Stephen B. Young
July 17, 2025
“If we place President Trump’s tariffs on Vietnamese goods in the context of a broader strategic picture, the U.S. and Vietnam can still find a common path through today’s tensions.”
— Stephen B. Young

This summer in Hanoi, the heat is not just from the weather but from mounting strategic pressures—both domestic and international. What is Trump’s America pursuing? Does Washington aim to impose itself on Vietnam, or is it seeking to build a long-term partnership grounded in reciprocity and balanced interests?

I. Tariffs and Strategy Go Hand in Hand
The Trump administration’s unexpected decision to impose a 20% tariff on Vietnamese exports—twice the previously negotiated rate—sent shockwaves through public opinion. Many in Vietnam see it as a trap. But is the tariff really the core issue?
At the same time that tariffs were announced, the United States also offered Vietnam its most flexible geo-strategic space since Đổi Mới:
- Refusing to facilitate transshipment of Chinese goods is not a severance from China, but a step toward strategic diversification. No one expects Vietnam to completely cut ties with China—geography and economics don’t allow it. But diversification is not only feasible—it’s wise.
- Allowing U.S. warships to dock at Cam Ranh Bay does not mean Vietnam is “taking sides.” The Philippines has done the same while maintaining strong trade with China. Singapore has long welcomed U.S. naval visits while being a key member of China-led RCEP.
- Signing a rare earth agreement is not about “selling off resources.” If done right, it can attract G7-level processing technology, reduce dependence on China, and end the outdated model of exporting raw materials and importing refined goods.
- Joining the Indo-Pacific supply chain does not mean abandoning the Chinese market. Rather, it enhances Vietnam’s negotiating power and achieves strategic balance.

II. A Truly Renewed Vietnam, Seen from Washington
History shows that the first strategic commitment between the U.S. and Vietnam came in October 1954, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower declared American support for the independence and economic development of the Republic of Vietnam (1).
Why did the U.S. make that pledge at such a pivotal moment? Because, as Eisenhower wrote, Americans respected Vietnamese nationalism—a resilient tradition of the people.
In his letter to Prime Minister Ngô Đình Diệm, the U.S. President expressed hope that the Vietnamese government would reflect the will of the people, act with enlightenment, and govern effectively—to earn respect domestically and globally, and to prevent any foreign ideology from being forced upon a free nation.
The word “nation” in that letter was decisive. Eisenhower acknowledged that the Vietnamese had their own traditions, values, religions, and aspirations—deserving of sovereignty, liberty, and independence, just as Americans had once demanded for themselves.
The key difference now is this: Back then, Eisenhower “picked” Saigon as a pawn on the Southeast Asian chessboard. Today, Washington “chooses” Hanoi—not as a pawn, but as a partner with weight and authority on the interregional and global chessboard (Indo-Pacific and beyond).
In that same spirit, American policymakers took close note of General Secretary Tô Lâm’s article on April 27, 2025, in which he emphasized:
“The aspiration for a peaceful, unified, and independent Vietnam is a sacred flame that has forged the national spirit over thousands of years of history…”
What stood out most to Washington was his reference to “the enduring nature of the Vietnamese nation”—a concept the U.S. has seen as the cornerstone of a lasting partnership since the beginning. Also notable was his call for national reconciliation—a sign that Vietnam is ready to enter a new historical era:
“The war is no longer a dividing line for people of the same Lạc Hồng bloodline… There is no reason for Vietnamese—sharing the same origin, all children of Mother Âu Cơ—to carry hatred or division in their hearts.”
The U.S. appreciates the General Secretary’s return to Vietnam’s cultural roots as a foundation for a future that is prosperous, globally integrated, and peacefully aligned with the international community.
Some scholars consider this a sign that Vietnam is gradually forming a new foreign and domestic policy—one deeply rooted in national identity, not merely reacting passively to geopolitical shifts, but proactively shaping its role and position within the global order.
With this vision, Vietnam can build soft power through engagement with the international community. To achieve this, the country needs to expand space for public discourse and develop a roadmap for political reform that aligns with the new context.
A senior advisor at the U.S. Department of State remarked: “We welcome the commitment of Vietnam’s leadership to pursue a path of harmonious development in connection with the civilized world.”
Vietnam does not need to choose sides, but it should choose humane and progressive values.

III. A Harder Question: Subordination—or True Partnership?
Some voices in Vietnam are asking: “If we yield to the U.S. now, are we risking subordination?”
But perhaps the more honest question should be: “If we continue on the current path, are we truly independent?”
More critically, how can Vietnam seize this rare opportunity to shift from a nation shaped by historical circumstance to a nation that shapes history?
Beijing has long been clear about its ambition to treat Vietnam as a strategic buffer zone. China dominates supply chains, controls rare earth exports, invests in critical infrastructure—and tightens its grip through a soft-strategic vise. Every time Hanoi leans West, there are warning signals from the North: maritime incidents, stalled negotiations, and unreasonable historical and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.
In this context, recent U.S. proposals offer Vietnam a chance to redefine its national positioning. An economy seen as a mere “proxy hub” for Chinese goods will never become a global manufacturing powerhouse.
But if Hanoi pivots—just as The Economist once suggested—Vietnam can become “the Bavaria of Asia”: a hub for green tech, high-value manufacturing, and strategic neutrality.
Vietnam can:
- Attract high-quality investment from the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Europe;
- Transition from an assembly-line model to innovation and brand ownership;
- Play a key role in restructuring global supply chains.
Now is the time for the Politburo, under General Secretary Tô Lâm’s leadership, to show strategic vision and political resolve. Hesitation at this moment would be a historical setback.
Is the U.S. applying pressure? Perhaps. But with long-term thinking and skillful diplomacy, Vietnam can turn that pressure into leverage—to restructure not only trade and defense but also its institutions and governance model.

After 80 years, could this coming August become the second defining August in Vietnam’s history?
Time is running out. A slow or ambiguous response will not only forfeit trade privileges—it will erode strategic trust from G7, Quad, and ASEAN partners.
What’s at stake is not just a seat at the global table—it’s the chance to finally step out of China’s shadow and build a resilient, independent, and globally competitive economy.

CONCLUSION:
The Vietnamese people once faced colonialism, imperialism, and war with courage. Today, that same courage must take a new form: the courage to choose, to change, and to redefine Vietnam’s place in the world.
General Secretary Tô Lâm and the Politburo now hold a historic opportunity: to lift Vietnam out of China’s assembly-line orbit and into true partnership with the global democratic community.
No nation can choose its geography,
But every nation can choose its future.
Joining the world’s march toward civilization is Vietnam’s opportunity to showcase its leadership—not only in economic reform but in strategic thinking and political confidence.
If Hanoi fails to seize this moment, it may be a very long time before history offers another chance.

NOTES:
- This historic letter was drafted by Kenneth T. Young, Director of the Southeast Asia Office at the U.S. State Department. Following this family legacy, I—Stephen B. Young—wrote “Kissinger’s Betrayal: How America Lost the Vietnam War,” exposing how Kissinger never truly understood Vietnamese nationalism.
Text of President Eisenhower’s October 23, 1954 letter to Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.
Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.
We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, bow an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.
The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.
Sincerely,
Dwight D. Eisenhower
(2) According to sources close to U.S.-Vietnam negotiations, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit, Secretary of State Marco delivered a handwritten letter from President Trump to General Secretary Tô Lâm, addressing the four key areas discussed in this article.
Stephen B. Young is the Global Executive Director of the Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism, former Dean and Professor of Hamline University School of Law, and a former Assistant Dean, The Harvard Law School. He is the author of Kissinger’s Betrayal: How America Lost the Vietnam War and, with Nguyen Ngoc Huy, Tradition of Human Rights in China and Vietnam, and “The Law of Property in Vietnam’s Le Dynasty”, Journal of Asian History, 1975