Author: CRT Admin

Vietnam at a Crossroads: 

• Power, Perception, and the Future of a Strategic Partner 
• Tô Lâm Through the Lens of Western Media:  Notes of Caution about Vietnam’s path of Development 

In recent days, feature stories about Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm appearing in French and American media have gone beyond mere profiles of a top political leader. They exposed how the West views Vietnam’s coming political trajectory. A confident, reform-oriented, and more open country need not fear any proffered narrative —because when reality changes, such narratives will change accordingly. As an old Confucian saying, now part of Vietnamese wisdom, reminds us: “Both bitter medicine and the truth can hurt but also heal.” 

By: Hoang Thang Dinh (PhD), U.S.–Vietnam Project, CRT 

 

Recent coverage in major Western outlets of Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm has gone well beyond the profile of an individual leader. It reflects something larger: how Vietnam’s political evolution is being assessed at a moment when the country has become central to the geopolitical and economic recalibration of the Indo-Pacific.

 

When Courrier International portrayed Mr. Tô as a “Frankenstein hybrid of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin,” and when The New York Times emphasized his rapid consolidation of authority, the language was vivid. But the underlying concern was structural, not personal. The issue is not simply who leads Vietnam. It is how Vietnam is choosing to be governed at a time when its international importance has never been greater.

 

The United States and Vietnam elevated their relationship in 2023 to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership — Washington’s highest diplomatic tier. The upgrade reflected converging interests: supply-chain diversification away from China, maritime security in the South China Sea, semiconductor investment, and a shared desire to balance Beijing’s expanding influence. For American policymakers, Vietnam has become a pivotal state in the Indo-Pacific architecture.

 

That is precisely why Western scrutiny has intensified.

 

In open societies, concentration of power draws attention. When observers see an expanded personal role in governance and the increasing prominence of security institutions within state management, they interpret these developments through a familiar framework: centralization justified in the name of stability. The comparisons to China and Russia may be exaggerated, but they are not accidental. They stem from perceived structural similarities — the prioritization of political control, the tightening of civic space, and the central role of security organs in policymaking.

 

Yet Vietnam is not China, and it is not Russia. Unlike Beijing or Moscow, Hanoi is not positioned as a systemic adversary of the West. It is, rather, a strategic partner whose trajectory matters precisely because cooperation is expanding. This creates a paradox. Western governments pursue pragmatic engagement for geopolitical reasons, while Western media and civil society evaluate Vietnam through normative standards rooted in rule of law, institutional transparency, and political pluralism.

 

That tension will not disappear.

 

Vietnam’s economic model magnifies the stakes. The country is deeply integrated into global markets and heavily dependent on exports and foreign direct investment. It is positioning itself as an alternative manufacturing hub, a semiconductor partner, and a key node in diversified supply chains. But global capital does not evaluate only labor costs and logistics. It also assesses predictability, legal safeguards, transparency, and reputational risk.

 

Political centralization can generate short-term decisiveness — faster policy execution, tighter administrative discipline, and coherent anti-corruption campaigns. But over time, investor confidence depends on institutional reliability rather than personal authority. Multinational corporations and financial markets are less concerned with ideology than with legal clarity, dispute resolution mechanisms, and governance predictability. Strategic trust is built not merely through alignment against China, but through institutional credibility.

 

For Washington, this raises a delicate question. How does the United States deepen strategic cooperation with Vietnam — in defense, technology, and supply chains — while remaining consistent with its stated commitment to democratic norms and human rights? For Hanoi, the question is equally consequential: how to preserve political stability while reassuring global partners that institutional development will keep pace with economic ambition.

 

This is not an argument for dismantling Vietnam’s one-party system. Political systems evolve according to their own histories and social contracts. But history offers a consistent lesson: systems capable of adaptation endure longer than those that close themselves off. In a competitive global environment defined by capital mobility, technological disruption, and talent flows, legitimacy is increasingly linked to transparency and institutional resilience.

 

If Vietnam continues to expand economically while constricting political space, it risks sustaining a structural contradiction. It seeks to attract high-value investment, advanced technology, and strategic trust from democratic economies — yet perceptions of institutional opacity may complicate that effort. Over time, perception shapes policy. And policy shapes capital flows.

 

Western commentary on Mr. Tô should therefore be understood less as hostility and more as providing important points for reflection. The sharper the language, the greater the opportunity to lean. Vietnam is not being treated as an adversary. It is being treated as a consequential partner whose direction matters.

 

A confident nation does not fear scrutiny. When realities evolve, perceptions follow. If Vietnam can demonstrate that political stability and institutional modernization are not mutually exclusive — that rule of law, accountability, and openness can coexist with centralized leadership — its strategic standing will strengthen accordingly.

 

In the fierce global competition for capital, technology, and influence, concentrated power may yield immediate decisiveness. But enduring strength flows from institutions. As an old Confucian saying reminds us: bitter medicine cures illness; the truth may be difficult to hear but it too heals

References:

• https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/09/world/asia/vietnams-leader-has-new-power-and-hes-in-a-hurry.html
• https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/politique-au-vietnam-l-ambitieux-to-lam-se-reve-en-monstre-de-frankenstein-mi-xi-jinping-mi-poutine_239501
• https://dcvonline.net/2026/02/11/lanh-dao-viet-nam-nam-them-quyen-luc-va-dang-voi-va/?utm_source=chatgpt.com (Bài trên NYT)
• https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?pli=1#inbox/FMfcgzQfBkQvhJqnpHnskXtnGGZSHxWQ (“Au Vietnam, l’ambitieux To Lam se rêve en “monstre de Frankenstein” mi-Xi Jinping, mi-Poutine”, Bản lược dịch do AI Gemini thực hiện từ Tạp chí “Courrier international”)
• https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-political-shake-up-consolidates-power-2025-xx-xx/

Introduction by Professor Stephen Young

Executive Director & CEO, U.S.–Vietnam Project, Caux Round Table

At a moment when the international system is under visible strain—from protracted conflicts in the Middle East to intensifying strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific—the  future trajectory of Vietnam–U.S. relations deserves careful and serious attention. The convergence of two volatile issues— bringing peace to Gaza and resolving the questions of who must pay tariffs and making supply-chains trustworthy and reliable—has created a rare inflection point global affairs. US-Vietnam relations today are not merely another episode in a narrowly focused bilateral engagement; conditions present a strategic test of whether the relationship can evolve from symbolic superficials into having structural resilience.

Vietnam and the United States have traveled a remarkable path over the past three decades. From  a post-war normalization to a more fulsome strategic partnership, the arc of cooperation has expanded to include issues of trade, technology, education, and regional security. Yet maturity in international relations is measured not by ceremonial events but by an ability to manage frictions—particularly in areas such as trade imbalances, origin transparency, and geopolitical risk.

In the analysis that follows, Hoang Thang Dinh (PhD) argues that Vietnam’s role in emerging peace initiatives and its response to tariff pressures are interconnected dimensions of building national credibility in a fragmented global order. As middle powers gain greater relevance in a multi-polar world, Vietnam’s choices—alongside America’s—will shape not only the durability of their bilateral ties but also the broader architecture of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and even beyond.

 

By: Hoang Thang Dinh (PhD), U.S.–Vietnam Project, CRT 

 

The “Board of Peace – Gaza” initiative has emerged at a moment when the international system is increasingly ruptured by protracted conflicts and strategic misalignments among major powers. The crisis in the Middle East is not merely a humanitarian tragedy or a matter of regional security; it has become emblematic of a global order lacking effective mechanisms for  inter-state coordination and intentional collective response. In such a context, the role of middle powers like Vietnam—countries that aspire to maintain channels of dialogue with multiple sides—becomes especially significant.

 

For Vietnam, active participation in peace initiatives is more than simply a position; it is an investment in acquiring long-term strategic credibility. Hanoi’s advantages lie in having a balanced diplomacy, avoidance of military alliances, and a consistent commitment to international law. By proactively leveraging outreach from this open-ended platform, Vietnam can affirm that it is not just one link in global supply chains, but, more significantly, is also a responsible stakeholder in all global affairs. In turn, this stance sends a signal to all partners – current and potential – that Vietnam’s bilateral relationships rest on political depth and strategic substance, rather than being limited to trade flows or petty transactional diplomacy.

 

Tariffs: A Bottleneck Requiring Decisive Resolution 

 

The immediate and more tangible test of Vietnam–U.S. relations lies in the economic sphere. A substantial trade surplus and recurring suspicions of tariff circumvention have turned the issue of trade practices and regulations into a persistent source of sensitivity. As the United States tightens supply chain controls to curb China’s industrial influence, Vietnam finds itself conflicted—benefiting from manufacturing relocation from China while simultaneously risking being perceived as a transshipment hub for Chinese companies.

 

At this time, should Indonesia secure a favorable trade arrangement with Washington, new competitive pressures would impact Vietnam markedly. Then present competitive rivalries would no longer center solely on textiles or furniture; competition would revolve around access to high-value technology supply chains, including semiconductors, advanced batteries, and renewable energy systems. For the United States, the decisive factor in economic relations is no longer low labor costs but institutional transparency and systemic reliability. In this light, a high-level trade consultation mechanism, coupled with firm commitments to prevent place of origin fraud, could prove pivotal in dispelling American suspicions and establishing a stable, forward-looking framework for trade between both parties. The multiple rounds of negotiations conducted by the ten trade delegations from both sides thus far do not appear to have yielded fully satisfactory outcomes for either party.

Resolving tariff disputes in a definitive manner would not only sustain export growth but also elevate Vietnam’s role from that of a passive recipient of supply chain relocation to a creator of value added innovation in emerging product lines.

 

U.S.–China Competition: Balancing Without Standing Aside 

 

The U.S.–China strategic rivalry is reshaping the Indo-Pacific security and economic landscapes. Within this evolving environment, Vietnam neither can nor would wish to choose sides, yet equally it cannot afford to remain just a silent and passive by-stander. An autonomous, independent and diversified foreign policy would enable Hanoi to maintain stable relations with both powers.  But doing so demands increasingly sophisticated management of risks and response to developments.

From Washington’s perspective, Vietnam could become a partner of considerable geostrategic relevance having a dynamic economy. For Hanoi, ties with the United States would provide access to advanced technology, a vast consumer market, and high-quality capital flows. If properly structured, such mutually beneficial cooperation between Washington and Hanoi would never aim at confronting any third country, but only at strengthening Vietnam’s strategic resilience. In a region where trust has become an increasingly scarce asset, policy consistency and predictability will constitute a most critical competitive advantage for any nation motivated to commit to such consistency and predictability.

 

From Historical Symbolism to Durable Strategic Architecture 

 

The historic events already commemorated this past year——fifty years since the end of the war, thirty years of normalization, and those yet to come – the 250th anniversary of American independence—create a powerful symbolic backdrop for the optimal evolution of Vietnam-US relations, Such bilateral relations have been, with good faith and skill, transformed from conflict to deep and wide-ranging cooperation within barely three decades, following a trajectory that has exceeded even the expectations of the most ptimistic observers.

 

History, however, is made only through the establishment of concrete and enduring institutional frameworks. Anything less substantive is only sand blowing in the wind.  If both sides can convert high-level engagements into substantive progress on tariff resolution, enhanced supply chain transparency, and coordinated contributions to peace initiatives such as proposed for Gaza, bilateral ties between Hanoi and Washington will enter a qualitatively more mature phase. At that point, the bilateral relationship will be less vulnerable to domestic political shifts in one country or the other, or to unpredictable fluctuations in the global balance of power.

In a world increasingly polarized and fragmented, the maturity of Vietnam–U.S. relations will not be measured solely by ceremonies and diplomatic language, but by the mutual capacity to confront and resolve the most difficult issues. It is precisely at these selective and very sensitive pressure points that the strategic future of the relationship will ultimately be determined.

After the 14^th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party: “Aftershocks” 

Vietnams after the 14th Party Congress, still  moves forward at a remarkable pace, with shifts in who holds power, new institutional arrangements, and adventuresome development  goals all unfolding simultaneously and at a speed rarely seen since the Đổi Mới reforms of the 1980s. On the surface, Vietnam’s political–economic landscape appears stable. Beneath what is apparent, however, multiple institutional layers are experiencing tremors that are starting to reverberate across society. Decisions taken today may well shape Vietnam’s developmental trajectory for decades to come. 

This series of thoughtful essays presents writings from diverse—sometimes divergent—sources. Taken collectively, they affirm that, 1) even under increasingly constrained conditions, independent voices persist in speaking out within Vietnamese civil society t, and that 2) these voices continue to deserve attention. 

Second Essay: When a powerful Institutional Shock Hits Markets

The post–Congress convergence of intensified power centralization and highly ambitious economic growth targets has produced a distinctive institutional shock—one that is now beginning to impact the market through channels far subtler than those associated with ordinary economic cycles. 

Nguyen Xuan Nghia, PhD
Economist, Institute for Vietnamese Development Issues

After the 14th Party Congress, Vietnam has entered a phase in which the surface of economic activity appears broadly stable. Official messaging emphasizes determination to reform, to streamline the state apparatus, to promote the private sector, and to pursue exceptionally high growth targets over the coming years. From the outside—particularly through the lens of international media and analysts—Vietnam is often portrayed as a country that has “placed a large bet” on successful economic development while maintaining regime stability.

Yet it is precisely the combination of intensified power concentration with ambitious growth objectives that has generated a peculiar  kind of institutional shock, not a shock that triggers immediate disruption, but rather, a shock which alters the operating rhythm of the entire system, changes gradually transmitting to the market through new expectations, behavioral shifts, and changes in resource allocation. These new dynamics are quiet, but cumulative—and difficult to reverse over the medium to long term.

Idealized Growth Expectations 

Analysis by Joshua Kurlantzick and Annabel Richter highlight a central paradox of the post–Congress economic environment: while political power has become more consolidated and tightly controlled, expectations of possible economic achievement have expanded to the point of near idealization. Annual growth of 10 percent is no longer framed as an optimistic scenario, but as an official target tied directly to the personal credibility of top leadership and to the legitimacy of the system as a whole (1).

In economic terms, this is not an ignorable prediction. When growth becomes a measure of political success, the market no longer views it as a theoretical outcome of long-term reform, but as an immediate mandate that must be fulfilled. Expectations are thus pushed beyond the economy’s current internal capacity to achieve , creating invisible pressure on investment and production decisions. In this context, risk lies less in failing to achieve high growth and more in drawing the entire system into a race toward objectives that exceed the ability of its underlying fundamentals to deliver as so unreasonably expected.

Redefining Risk 

Another notable development emphasized by policy analysts is the encouragement of the state apparatus to “accept higher risk” when approving projects, in order to replace a long-standing bureaucratized culture of risk aversion and fear of taking personal responsibility. From an administrative perspective, this signals an attempt to unlock human decision-making capacity that has been constrained for years (2).

From a market perspective, however, the implications are ambiguous. When prudence is relaxed not through deep institutional reform but under pressure to meet growth targets, risk itself becomes difficult to calculate. Businesses cannot clearly discern where the boundary will lie between acceptable risk and punishable failure. In such an environment, economic decisions will tend to favor projects that align with policy priorities and political signals, rather than those with only economic efficacy and not political patronage. The market thus operates less according to the open-minded logic of profit and more according to calculations seeking self-preservation.

Personalizing Growth Responsibility 

The direct linkage between the top leadership’s personal credibility and long-term growth objectives—toward 2030 and further to 2045—creates another powerful mechanism transmitting contexts for entrepreneurial decision-making (3). In political economy, when economic success or failure is personalized, systems tend to prioritize short-term results to preserve system legitimacy, even at the expense of long-term development achievements.

Markets respond to such a signal with considerable rationality. Long-term investments—particularly in areas requiring high institutional stability such as core technologies, education, or corporate governance reform—become less attractive than investments in large, quickly completed projects easily associated with policy achievement goals. Investment allocations thus become channeled, not due to capital scarcity, but because the incentives for using capital have shifted.

Resource Allocation via Public Spending and Mega-Projects 

Rapidly expanding public expenditure and the rollout of large-scale infrastructure mega-projects represent the clearest manifestation of structural shake-up as it impacts the market. These projects are not only intended to stimulate demand, but also to produce tangible, measurable outcomes within political cycles, thereby reinforcing short-term political legitimacy and social confidence (4).

Development experience, however, suggests that scale does not equate to quality. When capital is injected rapidly and institutional oversight is weakened from excessive concentration of political discretion, the risks of making inefficient and diffuse investment rise sharply. The market then responds by gravitating towards acquiring assets—particularly land and infrastructure-linked real estate—rather than in productivity enhancement or technological innovation. This encourages market adaptation pursuing capital sheltering, not value creation.

Distorted Competition and “National Champion” Groups 

A key component of Vietnam’s post–Congress economic strategy is the cultivation of “national pillar conglomerates”—private-sector entities receiving strong state guidance and support. Kurlantzick and Richter note that Vietnam currently lacks sufficiently robust mechanisms to regulate the relationship between these conglomerates and political power (5).

Under the new condition of concentrated authority, the line separating policy support from political patronage becomes increasingly “flexible”. Markets quickly recognize that scale and connections may matter as much as—if not more than—pure economic efficiency. Competition weakens, small and medium enterprises are squeezed, and innovation incentives decline—undermining the very foundation upholding sustainable long-term growth.

Erosion of External Long-Term Confidence 

Although Vietnam remains an attractive investment destination amid global supply-chain restructuring, uncertainties surrounding tariffs and U.S. efforts to prevent Vietnam from serving as a “transshipment hub” for Chinese goods significantly increase policy risk (6). When combined with a domestic system operating in campaign mode, foreign investors tend to shorten commitment horizons and avoid projects which require high institutional stability for their coming to profitable fruition.

There is no immediate capital flight. Yet confidence in long-term prospects erodes. This form of market impact is particularly dangerous because it does not immediately register in macroeconomic indicators, revealing itself instead through data on capital quality, investment duration, and willingness to transfer technology.

Reversal of Roles Between Institutions and the Market 

After the 14th Congress, the core economic question is no longer whether Vietnam can achieve 10 percent growth for several years, but whether its economy is being turned towards a trajectory in which the market must adapt to the operating tempo of political institutions—rather than such institutions creating space for the market to develop according to its own logic (7).

This represents a composite transmission channel, where all prior effects converge. If sustained, the market will continues to function on its own but will grow increasingly cautious, prioritizing safety over innovation, while the economy’s self-governance in making timely corrections erodes—especially as the labor force ages rapidly.

The overall institutional shock to Vietnam’s economy following the 14th Party Congress has not produced an immediate economic crisis. Instead, it is transmitting into the market through multiple channels concerns that drive decision-making—expectations, risk calculations, investment structures, competition, and long-term confidence. These concerns interact and reinforce one another, altering how the economy actually operates without dramatic surface-level disruption.

The deeper concern lies not in ambitious growth aspirations, but in the risk that the market becomes increasingly subordinated to the short-term operational rhythm of institutions. If this trajectory is not recognized and corrected in time, short-term growth gains may be purchased at the cost of prolonged fragility in the medium and long term—a price often recognized only when corrective capacity has already declined.

References:
(1) CFR – Vietnam’s Most Important Party Congress in Years…
(2) Thanh Tra – Encouraging and Protecting Officials Who Dare to Act
(3) EVN – International Impressions of Vietnam’s Breakthrough Economic Orientation
(4) Reuters – Vietnam Targets $55 Billion in Foreign Loans…
(5) CFR – same as (1)
(6) SCMP – Why One Clause in the US–Vietnam Trade Deal Is Sparking Concern
(7) VietnamPlus – Rethinking Vietnam’s Growth Model

Introduction 

The series “Vietnam: Shocks to the System After the 14th Party Congress” is published by a group of independent analysts and observers who closely track Vietnam’s political, economic, social, foreign policy, defense, and security dynamics in the new circumstances following on the14th Party Congress. Published in installments, the series aims to identify a phase of transition—an evolution in which Vietnam will experience the most profound and comprehensive undertaking of institutional experimentation since the launch of Đổi Mới, a time characterized by high-intensity change, accelerated tempo, and unprecedented levels of risk.

These essays were formulated within the framework of the new US – Vietnam Project of the Caux Round Table, a joint venture of concerned Vietnamese thought leaders and policy experts and Americans engaged with the contemporary unfolding of Vietnamese civilization.

The first essay in the series was written by Mr. Le Than. Mr. Lê Thân is well-known for incarceration as a political prisoner in the infamous prison on Con Son Island off South Vietnam under the Saigon Government during the Vietnam War.  In his later years, he served as the Chairman of the Lê Hiếu Đằng Club, a distinguished position that demonstrated his continued and strong commitment to social engagement after the war, so that his standing was not defined solely by his past imprisonment for revolutionary activities.

That Mr. Lê Thân was entrusted with the position of Chairman of the Club reflected several important qualities: he enjoys great respect among former political prisoners and intellectuals; he holds to an independent and forthright stance, avoiding opportunism, and his spirit of “lifelong struggle” before and after 1975. In the former South Vietnam, he struggled as a prisoner in Con Son Prison. After 1975, he continued to struggle for his values and vision by raising his voice as a citizen, guided by moral integrity and conscience.

What makes Mr. Lê Thân particularly distinctive is the historical continuity of being a political prisoner during wartime and then a critical, engaged citizen in peacetime. Not everyone who was imprisoned for revolutionary activities has had the courage to continue speaking out later in life. Mr. Lê Thân has done so with dignity, moderation, and unwavering determination.

First Essay: Institutions as the Bottleneck of All Bottlenecks – How Will Power Be Deployed? 

In the aftermath of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), observers—both domestic and international—have focused not only on specific individual appointments , but on a more fundamental set of structural challenges: What power structure will govern Vietnam going forward, and can the existing institutional framework absorb, regulate, and adapt to an increasingly concentrated configuration of authority? Or, under the leadership of Tô Lâm, will Vietnam adopt a Law regulating its Communist Party?

After the 14th Party Congress, observers inside and outside Vietnam have focused not only on who was appointed to what position but, more profoundly, on  the questions of  how will authoritative power  be exercised in this new phase of Vietnam’s modern history, and how  current institutions, in response to the growing concentration of authoritative power, will be  able to bear this burden, exercise  oversight, and self-correct when necessary.  

The emphatic consolidation of authority in a central fulcrum of leadership raises not only questions about individuals, but—more importantly—about the rules of the game. As personalized authority increasingly overrides traditional mechanisms for collective leadership, where exactly is the fault line between effective governance and risks to institutions? Are the existing designs of Party, State, and oversight bodies still adequate, or are structural limits to their ability to absorb and control such centralized power being exposed?

Given these developments and  the very serious questions they bring to our minds, debates over the possible legal legitimation of the role and responsibilities of the Communist Party of Vietnam—under one legal form or another—is no longer just speculative. Such debates reflect a practical necessity: when the exercise of power changes its modality, the subordinate institutional framework must change to accommodate the new reality, or else the exercise of power itself becomes the greatest bottleneck undermining systemic accomplishment

At the center of this debate stands General Secretary Tô Lâm, increasingly portrayed by Western media as the beneficiary of a shift towards a leadership modality of “one-person only”— a sharp divergence from Vietnam’s tradition of collective leadership which, for decades, functioned as an internal risk-reduction mechanism buttressing Vietnam’s political system.

 

Yet focusing solely on institutionalization of solitary individualism risks missing a deeper reality. The shock to the political system left by the 14th Congress does not implicate any single leader, but plays out in the growing collision between the Communist Party’s actual mode of exercising power and the legal–institutional framework that the Vietnamese state officially claims to honor and implement (1).

“One butt, two chairs”:  A choice of system, not just a temporary expedient 

International media outlets such as the BBC, Reuters, Bloomberg, and the South China Morning Post have increasingly framed the prospect of Tô Lâm simultaneously holding the positions of General Secretary and State President not as a temporary expedient, but as a structural choice. Their analyses converge on one point: this is an attempt to redesign the locus of power in order to overcome fragmentation within the current system.

This interpretation is not without merit. For years, Vietnam’s political apparatus has been criticized as slow-moving, multilayered, and divided among the Party, the State, and the Government. Major decisions often fall into a “collective responsibility trap,” where accountability is diluted to better hold up the banner of collective leadership.

In this context, the “one butt, two chairs” arrangement is seen as shortening channels of decision-making and consolidating authority around a clearly defined center. The core institutional problem, however, is not whether power is centralized, but rather this: Vietnam has never designed a system of legal accountability and oversight proportionate to having power concentrated in an individual.

Put differently, power is being concentrated far more rapidly than it is being subordinated to governance.

The National Assembly: Rubber-stamping, not Decision-making 

The upcoming session of the National Assembly—expected to elect Tô Lâm as State President—is accurately perceived by international observers. It is not a forum for debate over who should have authoritative power but only serves as  procedural formality assenting to decisions already made.

This accurately reflects the Assembly’s current institutional role: it does not supervise , lacks the right to veto or to delay, and it cannot decide on the uses of power. The National Assembly neither determines who holds power nor defines the scope of that power; it merely ratifies what has been arranged by Party leaders

 

The deeper issue here is not the mere formalism of parliamentary proceedings, but a structural contradiction between constitutional principles and operational reality. While Vietnam’s Constitution proclaims the state to be “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” the actual manipulation of authoritative power occurs almost entirely within the Communist Party’s decision-making apparatus.

Thus, the National Assembly instead of activating power delegated by the people, has become a connector that legalizes decisions made by a political organization standing above the Law.

The Communist Party: From Ruling Party to an Organization Outside the Law 

After more than half a century of comprehensive control, the Vietnamese Communist Party continues to operate with many characteristics of a revolutionary party—or even a closed organization—rather than as a transparent governing party within a modern rule-of-law state.

The most consequential decisions regarding personnel, policy, and national strategy are made in closed Party forums, then subsequently legalized by state institutions. This produces a legal paradox: an organization that exercises supreme authority over the state and society does not exist as a legal entity accountable either before the law or to citizens.

Under Article 4 of the Constitution, the Communist Party leads the state; yet the Party itself cannot be sued, lacks civil legal personality, and bears neither criminal nor civil liability as an organization. When a policy leads to serious consequences, responsibility therefore can only be assigned to individuals or state agencies—while the organization that made the ultimate decision remains free of all accountability mechanisms.

For years, intellectuals have proposed expeditiously enacting a Law applicable to the activities of the Communist Party. Such proposals have never gained traction, precisely because such codification of Article 4 of the Constitution would, in principle, subject the Party to oversight by the Government, the National Assembly, and the courts.

Yet such oversight is precisely the foundational requirement of any rule-of-law society. And it is precisely why this issue remains the institutional bottleneck of all bottlenecks, with no clear indication that it will be resolved.

This unresolved “shadow” of rogue autonomy renders any concentration of power the more dangerous: the more power is centralized outside the Law, the more glaring the accountability vacuum becomes. To mitigate this risk, a Law applicable to the Communist Party would need to define, at minimum: the Party’s legal status; the basis of its legitimacy; principles governing its accountability and oversight; boundaries between Party, State, and society; internal democracy; and the Party’s relationship with civil society (2).

Administrative Restructuring and Systemic Retrenchment 

Following the 14th Congress, the important question is no longer merely who occupies which positions, but how much restructuring can the system tolerate. The growing “underground discontent” within the bureaucracy does not constitute political opposition, but rather operational frustration: unclear lines of responsibility, legal and other risks to bureaucrats even when procedures are followed, and accusations of inertia when action is avoided.

These are textbook symptoms of worrisome institutional bottlenecks. When power is centralized without clear responsibility frameworks, a subordinate bureaucratic system’s natural responses are retrenchment and risk avoidance.  But, if discipline is tightened and personnel reshuffled without addressing legal foundations, governance effectiveness will decline rather than improve, increasing the risk of administrative paralysis.

The best structure: institutions or persons? 

The key question posed by international observers is whether this appointment to two offices will apply only in the case of  Tô Lâm, or whether it will evolve into a more permanent institutional arrangement.

If it remains just a one-time scenario , the system may tolerate it as an exception. But if it marks the beginning of a new, long-term, governance model, Vietnam must confront a question it has never fully answered: who oversees the leader when power is concentrated in a single individual within a system where the Party itself stands outside all legal accountability?

To date, there have been no clear signals of constitutional revision or the creation of new oversight mechanisms. As a result, power consolidation is proceeding far faster than the creation of institutional checks and balances—a formula historically associated with the accumulation of systemic d risk.

Conclusion: An Institutional Question Without an Answer 

This article doe snot  revolve around  Tô Lâm as an individual. It revolves around a single axial development: power is being consolidated rapidly, while legitimacy, legal status, and accountability mechanisms remain stagnant—or in some respects, have regressed.

 

The “one butt, two chairs” arrangement’, the National Assembly’s role of only formalism, bureaucratic retrenchment and constitutional contradictions over the source of authority, are not isolated phenomena. They are manifestations of one signal institutional bottleneck.

The final question of this essay is therefore not whether Tô Lâm wields sufficient power, but whether the system possesses enough capacity to absorb that power without paralyzing itself—or triggering a crisis of legitimacy. And the core question beneath all others remains: will Tô Lâm dare to breakup this heavy-handed institutional bottleneck by permitting adoption of a Law governing the Communist Party of Vietnam? (3)

 

References 

(1) BBC Vietnamese: 90 Years of the CPV: What Legal Basis for Its Existence and Rule? https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam-51348557

(2) Luật Khoa Magazine: Petition 72 and the Public Constitution: Citizens and Constitutional Participation https://luatkhoa.com/2025/03/kien-nghi-72-va-hien-phap-dai-chung-khi-cong-dan-tham-gia-lap-hien/

(3) BBC Vietnamese: Challenging the State to Debate the Constitution
https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2013/11/131117_vn_constitution_petition72_aims

Coming up in Part 2:
The Economy – When Institutional Shockwaves Begin to Spill into the Market
(Author: Dr. Nguyễn Xuân Nghĩa)