine of reform. The collapse of the slogan “rapid, strong, and steady advance toward socialism” had pushed the country to the brink of hunger—symbolized by nationwide dependence on sorghum imported from the Soviet Union.
Saigon and the southern region—drawing on market experience and economic dynamism—were the first to recover. “Fence-breaking” reforms in pricing, wages, production contracts, and enterprise autonomy laid the practical foundations for Đổi Mới. It was no coincidence that leaders with southern origins later played key roles during the early reform period.
Today, the regional balance of power has shifted. Northern leadership—having absorbed lessons from the post-1986 period, when the South enjoyed substantial autonomy—has narrowed the South’s room for maneuver, especially following the Nguyễn Tấn Dũng era and its controversial state-conglomerate model described as “steel fists.”
If 1986 marked northern concession to southern pragmatism, 2026 reflects a reassertion of centralized northern control.
2. Hunger and aspiration: different forms, the same political dynamic
In 1986, hunger was literal. In 2026, society “hungers” for the rule of law, while businesses hunger for economic freedom and thirst for a transparent, healthy legal environment.
Where past deprivation stemmed from a flawed economic model, today’s exhaustion arises from relentless inspections, administrative coercion by the security apparatus, and weak accountability among political leaders. New and troubling features have emerged: investigative and executive power now forms a wall that blocks capital, innovation, and production at the very moment they begin to take shape.
3. The rise of a socio-spiritual dimension
A defining feature of the current period is the strong resonance of traditional socio-spiritual sentiment: repeated natural disasters, relentless flooding, and as many as fifteen major storms have nurtured a collective sense that “heaven’s will” is turning against the system.
In East Asian political psychology, such phenomena are often interpreted as signs of dynastic or national transition. If reform-oriented forces knew how to channel this instinctive sentiment, it could become a strategic advantage.
In 1986, this psychological-political dimension was largely absent. In 2026, it has emerged as a powerful undercurrent shaping public emotion and expectation.
III. A Changed World: Globalization and the Limits of Absolute Control
1. Vietnam in 2026 is no longer Vietnam in 1986
- The private sector has become the backbone of economic growth;
- Vietnam occupies a key position in global electronics and semiconductor supply chains;
- Interwoven relations with the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China mean that senior leadership decisions now carry major geopolitical implications.
Under such conditions, a top-down model of total control is clearly ill-suited to an economy and society that demand speed, creativity, and adaptability.
2. Concentrated power—facing harsh limits
The current power structure rests primarily on:
- The expanding influence of the security apparatus;
- Strong totalitarian coercion—rule by police power rather than by the rule of law;
- Governance through repression and sophisticated extraction rather than trust-building;
- Preferential treatment for loyalist networks and obedience over institutional reform.
Meanwhile, businesses—the main drivers of growth—are increasingly constrained by legal uncertainty and intrusive security oversight.
3. “Political flooding” as a metaphor of the age
The persistence of coercive governance despite repeated natural disasters reveals a deeply troubling separation between the state and society.
At the Sixth Party Congress, economic and social crisis forced leadership change. Ahead of the Fourteenth Congress, although society is no less exhausted or gridlocked, the power structure appears more rigid and increasingly entrenched in both status and authority.
This contrast reflects a core trait of modern totalitarian systems: the survival of the system is prioritized above economic performance, social responsibility, or moral values.
Conclusion: Parallels as Reflection, Divergences as Warning
The Sixth Party Congress was a historic turning point that liberated national energy from the constraints of a failed economic model. The Fourteenth Congress could generate a similar breakthrough—or it may simply perpetuate a cycle of power consolidation if not accompanied by meaningful institutional reform.
The parallels lie in social fatigue, resolving deadlocks among the most senior cadres and officials,, and pressures for change from below.
The divergences lie in a more rigid power structure, a stronger private sector, and Vietnam’s far deeper integration into the global system.
And this time, whether acknowledged or not, socio-spiritual forces are also present as an invisible factor shaping collective sentiment.
History never repeats itself exactly. Yet patterns of power distribution, crisis dynamics, and signals from society’s foundations inevitably return—albeit in altered forms.
The Fourteenth Party Congress, therefore, is not merely about personnel appointments. It is a test of Vietnam’s entire philosophy of governance: whether its one-party system can adapt to a new stage of development, or whether it will continue to close itself off from warnings issued by society, markets—and even by nature itself.