By Dr. Dinh Hoang Thang (Fellow, The Caux Round Table)
• In today’s maritime disputes, strategic advantage no longer belongs to the country with the stronger legal right. Increasingly, it belongs to the country maintaining the more timely and sustained presence at sea.
• Today major powers ask not only which partner a country chooses, but also how efficiently that country operates according to credible standards—and so whether it is worthy of long-term strategic trust.
[Dr. Dinh Hoang Thang, a retired Ambassador and former senior official of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, has kindly agreed to support the Caux Round Table’s initiative to consider the implications of Vietnam’s evolving enhancements in economic developments, civic dialogue, and administrative reforms. Ambassador Thang’s insights and understanding of strategic contexts are remarkable and provide practical guidance for all interested in the future of Vietnam and of Vietnamese/American reciprocal relationships of mutual benefit.]
Introduction
Rarely has the South China Sea witnessed such a rapid succession of developments within such a short period of time.
Without any right under international law, China has once again unilaterally imposed its annual fishing ban across a vast expanse of the South China Sea. Encounters between Chinese maritime forces and Vietnamese fishermen continue to occur.
Second, the Vietnamese transport vessel Khoi Nguyen 18 sank near the Spratly Islands.
Third, the nuclear-powered American aircraft carrier USS George Washington arrived in Da Nang following joint operations with Japan and the Philippines.
Fourth, at almost the same time, Washington increased commercial pressure on Hanoi through higher tariffs and stricter scrutiny of supply chains.
At first glance, these appear to be unrelated events. Taken together, however, they reveal a broader strategic reality: security, sovereignty, and economics are no longer separate policy domains. They have become increasingly intertwined in shaping Vietnam’s strategic environment.
I. ARE TENSIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA JUST AD HOC AND INCIDENTAL OR IS COMPETION FOR MASTERY OF THOSE WATERS ENTERING A NEW STRATEGIC PHASE?
Viewed individually, each of the above developments might seem more or less accidental. Considered chronologically, however, they point to something more strategically significant. What is changing is not merely the frequency of incidents in the South China Sea, but the manner in which major powers are simultaneously employing military capabilities, economic leverage, and diplomatic influence to shape the strategic environment surrounding Vietnam.
Without open access to the entire South China Sea, what can Vietnam hope for in promoting its economy in the coming decades?
In the northern part of the South China Sea, China continues to enforce a unilateral fishing ban covering waters that Vietnam considers to fall within its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
A detailed 1794 British navigation map of the South China Sea shows no land feature in the sea with a Chinese name while other features and cities are shown with Malay, Vietnamese or English names.
In 1837, Father Jean Louis Taberd wrote in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal that Gia Long, Emperor of Dai Viet in 1816 “went with solemnity to plant his flag and take formal possession of [the Paracel Islands}, which is not likely any body will dispute with him”
(The journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Calcutta :Bishop’s College Press,1832-1936 v.6:pt.2=no.67-72 (1837): p. 745, https://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/item/123871)
Vietnam’s Fisheries Association has repeatedly protested these measures. Meanwhile, reports of Chinese maritime authorities confronting, expelling, assaulting, and confiscating fishing equipment from Vietnamese fishermen continue to emerge, reinforcing a persistent sense of insecurity among coastal communities that depend on these traditional fishing grounds for their livelihoods.
Against this backdrop, the sinking of Khoi Nguyen 18 near the Spratly Islands immediately attracted international attention. According to reporting by The New York Times, the vessel was supporting projects intended to strengthen Vietnam’s logistical presence in the Spratly archipelago. Vietnamese authorities have attributed the accident, at least preliminarily, to severe weather conditions. To date, no publicly available evidence justifies conclusions beyond those officially released.
Nevertheless, the fact that the incident occurred in close proximity to Chinese-controlled and heavily militarized features gives it significance extending well beyond that of an ordinary maritime accident.
Then, less than a week later, the USS George Washington Carrier Strike Group entered the South China Sea after concluding joint operations with Japan and the Philippines before making a port call in Da Nang.
Taken together, these developments suggest that the South China Sea is entering a new strategic phase where military competition, geopolitical influence, and competing visions of regional order intersect.
II. AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND A SUNKEN SHIP
The arrival of USS George Washington in Da Nang was far more than a routine naval port visit.
Before calling at Vietnam, the carrier strike group had conducted joint operations with Japan and the Philippines across the Western Pacific and the South China Sea. The strategic messages from Washington in making this naval deployment was unmistakable: the United States intends to maintain a sustained military presence in the Indo-Pacific while strengthening its network of regional partners in support of freedom of navigation and a rules-based maritime order and that the United States looks favorably on Vietnam’s right and ability to contribute to the sustainability of that freedom under a rules-based international order
For Vietnam, receiving another U.S. aircraft carrier demonstrates Hanoi’s continued commitment to expanding defense cooperation with a wide range of partners within its long-standing foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, diversification, and multilateralization.
More significant than the visit itself, however, is the strategic context in which it occurred—immediately following a series of heightened tensions in the South China Sea and amid intensifying strategic competition among the major powers.
If USS George Washington symbolizes power projected from outside the region, the sinking of Khoi Nguyen 18 points to a very different strategic reality. Today’s competition in the South China Sea is measured not only by the number of warships deployed or diplomatic statements issued, but increasingly by a country’s capacity – say China’s – to maintain a continuous and effective presence on the ground—or, more precisely, at sea.
(Consider the analogous situation in the Strait of Hormuz – Iran’s capacity to maintain a continuous threat to freedom of navigation through the Strait)
According to publicly available information, Khoi Nguyen 18 sank near Fiery Cross Reef, close to one of China’s largest military installations in the Spratly Islands. Chinese authorities reported that they had rescued most of the crew, while Vietnam publicly expressed appreciation for the rescue operation. From a humanitarian perspective, saving lives at sea is a universal obligation that deserves recognition regardless of sovereignty disputes or political differences.
Yet beyond this humanitarian dimension lies a broader geopolitical reality. China’s ability to reach the accident site more rapidly than any other actor reflects something far more significant than an efficient rescue capability. It reflects the extensive military infrastructure, logistical support, coast guard assets, and maritime forces that Beijing has built over the past decade on the artificial islands under its control. That unilaterally imposed permanent hegemonic presence has fundamentally altered the operational realities in large parts of the South China Sea.
The strategic lesson to be learned from these recent events, therefore, lies not in speculation about why the Vietnamese vessel sank. Rather, it lies in what the incident reveals about the evolving nature of maritime competition. In contemporary territorial disputes, strategic advantage belongs not only to the side with the stronger legal claims under international law, but increasingly to the side capable of maintaining the most persistent presence, responding the fastest to events, and exercising the greatest degree of practical control over contested waters.
In this sense, USS George Washington and Khoi Nguyen 18 inadvertently illustrate two dimensions of the same strategic picture. One reflects the growing involvement of external powers in preserving the regional balance of power. The other demonstrates that competition for effective presence is unfolding every day in the disputed waters themselves.
Facing these two dynamics, Vietnam must respond to a challenge that extends beyond defending its sovereignty. The more difficult task is to strengthen its own maritime presence while ensuring that isolated incidents do not become catalysts for wider strategic confrontation among the major powers.
III. WASHINGTON’S DUAL MESSAGE
On the one hand, a focus on the visit of USS George Washington, might lead one to conclude that Washington is placing renewed emphasis on the military dimension of its relationship with Vietnam. Yet, on the other hand, when this deployment is considered alongside recent American policy developments in bilateral trade, a more comprehensive picture emerges. U.S. policy toward Vietnam is no longer operating on two separate tracks—security on one hand and economics on the other. Increasingly, the two have become integrated components of a single more comprehensive strategic framework.
From a security perspective, Washington’s message to officials in Hanoi and all other nations is relatively straightforward. As China continues to expand its military and maritime presence throughout the South China Sea, the United States seeks to demonstrate that it remains a decisive balancing power in the Indo-Pacific, with Freedom of navigation operations, expanded defense cooperation with Japan and the Philippines, and the port visit of USS George Washington, all reinforce Washington’s commitment to preserving a regional order based on international law, where both large and small states are entitled to exercise their lawful rights at sea.
At precisely the same time, however, the United States has been sending Hanoi a second—and arguably more consequential— bilateral message. Rather than focusing on naval deployments, this message concerns Vietnan’s domestic economic governance. Washington has intensified its scrutiny of Vietnamese exports through investigations into rules of origin, tariff circumvention, forced labor, and direct inspections of manufacturing facilities participating in global supply chains. Combined with recently announced tariff measures, these actions suggest that the United States is no longer evaluating Vietnam solely as a rapidly growing trading partner. Increasingly, it is assessing the comity, transparency, and credibility of Vietnam’s economic institutions.
At first glance, these two messages may appear contradictory. On the one hand, Washington is strengthening defense cooperation with Vietnam; on the other, it is imposing more self-interested economic conditionalities. However, In reality, they are mutually enforcing American national concerns – one military and the other economic.
The United States seeks a Vietnam that is sufficiently capable to contribute to a stable balance of power in Southeast Asia. At the same time, it also seeks a Vietnam that is sufficiently capable of meeting the standards regarded in Washington as essential for a long-term strategic partnership between the two peoples: transparent supply chains, compliance with international trade commitments, stronger regulatory governance, and reduced vulnerability to opaque production networks closely linked to China. In other words, Vietnam is being evaluated not only according to its geopolitical location and its regional responsibilities, but also according to the compatibility of its development model with global standards today and with future advancements in the quality of goods and services, technologies, and openness of markets.
This more comprehensive American approach reflects an evolution in American strategic thinking. For many years, defense cooperation and economic cooperation were often treated as relatively separate policy domains. Today, that distinction is becoming increasingly blurred. As Vietnam becomes more important to the United States – perhaps becoming A Comprehensive Strategic Partner, the country’s value to the United States will be judged not merely by the number of high-level exchanges or naval visits, but by its capacity to uphold predictable rules, safeguard the integrity of international commerce, ensure transparency in global supply chains, and adapt to the evolving norms governing the international economic system.
For Hanoi, therefore, the strategic test of national success extends well beyond skillfully balancing diplomatic relations among major powers. It increasingly depends upon Vietnam’s ability to undertake domestic reforms that correspond to an international environment undergoing profound transformation. In this context, diplomacy and institutional reform can no longer be viewed as separate agendas. A country’s international credibility is becoming inseparable from 1) the quality of its domestic governance as deployed in achieving excellent economic performance – and 2) from its capacity to translate international commitments into consistent national practice – to “walk its talk”.
Ultimately, in the twenty-first century, major powers are no longer asking only where a country stands on issues of the moment. They are also asking how well that country is governed, whether its institutions operate according to internationally credible standards, and whether it can be trusted as a reliable strategic partner over the long term.
Conclusion:
In his remarks ahead of the 33rd Diplomatic Conference, Foreign Minister Le Hoai Trung reaffirmed the implementation of Politburo Resolution No. 06-NQ/TW, emphasizing that Vietnam’s external relations and international integration must advance in close coordination with the country’s internal development. This formulation raises an intriguing possibility. Might Vietnam eventually move beyond a diplomacy centered primarily on balancing external relationships toward what could be described as “timely diplomacy”—a diplomacy capable not merely of adapting to geopolitical change, but of recognizing historical shifts early enough to shape national strategy accordingly?
For many years, Vietnam’s foreign policy has succeeded in preserving a delicate strategic balance among the contending major powers while steadily expanding the country’s international partnerships. That achievement has given Vietnam an important strategic asset—one that deserves to be preserved. Yet as competition among the major powers increasingly shifts away from direct military confrontation toward rivalry over technology, supply chains, trade standards, and the capacity to shape regional order, maintaining balance alone may no longer be sufficient to advance and protect the interests of the Vietnamese people.
If the phrase “bamboo diplomacy” is indeed appearing less frequently in Vietnam’s official discourse, the more significant question is not whether a slogan is fading, but whether Vietnamese diplomacy is gradually entering a new stage of strategic thinking.
Recent developments—including the prominent participation of the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador at a high-level political event attended by Vietnam’s senior leadership—may be viewed as signals worth noting well. Even so, it would be premature to interpret such transactional episodes as evidence of a new foreign policy doctrine. In diplomacy, genuine strategic change is rarely announced overnight; it is revealed through the consistent accumulation of decisions, priorities, and policy behavior over time.
Such a strategic transformation for Vietnam, if it should emerge, would not abandon the principles that have guided Vietnam’s diplomacy for decades. Rather, it would represent their evolution. Strategic balance would remain essential, but it would no longer be the ultimate objective. The larger goal would be to anticipate structural changes in the international system, strengthen the nation’s long-term resilience, and expand Vietnam’s capacity to shape—not merely respond to—the external environment in ways that serve its enduring national interests.
Success in achieving that, perhaps, is the most consequential strategic test facing Hanoi today.