Following the official trip to the United States from February 18 to 20, regardless of what the General Secretary and his inner circle may publicly declare, the fundamental question moving forward remains this: What will be the true order of priorities for the Communist Party of Vietnam? The preservation of the existing system and one-party rule? The restructuring of the national development model? Or simply the consolidation of power at the level of individuals and factions?
Dr. Nguyễn Thế Hùng, PhD, and Professor Stephen Young, JD
I. Hexagram Qian and the Trajectory of Political Will
In the Yijing (I Ching), Hexagram Qian (乾) symbolizes Heaven—pure creative force, unrestrained yang energy, and the relentless ascent of will. The six lines of Qian are not merely metaphysical symbols; they constitute a structural model of political ascent.
From “Hidden dragon, do not act” (潜龙勿用) to “Flying dragon in the heavens” (飞龙在天), the hexagram outlines a process of self-construction and progressive legitimation. It depicts the journey of an individual endowed with strong political will, overcoming successive constraints to reach the apex of authority.
Yet the Yijing does not conclude at the summit. Immediately following “Flying dragon in the heavens” comes the warning: “Arrogant dragon will have regret” (亢龙有悔).
The philosophical insight here is profound: the apex is not a culmination but a new ordeal. Once at the highest point, a leader no longer confronts discrete rivals. Instead, the object of engagement becomes the totality—society, institutional structures, historical momentum, and collective expectation. Should the leader continue to operate in a mode of conquest rather than adjustment, counterforces inevitably arise. “Regret” in this sense does not signify immediate collapse, but the consequence of failing to transform one’s governing posture at the appropriate moment.
II. “Arrogant Dragon” Through the Lens of Modern Power Psychology
“Arrogance” (亢, kang) does not merely denote opposition. At a deeper level, it describes a confrontational stance maintained after the consolidation of supreme authority.
Political psychology suggests a recurring pattern: individuals who ascend through forceful will often internalize that will as universally efficacious. Before reaching the summit, firmness and decisiveness are assets. At the summit, however, excessive rigidity risks estrangement from the broader social organism.
At the apex, the “other dragon” is no longer a faction or rival personality. It is the aggregate of complex interests: markets, media ecosystems, an expanding middle class, global strategic pressures, and transnational economic interdependence. If governance remains purely confrontational—resisting rather than harmonizing—latent opposition accumulates within the system itself.
Thus, “Arrogant dragon will have regret” is not a moral admonition but a law of equilibrium. Power unmodulated generates counterpower. Will untempered erodes its own foundation.
III. “Ultimate Intent” (Khế Lý) and “Strategic Presentation” (Khế Cơ)
Within a modernized interpretive framework of the Yijing, we may distinguish between two analytical layers:
- Khế cơ (契機): the strategic discourse presented publicly—language of stability, development, discipline, integration, and the promise of a “new era.”
- Khế lý (契理): the ultimate intent—the deeper objective guiding political action, not necessarily disclosed in full, nor always readily decipherable.
In contemporary politics, ultimate intent is rarely articulated explicitly. It is typically obscured through three mechanisms: moralized rhetoric, incremental reform, and calibrated foreign policy balancing. Observers can infer it only through long-term behavioral patterns and policy prioritization.
In the present case, the issue is not what the General Secretary and his advisory circle state openly, but what they privilege in practice. Is the overarching goal systemic preservation? Structural transformation? Or power consolidation?
History suggests that when a leader attains authority not merely as a “product of circumstance” but through a prolonged process of self-positioning, such ascent is seldom accidental. It usually reflects a pre-formed will. The decisive question, then, is whether that will inclines toward preservation or transformation.
IV. Foreign Policy and the United States Visit: Confrontation or Harmonization?
In an era of intensifying global strategic competition, a visit to the United States carries significance beyond diplomatic ceremony. It signals both domestic messaging and external legitimation.
At the apex of power, a leader faces a strategic bifurcation: to employ foreign policy as an instrument of internal consolidation and projection of firmness, or to leverage it as an avenue for developmental expansion.
If emphasis falls on attracting investment, deepening technological cooperation, expanding markets, and maintaining strategic balance, such actions suggest what may be termed “harmonizing the dragon”—an acknowledgment that national strength cannot rely indefinitely on internal control alone but must rest upon integrative capacity.
Conversely, if foreign engagement functions primarily as a symbolic reinforcement of domestic authority without accompanying structural reform, the logic of “confrontational dragon” remains dominant.
The distinction lies not in diplomatic protocol, but in the substantive policy trajectory that follows.
V. Success or Regret?
Political history demonstrates that reaching the apex is seldom the most arduous task. The greater challenge lies in shifting from a posture of conquest to one of calibration.
If the ultimate intent is to reconcile competing interests, soften rigid structures, and widen the sphere of social creativity, then harmonization strengthens durability. If, however, ultimate intent is confined to preserving position through unyielding will, the equilibrium principle articulated in the Yijing will assert itself: a dragon that ascends too high without moderation will encounter regret.
The Yijing does not prophesy individuals. It delineates patterns.
Its central insight remains disarmingly simple:
When power reaches its extreme, survival no longer depends on strength, but on self-adjustment.
The inquiry into “ultimate intent,” therefore, is not a matter of personal curiosity. It is an inquiry into the trajectory of an entire historical phase.
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Dr. Nguyễn Thế Hùng, with a Ph.D. in Physics, is a scholar known for his impressive scientific learning and his comprehensive analytical approach to philosophical and cultural studies. With a deep interest in exploring ancient principles, he brings a modern scientific perspective to traditional Eastern thought. His latest publication on I Ching (Kinh Dịch), one of the oldest philosophical classics of East Asia, reflects this interdisciplinary vision. An English translation of his explanations of the I Ching’s 64 hexagrams is planned.
In his book, Dr. Nguyễn seeks to interpret the I Ching—a system centered on the concepts of yin and yang, transformation, and the dynamic nature of the universe—through the lens of contemporary scientific reasoning. Rather than treating the hexagrams solely as only mystical or for use in divination, he approaches them collectively as a symbolic framework that embodies profound insights into change, order, and human experience.
His work represents an effort to bridge modern physics and ancient wisdom, making the philosophical depth of the I Ching more accessible to today’s readers. The book serves not only as an academic contribution but also begins a cultural dialogue between science and the humanities.
Stephen B. Young, a student of jurisprudence and East Asian Law at Harvard Law School, has written The Tradition of Human Rights in China and Vietnam. He also studied the I Ching in Vietnam with Mr. Duong Thai Ban and writes for the Caux Round Table annual commentaries each lunar New Year on what can be constructively learned from the I Ching to apply to our decision making in the coming new lunar year. Young graduated from Harvard College and Harvard law School. He was an Assistant Dean at the Harvard Law School and Dean and Professor of Law at the Hamline School of Law. His is Global Executive Director of the Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism.