Author: CRT Admin

Vietnam and the United States Confront Multidimensional Strategic Variables: some are only optics but others have resilient substance

Introduction by Professor Stephen Young  

Unlike September 2024—when mixed signals and discordant domestic voices accompanied Vietnam’s high-level engagement with Washington—General Secretary To Lam’s visit to Washington on February 18 – 20) unfolded with more controlled message discipline and more obvious choreography. Over two days, the Vietnamese leader not only attended the inaugural session of President Donald Trump’s Gaza Peace Board but also secured something more politically consequential: a formal meeting with the American President at the White House.

After three previously unsuccessful attempts to arrange direct talks, the doors of the White House finally opened. The handshake, the carefully worded public praise, and the optics of mutual respect were unmistakable.

HOÀNG TRƯỜNG (PhD)

And yet: beneath the hopeful symbolism lies a more complex strategic landscape. Vietnam–U.S. relations are not stalled—but neither have they achieved a lasting structural break with the past. Instead, they remain in a transitional phase shaped by multidimensional uncertainties: institutional tensions within the United States, geoeconomic rivalry centered on China, and internal political calibrations in Vietnam.

This review examines the strategic consequences of the meeting—not merely as a diplomatic event, but as a node within a broader matrix of power, legitimacy, trade negotiation, and geopolitical balancing.

1. The Meaning of Access:  Washington’s Recognition of Party Leadership in Vietnam 

One of the most consequential dimensions of the visit lies not in what was signed, but in who was received—and how.

To Lam arrived in Washington not as head of state, nor as prime minister, but as General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam.  He does not hold a state office. Yet in Vietnam’s political system, the General Secretary of the Party is the supreme decision-maker, positioned over the Constitution and the laws

This distinction once posed a diplomatic complication for Washington. When General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong was invited to the Oval Office in 2015 by President Barack Obama, the meeting triggered a deliberate institutional adjustment in American protocol. Former U.S. Ambassador to Hanoi, Ted Osius, later described the extensive effort required to persuade Washington bureaucrats that the Party leader—not just the state president—was Vietnam’s highest authority in fact.

That meeting marked a turning point. It established a presidential–general secretary axis in bilateral engagement.

By contrast, President Trump appeared entirely comfortable hosting To Lam. Public remarks highlighted Vietnam’s importance and conveyed personal warmth. The ease of the interaction reflects how normalized the recognition of Vietnam’s Party leadership has become in U.S. diplomacy.

Strategically, this matters in two ways:

External legitimacy: It reinforces To Lam’s status as Vietnam’s principal interlocutor with the West.

Internal authority: It allows him to demonstrate to domestic audiences that he commands direct access to the world’s leading power. For a leader consolidating his position after the 14th Party Congress—and no longer holding the presidency—such symbolism carries weight.

2. Multilateral Cover, Bilateral Priority 

Officially, To Lam’s presence in Washington centered on his participation in the inaugural session of President Trump’s Board of Peace. 

Vietnam positioned itself as an early supporter of the effort. While President Trump announced that participating countries in the new international entity had pledged over $7 billion for Gaza reconstruction, Vietnam was not publicly listed among major financial contributors. Instead, Vietnamese officials later indicated future possible contributions in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict reconstruction support.

Yet the full bilateral schedule revealed the real priority for the two leaders: trade and technology.

Meetings included discussions with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and other economic officials. The Board of Peace discussion of Gaza provided diplomatic cover for what was, for Vietnam and the United States, fundamentally a commercial and strategic negotiation.

This dual-layer approach reflected Vietnam’s general foreign policy approach: using multilateral engagement as a platform to open up opportunities  bilateral negotiations.

3. Trade Tensions: Surplus, Tariffs, and Structural Friction 

The economic relationship between Vietnam and the United States is both extensive and contentious.

Vietnam’s trade surplus with the U.S. remains substantial. Washington has imposed a 20% tariff on Vietnamese imports and up to 40% on goods deemed to be Chinese products transshipped from Vietnam. Six negotiation rounds have yet to produce a comprehensive agreement resolving American concerns

Two structural concerns dominate U.S. calculations:

• Persistent trade imbalance.
• Allegations that Vietnam serves as a conduit for Chinese goods circumventing American tariffs.

Vietnam’s response to these concerns during To Lam’s visit was clear: visible rebalancing.

Agreements reportedly totaling more than $30 billion were showcased, prominently including aircraft purchases involving Boeing:

• Sun PhuQuoc Airways agreed to buy 40 Boeing 787-9 aircraft.
• Vietnam Airlines confirmed purchases of 50 Boeing 737-8 aircraft.
• Vietjet announced financing arrangements tied to additional Boeing aircraft acquisitions.

These transactions serve a dual purpose: commercial modernization of Vietnam and political signaling.

However, industry observers note that Vietnamese carriers—particularly Vietjet—have repeatedly signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs), restructuring agreements, and phased contracts over the past decade. Public announcements often do not clarify whether such deals represent new commitments or restructured previous orders.

In political terms, however, precision may matter less than perception. Large procurement announcements reinforce the narrative that Vietnam is actively narrowing its trade gap with the United States.   And President Trump loves to announce that foreign cash is flowing into America.

Thus, President Trump publicly acknowledged Vietnam’s efforts to rebalance – who buys from whom? —a domestic political win for him, even absent a signed trade agreement with Vietnam.

4. Export Controls and Technology Access: A Conditional Opening 

The most concrete outcome of the White House meeting was President Trump’s pledge to direct agencies to remove Vietnam from strategic export control categories D1–D3.

If implemented, this could expand Vietnam’s access to:

• American advanced semiconductors.
• American Artificial Intelligence technologies.
• American dual-use systems critical to industrial upgrading.

For Vietnam, this aligns with its ambition to move its economy up the global value chain and integrate Vietnamese companies into next-generation supply chains.

Yet President Trump’s pledge sits awkwardly within a volatile institutional environment.

On the same day as Trump met with his Vietnamese counterpart, the U.S. Supreme Court revoked Trump’s executive authority to impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).  Trump then immediately signaled his intention to pursue alternative legal routes under the Trade Act of 1974.

This episode illustrates a broader point: U.S. trade policy is currently shaped by friction among executive ambition, judicial oversight, and congressional scrutiny.

For Vietnam, this means that any prospective commitment from the White House must pass through domestic institutional filters. Policy durability cannot be assumed.

5. The China Variable: Transshipment and Strategic Suspicion 

Vietnam’s position within the serious U.S.–China rivalry is a central strategic variable.

Washington has grown increasingly attentive to transshipment practices—where Chinese goods are routed through third countries to evade tariffs. Congressional testimony has emphasized preventing such “leakage.”

Vietnam’s geographic proximity to China and deep integration into regional supply chains make it particularly scrutinized for assisting its neighbor gain access to US customers

If Vietnam is perceived as a backdoor channel for Chinese exports, punitive tariffs could be imposed by the United States. Conversely, overly restrictive Vietnamese measures against Chinese-linked investment could strain Hanoi–Beijing ties.

Thus, a balancing act defines Vietnam’s contemporary strategic posture:

• Maintain economic interdependence with China.
• Expand strategic partnership with the United States.
• Avoid formal alignment with either.

To Lam’s White House meeting may have strengthened reciprocal trust—but such trust remains conditioned on verifiable trade compliance.

6. Media Strategy and Narrative Construction 

An underexamined but strategically important dimension of the visit was narrative management.

Vietnamese media prominently highlighted digital displays in Times Square and a Washington Times article praising Vietnam’s proactive diplomacy. The latter appeared under an “advertisement” label, reflecting a sponsored placement.

Such media practices are not unprecedented; Vietnam has used similar strategies during previous high-level visits. Domestically, they serve to project international recognition and prestige.

For To Lam, narrative control was especially significant. Unlike September 2024—when online commentary and dissenting voices surfaced—this visit was subject to tighter domestic messaging discipline.

In political terms, such management of optics is a form of power consolidation on To Lam’s behalf.

7. Domestic Political Implications 

The domestic implications of the visit may be as important for Vietnam as the foreign policy outcomes.

To Lam previously served briefly as Vietnam’s President before consolidating his role solely as General Secretary. His continuing to operate internationally as Vietnam’s de facto head of state reinforces a Party-centered structure of national authority for the Vietnamese.

For internal Party audiences, the White House reception strengthens To Lam’s standing. It signals that he can command Western respect without diluting Vietnam’s political model.

However, risks remain.

In Vietnam, segments of ideological conservatives and veterans—whose political identity remains shaped by the “anti-American resistance” narrative—may view deepening U.S. ties with caution. Visible warmth with Washington could prompt calls for renewed emphasis on ideological vigilance against “peaceful evolution” – the importation into Vietnam of decentralizing and democratizing reforms.

Thus, external diplomatic successes must be balanced against internal ideological counterforces.

8. From Symbolism to Structure: What Would a Breakthrough Look Like? 

What would constitute a genuine strategic breakthrough?

Three developments would signal structural transformation:

1. A comprehensive bilateral trade agreement institutionalized over and above executive discretion.
2. Formal recognition under US trade law of Vietnam as a market economy. 
3. Ending American export control restrictions backed by congressional authority.

None of these steps occurred during To Lam’s visit.

Instead, the Vietnam/US bilateral relationship remains one of incremental adjustments.

Conclusion: Transitional, Not Transformational 

The February White House meeting between President Donald Trump and General Secretary To Lam was symbolically significant and politically useful for both sides.

For Washington, it reinforced influence in Southeast Asia without formal alliance commitments.

For Hanoi, it consolidated leadership legitimacy and advanced technology access negotiations.

Yet the relationship has not entered a new structural phase.

It remains in transition—shaped by:

• Institutional tension within the U.S. political system among the Presidency, the Congress, and the courts.
• Differing Strategic needs on the part of China and the United States.
• Unresolved domestic political differences within Vietnam.

The handshake mattered. The optics mattered. The promise on export controls mattered.

But transformation requires institutionalization of mutual collaboration and respect.

Until only political commitments harden into legally resilient frameworks, Vietnam–U.S. relations will continue advancing—carefully, conditionally, and in response to the differing influences of multidimensional strategic variables.

Following the official trip to the United States from February 18 to 20, regardless of what the General Secretary and his inner circle may publicly declare, the fundamental question moving forward remains this: What will be the true order of priorities for the Communist Party of Vietnam? The preservation of the existing system and one-party rule? The restructuring of the national development model? Or simply the consolidation of power at the level of individuals and factions?  

Dr. Nguyễn Thế Hùng, PhD, and Professor Stephen Young, JD 

I. Hexagram Qian and the Trajectory of Political Will 

In the Yijing (I Ching), Hexagram Qian (乾) symbolizes Heaven—pure creative force, unrestrained yang energy, and the relentless ascent of will. The six lines of Qian are not merely metaphysical symbols; they constitute a structural model of political ascent.

From “Hidden dragon, do not act” (潜龙勿用) to “Flying dragon in the heavens” (飞龙在天), the hexagram outlines a process of self-construction and progressive legitimation. It depicts the journey of an individual endowed with strong political will, overcoming successive constraints to reach the apex of authority.

Yet the Yijing does not conclude at the summit. Immediately following “Flying dragon in the heavens” comes the warning: “Arrogant dragon will have regret” (亢龙有悔).

The philosophical insight here is profound: the apex is not a culmination but a new ordeal. Once at the highest point, a leader no longer confronts discrete rivals. Instead, the object of engagement becomes the totality—society, institutional structures, historical momentum, and collective expectation. Should the leader continue to operate in a mode of conquest rather than adjustment, counterforces inevitably arise. “Regret” in this sense does not signify immediate collapse, but the consequence of failing to transform one’s governing posture at the appropriate moment.

II. “Arrogant Dragon” Through the Lens of Modern Power Psychology 

“Arrogance” (亢, kang) does not merely denote opposition. At a deeper level, it describes a confrontational stance maintained after the consolidation of supreme authority.

Political psychology suggests a recurring pattern: individuals who ascend through forceful will often internalize that will as universally efficacious. Before reaching the summit, firmness and decisiveness are assets. At the summit, however, excessive rigidity risks estrangement from the broader social organism.

At the apex, the “other dragon” is no longer a faction or rival personality. It is the aggregate of complex interests: markets, media ecosystems, an expanding middle class, global strategic pressures, and transnational economic interdependence. If governance remains purely confrontational—resisting rather than harmonizing—latent opposition accumulates within the system itself.

Thus, “Arrogant dragon will have regret” is not a moral admonition but a law of equilibrium. Power unmodulated generates counterpower. Will untempered erodes its own foundation.

III. “Ultimate Intent” (Khế Lý) and “Strategic Presentation” (Khế Cơ) 

Within a modernized interpretive framework of the Yijing, we may distinguish between two analytical layers:

• Khế cơ (契機): the strategic discourse presented publicly—language of stability, development, discipline, integration, and the promise of a “new era.”
• Khế lý (契理): the ultimate intent—the deeper objective guiding political action, not necessarily disclosed in full, nor always readily decipherable.

In contemporary politics, ultimate intent is rarely articulated explicitly. It is typically obscured through three mechanisms: moralized rhetoric, incremental reform, and calibrated foreign policy balancing. Observers can infer it only through long-term behavioral patterns and policy prioritization.

In the present case, the issue is not what the General Secretary and his advisory circle state openly, but what they privilege in practice. Is the overarching goal systemic preservation? Structural transformation? Or power consolidation?

History suggests that when a leader attains authority not merely as a “product of circumstance” but through a prolonged process of self-positioning, such ascent is seldom accidental. It usually reflects a pre-formed will. The decisive question, then, is whether that will inclines toward preservation or transformation.

IV. Foreign Policy and the United States Visit: Confrontation or Harmonization? 

In an era of intensifying global strategic competition, a visit to the United States carries significance beyond diplomatic ceremony. It signals both domestic messaging and external legitimation.

At the apex of power, a leader faces a strategic bifurcation: to employ foreign policy as an instrument of internal consolidation and projection of firmness, or to leverage it as an avenue for developmental expansion.

If emphasis falls on attracting investment, deepening technological cooperation, expanding markets, and maintaining strategic balance, such actions suggest what may be termed “harmonizing the dragon”—an acknowledgment that national strength cannot rely indefinitely on internal control alone but must rest upon integrative capacity.

Conversely, if foreign engagement functions primarily as a symbolic reinforcement of domestic authority without accompanying structural reform, the logic of “confrontational dragon” remains dominant.

The distinction lies not in diplomatic protocol, but in the substantive policy trajectory that follows.

V. Success or Regret? 

Political history demonstrates that reaching the apex is seldom the most arduous task. The greater challenge lies in shifting from a posture of conquest to one of calibration.

If the ultimate intent is to reconcile competing interests, soften rigid structures, and widen the sphere of social creativity, then harmonization strengthens durability. If, however, ultimate intent is confined to preserving position through unyielding will, the equilibrium principle articulated in the Yijing will assert itself: a dragon that ascends too high without moderation will encounter regret.

The Yijing does not prophesy individuals. It delineates patterns.

Its central insight remains disarmingly simple:
When power reaches its extreme, survival no longer depends on strength, but on self-adjustment.

The inquiry into “ultimate intent,” therefore, is not a matter of personal curiosity. It is an inquiry into the trajectory of an entire historical phase.  

————————————–

Dr. Nguyễn Thế Hùng, with a Ph.D. in Physics, is a scholar known for his impressive scientific learning and his comprehensive analytical approach to philosophical and cultural studies. With a deep interest in exploring ancient principles, he brings a modern scientific perspective to traditional Eastern thought. His latest publication on I Ching (Kinh Dịch), one of the oldest philosophical classics of East Asia, reflects this interdisciplinary vision. An English translation of his explanations of the I Ching’s 64 hexagrams is planned.

In his book, Dr. Nguyễn seeks to interpret the I Ching—a system centered on the concepts of yin and yang, transformation, and the dynamic nature of the universe—through the lens of contemporary scientific reasoning. Rather than treating the hexagrams solely as only mystical or  for use in divination, he approaches them collectively as a symbolic framework that embodies profound insights into change, order, and human experience.

His work represents an effort to bridge modern physics and ancient wisdom, making the philosophical depth of the I Ching more accessible to today’s readers. The book serves not only as an academic contribution but also begins a cultural dialogue between science and the humanities.

Stephen B. Young, a student of jurisprudence and East Asian Law at Harvard Law School, has written The Tradition of Human Rights in China and Vietnam.  He also studied the I Ching in Vietnam with Mr. Duong Thai Ban and writes for the Caux Round Table annual commentaries each lunar New Year on what can be constructively learned from the I Ching to apply to our decision making in the coming new lunar year.  Young graduated from Harvard College and Harvard law School. He was an Assistant Dean at the Harvard Law School and Dean and Professor of Law at the Hamline School of Law.  His is Global Executive Director of the Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism.

Vietnam at a Crossroads: 

• Power, Perception, and the Future of a Strategic Partner 
• Tô Lâm Through the Lens of Western Media:  Notes of Caution about Vietnam’s path of Development 

In recent days, feature stories about Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm appearing in French and American media have gone beyond mere profiles of a top political leader. They exposed how the West views Vietnam’s coming political trajectory. A confident, reform-oriented, and more open country need not fear any proffered narrative —because when reality changes, such narratives will change accordingly. As an old Confucian saying, now part of Vietnamese wisdom, reminds us: “Both bitter medicine and the truth can hurt but also heal.” 

By: Hoang Thang Dinh (PhD), U.S.–Vietnam Project, CRT 

Recent coverage in major Western outlets of Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm has gone well beyond the profile of an individual leader. It reflects something larger: how Vietnam’s political evolution is being assessed at a moment when the country has become central to the geopolitical and economic recalibration of the Indo-Pacific.

When Courrier International portrayed Mr. Tô as a “Frankenstein hybrid of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin,” and when The New York Times emphasized his rapid consolidation of authority, the language was vivid. But the underlying concern was structural, not personal. The issue is not simply who leads Vietnam. It is how Vietnam is choosing to be governed at a time when its international importance has never been greater.

The United States and Vietnam elevated their relationship in 2023 to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership — Washington’s highest diplomatic tier. The upgrade reflected converging interests: supply-chain diversification away from China, maritime security in the South China Sea, semiconductor investment, and a shared desire to balance Beijing’s expanding influence. For American policymakers, Vietnam has become a pivotal state in the Indo-Pacific architecture.

That is precisely why Western scrutiny has intensified.

In open societies, concentration of power draws attention. When observers see an expanded personal role in governance and the increasing prominence of security institutions within state management, they interpret these developments through a familiar framework: centralization justified in the name of stability. The comparisons to China and Russia may be exaggerated, but they are not accidental. They stem from perceived structural similarities — the prioritization of political control, the tightening of civic space, and the central role of security organs in policymaking.

Yet Vietnam is not China, and it is not Russia. Unlike Beijing or Moscow, Hanoi is not positioned as a systemic adversary of the West. It is, rather, a strategic partner whose trajectory matters precisely because cooperation is expanding. This creates a paradox. Western governments pursue pragmatic engagement for geopolitical reasons, while Western media and civil society evaluate Vietnam through normative standards rooted in rule of law, institutional transparency, and political pluralism.

That tension will not disappear.

Vietnam’s economic model magnifies the stakes. The country is deeply integrated into global markets and heavily dependent on exports and foreign direct investment. It is positioning itself as an alternative manufacturing hub, a semiconductor partner, and a key node in diversified supply chains. But global capital does not evaluate only labor costs and logistics. It also assesses predictability, legal safeguards, transparency, and reputational risk.

Political centralization can generate short-term decisiveness — faster policy execution, tighter administrative discipline, and coherent anti-corruption campaigns. But over time, investor confidence depends on institutional reliability rather than personal authority. Multinational corporations and financial markets are less concerned with ideology than with legal clarity, dispute resolution mechanisms, and governance predictability. Strategic trust is built not merely through alignment against China, but through institutional credibility.

For Washington, this raises a delicate question. How does the United States deepen strategic cooperation with Vietnam — in defense, technology, and supply chains — while remaining consistent with its stated commitment to democratic norms and human rights? For Hanoi, the question is equally consequential: how to preserve political stability while reassuring global partners that institutional development will keep pace with economic ambition.

This is not an argument for dismantling Vietnam’s one-party system. Political systems evolve according to their own histories and social contracts. But history offers a consistent lesson: systems capable of adaptation endure longer than those that close themselves off. In a competitive global environment defined by capital mobility, technological disruption, and talent flows, legitimacy is increasingly linked to transparency and institutional resilience.

If Vietnam continues to expand economically while constricting political space, it risks sustaining a structural contradiction. It seeks to attract high-value investment, advanced technology, and strategic trust from democratic economies — yet perceptions of institutional opacity may complicate that effort. Over time, perception shapes policy. And policy shapes capital flows.

Western commentary on Mr. Tô should therefore be understood less as hostility and more as providing important points for reflection. The sharper the language, the greater the opportunity to lean. Vietnam is not being treated as an adversary. It is being treated as a consequential partner whose direction matters.

A confident nation does not fear scrutiny. When realities evolve, perceptions follow. If Vietnam can demonstrate that political stability and institutional modernization are not mutually exclusive — that rule of law, accountability, and openness can coexist with centralized leadership — its strategic standing will strengthen accordingly.

In the fierce global competition for capital, technology, and influence, concentrated power may yield immediate decisiveness. But enduring strength flows from institutions. As an old Confucian saying reminds us: bitter medicine cures illness; the truth may be difficult to hear but it too heals

References:

• https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/09/world/asia/vietnams-leader-has-new-power-and-hes-in-a-hurry.html
• https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/politique-au-vietnam-l-ambitieux-to-lam-se-reve-en-monstre-de-frankenstein-mi-xi-jinping-mi-poutine_239501
• https://dcvonline.net/2026/02/11/lanh-dao-viet-nam-nam-them-quyen-luc-va-dang-voi-va/?utm_source=chatgpt.com (Bài trên NYT)
• https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?pli=1#inbox/FMfcgzQfBkQvhJqnpHnskXtnGGZSHxWQ (“Au Vietnam, l’ambitieux To Lam se rêve en “monstre de Frankenstein” mi-Xi Jinping, mi-Poutine”, Bản lược dịch do AI Gemini thực hiện từ Tạp chí “Courrier international”)
• https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-political-shake-up-consolidates-power-2025-xx-xx/

Introduction by Professor Stephen Young

Executive Director & CEO, U.S.–Vietnam Project, Caux Round Table

At a moment when the international system is under visible strain—from protracted conflicts in the Middle East to intensifying strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific—the  future trajectory of Vietnam–U.S. relations deserves careful and serious attention. The convergence of two volatile issues— bringing peace to Gaza and resolving the questions of who must pay tariffs and making supply-chains trustworthy and reliable—has created a rare inflection point global affairs. US-Vietnam relations today are not merely another episode in a narrowly focused bilateral engagement; conditions present a strategic test of whether the relationship can evolve from symbolic superficials into having structural resilience.

Vietnam and the United States have traveled a remarkable path over the past three decades. From  a post-war normalization to a more fulsome strategic partnership, the arc of cooperation has expanded to include issues of trade, technology, education, and regional security. Yet maturity in international relations is measured not by ceremonial events but by an ability to manage frictions—particularly in areas such as trade imbalances, origin transparency, and geopolitical risk.

In the analysis that follows, Hoang Thang Dinh (PhD) argues that Vietnam’s role in emerging peace initiatives and its response to tariff pressures are interconnected dimensions of building national credibility in a fragmented global order. As middle powers gain greater relevance in a multi-polar world, Vietnam’s choices—alongside America’s—will shape not only the durability of their bilateral ties but also the broader architecture of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and even beyond.

By: Hoang Thang Dinh (PhD), U.S.–Vietnam Project, CRT 

The “Board of Peace – Gaza” initiative has emerged at a moment when the international system is increasingly ruptured by protracted conflicts and strategic misalignments among major powers. The crisis in the Middle East is not merely a humanitarian tragedy or a matter of regional security; it has become emblematic of a global order lacking effective mechanisms for  inter-state coordination and intentional collective response. In such a context, the role of middle powers like Vietnam—countries that aspire to maintain channels of dialogue with multiple sides—becomes especially significant.

For Vietnam, active participation in peace initiatives is more than simply a position; it is an investment in acquiring long-term strategic credibility. Hanoi’s advantages lie in having a balanced diplomacy, avoidance of military alliances, and a consistent commitment to international law. By proactively leveraging outreach from this open-ended platform, Vietnam can affirm that it is not just one link in global supply chains, but, more significantly, is also a responsible stakeholder in all global affairs. In turn, this stance sends a signal to all partners – current and potential – that Vietnam’s bilateral relationships rest on political depth and strategic substance, rather than being limited to trade flows or petty transactional diplomacy.

Tariffs: A Bottleneck Requiring Decisive Resolution 

The immediate and more tangible test of Vietnam–U.S. relations lies in the economic sphere. A substantial trade surplus and recurring suspicions of tariff circumvention have turned the issue of trade practices and regulations into a persistent source of sensitivity. As the United States tightens supply chain controls to curb China’s industrial influence, Vietnam finds itself conflicted—benefiting from manufacturing relocation from China while simultaneously risking being perceived as a transshipment hub for Chinese companies.

At this time, should Indonesia secure a favorable trade arrangement with Washington, new competitive pressures would impact Vietnam markedly. Then present competitive rivalries would no longer center solely on textiles or furniture; competition would revolve around access to high-value technology supply chains, including semiconductors, advanced batteries, and renewable energy systems. For the United States, the decisive factor in economic relations is no longer low labor costs but institutional transparency and systemic reliability. In this light, a high-level trade consultation mechanism, coupled with firm commitments to prevent place of origin fraud, could prove pivotal in dispelling American suspicions and establishing a stable, forward-looking framework for trade between both parties. The multiple rounds of negotiations conducted by the ten trade delegations from both sides thus far do not appear to have yielded fully satisfactory outcomes for either party.

Resolving tariff disputes in a definitive manner would not only sustain export growth but also elevate Vietnam’s role from that of a passive recipient of supply chain relocation to a creator of value added innovation in emerging product lines.

U.S.–China Competition: Balancing Without Standing Aside 

The U.S.–China strategic rivalry is reshaping the Indo-Pacific security and economic landscapes. Within this evolving environment, Vietnam neither can nor would wish to choose sides, yet equally it cannot afford to remain just a silent and passive by-stander. An autonomous, independent and diversified foreign policy would enable Hanoi to maintain stable relations with both powers.  But doing so demands increasingly sophisticated management of risks and response to developments.

From Washington’s perspective, Vietnam could become a partner of considerable geostrategic relevance having a dynamic economy. For Hanoi, ties with the United States would provide access to advanced technology, a vast consumer market, and high-quality capital flows. If properly structured, such mutually beneficial cooperation between Washington and Hanoi would never aim at confronting any third country, but only at strengthening Vietnam’s strategic resilience. In a region where trust has become an increasingly scarce asset, policy consistency and predictability will constitute a most critical competitive advantage for any nation motivated to commit to such consistency and predictability.

From Historical Symbolism to Durable Strategic Architecture 

The historic events already commemorated this past year——fifty years since the end of the war, thirty years of normalization, and those yet to come – the 250th anniversary of American independence—create a powerful symbolic backdrop for the optimal evolution of Vietnam-US relations, Such bilateral relations have been, with good faith and skill, transformed from conflict to deep and wide-ranging cooperation within barely three decades, following a trajectory that has exceeded even the expectations of the most ptimistic observers.

History, however, is made only through the establishment of concrete and enduring institutional frameworks. Anything less substantive is only sand blowing in the wind.  If both sides can convert high-level engagements into substantive progress on tariff resolution, enhanced supply chain transparency, and coordinated contributions to peace initiatives such as proposed for Gaza, bilateral ties between Hanoi and Washington will enter a qualitatively more mature phase. At that point, the bilateral relationship will be less vulnerable to domestic political shifts in one country or the other, or to unpredictable fluctuations in the global balance of power.

In a world increasingly polarized and fragmented, the maturity of Vietnam–U.S. relations will not be measured solely by ceremonies and diplomatic language, but by the mutual capacity to confront and resolve the most difficult issues. It is precisely at these selective and very sensitive pressure points that the strategic future of the relationship will ultimately be determined.