Article 2:

ACCUMULATING INHERENT PARADOXES: VIETNAM’S PATH FORWARD?

Đinh Hoàng Thắng

Fellow, The Caux Round Table

Summary: Vietnam faces five inherent paradoxes: rapid development with weak institutional foundations; aggressive globalization but low domestic resilience; a dynamic society with slow governance reform; growth reliant on external forces while internal capacity is fragile; and high aspirations with inefficient allocation of resources. Three development scenarios are outlined: maintaining the status quo, controlled reform, or disruptive instability. Controlled reform is deemed most feasible, requiring political consensus, institutional restructuring, and enhanced governance capacity. Lessons from other countries highlight the importance of timely reforms but with stability alongside structural transformation. Central to this scenario is system  capacity for self-adjustment: identifying problems, learning, correcting mistakes, and generating new momentum. Risks implicit in the disruptive scenario include trust crises, social fragmentation, and geopolitical pressures. Vietnam must pursue a new development trajectory that balances stability with courageous reform, aiming for sustainable growth having deeper and broader social impact.

1. Five Internal Paradoxes of Vietnam

Vietnam’s current political–economic system is confronting five profound internal paradoxes that reflect tensions between tradition and modernization. 

The first paradox lies in the divide between economics and politics: the economy functions under a socialist-oriented market mechanism, sustaining GDP growth of 6–7% over decades and attracting massive FDI from corporations such as Samsung, Intel, and Foxconn. Yet the political system maintains tight control through the Communist Party, with strategic decisions such as State Owned Enterprise leadership appointments and media censorship, creating a misalignment between economic openness and ideological constraints.

The second paradox emerges from overusing the slogan of “renovation,” repeated again and again since the 1986 Đổi Mới reforms, while substantive reform progresses slowly. Vietnam has integrated into the WTO, CPTPP, and EVFTA, but core sectors such as land, State Owned Enterprise restructuring (accounting for roughly 30% of GDP), and administrative reform remain sluggish. Despite Party Congress XIII calling for breaking the “ask–give mechanism”, bureaucratic procedures and corruption still hinder progress, making reform largely superficial.

Third, traditional ideological legitimacy—Marxism–Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought—has weakened, especially among younger generations exposed to social media and global values. In contrast, pragmatic legitimacy based on stability and economic growth has become central, with the motto “stability above all” shaping decisions from COVID-19 management to growth-focused policies despite inflation.

The fourth paradox is sustaining a powerful state apparatus with dense security and media control when society’s trust is longer an absolute. Scandals such as Formosa, Việt Á, and the Trịnh Xuân Thanh case eroded public confidence, while PAPI surveys indicate declining satisfaction with local authorities, reflecting a widening gap between the state and citizens.

Lastly, internal competition among senior cadres and officials has intensified, with factions vying for key positions in the Politburo and Central Committee. The upcoming 14th Party Congress is expected to witness behind-the-scenes struggles for top leadership, where economic interests intertwine with power, leading to the allocation of state resources through factional bargaining.

Together, these five paradoxes create a pattern of “accumulative tension”—gradual layering of contradictions beneath a seemingly stable surface. Compared with Eastern Europe before 1989, Vietnam shows similar dynamics: partial marketization generating inequality, ideological decline replaced by pragmatism, strong power but weakening trust, and factional infighting within Party and State leadership. Vietnam has avoided sudden collapse thanks to sustained growth and stronger control, but if this “accumulation” continues, similar abrupt ruptures may occur unless deep reform releases the pressure.

2. Three Future Development Scenarios

From a political–philosophical perspective, three developmental scenarios for Vietnam after the 14th Party Congress reflect tension between static stability (Aristotle’s stasis) and dialectical evolution (Hegel’s synthesis) where confronting internal contradictions may lead either to structural renewal or to collapse.

Scenario one would be to reinforce the current model which would maintain comprehensive Communist Party control while harmonizing market economics with such centralized authority. Advantages include social stability, avoidance of Soviet-style collapse, and continued 6–7% GDP growth similar to China under Xi Jinping, ensuring FDI attraction and regional stability. However, internal contradictions would continue to accumulate: outdated ideology would collide with market reality, corruption would exploit bureaucratic weaknesses, inequality would rise (Gini increasing from 0.35 to 0.43 in 15 years), and societal trust would erode, risking eventual rupture within 10–15 years. Estimated probability of implementation: 65%.

Scenario two – controlled reform – would aim to establish a new developmental orientation through internal pluralization within the Party, reduce State Owned Enterprise dominance, reform land ownership opportunities, and enhance transparency. Following Hegel, this would implement synthesis—transforming the inconsistency of ideological orthodoxy with free-market practices into a higher form of supervised democratic governance. Benefits would include productivity gains, restored trust, and a transformation similar to Đổi Mới 1986 or Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, while avoiding Gorbachev-style destabilization. Risks would include factional conflict and loss of central control. Estimated probability of implementation: 20%.

Scenario three – disorder and instability – would see an increase in ideological decline, social distrust, fragmentation of authority, inflation, and global shocks. This Marxian crisis would resemble Eastern Europe 1989—potentially enabling democratic restructuring but risking severe chaos, economic collapse, and foreign intervention. Estimated probability of implementation: 15%.

In conclusion, scenario one has the advantage but would bring on pressure; scenario two is most sustainable yet difficult; scenario three is dangerous and must be prevented.

3. Assessing the Controlled Reform Scenario

Vietnam stands at a strategic crossroads amid socio-economic transformation and geopolitical pressures. Controlled reform emerges as a feasible path to create a new developmental orientation—reducing personalized power, strengthening rule of law, enhancing political adaptability, and cautiously expanding civic space. This would not be a rupture breaking away from the revolution but an evolutionary renewal leveraging existing solid accomplishments.

Reducing personalized leadership means shifting from individual-centric authority to more collective, professional governance and to transparent merit-based leadership selection. 

Strengthening rule of law requires greater judicial independence and legal accountability across all state institutions, including the ruling party, thereby curbing abuse of power and fostering investor confidence. Enhancing self-adjusting capacity involves creating internal feedback mechanisms, dialogues with experts, and independent policy research. Controlled civic space expansion allows NGOs, social organizations, and intellectual forums to operate within legal frameworks, turning social input into governance assets.

Though difficult and requiring leadership consensus, this pathway is more sustainable than merely reinforcing the old model. Global lessons show controlled reform (Singapore, South Korea) can transition authoritarian modernizing systems into effective democratic governance. A phased 5–10 year roadmap is proposed—from legal groundwork and pilot reforms, to institutional oversight strengthening, to digital transparency integration. With decisive leadership and international cooperation, Vietnam can position itself as a new Southeast Asian development model.

A very appropriate equilibrium development model for Vietnam to emulate is Singapore.  Lee Kwan Yew and his People’s Action Party followed a blended approach to development using both dominant government priority setting and regulation and private sector self-help in education and entrepreneurship.  The PAP, with over 60% support from voting citizens and so majority control of the national assembly, built a strong state – no chewing gum allowed! – but it provided cultural, social, and market spaces for individual initiatives to innovate and create wealth, social capitals and human capitals.

4. Lessons from “Brother Nations”

Vietnam is entering a decisive historical phase marked by economic growth alongside deepening paradoxes: rising inequality, environmental degradation, bureaucratic inertia, and trust erosion due to corruption scandals. 

Lessons from Eastern Europe and China teach the danger of delaying political reform while crises deepen. In the late 1980s, regimes liberalized economically but suppressed political pluralism; accumulated tensions exploded, with Soviet Russia collapsing illustrating how rigidity destroys legitimacy.

China teaches that economic reform without governance modernization yields diminishing returns: while opening lifted millions from poverty, authoritarian rigidity, debt-driven overexpansion, youth unemployment, and overcentralization under Xi reveal vulnerability.

Vietnam shows parallels: strong growth but widening disparity, unresolved State Owned Enterprise inefficiencies, real estate vulnerabilities, leadership factionalism, and weakening institutional competitiveness. Therefore, Vietnam should: (1) institutionalize leadership succession transparency and competency criteria; (2) strengthen judicial independence and digital transparency to fight corruption; (3) cautiously expand civil society to create legitimate policy feedback channels; (4) invest in adaptive resilience with early-warning governance tools. These steps combine urgency with pragmatism, transforming paradox into opportunity.

5. The Role of Self-Adjustment Capacity

Vietnam’s central question is no longer merely growth versus stability, but whether its political system can self-adjust to survive historically. Systems endure only when they do not consider themselves absolute. True strength lies not in coercion but in acknowledging limits, listening to warning signals, and adapting proactively.

Today, legitimacy must evolve beyond economic performance toward inclusive development, transparent governance, and a renewed “social contract” recognizing citizens as active participants, not simply governed subjects.

A viable future requires lawful constraints on power, acceptance of criticism as constructive, and recognition of civil society as a governance partner. A system capable of self-adjustment transforms pressure into reform momentum, prevents accumulated paradoxes from turning into crises and instead shapes a new direction  for developmental.

6. Risks of the Instability Scenario

Vietnam may still fall into instability if it loses the capacity to adapt. Accumulated contradictions could then easily trigger combined economic, political, and social crises—slowing growth, financial vulnerabilities, unemployment, persistent corruption scandals, leadership fragmentation, and declining public trust.

External shocks—US–China rivalry, global recession, geopolitical turbulence—could intensify internal fragility, shifting away from controlling tensions to systemic disintegration. Eastern Europe’s rapid collapse illustrates the danger of delayed reform. Vietnam’s stronger control capacity offers resilience, but resilience is not immunity. If social trust weakens, inequality deepens, leadership rivalries intensify, dialogue narrows, and international confidence erodes, instability becomes a real, not hypothetical, threat.

7. Building a New Developmental Orientation for Vietnam

The heart of the matter is not GDP growth, but the duties that come with political power: securing national safety, economic prosperity, human dignity, and the future of the generations to come. Power must serve the nation, not itself. Vietnam needs a developmental orientation that balances stability with controlled reform, modern governance with societal participation, and state strength with community empowerment. Maintaining the current model would preserve stability in the short term but risks medium-term erosion of legitimacy; choosing the path of instability, conversely, would be economically and socially devastating.

Thus, the most reasonable—and most difficult—path is controlled reform: strengthening rule of law, improving governance, cautiously expanding civic space, institutionalizing leadership succession, and building trust-based legitimacy. If chosen after the 14th Congress, Vietnam can thus transform its accumulated contradictions into a foundation for renewed legitimacy, avoiding Eastern Europe’s collapse and China’s fragility, and emerging as a distinctive Southeast Asian model: stable yet adaptive, globally integrated yet culturally grounded, powerful yet accountable, and above all—governance that truly serves the Vietnamese people.

Written December 2025 for the Caux Round Table which, in 1986, was founded in Caux, Switzerland; is incorporated in the United States of America; and has its Administrative Office in, St Paul, Minnesota

In keeping with the New Year greeting of Professor Stephen Young, Director of CRT, in His grace, God has granted us the gift of the New Year within ourselves. With the strength and grace so bestowed upon us, we can become peacemakers. At any moment, we can accept responsibility and take action. God is waiting for us to stand up; He has made it possible for us to set right what has gone wrong. It is in this spirit of solidarity that, in recent years, CRT has placed particular emphasis on East–West dialogue, intercivilizational exchange, and the study of systemic transformation in post-socialist, reforming, and transitional societies, including China, Vietnam, Eastern Europe, and Russia. Presented below are the two most recent contributions to this ongoing endeavor by Dr. Đinh Hoàng Thắng, CRT Fellow.

First Essay: 

Collapse on the One Hand; Sustainability on the other: Why did the Soviet System fail in Russia and Eastern Europe but Socialism in China still exists – at least until now?

Đinh Hoàng Thắng

Fellow, The Caux Round Table

In our lifetimes, global political history has witnessed contrasting trajectories between leading socialist systems. The Soviet system in Russia and its client states in Eastern Europe rapidly collapsed while in China a socialist system of governance and economy has survived through controlled reforms under the direction of a dominant centralized Party and State authority apparatus. The question is inevitable: How could systems born from the same ideological orientation arrive at such different outcomes?

The quick answer is that history is not teleological – not in any way driven by fixed forces towards one necessary end state. Rather, history, even understood as directed by dialectical materialism, is an open-ended, unplanned process of actions and connected reactions, a never-ending process of adjustments, change and evolution.  The “now” of any moment in history has proceeded from a “past” and is shaping the “future”.

Thus, even socialism as an ideal social arrangement cannot be monolithic. Socialism in China was not destined to replicate socialism in Russia.

Thus, the inconsistent evolutions of socialism in Russia and China depended on different decision-making dynamics.  The Russian transition out of Stalinism took a different course than did the Chinese transition out of Maoism. As President Xi Jinping continually insists Chinese socialism evolved under the guidance of “Chinese Characteristics”. The two processes of transition took remnants of an established order and retained some, reorganized others, contested alternatives, and eventually re-configured governing institutions into a new politics.

We then need to consider what “Russian” characteristics” drove the evolution of socialism in Russia and what specific “Chinese” characteristics have produced the Xi Jinping model of political legitimacy and economic development in China.

1. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Failure Born from an Accumulation of errors, leading to Crisis and then to Loss of Direction

Before collapsing, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies had endured a prolonged period of economic, political and cultural stagnation. Centrally planned economies reached the limits of their regulatory capacity: an inability to provide incentives for innovation, operational inefficiency, and growing disconnection from real market demands. In parallel, ideological legitimacy evaporated, at first slowly and then dramatically. Once appealing slogans lost their power to persuade the public of what was right and what was wrong because the gap between regime propaganda and lived reality had grown too wide.  When the propaganda lost its moral power, the Soviet regimes lost their ability to command obedience and respect.

More importantly, the final phase, one of “accumulation of shortcomings and errors”, of these intertwined Soviet systems brought about not strength, but introduced self-destructive forces. Reforms came too late, or were only half-hearted. Political structures lost cohesion as rejection of their authority spread across society . Such socialism developed what could be called “existential fatigue.” Confidence in the endurance of the model decayed psychologically long before collapse arrived politically. When such internal contradictions reached a certain threshold, instead of forming a coherent and effective trajectory into the future—a directional alignment capable of holding the system together—those internal contradictions produced fragmentation, confrontation, and eventually sudden disintegration.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the Soviet states of Eastern Europe collapsed from any single political incident. Their fall came from institutional gridlock, which had taken decades of dysfunctions to accumulate system-destroying critical mass. Once legitimacy crumbled and the state lost its capacity to mobilize society, even a moderate shock was enough to bring down a structure already hollowed out from within. In other words, the Soviet–Eastern European collapse resulted from the failure of their transition out of original orthodoxy, a systemic failure to forestall the accumulation of disappointments, resentments, malingering obstructions, profiteering, and other refusals of obedience.   These Soviet regimes failed to envision and implement a new path capable of reconciling contradictions and reviving historical vitality.

We might then consider what “Russian” characteristics contributed to the failure of the Soviet regime. An obvious consideration is the Muscovite tradition of cruel rulers and compliant sycophants. Russia arose from a social structure dualism of the Tsar and the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church where no freedoms existed either in politics or religion.  Thus, Russians have carried into the present a national character of servile accommodation. Inventiveness, pragmatism, checks and balances, decentralized flexibility have never characterized Russian culture, society or politics.

2. The Chinese transition out of Maoism: Surviving Through Accumulating Power and Controlling institutional Assignments

Sharing the same socialist ideological foundation, China nonetheless chose a different transitional path when the shortcomings of Maoist orthodoxy became evident. After the traumatic disruptions of the Maoist era, China gave itself a reform program marked by strong pragmatism. Unlike the Soviet Union, China moved earlier and more decisively in restructuring its economy while still retaining a highly rigid hierarchy for its politics.

What mattered most was not just generating economic growth, but the creation of a new basis for regime legitimacy—one derived from delivering development, improving livelihoods, and utilizing nationalism as a powerful binding force. China has also advanced further than many nations in building sophisticated tools for social control, deploying security and digital technologies extensively to manage dissent.

As a result, China has formed what may be called a “directional alignment of power”: a trajectory in which the state holds absolute authority while refusing to abandon the imperative of development. Ideology has been “pragmatized”: socialism remains the rhetoric, but the underlying logic is one of power, national strategy, and economic advancement. This helps China avoid an Eastern European-style shock—at least in the short term.

This successful transition was made possible through the deployment of “Chinese” characteristics, policies borrowed from 2,000 years of imperial order, where individual dynasties might have risen to power and then collapsed but a habit of showing pragmatic concern for social order from family, to village, to district and finally the state was reinvigorated again and again.

3.  The Chinese Communist Party’s Survival Until Today Does Not Guarantee Its Future Durability

However, the continuing survival of Chinese socialism should not be mistaken for a guarantee of its sustainability. Beneath its seemingly stable surface lies mounting pressure: slowing growth, demographic decline, widening inequality, social tensions, and sustained international strategic competition. All of these dynamics create new, or exacerbate existing, contradictions within the system, contradictions which, day by day, are accumulating the power to destabilize China’s future.

Just as the Soviet Union once believed itself “too strong to fall,” China is not immune to the forces which dictate history. Chinese socialism did not escape history but began its adjustment to historical realities before the Russian Soviet leaders did.  Socialist Russian and Eastern European regimes allowed history to push them into corners where collapse was their only future.  But history is still grinding away at Chinese Socialism. More challenges to the regime are to come. 

So, if one must explain why Soviet Russia and its Eastern Europe client states disappeared while Communist China still endures, the reasons are:

• Russia and Eastern Europe accumulated dysfunctions and weaknesses, leading to, first, a loss of reform options and then collapse
• China sustained centralized ruling power through pragmatic economic reforms producing continued interim survival

But history remains open to change and new developments. The decisive question for Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China is: the coming accumulation of circumstantial realities will generate what kind of a governing regime?

Written December 2025 for the Caux Round Table which, in 1986, was founded in Caux, Switzerland; is incorporated in the United States of America; and has its Administrative Office in, St Paul, Minnesota

With my daughter and her two daughters, I attended the Christmas Eve service and carol singing at the Congregational Church in Wellfleet, Massachusetts.  The church was founded in 1721.  Listening to the Gospel readings on the birth of the baby Jesus and singing the old familiar carols, I found my mind spontaneously unfolding in a new direction, most likely responding to reactions on our new world order of wars – combat and trade – and more craven submission to the will of the strong and the domineering.

The message of Christmas Eve presented to us was most traditional, in keeping with my memories of Unitarian Christmas Eve services in decades past: God sent Jesus to be our savior; God’s word was thus made flesh; his will was incarnated in human form.  Our role in the service and in life – like that of the shepherds invited by the angels to go and worship the newborn babe and the wise men delegated to bringing him incense and myrrh – was to celebrate Jesus’ power, goodness and glory.

Part of me started to ask: how will Christ bring peace to Ukraine and Gaza?

Is that his job or is it ours?

After all, we have agency.  After all, our flesh is not forbidden from internalizing the Word of God and also making it present in our human form.

In his grace, the God of Jesus has also enabled us to receive his gift in ourselves.  With our power, our grace, we can be the peacemakers.  We can accept, at any time, responsibility and act. God is waiting for us to step up.  He has made it possible for us to make things right.

Something of God has been incarnated in each of us – but can we find that within ourselves?

The Christmas carols affirmed: “So God imparts to human hearts the blessings of his heaven; Christ enter in and be born in us this day” (“O Little Town of Bethlehem”); “Let every heart prepare him room” (“Joy to the World”).

As Rabbi Hillel asked: “If not us, then who?”

Christianity is not alone in its expectations that we, ourselves, must serve and do what is right.

The Buddha taught us to keep to the middle path and be righteous.  His Noble Eightfold Path, open to us at any time upon our opening ourselves up to possibility, is: right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration.

Qur’an reveals that each of us was born invested with the breath of God in order that we serve as his khalifa – steward – in his creation.  As God is merciful and compassionate, so too are we made also to be merciful and compassionate.

Confucius was certain that, “To see what is right and not to do it is want of courage.”  He added that, “A person with inner quality thinks of virtue; the small-minded person thinks of selfish advantage.”

Singer Bonnie Raitt put it this way in one of her songs:

You step out on the track in the pourin’ rain.
And when you get run over, well, you blame the train.
… And don’t you think that you had enough?  Ain’t it time to get a different view?
Can’t just wait around for what you want, it’s all about the way you choose.
Ain’t nobody else that can make things right.
Baby, it’s down to you.

So, please celebrate not just the story of the baby Jesus, but your story – the story of your grace bestowed upon you to make this a better world, the good news of how you will employ your goodwill to bring about more peace on this earth.

Sincerely yours and Happy New Year,

A few days ago, I listened to President Trump’s speech to the American people.  I thought he was trying too hard to make a sale.

I then reflected, but only very briefly, on the Caux Round table’s advocacy of “discourse” as a fundamental moral parameter for good public governance.  With Trump’s speech in mind, I wondered if we need to add to our recommendation more definition.  Just what is moral discourse?

As a child, I heard the common American saying, “There’s a sucker born every minute” or “There’s one born every minute.”  In junior high school, I think, I first read Mark Twain’s allegorical novel about Americans – Adventures of Huckleberry Finn.  I took it as a call to be self-reliant and curious, but also as a warning to always be on your guard.

The novel has Huck Finn and his friend, Jim, run into two traveling salesmen, who it quickly becomes clear are con men profiting from duping the kind and the decent – but gullible – among us.

One presents himself and performs as the king of France, the pretender to the throne and his sidekick passes himself off as the duke of Bridgewater.  The king is persuasive, smooth-talking and opportunistic.  He sells The Royal Nonesuch (a fake theatrical performance which will come to town) and the Wilks inheritance, where he pretends to be an English heir selling a false claim to an estate.

Twain uses these satirical fictional characters to expose gullibility, greed and moral blindness on the part of naïve and well-intentioned, small-town and provincial Americans.

In real life, there was P.T. Barnum, who ran a traveling circus going from town to town making money by selling entertaining acts and the chance to see unusual animals.  He is remembered for advising: “Nobody ever lost a dollar by underestimating the taste of the American public” and “No one in this world…has ever lost money by underestimating the intelligence of the great masses of the plain people.”

In the December 19 edition of the Wall Street Journal, Joseph Eptsein published his assessment of Donald Trump as very much in this American tradition of traveling salesmen, who might be just con men.  Epstein’s take on Trump is that he is a slick salesman with big claims and few deliverables.

Here are excerpts from Epstein’s essay:

President Trump’s recent commercials for Trump wristwatches have caught my attention.  In one commercial, three watches are shown, one with a red face between the other two.  All three have the name Trump on them.  Mr. Trump wears the red-faced watch and urges us to buy one, which, along with putting money in his pocket, would show support for him and his movement.

I don’t know for certain if a president’s selling his own merchandise is unprecedented, but it strikes me as extraordinary.  A billionaire, he surely doesn’t need the money.  What I suspect he does need is the action.  A real estate man, builder though he has been, he is also a salesman.  My guess is that it’s through selling, closing the deal, that he gets his true kicks.

Mr. Trump seems to me a particular kind of salesman – the kind once known as a “borax man.” In the Chicago of my youth, a borax man was an especially slick salesman, aggressive and relentless, usually specializing in home-improvement products.  These improvements didn’t improve anywhere near so thoroughly as the borax man promised.  The term derives from the white crystalline powder used in cleaning, soldering, glass making and in pesticides, which in centuries past was sold as a cure-all.  Soon it came to mean tawdry and second-class goods. …

Mr. Trump has been called a fascist, an authoritarian, a dictator and more.  None of these terms has seemed to me anywhere near a good fit.  All are too elevated.  Mr. Trump, not the most learned of men, may never have even heard of some of these words before he was called them.  A borax man seems a finer, near-perfect fit.

As a borax man, Donald Trump is attempting to sell the greatest of all products: the promise to return America to its former greatness.  Like all borax men, he doesn’t really deliver the product.…

Like the good borax man that he is, Mr. Trump is always congratulating himself, telling Americans about all the good things he has done for them – with lots more on the way.  My father used to say that a salesman first has to sell himself.  Mr. Trump attempts to do this, hiring only cabinet members who will flatter him, over and over again telling us of all the wars he’s stopped, the economic growth he’s caused, the crime he’s prevented.  Boraxian.

I find it helpful to think of our president as a slick and aggressive salesman.  His modus operandi generally is better understood when he is so considered.  His claims are more easily examined and, often necessarily, refuted when understood as coming from a high-pressure salesman.  Doing so also clears away, at least for me, any remaining aspects of Trump derangement syndrome.  I intend to view him as the ultimate borax man for the remainder of his time in office and I invite you to do likewise.

Our Vietnamese correspondent has shared with me his generally optimistic report on the political environment which will shape decisions at the forthcoming Party Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

I note with interest the discussion of traditional Vietnamese sensitivity to the signals we mere humans get from Heaven as to our fates as time and space cycle through the years.

The Vietnamese Communist Party Today Compared with Forty Years Ago: The 14th Party Congress and the 6th Party Congress — Parallels, Divergences, and Enduring Historical Undercurrents. 

Four decades after the Sixth Party Congress—an event widely regarded as having opened a historic door toward a more flexible economic order (Đổi Mới)—Vietnam once again confronts a life-defining political moment: a critical transition of power with far-reaching consequences.

Hoàng Trường

The Fourteenth Party Congress is approaching amid intensifying economic, political, and social pressures, a visible erosion of public trust, and increasingly complex factional maneuvering among highly placed officials.

The reappearance of familiar patterns in the operation of power has led many observers to pose an unsettling question: is history repeating itself—once again moving through familiar cycles of power?

A comparison between the 14th Party Congress (2026) and the 6th Party Congress (1986) reveals notable similarities, while also exposing fundamental differences that reflect both the changing times and the evolving structure and operation of totalitarian power.

I. Parallels: When Power Becomes Trapped in Bargaining

1. Deadlock and infighting among the most prominent cadres and officials

In the lead-up to the Sixth Party Congress, Lê Đức Thọ—despite advanced age and declining health—was unwilling to step aside. Phạm Văn Đồng and Trường Chinh were forced into compromise in order to prevent factional conflict from spiraling out of control. A transitional arrangement was devised: Trường Chinh would preside over the Congress, then hand over leadership to Nguyễn Văn Linh—a new figure representing the emerging reformist tendency.

Ahead of the Fourteenth Congress, a similar pattern of “forced compromise” has once again emerged. Central Committee meetings have been postponed repeatedly (three times), and personnel lists revised again and again—clear indications that no faction has yet secured overwhelming dominance.

The crucial parallel lies here: while the overall strategic direction is widely acknowledged, personnel arrangements have become the central bottleneck.

In 1986, despite fierce debate, senior leaders recognized that the centrally planned economic model had reached its limits. Likewise, by 2026, a growing consensus has formed that growth driven by land rents, privileges, and easy capital has exhausted its momentum.

The Politburo has issued Resolution 68, effectively mandating a shift in development priorities toward the private sector. Yet disagreements over who should lead this transformation have prolonged internal division for more than a year.

2. A shared denominator: erosion of social trust

From 1975 to 1986, the subsidy-based economic model plunged everyday life into severe deprivation. Public confidence deteriorated rapidly.

Today, although surface-level material conditions have changed dramatically, the psychological parallels are unmistakable:

• Businesses are exhausted by overlapping inspections and audits;
• The business environment is obstructed by fear of making mistakes and by interference from enforcement agencies lacking accountability;
• Confidence in the future is declining as opportunities are squeezed by rent-seeking power groups intent on expanding their privileges.

As in 1986, society is fatigued, and expectations for a decisive change are once again on the rise.

II. Divergences: Reversed Regional Roles and a Transformed Power Structure

1. Southern dynamism: from reform driver to controlled subordinate

At the Sixth Party Congress, southern Vietnam was the most powerful engine of reform. The collapse of the slogan “rapid, strong, and steady advance toward socialism” had pushed the country to the brink of hunger—symbolized by nationwide dependence on sorghum imported from the Soviet Union.

Saigon and the southern region—drawing on market experience and economic dynamism—were the first to recover. “Fence-breaking” reforms in pricing, wages, production contracts, and enterprise autonomy laid the practical foundations for Đổi Mới. It was no coincidence that leaders with southern origins later played key roles during the early reform period.

Today, the regional balance of power has shifted. Northern leadership—having absorbed lessons from the post-1986 period, when the South enjoyed substantial autonomy—has narrowed the South’s room for maneuver, especially following the Nguyễn Tấn Dũng era and its controversial state-conglomerate model described as “steel fists.”

If 1986 marked northern concession to southern pragmatism, 2026 reflects a reassertion of centralized northern control.

2. Hunger and aspiration: different forms, the same political dynamic

In 1986, hunger was literal. In 2026, society “hungers” for the rule of law, while businesses hunger for economic freedom and thirst for a transparent, healthy legal environment.

Where past deprivation stemmed from a flawed economic model, today’s exhaustion arises from relentless inspections, administrative coercion by the security apparatus, and weak accountability among political leaders. New and troubling features have emerged: investigative and executive power now forms a wall that blocks capital, innovation, and production at the very moment they begin to take shape.

3. The rise of a socio-spiritual dimension

A defining feature of the current period is the strong resonance of traditional socio-spiritual sentiment: repeated natural disasters, relentless flooding, and as many as fifteen major storms have nurtured a collective sense that “heaven’s will” is turning against the system.

In East Asian political psychology, such phenomena are often interpreted as signs of dynastic or national transition. If reform-oriented forces knew how to channel this instinctive sentiment, it could become a strategic advantage.

In 1986, this psychological-political dimension was largely absent. In 2026, it has emerged as a powerful undercurrent shaping public emotion and expectation.

III. A Changed World: Globalization and the Limits of Absolute Control

1. Vietnam in 2026 is no longer Vietnam in 1986

• The private sector has become the backbone of economic growth;
• Vietnam occupies a key position in global electronics and semiconductor supply chains;
• Interwoven relations with the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China mean that senior leadership decisions now carry major geopolitical implications.

Under such conditions, a top-down model of total control is clearly ill-suited to an economy and society that demand speed, creativity, and adaptability.

2. Concentrated power—facing harsh limits

The current power structure rests primarily on:

• The expanding influence of the security apparatus;
• Strong totalitarian coercion—rule by police power rather than by the rule of law;
• Governance through repression and sophisticated extraction rather than trust-building;
• Preferential treatment for loyalist networks and obedience over institutional reform.

Meanwhile, businesses—the main drivers of growth—are increasingly constrained by legal uncertainty and intrusive security oversight.

3. “Political flooding” as a metaphor of the age

The persistence of coercive governance despite repeated natural disasters reveals a deeply troubling separation between the state and society.

At the Sixth Party Congress, economic and social crisis forced leadership change. Ahead of the Fourteenth Congress, although society is no less exhausted or gridlocked, the power structure appears more rigid and increasingly entrenched in both status and authority.

This contrast reflects a core trait of modern totalitarian systems: the survival of the system is prioritized above economic performance, social responsibility, or moral values.

Conclusion: Parallels as Reflection, Divergences as Warning

The Sixth Party Congress was a historic turning point that liberated national energy from the constraints of a failed economic model. The Fourteenth Congress could generate a similar breakthrough—or it may simply perpetuate a cycle of power consolidation if not accompanied by meaningful institutional reform.

The parallels lie in social fatigue, resolving deadlocks among the most senior cadres and officials,, and pressures for change from below.

The divergences lie in a more rigid power structure, a stronger private sector, and Vietnam’s far deeper integration into the global system.

And this time, whether acknowledged or not, socio-spiritual forces are also present as an invisible factor shaping collective sentiment.

History never repeats itself exactly. Yet patterns of power distribution, crisis dynamics, and signals from society’s foundations inevitably return—albeit in altered forms.

The Fourteenth Party Congress, therefore, is not merely about personnel appointments. It is a test of Vietnam’s entire philosophy of governance: whether its one-party system can adapt to a new stage of development, or whether it will continue to close itself off from warnings issued by society, markets—and even by nature itself.

The misuse of taxpayer’s money, a form of theft, by many in the Somali community and others who masterminded fraudulent diversions of public funds, is a Minnesota governance scandal and abuse of private power.  Guilt belongs on those who wrongfully diverted the public monies and those in government who stood by in silence and apathy while the theft continued.

A moral question has been raised, asking if it is uncalled for racism or malign bias, based on nationality or religion, to ask that culpable immigrants be called to public account for their actions?

If those asked to account for their behavior in the misuse of public funds are Somali Muslims, the answer is clear: such theft violated Qur’anic standards for righteous conduct on the part of faithful Muslims.

First, let’s consider the Qur’anic prohibition of “corruption.”

“Do not consume one another’s wealth unjustly, nor use it to bribe authorities to sinfully consume part of others’ wealth.” (2:188)

“O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm in justice, witnesses for Allah.” (4:135)

“Allah does not love those who spread corruption (2:205) and promises severe retribution for the unjust.” (2:279)

“Who break the covenant of Allah after contracting it and sever that which Allah has ordered to be joined and cause corruption on earth.  It is those who are the losers.” (2:27)

“O you who have believed, do not consume one another’s wealth unjustly, but only [in lawful] business by mutual consent.” (4:29)

“Give just measure and defraud none … do not cheat your fellow men of what is rightly theirs; nor shall you corrupt the land with evil.” (26:183)

In the Qur’an, the word usually translated as “corruption” is fasād, which comes from a root word meaning to spoil, ruin, decay, become disordered, go bad or act wickedly.  Depending on context, fasād can refer to: moral corruption – wrongdoing, injustice, oppression, spreading vice; social and political disorder – destabilizing society, rebellion, civil strife, breaking public order. Environmental destruction – harming the earth, wasting resources, causing ecological imbalance; economic injustice – cheating, fraud, usury, exploitation.

Thus, in the Qur’an, “corruption” (fasād) is a comprehensive term meaning: any act that damages moral integrity, social harmony, justice or the natural world.  Those who commit fasād, no matter their race, ethnicity or gender, are culpable of wrongdoing and may be justifiably called out in public to account for their transgressions.  If they are Muslim, their claim that others owe them acquiescence with regard to their wrongdoing is absurd.

The Qur’anic standard of rectitude derives from Abrahamic religious values.  Thus, the Ten Commandments demand that “thou shall not steal.”  Jesus said: “You know the commandments: You shall not murder; you shall not commit adultery; you shall not steal…” (Mark 10:19 (cf. Matthew 19:18)  “Take care!  Be on your guard against all kinds of greed; for one’s life does not consist in the abundance of possessions.” (Luke 12:15)  “For it is from within, from the human heart, that evil intentions come: theft, murder, adultery…” (Mark 7:21–23)

Secular American law has always criminalized theft.

Thus, Qur’anic guidance for Somali Muslim immigrants to America largely tracks American standards of virtue, making it quite easy for Somali immigrants to assimilate to traditional American standards of justice and fairplay, even though those standards were originally more Christian and secular than Islamic.

In addition, Qur’an records that Allah created all human persons – men and women equally – to be his stewards in creation – khalifa.  Thus, from a Muslim standpoint, every person born has fiduciary responsibilities to do right in benefiting God’s creation, just as God has instructed.

Those who steal, commit fraud and/or pervert the laws and the course of justice are not stewards, but rather self-seeking abusers of their God-given powers and talents.

For me, it is the solemn responsibility of Somali imams to conscientiously instruct their community in the correct behaviors expected of khalifas, just as I expect rabbis, Catholic priests and Protestant pastors to instruct those of their respective religions in the teachings of the Ten Commandments and Jesus.

There is a worrisome quality about Donald Trump’s temperament which is drawing attention.  To me, his incivility is also driving his new, isolationist, beggar-thy-neighbor national security strategy, as I argue here.

The 14th Party Congress and the “Post-Karma” of To Lam

Nguyen Khac Mai – President, Institute for Vietnamese Wisdom Studies

I draw on the Buddhist concept of karma to reflect on the political path of To Lam. Everything he has done—through body, speech, and mind—during his years as Minister of Public Security and now as the country’s top leader, remains vivid in the memory of the public. These are his past karmas: actions that, in the eyes of many, continue certain “old corruptions” that Ho Chi Minh once warned about, yet also contain elements that disrupt stagnation and generate momentum for reform. Whether these past karmas are virtuous or harmful will be judged by society and by history.

But the transformation of karma is not a solitary journey. One who wishes to transform must repent, must cultivate new and better karmas, and must accept supporting conditions—that is, criticism, oversight, and assistance from society. Without this, goodwill can easily turn into illusion.

I. Post-Karma: The Vision of a “Rising Era” and Five Strategic Pillars

To Lam’s post-karma began when he assumed the position of General Secretary, preparing for the 14th Party Congress and shaping the decisions that followed. His proposed vision—the “Rising Era”—aims for a more civilized, humane, service-oriented, and developmental Party and State. He set forth five strategic pillars:

1. Reforming the Party: shifting from a mindset of power to a spirit of public service; the Party must be the servant of the people, not their ruler.
2. Advancing culture, science, education, and technology: regarding these as new national capabilities—AI, digitalization, and scientific research—to elevate Vietnam’s competitiveness.
3. Administrative reform: building a three-tiered government structure guided by performance-based governance and a citizen-centered, developmental state.
4. Developing the private economy and civil society: creating new engines of national growth while addressing historical debts by legitimizing, respecting, and fostering civil society.
5. Multilateral international integration: a “bamboo diplomacy” that is flexible yet principled, transforming external resources into domestic strength.

These ideas, at the conceptual level, are modern and progressive. Yet the gap between vision and implementation is always perilous: if carried out under concentrated power, opaque processes, or insufficient consultation, the post-karma may quickly distort.

II. One Year In: Recognizing Early Deviations

For post-karma to become good karma, we must confront the missteps that have emerged during To Lam’s initial period in office.

1. Localism and concentrated appointments

The accelerated appointment of officials from a single province (Hung Yen) and from the security sector to many key positions has raised concerns about regional imbalance and a closing of political space. A sustainable political system requires diversity of origin and professional background; excessive concentration risks creating the image of a closed circle of power.

2. Personalism in symbols and public projects

Proposals to name streets after family members, or to pursue sector-branded megaprojects—such as a Public Security theater, stadium, or even airport—evoke a tendency toward personalization and “sectoral branding” of state authority. In a period that demands austerity, prioritization, and public benefit, such symbols can misallocate resources and alienate public sentiment.

3. Major national decisions driven by voluntarism

Gigantic initiatives—the North–South high-speed railway, the nuclear program in Binh Thuan, or the merger of provinces—cannot be approached with haste or unilateral decision-making. These trillion-dollar, multi-generational projects require independent research, broad consultation, and rigorous socio-environmental impact assessments. A country cannot “run while lining up” on matters of its future.

These deviations are not cosmetic; they reveal a paradox: although renewal is proclaimed, the methods of implementation risk replicating old power patterns. Without timely correction, the post-karma cannot achieve long-term legitimacy.

III. Four Social Imperatives for Turning Post-Karma into Good Karma

Vietnam must not miss a historical window of opportunity. Society must act as a constructive partner setting realistic guardrails.

1. Reviving and strengthening civil society as a monitoring partner

Civil society is not an adversary of the Party but a vital mechanism of oversight and policy improvement. Vietnam must legally recognize civil society organizations and empower the press—within lawful frameworks—to monitor public affairs.

2. A citizenry aware of its opportunity and responsibility

This is a rare “window of opportunity.” Citizens must raise awareness: expressing opinions, monitoring major projects, demanding transparency. Consensus does not mean passive silence; it means active participation.

3. Independent expert consultation for all strategic projects

All megaprojects should be reviewed by independent scientific councils that publish environmental, social, and fiscal impact assessments. This prevents voluntarism and ensures the sustainability of national decisions.

4. Building a new political culture: integrity and accountability

Vietnam needs programs on public-service ethics, transparent appointment processes, assets disclosure, and mechanisms for conflict-of-interest management. A new political culture is essential to prevent distortion of reforms.

IV. Traditional Wisdom as the Foundation for Modern Reform

Figures such as To Hien Thanh and Ngo Thi Si, along with the Nho–Buddhist tradition of East Asia, left behind profound lessons in political ethics: appoint the upright, lead through moral example, and persuade before punishing. Einstein reminds us that no problem can be solved with the same mindset that created it, and Engels urges socialists to learn from the advanced nations. These teachings suggest that post-karma must synthesize ancient Vietnamese wisdom with modern scientific governance.

V. Practical Steps Toward Realizing a Meaningful Post-Karma

• Conduct a comprehensive review of appointments through an independent oversight committee.
• Establish a National Scientific Council for all strategic megaprojects, with mandatory public reports.
• Codify public consultation in planning processes to ensure citizens have a voice from the outset.
• Develop civil society and professionalized journalism—within a legal framework—as channels of public oversight.
• Enforce asset transparency, conflict-of-interest regulations, and integrity norms throughout the public sector.

Conclusion

Past karma explains the path to power; post-karma determines whether that power serves the nation. To Lam’s post-karma can become good karma only if grounded in transparency, consultation, integrity, and societal partnership. Without these, goodwill may be swallowed by old patterns of authority.

The nation’s fate is like tangled vines, the ancients said: to untangle it requires wisdom, goodwill, and—above all—the participation of the people. A worthy post-karma is a promise to the nation: a Party and a State that serve, and a society capable of rising with its own strength.

Ну, погоди! — Just wait and see.

In concordance with the World Bank’s “World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society and Behavior” on the foundation for economic wealth creation lying in social and human capitals, the Caux Round Table has been advocating a wholistic approach to enhancement of global standards of living – start with human and social capitals – living out values and ethics, if you will – in order to build financial and economic capitals – property derived from the wise use of life and liberty.

The U.S., in recent decades, may have turned off the road leading to future social and economic happiness by not developing human and social capitals for its citizens and its economy.

Former Senator Ben Sasse made this damning assessment of public education, at least in California, in the Wall Street Journal.

I read these comments with alarm:

The number of freshmen entering the University of California San Diego (USCD) whose math skills fall below a high-school level has increased nearly 30-fold over the past five years, according to a shocking new report from the university’s Senate-Administration Working Group on Admissions.  Worse still, one in 12 entering freshmen have math skills below middle-school levels.  That means college students might struggle with questions such as this: “7+2=6+__?”  Or this: “Sarah had nine pennies and nine dimes. How many coins did she have in all?”

But it gets worse: The students admitted to UCSD were, on average, receiving “A” grades in high school math classes that supposedly built multiple years beyond algebraic and arithmetic foundations.  This was a fraud.  High schools have clearly been inflating grades beyond what many students earned or deserved.  How could schools do such a disservice to taxpayers and more important, to these students?

What now is to be done?

This past weekend, Pope Leo XIV visited Lebanon.  His remarks, to me, captured the grace of concern for others with which the Prophet Muhammad framed his covenants to respect and protect Christians and Jews.  I, myself, perceive a resonance between the Pope’s vision for humanity and of inter-religious dialogue and cooperation and the texts of those historic Islamic covenants, promises given in the name of Allah.

The Caux Round Table, for five years now, has done its best to study carefully, with leadership from our Muslim colleagues, the historicity of the Prophet’s covenants and to then bring the best scholarship on the covenants to wider audiences, especially in Lebanon and in the Vatican.

I quote for you here the relevant thoughts of Pope Leo:

It is in light of this authority that I wish to address to you the words of Jesus that have been chosen as the central theme of my journey: “Blessed are the peacemakers!” (Mt 5:9). …

Finally, I would like to outline a third characteristic of those who strive for peace.  Even when it requires sacrifice, peacemakers dare to persevere.

In remarks to a gathering of religious leaders of many faiths, Pope Leo said:

In his Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in Medio Oriente, signed here in Beirut in 2012, Pope Benedict XVI emphasized that “[t]he Church’s universal nature and vocation require that she engage in dialogue with the members of other religions.  In the Middle East, this dialogue is based on the spiritual and historical bonds uniting Christians to Jews and Muslims. It is a dialogue which is not primarily dictated by pragmatic, political or social considerations, but by underlying theological concerns which have to do with faith” (n. 19).  Dear friends, your presence here today, in this remarkable place where minarets and church bell towers stand side by side, yet both reach skyward, testifies to the enduring faith of this land and the steadfast devotion of its people to the one God.  Here in this beloved land, may every bell toll, every adhān, every call to prayer blend into a single, soaring hymn – not only to glorify the merciful Creator of heaven and earth, but also to lift a heartfelt prayer for the divine gift of peace. …

Yet, in the midst of these struggles, a sense of hopefulness and encouragement can be found when we focus on what unites us: our common humanity and our belief in a God of love and mercy.  In an age when coexistence can seem like a distant dream, the people of Lebanon, while embracing different religions, stand as a powerful reminder that fear, distrust and prejudice do not have the final word and that unity, reconciliation and peace are possible.  It is a mission that remains unchanged throughout the history of this beloved land: to bear witness to the enduring truth that Christians, Muslims, Druze and countless others can live together and build a country united by respect and dialogue.

May we all be peacemakers.