Category: Vietnam

Stephen B. Young, Global Executive Director

The following commentary presents a second case study on the prevalence of crony capitalism in a developing country – Vietnam – a nation that could quickly catch up with the economic achievements of Singapore and South Korea if it adopted a more “moral” form of capitalism.

Similar to last week’s case of “Vietnamese cars, Vietnamese goods…”, this time we examine how crony capitalism is being used to exploit government allocations of land use.

The commentary below highlights “crony capitalism,” where, as the analysis suggests, government officials secretly colluded to share a business opportunity. Those with political power in a one-party regime need money to build influence and attract “clients,” but they cannot openly engage in private business. As a result, those in authority favor one project over another, granting licenses and permits – essentially “green-lighting” plans.

Businesses that receive such “favors” reap large profits, then divide the spoils – one way or another – with the decision-making officials.

I have heard Vietnamese joke that in Vietnam, “the first administrative document you submit to an official is an envelope of cash.”

From this commentary, we can infer that in Vietnam today, not just a few individuals but the entire ruling apparatus has turned into a political-economic structure of rent-seeking by those with political authority and influence. In reality, Vietnam’s constitutional structure has become one “of interest groups, by interest groups, and for interest groups.”

“Strategic planning” in an economy subordinated both to Party power and to unaccountable administrative fiat creates countless opportunities to extract personal gain from public assets.

The commentary makes clear that under such a regime, the practice of politics is not about serving the nation with fidelity and integrity, but rather about leveraging whatever power one holds to gain private ownership of financial assets – monetizing one’s position.

In Vietnam there is a cynical saying: “If you can’t take care of Brother Three, you’d better take care of Brother Four.”

As has been demonstrated again and again – especially in the outstanding book Failed States by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson – corruption and authoritarianism are like two peas in a pod, or like a shadow that always follows power: whoever holds power inevitably has a dark side shadowing them.

The author makes a strong case that building a new international airport at Long Thanh, far from Ho Chi Minh City, makes no sense under any calculation of market rationality. He then offers five alternative solutions that would better respond to supply and demand realities.

In my view, his warning is highly credible: if the Long Thanh airport project goes forward without consultation or input from those directly affected by such an enormous expenditure, then a perfectly viable solution will be ignored. The current Tan Son Nhat airport will become obsolete, while a redundant new airport will be built at Long Thanh.

In that case, Vietnam will continue to sink deeper into the gray zone of crony capitalism, unable to become truly wealthy or strong, always misallocating resources by diverting funds away from the public good in order to serve private interests – the very sort Karl Marx castigated in Das Kapital as “Mr. Moneybags.”

To rephrase another famous line of Karl Marx, we might say that crony capitalism “takes from those with ability and gives to others according to their wishes.”

Rent-seeking by the well-connected and by government privilege-holders is nothing less than social theft, not social righteousness.

You can find the second case study of crony capitalism in Vietnam on Vietnamese social media here:
👉 https://phongtraoduytan.com/chinh-tri/chinh-tri-viet-nam/3065/

And you may read the English version of the commentary below:

Turning Long Thanh into an International Airport to Strangle Tan Son Nhat: A Classic Case of “Crony Capitalism”

If today the people and conscientious managers remain silent, then tomorrow it won’t just be one airport being strangled, but the entire nation dragged into the abyss.

By: Tran Quoc Sach

1. Introduction: Airports and the Truth Behind the Glitter

A metropolis like Ho Chi Minh City—with more than 10 million residents plus surrounding satellite towns—having two airports is completely normal. Around the world, there are countless examples: Tokyo has Narita and Haneda; London has Heathrow, Gatwick, and Stansted; Paris has Charles de Gaulle and Orly. The question is not whether “two airports are necessary,” but why there is such a deliberate attempt now to make Long Thanh the main international hub for Ho Chi Minh City, effectively strangling the current airport Tan Son Nhat—the nation’s most important gateway.

The truth behind the so-called “mega project of the century” Long Thanh is this: (1) It is not merely a technical or planning issue, but a living example of crony capitalism, where political power and vested interests collude, turning public infrastructure into a tool for private enrichment. If this model is not stopped, it will drag the entire nation into a bottomless pit—rather than lifting it up, as the empty socialist slogans claim.

 2. Tan Son Nhat’s Golden Land: National Assets Turned into a Feast for Interest Groups

Colonel Phan Tuong—the officer who took over Tan Son Nhat on April 30, 1975—once revealed the following (2):

• Under the French, the airport was planned at 1,800 hectares.

• Under the Republic of Vietnam, operations expanded to 1,850 hectares.

• After 1975, “under our management,” the area shrank to just 1,100 hectares.

So where did the missing 750 hectares go? The answer is obvious: golf courses and residential areas. Prime land in the heart of Saigon, instead of serving aviation and national defense, was converted into lucrative commercial projects. This is not only absurd from a planning perspective but has direct consequences: drainage canals and reservoirs that once lay under that land were filled in. Runway flooding today is not caused by “tidal surges” or “climate change”—fancy phrases state media throws around—but simply because the drainage system has been strangled.

Now, instead of reclaiming those 750 hectares to expand Tan Son Nhat,  officials concocted the narrative: “Tan Son Nhat is overloaded, so we must build Long Thanh.” In other words, those in charge created a problem only to sell their own “solutions”—solutions that are costly, irrational, yet hugely profitable for their cronies.

 3. Crony Capitalism: When the State Becomes a Tool of Cliques

To understand why Tan Son Nhat is being strangled, we must revisit the concept of crony capitalism (3).

In a healthy society with democratic institutions, politics serves the people, while businesses operate according to market rules. But under crony capitalism, these two spheres secretly collude to carve up benefits, through shady deals between corrupt politicians and unscrupulous businessmen:

• Politicians need money but cannot directly do business.

• They use their power to channel projects, allocate budgets, and greenlight planning for their “backyard” companies.

• Those companies reap profits, then kick back “slices of the pie” to the policymakers.

Gradually, not just individuals but the entire ruling apparatus morphs into a political–economic mafia network. The state ceases to be “of the people, by the people, for the people,” and becomes a state “of the interest groups, by the interest groups, for the interest groups.” In such a system, every so-called “strategic plan” is nothing but a cover for looting public assets.

In this case, Long Thanh is the shiny “cover,” while the 750 hectares of golden land at Tan Son Nhat are the first juicy prize. Once Tan Son Nhat is stripped of its role and Long Thanh crowned the new hub, the entire 1,800 hectares of prime Saigon land will gradually fall into the hands of these cronies—“Anh Ba, Anh Tu,” and their cliques.

In a democracy, politicians serve the nation according to the will of the people. They dare not abuse power for personal gain, because once they lose the voters’ trust, they must resign and return to being ordinary citizens. By contrast, in a dictatorship—an authoritarian system—politics is not about serving the country but about exploiting power for illicit enrichment. Those in power cling to their seats solely to plunder, and corruption can never be eradicated. It simply mutates from one face to another, from the faction of “Anh Ba” to the faction of “Anh Tu.” That is why dictatorship and corruption are inseparable—two sides of the same coin.

The Long Thanh project is not an unsolvable issue. The original rationale was to “ease the load” on Tan Son Nhat (despite strong opposition from experts). Yet the most rational solution is simple: return the land seized for golf courses, and Tan Son Nhat could easily expand to handle 80 million passengers annually, while continuing to operate normally. Only when Tan Son Nhat truly reaches capacity should traffic gradually shift to Long Thanh. In reality, Tan Son Nhat handled 40 million passengers in 2023, and only 38 million in 2024. At this fluctuating rate, even a decade from now it may still not be overloaded.

But to “rescue their cronies,” the public is told that there is no option left but to immediately divert international routes to Long Thanh, while rushing to build connections between the two airports. Connections may be necessary—but are they urgent, when Tan Son Nhat still functions normally? If you, as a journalist, so much as “poke your nose” into this subject, the authoritarian machine will come crashing down on you—just like how Pol Pot’s gang, once fostered by China, unleashed terror. In such a regime, at any time, anywhere, the government sees you as the enemy. Why? Because by exposing the truth, you threaten to take away their share of the pie.

 4. A Hundred-Year Vision Built with Patchwork, Fixing Mistakes as They Go

A major infrastructure project should be based on a hundred-year vision. But let’s look at reality:

• Metro Line 1 in Ho Chi Minh City: approved in 2007, started in 2008, scheduled to finish in 2018. After endless delays, only in 2024 did trial runs begin—17 years for 19 kilometers of track.

• Metro Line 2: approved in 2010, groundbreaking in 2025, projected completion by 2030. But who dares believe that projection?

• The HCMC–Long Thanh–Dau Giay expressway, just 55 km long, took 16 years to finish—yet was already congested the moment it opened.

In this context, Long Thanh is painted as a “project of the century.” But once the die is cast, people will suddenly realize: no metro connection, no high-speed rail, no proper transfer infrastructure. Traveling from Tan Son Nhat to Long Thanh takes 3–5 hours. Who would want to book a connecting flight under such conditions? This is not long-term vision—this is patchwork, fixing mistakes as they go (4).

The truth: Long Thanh looks beautiful on paper, but in reality it’s just a black hole for taxpayer money—bloated costs, endless overruns—while essential infrastructure for the people is neglected.

 5. Solutions & Recommendations: Reclaim Public Infrastructure for the People

Facing this disaster, to protect national interests and stop the rampant crony-capitalist model, concrete and decisive actions are needed:

1. Return the 750 hectares to Tan Son Nhat. The golf course must be reclaimed immediately, restoring its original aviation function. This is the optimal solution: expand capacity while also fixing flooding caused by blocked drainage.

2. Stop the hidden scheme to “strangle Tan Son Nhat” by designating Long Thanh the central hub. The two airports must complement each other, not be forced into competition.

3. Make transparent all interests tied to Long Thanh. Publicly disclose contractors, investors, and financial terms so citizens can monitor.

4. Establish independent oversight for strategic infrastructure projects. We cannot allow the same apparatus to design, approve, implement, and supervise. That’s like players both kicking the ball and blowing the whistle! Oversight must include civil society, independent experts, and a free press.

5. Reform land policy at its root. As long as land remains “collectively owned, managed by the state,” it will remain fertile ground for corruption and cronyism. Legal mechanisms must prevent arbitrary conversion of public land, especially strategic assets like airports, seaports, and rail stations.

6. Conclusion: Crony Capitalism—the Road to Ruin

Under the slogan of building Long Thanh to advance toward “socialism,” the reality is the opposite: a political–economic mafia in action. Public assets are being carved up, infrastructure strangled, while citizens are left to shoulder public debt, traffic jams, and flooding (5).

This is not “progress toward socialism.” This is a plunge into ruin. The vultures of crony capitalism are tearing apart the flesh of this nation—its land, its infrastructure, its resources, and even its trust.

A nation can only rise when public infrastructure is protected as sacred assets, when the state truly belongs to the people, and when planning is based on long-term vision—not the short-sighted greed of interest groups.

Tan Son Nhat today is the test. If the people and conscientious managers remain silent, then tomorrow it won’t just be one airport being strangled—it will be the entire nation dragged into the abyss.

 

References:

(1) https://phapluatplus.baophapluat.vn/ro-dan-hinh-hai-sieu-du-an-san-bay-long-thanh-86628.html

(2) https://vietnamfinance.vn/dai-ta-phan-tuong–nguoi-tiep-quan-tan-son-nhat-sau-ngay-thong-nhat-d49765.html

(3) https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/crony%20capitalism

(4) https://tienphong.vn/mat-5-tieng-di-chuyen-giua-san-bay-long-thanh-tan-son-nhat-thi-khong-ai-muon-dat-ve-post1755356.tpo

(5) https://tuoitre.vn/thiet-hai-hang-ti-usd-vi-ha-tang-qua-tai-nhung-giai-phap-tp-hcm-can-lam-ngay-20250807095909853.htm

Introduction:

Stephen B. Young, Global Executive Director, the Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism

The following commentary presents a case study of the tension between a Moral Capitalism and a Crony Capitalism in a developing country, Vietnam.  The defining characteristic of Crony Capitalism in the insertion of political power as a kind of “grey” property into business decision-making.  The asset purchased by a business from the “Crony” is not land, labor, capital, or raw materials. It is permission to operate. Sometimes the permission is formal license from a public authority which is paid for, either legally, or corruptly.  But sometimes the permission is private, unseen by the public or the market, a personal commitment either to manipulate political authority to favor the business or to prevent political authority from interfering in the business.

Economists refer to the mechanism of Crony Capitalism as “rent-extraction”. Those who use power on one kind or another, legally or illegally, to make money though rent-extraction are called rent-seekers.

Rent-seekers and rent-extraction violate the rules and practices of Moral Capitalism and Moral Government where public office is held as a trust to enhance the common good of the community.

The commentary argues that in Vietnam today what is produced in Vietnam – “Made in Vietnam” – should not finance rent-seeking by anyone. Chinese entrepreneurs should not be able to buy permission to make Chinese goods in Vietnam and pass them off as Vietnamese goods reflecting the skills and efforts of Vietnamese.

The Commentary asks Why are powerful people pushing sales of certain products and not others? Who will compensate them for this effort? If their favored companies gain a monopoly or a disproportionate share of the market, such companies can force the Vietnamese people to pay monopoly prices – to pay “rents” to those who  hold power.

The Commentary is available at: https://chantroimoimedia.com/2025/08/05/hang-viet-xe-viet-va-cau-chuyen-ep-dan-yeu-vuong-vin/amp/

VIETNAMESE PRODUCTS, VIETNAMESE EVs, AND THE FORCED “LOVE” FOR VINFAST

Loving your country doesn’t mean loving a product made with 70% Chinese parts!

Author: Trần Trung Thực

What does “Made in Vietnam” truly mean? Ideally, it should refer to products created by Vietnamese people, infused with Vietnamese intellect and labor, serving the Vietnamese community, and contributing to the nation’s goal of sustainable, self-reliant development.

Unfortunately, today, the concept of “Vietnamese goods” is being narrowed, even distorted. Instead of supporting locally made, accessible products, all attention and resources—from media to policies and even subtle forms of coercion—are being funneled into promoting a single model: the Vietnamese electric vehicle.

The pressing question is: Why, at this point in time, has the conversation shifted from broadly supporting “Vietnamese products” to solely pushing for one very specific, very expensive item that’s out of reach for most working-class citizens: VinGroup’s electric scooters?

From the 3-million-dong bike to the 40-million-dong e-scooter – blatant imposition

Let’s face reality: Most workers, students, laborers, and street vendors in Vietnam still rely on traditional motorbikes—used ones can cost as little as 3–5 million VND. They’re easy to fix, simple to use, and well-suited to both the terrain and the modest income of the average Vietnamese.

Yet in recent years, a massive media campaign has been in full swing to glorify “Vietnamese” electric vehicles—sleek, clean, high-tech machines, priced at 30–40 million VND apiece, not including battery replacements, charging, and maintenance.

Alongside this PR push are policy proposals to ban gasoline vehicles, recall older models, raise environmental taxes, and most recently, Resolution 68. Yes, promoting green transport and reducing pollution is a worthy goal. But why is only one type of vehicle—produced by one major corporation—being touted as the national symbol, the “Vietnamese dream,” and the only acceptable path forward?

Policy lobbying—or aggressive market interference?

This is no longer a matter of free market dynamics. When policies are tailored to pave the way for one specific product, we must speak up. Lobbying is not new—but when it escalates into indirect coercion of consumers, via policy pressure, inflated propaganda, and limited alternatives, then we’re no longer talking about fair competition but engineered monopoly.

Who’s behind voices like Trần Đình Thiên?

Recently, Trần Đình Thiên—a figure once sarcastically nicknamed “Trần Huyên Thuyên” (Trần the Rambler) for his often lofty, ungrounded public statements—has again stirred controversy. He openly and enthusiastically advocates for Vietnamese EVs, declaring them the inevitable future.

But it’s his most recent comment that truly raises eyebrows:

> “Joining hands to support Vietnamese EVs is how each of us can show our patriotism.”

This statement eerily echoes a dangerous old slogan:

> “To love your country is to love socialism.”

History has shown us that when patriotism is hijacked to serve specific political, economic, or ideological agendas, the result is often division, coercion, and public disillusionment. Patriotism should never be reduced to favoring one brand—nor should it ever become a mandatory sentiment.

Let’s define Vietnamese goods—clearly and honestly

It’s important that readers understand what qualifies as a “Vietnamese product.” Yes, it may be labeled “Made in Vietnam,” but more importantly, it must have substantial local value-added content—meaning the parts, labor, intellectual property, and supply chain are predominantly Vietnamese.

Take Trung Nguyên coffee, for instance: grown, processed, and packaged entirely in Vietnam, exported to over 200 countries and territories. Or the Vietnamese catfish industry, which, though using feed from CP (a Thai-owned firm in Vietnam), still produces fundamentally local products.

In contrast, VinFast electric scooters reportedly consist of over 70% imported components. The remaining 30% “Vietnamese” portion includes things like food service, driver wages, utility bills, and land use—not core manufacturing.

Governments should encourage investment in local supply chains and supporting industries—that’s good policy. But once a product hits the market, it is the consumer who decides. No government, ministry, or academic has the right to promote one product while disparaging others. That violates the basic principles of fair competition.

Don’t forget: major brands like Honda, Suzuki, Hyundai, and Kymco all operate manufacturing facilities in Vietnam. Their products also count as Vietnamese-made.

Patriotism is not about endorsing a product made of 70% Chinese parts—especially if it’s inferior in both price and quality compared to its competitors.

—

Final thoughts

Dear Mr. Trần Đình Thiên,

Dear economic advisors,

Dear those holding the reins of media and policy:

Please, let the people choose what fits their lives. If electric vehicles are truly good, the market will choose them. But if they don’t suit the income, infrastructure, or reality of most Vietnamese citizens, then don’t force this love on us.

> “Loving someone, when forced, can hurt them tenfold.”

And that’s exactly what’s happening!

Stephen B. Young

July 17, 2025

“If we place President Trump’s tariffs on Vietnamese goods in the context of a broader strategic picture, the U.S. and Vietnam can still find a common path through today’s tensions.”
— Stephen B. Young

This summer in Hanoi, the heat is not just from the weather but from mounting strategic pressures—both domestic and international. What is Trump’s America pursuing? Does Washington aim to impose itself on Vietnam, or is it seeking to build a long-term partnership grounded in reciprocity and balanced interests?

I. Tariffs and Strategy Go Hand in Hand

The Trump administration’s unexpected decision to impose a 20% tariff on Vietnamese exports—twice the previously negotiated rate—sent shockwaves through public opinion. Many in Vietnam see it as a trap. But is the tariff really the core issue?

At the same time that tariffs were announced, the United States also offered Vietnam its most flexible geo-strategic space since Đổi Mới:

• Refusing to facilitate transshipment of Chinese goods is not a severance from China, but a step toward strategic diversification. No one expects Vietnam to completely cut ties with China—geography and economics don’t allow it. But diversification is not only feasible—it’s wise.

• Allowing U.S. warships to dock at Cam Ranh Bay does not mean Vietnam is “taking sides.” The Philippines has done the same while maintaining strong trade with China. Singapore has long welcomed U.S. naval visits while being a key member of China-led RCEP.

• Signing a rare earth agreement is not about “selling off resources.” If done right, it can attract G7-level processing technology, reduce dependence on China, and end the outdated model of exporting raw materials and importing refined goods.

• Joining the Indo-Pacific supply chain does not mean abandoning the Chinese market. Rather, it enhances Vietnam’s negotiating power and achieves strategic balance.

II. A Truly Renewed Vietnam, Seen from Washington

History shows that the first strategic commitment between the U.S. and Vietnam came in October 1954, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower declared American support for the independence and economic development of the Republic of Vietnam (1).

Why did the U.S. make that pledge at such a pivotal moment? Because, as Eisenhower wrote, Americans respected Vietnamese nationalism—a resilient tradition of the people.

In his letter to Prime Minister Ngô Đình Diệm, the U.S. President expressed hope that the Vietnamese government would reflect the will of the people, act with enlightenment, and govern effectively—to earn respect domestically and globally, and to prevent any foreign ideology from being forced upon a free nation.

The word “nation” in that letter was decisive. Eisenhower acknowledged that the Vietnamese had their own traditions, values, religions, and aspirations—deserving of sovereignty, liberty, and independence, just as Americans had once demanded for themselves.

The key difference now is this: Back then, Eisenhower “picked” Saigon as a pawn on the Southeast Asian chessboard. Today, Washington “chooses” Hanoi—not as a pawn, but as a partner with weight and authority on the interregional and global chessboard (Indo-Pacific and beyond).

In that same spirit, American policymakers took close note of General Secretary Tô Lâm’s article on April 27, 2025, in which he emphasized:

“The aspiration for a peaceful, unified, and independent Vietnam is a sacred flame that has forged the national spirit over thousands of years of history…”

What stood out most to Washington was his reference to “the enduring nature of the Vietnamese nation”—a concept the U.S. has seen as the cornerstone of a lasting partnership since the beginning. Also notable was his call for national reconciliation—a sign that Vietnam is ready to enter a new historical era:

“The war is no longer a dividing line for people of the same Lạc Hồng bloodline… There is no reason for Vietnamese—sharing the same origin, all children of Mother Âu Cơ—to carry hatred or division in their hearts.”

The U.S. appreciates the General Secretary’s return to Vietnam’s cultural roots as a foundation for a future that is prosperous, globally integrated, and peacefully aligned with the international community.

Some scholars consider this a sign that Vietnam is gradually forming a new foreign and domestic policy—one deeply rooted in national identity, not merely reacting passively to geopolitical shifts, but proactively shaping its role and position within the global order. 

With this vision, Vietnam can build soft power through engagement with the international community. To achieve this, the country needs to expand space for public discourse and develop a roadmap for political reform that aligns with the new context.

A senior advisor at the U.S. Department of State remarked: “We welcome the commitment of Vietnam’s leadership to pursue a path of harmonious development in connection with the civilized world.” 

Vietnam does not need to choose sides, but it should choose humane and progressive values.

III. A Harder Question: Subordination—or True Partnership?

Some voices in Vietnam are asking: “If we yield to the U.S. now, are we risking subordination?”

But perhaps the more honest question should be: “If we continue on the current path, are we truly independent?”

More critically, how can Vietnam seize this rare opportunity to shift from a nation shaped by historical circumstance to a nation that shapes history?

Beijing has long been clear about its ambition to treat Vietnam as a strategic buffer zone. China dominates supply chains, controls rare earth exports, invests in critical infrastructure—and tightens its grip through a soft-strategic vise. Every time Hanoi leans West, there are warning signals from the North: maritime incidents, stalled negotiations, and unreasonable historical and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.

In this context, recent U.S. proposals offer Vietnam a chance to redefine its national positioning. An economy seen as a mere “proxy hub” for Chinese goods will never become a global manufacturing powerhouse.

But if Hanoi pivots—just as The Economist once suggested—Vietnam can become “the Bavaria of Asia”: a hub for green tech, high-value manufacturing, and strategic neutrality.

Vietnam can:

• Attract high-quality investment from the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Europe;
• Transition from an assembly-line model to innovation and brand ownership;
• Play a key role in restructuring global supply chains.

Now is the time for the Politburo, under General Secretary Tô Lâm’s leadership, to show strategic vision and political resolve. Hesitation at this moment would be a historical setback.

Is the U.S. applying pressure? Perhaps. But with long-term thinking and skillful diplomacy, Vietnam can turn that pressure into leverage—to restructure not only trade and defense but also its institutions and governance model.

After 80 years, could this coming August become the second defining August in Vietnam’s history?

Time is running out. A slow or ambiguous response will not only forfeit trade privileges—it will erode strategic trust from G7, Quad, and ASEAN partners.

What’s at stake is not just a seat at the global table—it’s the chance to finally step out of China’s shadow and build a resilient, independent, and globally competitive economy.

CONCLUSION:

The Vietnamese people once faced colonialism, imperialism, and war with courage. Today, that same courage must take a new form: the courage to choose, to change, and to redefine Vietnam’s place in the world.

General Secretary Tô Lâm and the Politburo now hold a historic opportunity: to lift Vietnam out of China’s assembly-line orbit and into true partnership with the global democratic community.

No nation can choose its geography,

But every nation can choose its future.

Joining the world’s march toward civilization is Vietnam’s opportunity to showcase its leadership—not only in economic reform but in strategic thinking and political confidence.

If Hanoi fails to seize this moment, it may be a very long time before history offers another chance.

NOTES:

1. This historic letter was drafted by Kenneth T. Young, Director of the Southeast Asia Office at the U.S. State Department. Following this family legacy, I—Stephen B. Young—wrote “Kissinger’s Betrayal: How America Lost the Vietnam War,” exposing how Kissinger never truly understood Vietnamese nationalism.

Text of President Eisenhower’s October 23, 1954 letter to Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.

We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, bow an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

(2) According to sources close to U.S.-Vietnam negotiations, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit, Secretary of State Marco delivered a handwritten letter from President Trump to General Secretary Tô Lâm, addressing the four key areas discussed in this article.

Stephen B. Young is the Global Executive Director of the Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism, former Dean and Professor of Hamline University School of Law, and  a former Assistant Dean, The Harvard Law School. He is the author of Kissinger’s Betrayal: How America Lost the Vietnam War and, with Nguyen Ngoc Huy, Tradition of Human Rights in China and Vietnam, and “The Law of Property in Vietnam’s Le Dynasty”, Journal of Asian History, 1975 

We recently appointed H. E. Dinh Hoang Thang to serve as a fellow.  Ambassador Thang is a former Vietnamese ambassador to The Netherlands, former head of the Leadership Advisory Group of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is an associate of the Angkor Royal Foundation in Budapest, Hungary.  He currently resides in Paris and contributes commentaries on international relations and Vietnamese developments, with a particular focus on Vietnam’s future prospects.

His first commentary for the Caux Round Table can be found here.

Amb. Thang addresses optimistically the new possibilities for Vietnam now being advanced by a new secretary general of the Vietnamese Communist Party, To Lam.  The strategic choice facing the Vietnamese Communist Party has significance for Vietnam’s prosperity, regional and global economies and the geopolitics of Asia, China and the U.S.