Article 2:

ACCUMULATING INHERENT PARADOXES: VIETNAM’S PATH FORWARD?

Đinh Hoàng Thắng

Fellow, The Caux Round Table

Summary: Vietnam faces five inherent paradoxes: rapid development with weak institutional foundations; aggressive globalization but low domestic resilience; a dynamic society with slow governance reform; growth reliant on external forces while internal capacity is fragile; and high aspirations with inefficient allocation of resources. Three development scenarios are outlined: maintaining the status quo, controlled reform, or disruptive instability. Controlled reform is deemed most feasible, requiring political consensus, institutional restructuring, and enhanced governance capacity. Lessons from other countries highlight the importance of timely reforms but with stability alongside structural transformation. Central to this scenario is system  capacity for self-adjustment: identifying problems, learning, correcting mistakes, and generating new momentum. Risks implicit in the disruptive scenario include trust crises, social fragmentation, and geopolitical pressures. Vietnam must pursue a new development trajectory that balances stability with courageous reform, aiming for sustainable growth having deeper and broader social impact.

1. Five Internal Paradoxes of Vietnam

Vietnam’s current political–economic system is confronting five profound internal paradoxes that reflect tensions between tradition and modernization. 

The first paradox lies in the divide between economics and politics: the economy functions under a socialist-oriented market mechanism, sustaining GDP growth of 6–7% over decades and attracting massive FDI from corporations such as Samsung, Intel, and Foxconn. Yet the political system maintains tight control through the Communist Party, with strategic decisions such as State Owned Enterprise leadership appointments and media censorship, creating a misalignment between economic openness and ideological constraints.

The second paradox emerges from overusing the slogan of “renovation,” repeated again and again since the 1986 Đổi Mới reforms, while substantive reform progresses slowly. Vietnam has integrated into the WTO, CPTPP, and EVFTA, but core sectors such as land, State Owned Enterprise restructuring (accounting for roughly 30% of GDP), and administrative reform remain sluggish. Despite Party Congress XIII calling for breaking the “ask–give mechanism”, bureaucratic procedures and corruption still hinder progress, making reform largely superficial.

Third, traditional ideological legitimacy—Marxism–Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought—has weakened, especially among younger generations exposed to social media and global values. In contrast, pragmatic legitimacy based on stability and economic growth has become central, with the motto “stability above all” shaping decisions from COVID-19 management to growth-focused policies despite inflation.

The fourth paradox is sustaining a powerful state apparatus with dense security and media control when society’s trust is longer an absolute. Scandals such as Formosa, Việt Á, and the Trịnh Xuân Thanh case eroded public confidence, while PAPI surveys indicate declining satisfaction with local authorities, reflecting a widening gap between the state and citizens.

Lastly, internal competition among senior cadres and officials has intensified, with factions vying for key positions in the Politburo and Central Committee. The upcoming 14th Party Congress is expected to witness behind-the-scenes struggles for top leadership, where economic interests intertwine with power, leading to the allocation of state resources through factional bargaining.

Together, these five paradoxes create a pattern of “accumulative tension”—gradual layering of contradictions beneath a seemingly stable surface. Compared with Eastern Europe before 1989, Vietnam shows similar dynamics: partial marketization generating inequality, ideological decline replaced by pragmatism, strong power but weakening trust, and factional infighting within Party and State leadership. Vietnam has avoided sudden collapse thanks to sustained growth and stronger control, but if this “accumulation” continues, similar abrupt ruptures may occur unless deep reform releases the pressure.

2. Three Future Development Scenarios

From a political–philosophical perspective, three developmental scenarios for Vietnam after the 14th Party Congress reflect tension between static stability (Aristotle’s stasis) and dialectical evolution (Hegel’s synthesis) where confronting internal contradictions may lead either to structural renewal or to collapse.

Scenario one would be to reinforce the current model which would maintain comprehensive Communist Party control while harmonizing market economics with such centralized authority. Advantages include social stability, avoidance of Soviet-style collapse, and continued 6–7% GDP growth similar to China under Xi Jinping, ensuring FDI attraction and regional stability. However, internal contradictions would continue to accumulate: outdated ideology would collide with market reality, corruption would exploit bureaucratic weaknesses, inequality would rise (Gini increasing from 0.35 to 0.43 in 15 years), and societal trust would erode, risking eventual rupture within 10–15 years. Estimated probability of implementation: 65%.

Scenario two – controlled reform – would aim to establish a new developmental orientation through internal pluralization within the Party, reduce State Owned Enterprise dominance, reform land ownership opportunities, and enhance transparency. Following Hegel, this would implement synthesis—transforming the inconsistency of ideological orthodoxy with free-market practices into a higher form of supervised democratic governance. Benefits would include productivity gains, restored trust, and a transformation similar to Đổi Mới 1986 or Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, while avoiding Gorbachev-style destabilization. Risks would include factional conflict and loss of central control. Estimated probability of implementation: 20%.

Scenario three – disorder and instability – would see an increase in ideological decline, social distrust, fragmentation of authority, inflation, and global shocks. This Marxian crisis would resemble Eastern Europe 1989—potentially enabling democratic restructuring but risking severe chaos, economic collapse, and foreign intervention. Estimated probability of implementation: 15%.

In conclusion, scenario one has the advantage but would bring on pressure; scenario two is most sustainable yet difficult; scenario three is dangerous and must be prevented.

3. Assessing the Controlled Reform Scenario

Vietnam stands at a strategic crossroads amid socio-economic transformation and geopolitical pressures. Controlled reform emerges as a feasible path to create a new developmental orientation—reducing personalized power, strengthening rule of law, enhancing political adaptability, and cautiously expanding civic space. This would not be a rupture breaking away from the revolution but an evolutionary renewal leveraging existing solid accomplishments.

Reducing personalized leadership means shifting from individual-centric authority to more collective, professional governance and to transparent merit-based leadership selection. 

Strengthening rule of law requires greater judicial independence and legal accountability across all state institutions, including the ruling party, thereby curbing abuse of power and fostering investor confidence. Enhancing self-adjusting capacity involves creating internal feedback mechanisms, dialogues with experts, and independent policy research. Controlled civic space expansion allows NGOs, social organizations, and intellectual forums to operate within legal frameworks, turning social input into governance assets.

Though difficult and requiring leadership consensus, this pathway is more sustainable than merely reinforcing the old model. Global lessons show controlled reform (Singapore, South Korea) can transition authoritarian modernizing systems into effective democratic governance. A phased 5–10 year roadmap is proposed—from legal groundwork and pilot reforms, to institutional oversight strengthening, to digital transparency integration. With decisive leadership and international cooperation, Vietnam can position itself as a new Southeast Asian development model.

A very appropriate equilibrium development model for Vietnam to emulate is Singapore.  Lee Kwan Yew and his People’s Action Party followed a blended approach to development using both dominant government priority setting and regulation and private sector self-help in education and entrepreneurship.  The PAP, with over 60% support from voting citizens and so majority control of the national assembly, built a strong state – no chewing gum allowed! – but it provided cultural, social, and market spaces for individual initiatives to innovate and create wealth, social capitals and human capitals.

4. Lessons from “Brother Nations”

Vietnam is entering a decisive historical phase marked by economic growth alongside deepening paradoxes: rising inequality, environmental degradation, bureaucratic inertia, and trust erosion due to corruption scandals. 

Lessons from Eastern Europe and China teach the danger of delaying political reform while crises deepen. In the late 1980s, regimes liberalized economically but suppressed political pluralism; accumulated tensions exploded, with Soviet Russia collapsing illustrating how rigidity destroys legitimacy.

China teaches that economic reform without governance modernization yields diminishing returns: while opening lifted millions from poverty, authoritarian rigidity, debt-driven overexpansion, youth unemployment, and overcentralization under Xi reveal vulnerability.

Vietnam shows parallels: strong growth but widening disparity, unresolved State Owned Enterprise inefficiencies, real estate vulnerabilities, leadership factionalism, and weakening institutional competitiveness. Therefore, Vietnam should: (1) institutionalize leadership succession transparency and competency criteria; (2) strengthen judicial independence and digital transparency to fight corruption; (3) cautiously expand civil society to create legitimate policy feedback channels; (4) invest in adaptive resilience with early-warning governance tools. These steps combine urgency with pragmatism, transforming paradox into opportunity.

5. The Role of Self-Adjustment Capacity

Vietnam’s central question is no longer merely growth versus stability, but whether its political system can self-adjust to survive historically. Systems endure only when they do not consider themselves absolute. True strength lies not in coercion but in acknowledging limits, listening to warning signals, and adapting proactively.

Today, legitimacy must evolve beyond economic performance toward inclusive development, transparent governance, and a renewed “social contract” recognizing citizens as active participants, not simply governed subjects.

A viable future requires lawful constraints on power, acceptance of criticism as constructive, and recognition of civil society as a governance partner. A system capable of self-adjustment transforms pressure into reform momentum, prevents accumulated paradoxes from turning into crises and instead shapes a new direction  for developmental.

6. Risks of the Instability Scenario

Vietnam may still fall into instability if it loses the capacity to adapt. Accumulated contradictions could then easily trigger combined economic, political, and social crises—slowing growth, financial vulnerabilities, unemployment, persistent corruption scandals, leadership fragmentation, and declining public trust.

External shocks—US–China rivalry, global recession, geopolitical turbulence—could intensify internal fragility, shifting away from controlling tensions to systemic disintegration. Eastern Europe’s rapid collapse illustrates the danger of delayed reform. Vietnam’s stronger control capacity offers resilience, but resilience is not immunity. If social trust weakens, inequality deepens, leadership rivalries intensify, dialogue narrows, and international confidence erodes, instability becomes a real, not hypothetical, threat.

7. Building a New Developmental Orientation for Vietnam

The heart of the matter is not GDP growth, but the duties that come with political power: securing national safety, economic prosperity, human dignity, and the future of the generations to come. Power must serve the nation, not itself. Vietnam needs a developmental orientation that balances stability with controlled reform, modern governance with societal participation, and state strength with community empowerment. Maintaining the current model would preserve stability in the short term but risks medium-term erosion of legitimacy; choosing the path of instability, conversely, would be economically and socially devastating.

Thus, the most reasonable—and most difficult—path is controlled reform: strengthening rule of law, improving governance, cautiously expanding civic space, institutionalizing leadership succession, and building trust-based legitimacy. If chosen after the 14th Congress, Vietnam can thus transform its accumulated contradictions into a foundation for renewed legitimacy, avoiding Eastern Europe’s collapse and China’s fragility, and emerging as a distinctive Southeast Asian model: stable yet adaptive, globally integrated yet culturally grounded, powerful yet accountable, and above all—governance that truly serves the Vietnamese people.

Written December 2025 for the Caux Round Table which, in 1986, was founded in Caux, Switzerland; is incorporated in the United States of America; and has its Administrative Office in, St Paul, Minnesota

In keeping with the New Year greeting of Professor Stephen Young, Director of CRT, in His grace, God has granted us the gift of the New Year within ourselves. With the strength and grace so bestowed upon us, we can become peacemakers. At any moment, we can accept responsibility and take action. God is waiting for us to stand up; He has made it possible for us to set right what has gone wrong. It is in this spirit of solidarity that, in recent years, CRT has placed particular emphasis on East–West dialogue, intercivilizational exchange, and the study of systemic transformation in post-socialist, reforming, and transitional societies, including China, Vietnam, Eastern Europe, and Russia. Presented below are the two most recent contributions to this ongoing endeavor by Dr. Đinh Hoàng Thắng, CRT Fellow.

First Essay: 

Collapse on the One Hand; Sustainability on the other: Why did the Soviet System fail in Russia and Eastern Europe but Socialism in China still exists – at least until now?

Đinh Hoàng Thắng

Fellow, The Caux Round Table

In our lifetimes, global political history has witnessed contrasting trajectories between leading socialist systems. The Soviet system in Russia and its client states in Eastern Europe rapidly collapsed while in China a socialist system of governance and economy has survived through controlled reforms under the direction of a dominant centralized Party and State authority apparatus. The question is inevitable: How could systems born from the same ideological orientation arrive at such different outcomes?

The quick answer is that history is not teleological – not in any way driven by fixed forces towards one necessary end state. Rather, history, even understood as directed by dialectical materialism, is an open-ended, unplanned process of actions and connected reactions, a never-ending process of adjustments, change and evolution.  The “now” of any moment in history has proceeded from a “past” and is shaping the “future”.

Thus, even socialism as an ideal social arrangement cannot be monolithic. Socialism in China was not destined to replicate socialism in Russia.

Thus, the inconsistent evolutions of socialism in Russia and China depended on different decision-making dynamics.  The Russian transition out of Stalinism took a different course than did the Chinese transition out of Maoism. As President Xi Jinping continually insists Chinese socialism evolved under the guidance of “Chinese Characteristics”. The two processes of transition took remnants of an established order and retained some, reorganized others, contested alternatives, and eventually re-configured governing institutions into a new politics.

We then need to consider what “Russian” characteristics” drove the evolution of socialism in Russia and what specific “Chinese” characteristics have produced the Xi Jinping model of political legitimacy and economic development in China.

1. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Failure Born from an Accumulation of errors, leading to Crisis and then to Loss of Direction

Before collapsing, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies had endured a prolonged period of economic, political and cultural stagnation. Centrally planned economies reached the limits of their regulatory capacity: an inability to provide incentives for innovation, operational inefficiency, and growing disconnection from real market demands. In parallel, ideological legitimacy evaporated, at first slowly and then dramatically. Once appealing slogans lost their power to persuade the public of what was right and what was wrong because the gap between regime propaganda and lived reality had grown too wide.  When the propaganda lost its moral power, the Soviet regimes lost their ability to command obedience and respect.

More importantly, the final phase, one of “accumulation of shortcomings and errors”, of these intertwined Soviet systems brought about not strength, but introduced self-destructive forces. Reforms came too late, or were only half-hearted. Political structures lost cohesion as rejection of their authority spread across society . Such socialism developed what could be called “existential fatigue.” Confidence in the endurance of the model decayed psychologically long before collapse arrived politically. When such internal contradictions reached a certain threshold, instead of forming a coherent and effective trajectory into the future—a directional alignment capable of holding the system together—those internal contradictions produced fragmentation, confrontation, and eventually sudden disintegration.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the Soviet states of Eastern Europe collapsed from any single political incident. Their fall came from institutional gridlock, which had taken decades of dysfunctions to accumulate system-destroying critical mass. Once legitimacy crumbled and the state lost its capacity to mobilize society, even a moderate shock was enough to bring down a structure already hollowed out from within. In other words, the Soviet–Eastern European collapse resulted from the failure of their transition out of original orthodoxy, a systemic failure to forestall the accumulation of disappointments, resentments, malingering obstructions, profiteering, and other refusals of obedience.   These Soviet regimes failed to envision and implement a new path capable of reconciling contradictions and reviving historical vitality.

We might then consider what “Russian” characteristics contributed to the failure of the Soviet regime. An obvious consideration is the Muscovite tradition of cruel rulers and compliant sycophants. Russia arose from a social structure dualism of the Tsar and the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church where no freedoms existed either in politics or religion.  Thus, Russians have carried into the present a national character of servile accommodation. Inventiveness, pragmatism, checks and balances, decentralized flexibility have never characterized Russian culture, society or politics.

2. The Chinese transition out of Maoism: Surviving Through Accumulating Power and Controlling institutional Assignments

Sharing the same socialist ideological foundation, China nonetheless chose a different transitional path when the shortcomings of Maoist orthodoxy became evident. After the traumatic disruptions of the Maoist era, China gave itself a reform program marked by strong pragmatism. Unlike the Soviet Union, China moved earlier and more decisively in restructuring its economy while still retaining a highly rigid hierarchy for its politics.

What mattered most was not just generating economic growth, but the creation of a new basis for regime legitimacy—one derived from delivering development, improving livelihoods, and utilizing nationalism as a powerful binding force. China has also advanced further than many nations in building sophisticated tools for social control, deploying security and digital technologies extensively to manage dissent.

As a result, China has formed what may be called a “directional alignment of power”: a trajectory in which the state holds absolute authority while refusing to abandon the imperative of development. Ideology has been “pragmatized”: socialism remains the rhetoric, but the underlying logic is one of power, national strategy, and economic advancement. This helps China avoid an Eastern European-style shock—at least in the short term.

This successful transition was made possible through the deployment of “Chinese” characteristics, policies borrowed from 2,000 years of imperial order, where individual dynasties might have risen to power and then collapsed but a habit of showing pragmatic concern for social order from family, to village, to district and finally the state was reinvigorated again and again.

3.  The Chinese Communist Party’s Survival Until Today Does Not Guarantee Its Future Durability

However, the continuing survival of Chinese socialism should not be mistaken for a guarantee of its sustainability. Beneath its seemingly stable surface lies mounting pressure: slowing growth, demographic decline, widening inequality, social tensions, and sustained international strategic competition. All of these dynamics create new, or exacerbate existing, contradictions within the system, contradictions which, day by day, are accumulating the power to destabilize China’s future.

Just as the Soviet Union once believed itself “too strong to fall,” China is not immune to the forces which dictate history. Chinese socialism did not escape history but began its adjustment to historical realities before the Russian Soviet leaders did.  Socialist Russian and Eastern European regimes allowed history to push them into corners where collapse was their only future.  But history is still grinding away at Chinese Socialism. More challenges to the regime are to come. 

So, if one must explain why Soviet Russia and its Eastern Europe client states disappeared while Communist China still endures, the reasons are:

• Russia and Eastern Europe accumulated dysfunctions and weaknesses, leading to, first, a loss of reform options and then collapse
• China sustained centralized ruling power through pragmatic economic reforms producing continued interim survival

But history remains open to change and new developments. The decisive question for Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China is: the coming accumulation of circumstantial realities will generate what kind of a governing regime?

Written December 2025 for the Caux Round Table which, in 1986, was founded in Caux, Switzerland; is incorporated in the United States of America; and has its Administrative Office in, St Paul, Minnesota

Our Vietnamese correspondent has shared with me his generally optimistic report on the political environment which will shape decisions at the forthcoming Party Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

I note with interest the discussion of traditional Vietnamese sensitivity to the signals we mere humans get from Heaven as to our fates as time and space cycle through the years.

The Vietnamese Communist Party Today Compared with Forty Years Ago: The 14th Party Congress and the 6th Party Congress — Parallels, Divergences, and Enduring Historical Undercurrents. 

Four decades after the Sixth Party Congress—an event widely regarded as having opened a historic door toward a more flexible economic order (Đổi Mới)—Vietnam once again confronts a life-defining political moment: a critical transition of power with far-reaching consequences.

Hoàng Trường

The Fourteenth Party Congress is approaching amid intensifying economic, political, and social pressures, a visible erosion of public trust, and increasingly complex factional maneuvering among highly placed officials.

The reappearance of familiar patterns in the operation of power has led many observers to pose an unsettling question: is history repeating itself—once again moving through familiar cycles of power?

A comparison between the 14th Party Congress (2026) and the 6th Party Congress (1986) reveals notable similarities, while also exposing fundamental differences that reflect both the changing times and the evolving structure and operation of totalitarian power.

I. Parallels: When Power Becomes Trapped in Bargaining

1. Deadlock and infighting among the most prominent cadres and officials

In the lead-up to the Sixth Party Congress, Lê Đức Thọ—despite advanced age and declining health—was unwilling to step aside. Phạm Văn Đồng and Trường Chinh were forced into compromise in order to prevent factional conflict from spiraling out of control. A transitional arrangement was devised: Trường Chinh would preside over the Congress, then hand over leadership to Nguyễn Văn Linh—a new figure representing the emerging reformist tendency.

Ahead of the Fourteenth Congress, a similar pattern of “forced compromise” has once again emerged. Central Committee meetings have been postponed repeatedly (three times), and personnel lists revised again and again—clear indications that no faction has yet secured overwhelming dominance.

The crucial parallel lies here: while the overall strategic direction is widely acknowledged, personnel arrangements have become the central bottleneck.

In 1986, despite fierce debate, senior leaders recognized that the centrally planned economic model had reached its limits. Likewise, by 2026, a growing consensus has formed that growth driven by land rents, privileges, and easy capital has exhausted its momentum.

The Politburo has issued Resolution 68, effectively mandating a shift in development priorities toward the private sector. Yet disagreements over who should lead this transformation have prolonged internal division for more than a year.

2. A shared denominator: erosion of social trust

From 1975 to 1986, the subsidy-based economic model plunged everyday life into severe deprivation. Public confidence deteriorated rapidly.

Today, although surface-level material conditions have changed dramatically, the psychological parallels are unmistakable:

• Businesses are exhausted by overlapping inspections and audits;
• The business environment is obstructed by fear of making mistakes and by interference from enforcement agencies lacking accountability;
• Confidence in the future is declining as opportunities are squeezed by rent-seeking power groups intent on expanding their privileges.

As in 1986, society is fatigued, and expectations for a decisive change are once again on the rise.

II. Divergences: Reversed Regional Roles and a Transformed Power Structure

1. Southern dynamism: from reform driver to controlled subordinate

At the Sixth Party Congress, southern Vietnam was the most powerful engine of reform. The collapse of the slogan “rapid, strong, and steady advance toward socialism” had pushed the country to the brink of hunger—symbolized by nationwide dependence on sorghum imported from the Soviet Union.

Saigon and the southern region—drawing on market experience and economic dynamism—were the first to recover. “Fence-breaking” reforms in pricing, wages, production contracts, and enterprise autonomy laid the practical foundations for Đổi Mới. It was no coincidence that leaders with southern origins later played key roles during the early reform period.

Today, the regional balance of power has shifted. Northern leadership—having absorbed lessons from the post-1986 period, when the South enjoyed substantial autonomy—has narrowed the South’s room for maneuver, especially following the Nguyễn Tấn Dũng era and its controversial state-conglomerate model described as “steel fists.”

If 1986 marked northern concession to southern pragmatism, 2026 reflects a reassertion of centralized northern control.

2. Hunger and aspiration: different forms, the same political dynamic

In 1986, hunger was literal. In 2026, society “hungers” for the rule of law, while businesses hunger for economic freedom and thirst for a transparent, healthy legal environment.

Where past deprivation stemmed from a flawed economic model, today’s exhaustion arises from relentless inspections, administrative coercion by the security apparatus, and weak accountability among political leaders. New and troubling features have emerged: investigative and executive power now forms a wall that blocks capital, innovation, and production at the very moment they begin to take shape.

3. The rise of a socio-spiritual dimension

A defining feature of the current period is the strong resonance of traditional socio-spiritual sentiment: repeated natural disasters, relentless flooding, and as many as fifteen major storms have nurtured a collective sense that “heaven’s will” is turning against the system.

In East Asian political psychology, such phenomena are often interpreted as signs of dynastic or national transition. If reform-oriented forces knew how to channel this instinctive sentiment, it could become a strategic advantage.

In 1986, this psychological-political dimension was largely absent. In 2026, it has emerged as a powerful undercurrent shaping public emotion and expectation.

III. A Changed World: Globalization and the Limits of Absolute Control

1. Vietnam in 2026 is no longer Vietnam in 1986

• The private sector has become the backbone of economic growth;
• Vietnam occupies a key position in global electronics and semiconductor supply chains;
• Interwoven relations with the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China mean that senior leadership decisions now carry major geopolitical implications.

Under such conditions, a top-down model of total control is clearly ill-suited to an economy and society that demand speed, creativity, and adaptability.

2. Concentrated power—facing harsh limits

The current power structure rests primarily on:

• The expanding influence of the security apparatus;
• Strong totalitarian coercion—rule by police power rather than by the rule of law;
• Governance through repression and sophisticated extraction rather than trust-building;
• Preferential treatment for loyalist networks and obedience over institutional reform.

Meanwhile, businesses—the main drivers of growth—are increasingly constrained by legal uncertainty and intrusive security oversight.

3. “Political flooding” as a metaphor of the age

The persistence of coercive governance despite repeated natural disasters reveals a deeply troubling separation between the state and society.

At the Sixth Party Congress, economic and social crisis forced leadership change. Ahead of the Fourteenth Congress, although society is no less exhausted or gridlocked, the power structure appears more rigid and increasingly entrenched in both status and authority.

This contrast reflects a core trait of modern totalitarian systems: the survival of the system is prioritized above economic performance, social responsibility, or moral values.

Conclusion: Parallels as Reflection, Divergences as Warning

The Sixth Party Congress was a historic turning point that liberated national energy from the constraints of a failed economic model. The Fourteenth Congress could generate a similar breakthrough—or it may simply perpetuate a cycle of power consolidation if not accompanied by meaningful institutional reform.

The parallels lie in social fatigue, resolving deadlocks among the most senior cadres and officials,, and pressures for change from below.

The divergences lie in a more rigid power structure, a stronger private sector, and Vietnam’s far deeper integration into the global system.

And this time, whether acknowledged or not, socio-spiritual forces are also present as an invisible factor shaping collective sentiment.

History never repeats itself exactly. Yet patterns of power distribution, crisis dynamics, and signals from society’s foundations inevitably return—albeit in altered forms.

The Fourteenth Party Congress, therefore, is not merely about personnel appointments. It is a test of Vietnam’s entire philosophy of governance: whether its one-party system can adapt to a new stage of development, or whether it will continue to close itself off from warnings issued by society, markets—and even by nature itself.

The 14th Party Congress and the “Post-Karma” of To Lam

Nguyen Khac Mai – President, Institute for Vietnamese Wisdom Studies

I draw on the Buddhist concept of karma to reflect on the political path of To Lam. Everything he has done—through body, speech, and mind—during his years as Minister of Public Security and now as the country’s top leader, remains vivid in the memory of the public. These are his past karmas: actions that, in the eyes of many, continue certain “old corruptions” that Ho Chi Minh once warned about, yet also contain elements that disrupt stagnation and generate momentum for reform. Whether these past karmas are virtuous or harmful will be judged by society and by history.

But the transformation of karma is not a solitary journey. One who wishes to transform must repent, must cultivate new and better karmas, and must accept supporting conditions—that is, criticism, oversight, and assistance from society. Without this, goodwill can easily turn into illusion.

I. Post-Karma: The Vision of a “Rising Era” and Five Strategic Pillars

To Lam’s post-karma began when he assumed the position of General Secretary, preparing for the 14th Party Congress and shaping the decisions that followed. His proposed vision—the “Rising Era”—aims for a more civilized, humane, service-oriented, and developmental Party and State. He set forth five strategic pillars:

1. Reforming the Party: shifting from a mindset of power to a spirit of public service; the Party must be the servant of the people, not their ruler.
2. Advancing culture, science, education, and technology: regarding these as new national capabilities—AI, digitalization, and scientific research—to elevate Vietnam’s competitiveness.
3. Administrative reform: building a three-tiered government structure guided by performance-based governance and a citizen-centered, developmental state.
4. Developing the private economy and civil society: creating new engines of national growth while addressing historical debts by legitimizing, respecting, and fostering civil society.
5. Multilateral international integration: a “bamboo diplomacy” that is flexible yet principled, transforming external resources into domestic strength.

These ideas, at the conceptual level, are modern and progressive. Yet the gap between vision and implementation is always perilous: if carried out under concentrated power, opaque processes, or insufficient consultation, the post-karma may quickly distort.

II. One Year In: Recognizing Early Deviations

For post-karma to become good karma, we must confront the missteps that have emerged during To Lam’s initial period in office.

1. Localism and concentrated appointments

The accelerated appointment of officials from a single province (Hung Yen) and from the security sector to many key positions has raised concerns about regional imbalance and a closing of political space. A sustainable political system requires diversity of origin and professional background; excessive concentration risks creating the image of a closed circle of power.

2. Personalism in symbols and public projects

Proposals to name streets after family members, or to pursue sector-branded megaprojects—such as a Public Security theater, stadium, or even airport—evoke a tendency toward personalization and “sectoral branding” of state authority. In a period that demands austerity, prioritization, and public benefit, such symbols can misallocate resources and alienate public sentiment.

3. Major national decisions driven by voluntarism

Gigantic initiatives—the North–South high-speed railway, the nuclear program in Binh Thuan, or the merger of provinces—cannot be approached with haste or unilateral decision-making. These trillion-dollar, multi-generational projects require independent research, broad consultation, and rigorous socio-environmental impact assessments. A country cannot “run while lining up” on matters of its future.

These deviations are not cosmetic; they reveal a paradox: although renewal is proclaimed, the methods of implementation risk replicating old power patterns. Without timely correction, the post-karma cannot achieve long-term legitimacy.

III. Four Social Imperatives for Turning Post-Karma into Good Karma

Vietnam must not miss a historical window of opportunity. Society must act as a constructive partner setting realistic guardrails.

1. Reviving and strengthening civil society as a monitoring partner

Civil society is not an adversary of the Party but a vital mechanism of oversight and policy improvement. Vietnam must legally recognize civil society organizations and empower the press—within lawful frameworks—to monitor public affairs.

2. A citizenry aware of its opportunity and responsibility

This is a rare “window of opportunity.” Citizens must raise awareness: expressing opinions, monitoring major projects, demanding transparency. Consensus does not mean passive silence; it means active participation.

3. Independent expert consultation for all strategic projects

All megaprojects should be reviewed by independent scientific councils that publish environmental, social, and fiscal impact assessments. This prevents voluntarism and ensures the sustainability of national decisions.

4. Building a new political culture: integrity and accountability

Vietnam needs programs on public-service ethics, transparent appointment processes, assets disclosure, and mechanisms for conflict-of-interest management. A new political culture is essential to prevent distortion of reforms.

IV. Traditional Wisdom as the Foundation for Modern Reform

Figures such as To Hien Thanh and Ngo Thi Si, along with the Nho–Buddhist tradition of East Asia, left behind profound lessons in political ethics: appoint the upright, lead through moral example, and persuade before punishing. Einstein reminds us that no problem can be solved with the same mindset that created it, and Engels urges socialists to learn from the advanced nations. These teachings suggest that post-karma must synthesize ancient Vietnamese wisdom with modern scientific governance.

V. Practical Steps Toward Realizing a Meaningful Post-Karma

• Conduct a comprehensive review of appointments through an independent oversight committee.
• Establish a National Scientific Council for all strategic megaprojects, with mandatory public reports.
• Codify public consultation in planning processes to ensure citizens have a voice from the outset.
• Develop civil society and professionalized journalism—within a legal framework—as channels of public oversight.
• Enforce asset transparency, conflict-of-interest regulations, and integrity norms throughout the public sector.

Conclusion

Past karma explains the path to power; post-karma determines whether that power serves the nation. To Lam’s post-karma can become good karma only if grounded in transparency, consultation, integrity, and societal partnership. Without these, goodwill may be swallowed by old patterns of authority.

The nation’s fate is like tangled vines, the ancients said: to untangle it requires wisdom, goodwill, and—above all—the participation of the people. A worthy post-karma is a promise to the nation: a Party and a State that serve, and a society capable of rising with its own strength.

Ну, погоди! — Just wait and see.

By Dinh Hoang Thang , Fellow the Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism

Busan — a city that smells of salt and ocean water, once defined by tides and trade — suddenly found itself at the center of a geopolitical storm. Before arriving here, Donald Trump had stopped in Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo. Five days, three capitals (October 26–30): what seemed like a restless shuttle across Asia turned out to be a cartography of power. Did the history of East Asia just quietly turn a new page? 

I. A Journey Writting a Message 

Trump’s travels were no ordinary tour. The trip implemented a strategy , scripted in three acts: beginning in Kuala Lumpur — the symbolic heart of ASEAN; moved to Tokyo — the setting of a revived alliance; and ended in Busan — where two superpowers tested each other’s resolve.

The sequence mattered. Southeast Asia is not an audience, but part of the stage. Japan is no longer just an ally, but a co-architect of global order. And Busan — that sea-wrapped arena — became host to the acting out of raw, transactional power.

In Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN — once derided as a “talking club” — suddenly looked relevant. Small nations, through the art of flexible diplomacy, managed to engage both Washington and Beijing, bargaining for space, investment, and having a voice in an age of tightening rivalry.

In Tokyo, Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae, heir to former Prime Minister Abe’s strategic realism, met Trump to discuss supply chains, defense, and technological autonomy. The U.S.–Japan alliance is no longer built only on deterrence; it now rests on industrial and technological power — an alliance of determinative capability.

And finally, in Busan, amid jet engine thrusts and the scent of the sea, Trump and Xi met in a modest room — no red carpets, no choreographed grandeur. What unfolded was a minimalist drama of power: an interim detente, not a peace; a truce defined by interests, not ideals.

II. Japan’s New Doctrine and the Shape of a Regional Order 

Shinzo Abe planted the seeds of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Takaichi Sanae is harvesting them — with less rhetoric and more resolve. Her ambition is transparent: boost defense spending, anchor security cooperation with the U.S., and weave industrial links with India, Australia, and South Korea. This is Abe 2.0 — democratic, assertive, and determined to keep East Asia’s future from being written by Beijing.

With Trump’s pragmatic America back in play, Tokyo understands that autonomy is the new loyalty. Instead of sheltering under Washington’s security umbrella, Japan needs its own raincoat — rebuilding semiconductor industries, advancing clean energy, and reimagining its role in regional supply chains. The Abe–Takaichi doctrine turns ideals into instruments: from “rules-based order” to “capabilities-based alliances.”

III. Busan: When Two Worlds Talk in Calculus 

After months of tariff battles, tech bans, and rare-earth restrictions, both Trump and Xi needed a breather. The outcome was a temporary armistice: Washington eased some tariffs; Beijing resumed U.S. soybean imports and pledged to rein in fentanyl exports. But beneath the smiles, the calculation was cold-hearted.

Trump needed stability heading into an election year. Xi needed calm to sustain his authority at home and preserve his face internationally. Each leader stepped back a few inches — without abandoning a single trenchline.

The U.S.–China rivalry has entered a new phase: managed competition. The conflict has evolved from a trade war to a war of standards — over chips, AI, finance, and energy. Two gravitational systems now coexist: not colliding, not converging, but circling in uneasy proximity. Like twin planets in an imperfect orbit, they offset the pull of — and so limit — each other’s orbit.

IV. ASEAN Awakens: From Playing Field to Power Hub 

One quiet happening during Trump’s journey was the awakening of ASEAN. As Air Force One touched down in Kuala Lumpur, Southeast Asia ceased to be a corridor between superpowers and began to act as a hinge of strategic consequence.

ASEAN’s new realism lies in “neutral pragmatism.” Its members — Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, among others — are mastering the art of balance: welcoming investment, keeping dialogue open, and leveraging great-power rivalry to augment  self-reliant autonomy.

Neutrality no longer means passivity. It’s an art of motion, not a state of immobility — the ability to maneuver between forces without being crushed. If sustained, that agility could transform ASEAN from a passive zone into a dynamic geoeconomic contributor to a multi-polar world.

V. Vietnam: From Insecure Wariness to Self-Reliant Confidence 

Vietnam stands at the confluence of two currents: commerce and security strategy. The temporary U.S.–China détente offers a breathing space — stable trade, redirected investment, supply-chain realignment — but of uncertain duration. A single tariff tweak in Washington or a military move by Beijing in the South China Sea could upend it overnight.

Vietnam’s survival strategy must therefore be double-tracked: pragmatic in action, visionary in thought.

Pragmatism means infrastructure reform, institutional modernization, human-capital investment, and advances in logistics and semiconductors — the bloodstream feeding the new global economy.

Vision means redefining “self-reliance” not through isolation, but through innovation; not by avoiding conflict, but by shaping cooperation.

“Self-reliance” today is not a slogan but a system — the ability to shift from low-cost manufacturing to high-value creation, from export dependency to endogenous value chains.

As global powers race to secure chips and critical minerals, Vietnam must secure and refine its most precious resource: people — their education, creativity, and freedom – to shape the counry’s future.

Vietnam’s strength has never been about size. It lies in self-definition — the capacity to carve a very purposeful identity and design an innovative strategy amid flux.

VI. East Asia: A Quiet Reshaping of Order 

Trump’s five-day tour did not shake the earth with thunder.  But it did trigger some quiet tectonic movements. The regional order is morphing from black-and-white confrontation to a spectrum of pragmatic competition. Japan grows firmer, South Korea more adaptive, ASEAN more flexible, and China more cautious.

This is not the collapse of an old order but the reconfiguration of one — an emerging, networked, interdependent Indo-Pacific, built less on declarations and more on interlocking actions.

The new order cannot yet neutralize Beijing’s ambitions, but it has birthed a chain reaction: middle powers linking up, industrial alliances forming, technology partnerships expanding, preventive diplomacy taking root. A soft multipolarity is emerging — not of rival empires, but of complementary capabilities.

VII. Busan: Mirror or Gateway? 

From the salty winds of Busan rises an image of contemporary East Asia — a mirror in which every nation can see itself: its possibilities, its limits. Trump’s five-day voyage did not redraw borders, but it stirred currents that may erode the old shorelines of certainty.

East Asia is entering a new phase — one of mid-sized powers asserting agency, of profitable alignments replacing rigid blocs, of competition measured not in ideology but in competence.

Vietnam, poised in the storm’s eye, has a choice: to shrink and dodge — or to reach and redefine.

In an age when power resides less in missiles or money than in ideas and intellect, any meaningful rise of Vietnam to take advantage of the new order will begin not with muscle power, but with heart/mind power – the freedom to think and the courage to create.

Trump’s five-day odyssey was but a moment. Yet history often turns on such moments — quietly, but profoundly.

Our fellow, Dinh Hoang Thang, keeps a close eye and ear on the evolution of Vietnam away from a traditional “socialist one-party democracy.”

After the conclusion of the recent session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, former Ambassador Thang came to certain conclusions, which you can read here.

Vietnam’s Central Committee Meetings and Tô Lâm’s Visit to Pyongyang: An Outside Perspective

By Dr. Hoang Thang Dinh, Caux Round Table Fellow

Summary: 

Vietnam’s political evolution entered a decisive stage with the 13th Central Committee Plenum  (early October 2025) followed by General Secretary Tô Lâm’s state visit to North Korea — political moves that revealed both a consolidation of power and a search for stability amid a rapidly shifting East Asian order. While Hanoi balances relations among major powers, the real test of its leadership will lie in transforming political symbolism into practical governance and successful economic outcomes. The forthcoming 14th Party Congress will determine (i) whether Vietnam can reform its political and economic power structures and practics without losing stability — and (ii) integrate more globally while maintaining its autonomous, self-reliant, identity.

1. Power Shifts and the Quest for Stability 

East Asia is reconfiguring  its power dynamics — from China’s many internal challenges to Japan’s evolving defense strategies and capabilities . Against this changing regional order, Vietnam has just taken three pivotal steps in its current five-year political cycle: the 13th Central Committee Plenum, General Secretary Tô Lâm’s state visit to Pyongyang, and preparations for the 14th Plenum in mid-November.

 Each step serves two objectives: choosing leaders and advancing Vietnam’s stature in world affairs.

Before the 13th Plenum, Tô Lâm issued Regulation No. 365 (September 2025), elevating the Standing Secretariat to “core leadership” status — effectively adding a fifth pillar to the traditional tứ trụ (“four pillars”), forming what analysts call a Bộ Ngũ or “Pentarchy” [1].
Despite administrative streamlining elsewhere in governing institutions, the Central Committee remains at about 200 members strong, and the Politburo at 17–19 members. This equilibrium preserves collective leadership and the practice of internal balancing among factions [3].

2. Two Milestones, One Message 

Hanoi’s delicate balancing act – simultaneously positioning relationships with the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea, and now North Korea—demonstrates its enduring ambition for achieving what might be called “soft multilateralism.” Importantly and in addition, with the 14th Party Congress approaching, this achievement also furthers a very important domestic objective: to strengthen Tô Lâm’s legitimacy and the influence  projected by  his political base.

A Vietnamese expert told BBC News that if the Pyongyang visit (Oct 9–11) was simply “to score within the communist club,” it could backfire. But if framed as “a balancing message that Vietnam can talk to all sides,” it would be a bold yet risky diplomatic act [4].

That visit, praised as occurring in a “particularly friendly atmosphere,” emphasized the solidarity of remaining socialist states. Still, it raised a deeper question: did it demonstrate diplomatic independence — or was it a gesture of self-importance compensating for slower progress with Washington?

While both sides agreed to cooperate in several sectors, real progress now depends on overcoming institutional and sanction barriers. Reuters quoted KCNA’s assessment of To Lam’s visit as merely a reaffirmation of “traditional comradeship” [5].

3. Concentrated Power with Attentive Execution

The four Central Committee plenums convened under Tô Lâm’s leadership — from the 10th to the 13th — illustrate a subtle governance model of “centralization with fine tuning” [6]. Introducing confidential voting within the Politburo — an unusual move — signals an attempt to have both firm control and participatory consensus [7].

However, system performance remains uneven. Despite administrative reforms, the hesitant response to recent typhoons exposed weak coordination among agencies and responsible officials. Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính’s public scolding of absent provincial leaders became emblematic of widespread personal inefficiency and irresponsibility in the apparatus of government[8]. The gap between having political authority and delivering good results has become Vietnam’s “Achilles Heel”.

4. Diplomacy: Symbolism delivering limited results 

Tô Lâm’s Pyongyang trip symbolized ideological loyalty and political steadiness on his part [9]. Yet, with North Korea under heavy sanctions, the scope for cooperation benefiting Vietnam is narrow.

While domestic media stressed the visit’s symbolic value, such public imagery has limited practical effect as Vietnam seeks investment and deeper integration into CPTPP and RCEP. In an increasingly pragmatic world, only invoking “socialist friendship” does not impress those potential partners who prioritize performance over ideology [10].

The muted global response to Vietnam’s appeal for disaster aid after the recent typhoons highlights this gap between “socialist solidarity” and money provided when it is needed.

5. Administrative Mergers and the Two-Level Governance Test 

Domestically, reforms such as consolidation of some provinces one with another and administrative streamlining were designed to cut costs and boost efficiency — but outcomes have not met expectations. Bigger, consolidated, administrative units do not guarantee better, more effective, governance.

High restructuring costs and cultural disparities have generated pushback where the reforms have been imposed. Experts suggest that true efficiency will come only through capacity-building, digital governance, and empowered local autonomy, not with just consolidation alone [11].

Ironically, once-efficient disaster-response systems slowed down after the mergers of provincial administrations. Hanoi’s decision not to release typhoon casualty figures, while appealing for aid, underscored a paradox: centralized power does not guarantee accountability or good results [12].

6. Institutional Credibility and the Implementation Gap 

A political system is judged by its ability to implement, not by its scope of control. Its strength grows out of good results, not from the sweep of its legally authorized span of control.  Regional surveys (2024–2025) show declining public trust in local governments due to poor crisis response and service delivery [13].

The widening gap between “political rhetoric” and “administrative outcomes” now defines Vietnam’s foundational political dilemma — reforming the system without precipitating instability.

7. Between Reform and Stability 

The political landscape following the 13th Central Committee plenum reflects a model of “conditional stability”: political power remains concentrated, yet must adapt to the demands of modern governance; diplomacy remains largely symbolic, yet needs to shift gradually toward pragmatism. To what extent will the concept of “liuzhi”—a key framework for understanding how Beijing integrates Party discipline with state authority—be adopted in Hanoi’s political system? [14] Or, as analyst David Brown once observed, Vietnam’s new regime is still finding its footing—caught between freedom and discipline, stability and innovation, expectation and reform. [15]

The country now faces a dual adjustment process: consolidating political legitimacy while enhancing institutional capacity. The success of this strategy depends on whether the system can turn political symbolism into practical effectiveness—whether administrative reform can genuinely improve governance, and whether symbolic diplomacy can open new economic frontiers.

On the eve of the 14th National Congress, these questions remain unanswered. The upcoming Congress will not merely be a personnel reshuffle—it will be a test of Vietnam’s governance model: can the country remain stable while pursuing reform, and integrate globally while preserving its own identity? How can it reinforce central authority without neglecting the balance of power with local institutions? [16]

References 

[1 & 3] https://fulcrum.sg/to-lam-is-institutionalising-politics-again/
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z128gPCvTnY
[4] https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/cge2e1ywd4go
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-vietnam-agree-cooperate-defence-other-fields-kcna-says-2025-10-11/
[6] https://fulcrum.sg/to-lam-is-institutionalising-politics-again/
[7] https://youtu.be/9dWd3-s1KB4?si=6LvXedt8YbOpL_Sg
[8] https://youtu.be/AioD65l4nyE?si=F3xl9pmrJLQGZs0-
[9] https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/10/10/the-message-of-the-visit-to-north-korea-that-vietnam-wants-to-send-to-major-countries/
[10] https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3328310/vietnams-leader-heads-north-korea-first-visit-18-years-rebalance-relations
[11] https://asiatimes.com/2025/08/to-lam-consolidating-hard-fast-and-forceful-rule-in-vietnam/
[12] https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/enablers-and-barriers-implementing-effective-disaster-risk-management-according-good
[13] https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/0c2ba150-f410-4cb0-994e-ad1ea812642c

[14] https://youtube.com/watch?v=B18pzEYjdwM&si=9DZCTxEq-Hbm57D9

[15] https://www.eurasiareview.com/16012025-vietnams-new-regime-finds-its-footing-analysis/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[16] https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/09/03/vietnam-redraws-its-administrative-map/

On the 80th Anniversary of Vietnam’s Independence, September 2, 2025

 Introduction

Stephen B. Young,

Global Executive Director

In a most unusual open letter, Mr. Lê Thân – once an activist who was tried and imprisoned by the former Republic of Vietnam government in Saigon – has, on this National Day, set forth new standards for the leadership role of today’s head of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

These standards reflect the moral foundations of the Caux Round Table’s Principles for Responsible Governance. Mr. Lê Thân also points to the essential foundations for living a life of integrity and decency:

“The strength of a nation does not lie only in weapons or wealth, but in honor. And honor is not won through violence, but through fairness; not through power, but through justice; not through command, but through respect for one’s own people…”

“Seize this moment! Seize this opportunity! Let power be transformed into service, and let service become greatness.”

The Caux Round Table Principles for Responsible Governance hold that state power is a trust granted by the people. It is not meant to satisfy personal ambition, accumulate wealth, or secure privileges, but to act on behalf of the community in serving the public good.

Public power always comes with responsibility; to hold power is to bind one’s actions to the welfare of others. Public office is not private property, but a temporary trust to serve the common good.

Those who hold public office must be accountable to the people for their actions. If they act wrongly, neglect responsibility, or abuse their power, they may be removed. And it is upon them to prove their own integrity.

The state exists only as a servant and instrument for higher purposes of society, not as its master. Public power must be exercised within the bounds of moral responsibility, for the well-being of the people. Any government that betrays this trust will lose legitimacy and can be replaced.

I am reminded of the words of Nguyễn Trãi – the great thinker and statesman of the 15th century – who helped establish the Lê dynasty after defeating Chinese invaders. Nguyễn Trãi wrote of nhân nghĩa – humane righteousness – as the foundation of politics. Only on such a basis can a government deserve the people’s support.

You can check out the Vietnamese version here, on one of the most popular social media sites in Vietnam: https://boxitvn.blogspot.com/2025/09/thu-ngo-goi-ong-to-lam-tong-bi-thu-csvn.html

________________________

Dear General Secretary,

On September 2, 1945, at Ba Đình Square, President Hồ Chí Minh declared the birth of a free Vietnam. From that square rose not only a republic, but a promise—a promise of independence, of freedom, of a people governing themselves.

Eighty years have passed. We have endured trial and triumph. We have suffered wounds and built anew. We have achieved much. Yet the Revolution remains unfinished. For as Karl Marx reminded us, no revolution is truly won until the people enjoy abundance, a sound culture, and democratic rule. By this measure, our task is still before us.

The duty of leadership today is not merely to guard the past. It is to raise it higher. To advance does not mean to betray; it means to carry forward, to complete what history began but could not finish. We have progress, yes. But we also have decline in morals, division of wealth, and doubt in the hearts of the people. These are not small matters. They cut to the core. They demand renewal—deep, honest, and whole.

You hold great power. But power endures only when it wins trust. The strong leader is not the one who speaks last, but the one who listens first. Not the one who commands alone, but the one who unites. Not the one who rules over, but the one who awakens the conscience of a nation. Legitimacy cannot be forced. It is given—freely, proudly—by the people when they believe.

This year marks eighty years of independence. But it may also mark your place in history. The August Revolution gave us sovereignty. Your leadership can give us liberty, democracy, and prosperity. Rarely does history open such a door: a chance to bind past to future, to meet the present with courage, and to shape the destiny of generations.

In the world beyond, Vietnam must be steadfast yet supple—holding fast to principle, yet never trapped by rigidity. The strength of a nation is not only in arms or wealth, but in its honor. And honor is won not by force, but by fairness; not by power, but by justice; not by command, but by respect for its own people.

Seize this hour. Take this chance. Let power become service, and service become greatness. Do this, and history will not remember you as one who merely preserved order, but as one who carried Vietnam into a new age—an age of freedom, of democracy, of prosperity.

With solemn respect, I place these words before you, dear General Secretary. May the spirit proclaimed on September 2, 1945—independence, freedom, sovereignty of the people—live not only in memory, but in the daily life of our nation, here and now.

Ho Chi Minh City, August 25, 2025

Lê Thân

Former Political Prisoner, Côn Đảo
Chairman, Lê Hiếu Đằng Club