After the 14^th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party: “Aftershocks” 

Vietnams after the 14th Party Congress, still  moves forward at a remarkable pace, with shifts in who holds power, new institutional arrangements, and adventuresome development  goals all unfolding simultaneously and at a speed rarely seen since the Đổi Mới reforms of the 1980s. On the surface, Vietnam’s political–economic landscape appears stable. Beneath what is apparent, however, multiple institutional layers are experiencing tremors that are starting to reverberate across society. Decisions taken today may well shape Vietnam’s developmental trajectory for decades to come. 

This series of thoughtful essays presents writings from diverse—sometimes divergent—sources. Taken collectively, they affirm that, 1) even under increasingly constrained conditions, independent voices persist in speaking out within Vietnamese civil society t, and that 2) these voices continue to deserve attention. 

Second Essay: When a powerful Institutional Shock Hits Markets

The post–Congress convergence of intensified power centralization and highly ambitious economic growth targets has produced a distinctive institutional shock—one that is now beginning to impact the market through channels far subtler than those associated with ordinary economic cycles. 

Nguyen Xuan Nghia, PhD
Economist, Institute for Vietnamese Development Issues

After the 14th Party Congress, Vietnam has entered a phase in which the surface of economic activity appears broadly stable. Official messaging emphasizes determination to reform, to streamline the state apparatus, to promote the private sector, and to pursue exceptionally high growth targets over the coming years. From the outside—particularly through the lens of international media and analysts—Vietnam is often portrayed as a country that has “placed a large bet” on successful economic development while maintaining regime stability.

Yet it is precisely the combination of intensified power concentration with ambitious growth objectives that has generated a peculiar  kind of institutional shock, not a shock that triggers immediate disruption, but rather, a shock which alters the operating rhythm of the entire system, changes gradually transmitting to the market through new expectations, behavioral shifts, and changes in resource allocation. These new dynamics are quiet, but cumulative—and difficult to reverse over the medium to long term.

Idealized Growth Expectations 

Analysis by Joshua Kurlantzick and Annabel Richter highlight a central paradox of the post–Congress economic environment: while political power has become more consolidated and tightly controlled, expectations of possible economic achievement have expanded to the point of near idealization. Annual growth of 10 percent is no longer framed as an optimistic scenario, but as an official target tied directly to the personal credibility of top leadership and to the legitimacy of the system as a whole (1).

In economic terms, this is not an ignorable prediction. When growth becomes a measure of political success, the market no longer views it as a theoretical outcome of long-term reform, but as an immediate mandate that must be fulfilled. Expectations are thus pushed beyond the economy’s current internal capacity to achieve , creating invisible pressure on investment and production decisions. In this context, risk lies less in failing to achieve high growth and more in drawing the entire system into a race toward objectives that exceed the ability of its underlying fundamentals to deliver as so unreasonably expected.

Redefining Risk 

Another notable development emphasized by policy analysts is the encouragement of the state apparatus to “accept higher risk” when approving projects, in order to replace a long-standing bureaucratized culture of risk aversion and fear of taking personal responsibility. From an administrative perspective, this signals an attempt to unlock human decision-making capacity that has been constrained for years (2).

From a market perspective, however, the implications are ambiguous. When prudence is relaxed not through deep institutional reform but under pressure to meet growth targets, risk itself becomes difficult to calculate. Businesses cannot clearly discern where the boundary will lie between acceptable risk and punishable failure. In such an environment, economic decisions will tend to favor projects that align with policy priorities and political signals, rather than those with only economic efficacy and not political patronage. The market thus operates less according to the open-minded logic of profit and more according to calculations seeking self-preservation.

Personalizing Growth Responsibility 

The direct linkage between the top leadership’s personal credibility and long-term growth objectives—toward 2030 and further to 2045—creates another powerful mechanism transmitting contexts for entrepreneurial decision-making (3). In political economy, when economic success or failure is personalized, systems tend to prioritize short-term results to preserve system legitimacy, even at the expense of long-term development achievements.

Markets respond to such a signal with considerable rationality. Long-term investments—particularly in areas requiring high institutional stability such as core technologies, education, or corporate governance reform—become less attractive than investments in large, quickly completed projects easily associated with policy achievement goals. Investment allocations thus become channeled, not due to capital scarcity, but because the incentives for using capital have shifted.

Resource Allocation via Public Spending and Mega-Projects 

Rapidly expanding public expenditure and the rollout of large-scale infrastructure mega-projects represent the clearest manifestation of structural shake-up as it impacts the market. These projects are not only intended to stimulate demand, but also to produce tangible, measurable outcomes within political cycles, thereby reinforcing short-term political legitimacy and social confidence (4).

Development experience, however, suggests that scale does not equate to quality. When capital is injected rapidly and institutional oversight is weakened from excessive concentration of political discretion, the risks of making inefficient and diffuse investment rise sharply. The market then responds by gravitating towards acquiring assets—particularly land and infrastructure-linked real estate—rather than in productivity enhancement or technological innovation. This encourages market adaptation pursuing capital sheltering, not value creation.

Distorted Competition and “National Champion” Groups 

A key component of Vietnam’s post–Congress economic strategy is the cultivation of “national pillar conglomerates”—private-sector entities receiving strong state guidance and support. Kurlantzick and Richter note that Vietnam currently lacks sufficiently robust mechanisms to regulate the relationship between these conglomerates and political power (5).

Under the new condition of concentrated authority, the line separating policy support from political patronage becomes increasingly “flexible”. Markets quickly recognize that scale and connections may matter as much as—if not more than—pure economic efficiency. Competition weakens, small and medium enterprises are squeezed, and innovation incentives decline—undermining the very foundation upholding sustainable long-term growth.

Erosion of External Long-Term Confidence 

Although Vietnam remains an attractive investment destination amid global supply-chain restructuring, uncertainties surrounding tariffs and U.S. efforts to prevent Vietnam from serving as a “transshipment hub” for Chinese goods significantly increase policy risk (6). When combined with a domestic system operating in campaign mode, foreign investors tend to shorten commitment horizons and avoid projects which require high institutional stability for their coming to profitable fruition.

There is no immediate capital flight. Yet confidence in long-term prospects erodes. This form of market impact is particularly dangerous because it does not immediately register in macroeconomic indicators, revealing itself instead through data on capital quality, investment duration, and willingness to transfer technology.

Reversal of Roles Between Institutions and the Market 

After the 14th Congress, the core economic question is no longer whether Vietnam can achieve 10 percent growth for several years, but whether its economy is being turned towards a trajectory in which the market must adapt to the operating tempo of political institutions—rather than such institutions creating space for the market to develop according to its own logic (7).

This represents a composite transmission channel, where all prior effects converge. If sustained, the market will continues to function on its own but will grow increasingly cautious, prioritizing safety over innovation, while the economy’s self-governance in making timely corrections erodes—especially as the labor force ages rapidly.

The overall institutional shock to Vietnam’s economy following the 14th Party Congress has not produced an immediate economic crisis. Instead, it is transmitting into the market through multiple channels concerns that drive decision-making—expectations, risk calculations, investment structures, competition, and long-term confidence. These concerns interact and reinforce one another, altering how the economy actually operates without dramatic surface-level disruption.

The deeper concern lies not in ambitious growth aspirations, but in the risk that the market becomes increasingly subordinated to the short-term operational rhythm of institutions. If this trajectory is not recognized and corrected in time, short-term growth gains may be purchased at the cost of prolonged fragility in the medium and long term—a price often recognized only when corrective capacity has already declined.

References:
(1) CFR – Vietnam’s Most Important Party Congress in Years…
(2) Thanh Tra – Encouraging and Protecting Officials Who Dare to Act
(3) EVN – International Impressions of Vietnam’s Breakthrough Economic Orientation
(4) Reuters – Vietnam Targets $55 Billion in Foreign Loans…
(5) CFR – same as (1)
(6) SCMP – Why One Clause in the US–Vietnam Trade Deal Is Sparking Concern
(7) VietnamPlus – Rethinking Vietnam’s Growth Model

Introduction 

The series “Vietnam: Shocks to the System After the 14th Party Congress” is published by a group of independent analysts and observers who closely track Vietnam’s political, economic, social, foreign policy, defense, and security dynamics in the new circumstances following on the14th Party Congress. Published in installments, the series aims to identify a phase of transition—an evolution in which Vietnam will experience the most profound and comprehensive undertaking of institutional experimentation since the launch of Đổi Mới, a time characterized by high-intensity change, accelerated tempo, and unprecedented levels of risk.

These essays were formulated within the framework of the new US – Vietnam Project of the Caux Round Table, a joint venture of concerned Vietnamese thought leaders and policy experts and Americans engaged with the contemporary unfolding of Vietnamese civilization.

The first essay in the series was written by Mr. Le Than. Mr. Lê Thân is well-known for incarceration as a political prisoner in the infamous prison on Con Son Island off South Vietnam under the Saigon Government during the Vietnam War.  In his later years, he served as the Chairman of the Lê Hiếu Đằng Club, a distinguished position that demonstrated his continued and strong commitment to social engagement after the war, so that his standing was not defined solely by his past imprisonment for revolutionary activities.

That Mr. Lê Thân was entrusted with the position of Chairman of the Club reflected several important qualities: he enjoys great respect among former political prisoners and intellectuals; he holds to an independent and forthright stance, avoiding opportunism, and his spirit of “lifelong struggle” before and after 1975. In the former South Vietnam, he struggled as a prisoner in Con Son Prison. After 1975, he continued to struggle for his values and vision by raising his voice as a citizen, guided by moral integrity and conscience.

What makes Mr. Lê Thân particularly distinctive is the historical continuity of being a political prisoner during wartime and then a critical, engaged citizen in peacetime. Not everyone who was imprisoned for revolutionary activities has had the courage to continue speaking out later in life. Mr. Lê Thân has done so with dignity, moderation, and unwavering determination.

First Essay: Institutions as the Bottleneck of All Bottlenecks – How Will Power Be Deployed? 

In the aftermath of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), observers—both domestic and international—have focused not only on specific individual appointments , but on a more fundamental set of structural challenges: What power structure will govern Vietnam going forward, and can the existing institutional framework absorb, regulate, and adapt to an increasingly concentrated configuration of authority? Or, under the leadership of Tô Lâm, will Vietnam adopt a Law regulating its Communist Party?

After the 14th Party Congress, observers inside and outside Vietnam have focused not only on who was appointed to what position but, more profoundly, on  the questions of  how will authoritative power  be exercised in this new phase of Vietnam’s modern history, and how  current institutions, in response to the growing concentration of authoritative power, will be  able to bear this burden, exercise  oversight, and self-correct when necessary.  

The emphatic consolidation of authority in a central fulcrum of leadership raises not only questions about individuals, but—more importantly—about the rules of the game. As personalized authority increasingly overrides traditional mechanisms for collective leadership, where exactly is the fault line between effective governance and risks to institutions? Are the existing designs of Party, State, and oversight bodies still adequate, or are structural limits to their ability to absorb and control such centralized power being exposed?

Given these developments and  the very serious questions they bring to our minds, debates over the possible legal legitimation of the role and responsibilities of the Communist Party of Vietnam—under one legal form or another—is no longer just speculative. Such debates reflect a practical necessity: when the exercise of power changes its modality, the subordinate institutional framework must change to accommodate the new reality, or else the exercise of power itself becomes the greatest bottleneck undermining systemic accomplishment

At the center of this debate stands General Secretary Tô Lâm, increasingly portrayed by Western media as the beneficiary of a shift towards a leadership modality of “one-person only”— a sharp divergence from Vietnam’s tradition of collective leadership which, for decades, functioned as an internal risk-reduction mechanism buttressing Vietnam’s political system.

Yet focusing solely on institutionalization of solitary individualism risks missing a deeper reality. The shock to the political system left by the 14th Congress does not implicate any single leader, but plays out in the growing collision between the Communist Party’s actual mode of exercising power and the legal–institutional framework that the Vietnamese state officially claims to honor and implement (1).

“One butt, two chairs”:  A choice of system, not just a temporary expedient 

International media outlets such as the BBC, Reuters, Bloomberg, and the South China Morning Post have increasingly framed the prospect of Tô Lâm simultaneously holding the positions of General Secretary and State President not as a temporary expedient, but as a structural choice. Their analyses converge on one point: this is an attempt to redesign the locus of power in order to overcome fragmentation within the current system.

This interpretation is not without merit. For years, Vietnam’s political apparatus has been criticized as slow-moving, multilayered, and divided among the Party, the State, and the Government. Major decisions often fall into a “collective responsibility trap,” where accountability is diluted to better hold up the banner of collective leadership.

In this context, the “one butt, two chairs” arrangement is seen as shortening channels of decision-making and consolidating authority around a clearly defined center. The core institutional problem, however, is not whether power is centralized, but rather this: Vietnam has never designed a system of legal accountability and oversight proportionate to having power concentrated in an individual.

Put differently, power is being concentrated far more rapidly than it is being subordinated to governance.

The National Assembly: Rubber-stamping, not Decision-making 

The upcoming session of the National Assembly—expected to elect Tô Lâm as State President—is accurately perceived by international observers. It is not a forum for debate over who should have authoritative power but only serves as  procedural formality assenting to decisions already made.

This accurately reflects the Assembly’s current institutional role: it does not supervise , lacks the right to veto or to delay, and it cannot decide on the uses of power. The National Assembly neither determines who holds power nor defines the scope of that power; it merely ratifies what has been arranged by Party leaders

The deeper issue here is not the mere formalism of parliamentary proceedings, but a structural contradiction between constitutional principles and operational reality. While Vietnam’s Constitution proclaims the state to be “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” the actual manipulation of authoritative power occurs almost entirely within the Communist Party’s decision-making apparatus.

Thus, the National Assembly instead of activating power delegated by the people, has become a connector that legalizes decisions made by a political organization standing above the Law.

The Communist Party: From Ruling Party to an Organization Outside the Law 

After more than half a century of comprehensive control, the Vietnamese Communist Party continues to operate with many characteristics of a revolutionary party—or even a closed organization—rather than as a transparent governing party within a modern rule-of-law state.

The most consequential decisions regarding personnel, policy, and national strategy are made in closed Party forums, then subsequently legalized by state institutions. This produces a legal paradox: an organization that exercises supreme authority over the state and society does not exist as a legal entity accountable either before the law or to citizens.

Under Article 4 of the Constitution, the Communist Party leads the state; yet the Party itself cannot be sued, lacks civil legal personality, and bears neither criminal nor civil liability as an organization. When a policy leads to serious consequences, responsibility therefore can only be assigned to individuals or state agencies—while the organization that made the ultimate decision remains free of all accountability mechanisms.

For years, intellectuals have proposed expeditiously enacting a Law applicable to the activities of the Communist Party. Such proposals have never gained traction, precisely because such codification of Article 4 of the Constitution would, in principle, subject the Party to oversight by the Government, the National Assembly, and the courts.

Yet such oversight is precisely the foundational requirement of any rule-of-law society. And it is precisely why this issue remains the institutional bottleneck of all bottlenecks, with no clear indication that it will be resolved.

This unresolved “shadow” of rogue autonomy renders any concentration of power the more dangerous: the more power is centralized outside the Law, the more glaring the accountability vacuum becomes. To mitigate this risk, a Law applicable to the Communist Party would need to define, at minimum: the Party’s legal status; the basis of its legitimacy; principles governing its accountability and oversight; boundaries between Party, State, and society; internal democracy; and the Party’s relationship with civil society (2).

Administrative Restructuring and Systemic Retrenchment 

Following the 14th Congress, the important question is no longer merely who occupies which positions, but how much restructuring can the system tolerate. The growing “underground discontent” within the bureaucracy does not constitute political opposition, but rather operational frustration: unclear lines of responsibility, legal and other risks to bureaucrats even when procedures are followed, and accusations of inertia when action is avoided.

These are textbook symptoms of worrisome institutional bottlenecks. When power is centralized without clear responsibility frameworks, a subordinate bureaucratic system’s natural responses are retrenchment and risk avoidance.  But, if discipline is tightened and personnel reshuffled without addressing legal foundations, governance effectiveness will decline rather than improve, increasing the risk of administrative paralysis.

The best structure: institutions or persons? 

The key question posed by international observers is whether this appointment to two offices will apply only in the case of  Tô Lâm, or whether it will evolve into a more permanent institutional arrangement.

If it remains just a one-time scenario , the system may tolerate it as an exception. But if it marks the beginning of a new, long-term, governance model, Vietnam must confront a question it has never fully answered: who oversees the leader when power is concentrated in a single individual within a system where the Party itself stands outside all legal accountability?

To date, there have been no clear signals of constitutional revision or the creation of new oversight mechanisms. As a result, power consolidation is proceeding far faster than the creation of institutional checks and balances—a formula historically associated with the accumulation of systemic d risk.

Conclusion: An Institutional Question Without an Answer 

This article doe snot  revolve around  Tô Lâm as an individual. It revolves around a single axial development: power is being consolidated rapidly, while legitimacy, legal status, and accountability mechanisms remain stagnant—or in some respects, have regressed.

The “one butt, two chairs” arrangement’, the National Assembly’s role of only formalism, bureaucratic retrenchment and constitutional contradictions over the source of authority, are not isolated phenomena. They are manifestations of one signal institutional bottleneck.

The final question of this essay is therefore not whether Tô Lâm wields sufficient power, but whether the system possesses enough capacity to absorb that power without paralyzing itself—or triggering a crisis of legitimacy. And the core question beneath all others remains: will Tô Lâm dare to breakup this heavy-handed institutional bottleneck by permitting adoption of a Law governing the Communist Party of Vietnam? (3)

References 

(1) BBC Vietnamese: 90 Years of the CPV: What Legal Basis for Its Existence and Rule? https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam-51348557

(2) Luật Khoa Magazine: Petition 72 and the Public Constitution: Citizens and Constitutional Participation https://luatkhoa.com/2025/03/kien-nghi-72-va-hien-phap-dai-chung-khi-cong-dan-tham-gia-lap-hien/

(3) BBC Vietnamese: Challenging the State to Debate the Constitution
https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2013/11/131117_vn_constitution_petition72_aims

Coming up in Part 2:
The Economy – When Institutional Shockwaves Begin to Spill into the Market
(Author: Dr. Nguyễn Xuân Nghĩa)

Introduction

Stephen B. Young

Director, Caux Round Table U.S. – Vietnam Project

Vietnam’s recent 14th National Congress of its ruling Communist Party comes at a moment of profound transformation in both the global order and the country’s governance. As great-power competition intensifies, international norms fragment, and security once again dominates global policy thinking, Vietnam finds itself navigating an increasingly narrow passage between opportunity and constraint. The Congress therefore deserves to be recognized not merely as a milestone in the country’s internal political evolution, but as a strategic inflection point shaping how Vietnam defines its future role,  develops capacity, and experiences limits in the international system.

The two essays presented here examine this moment from complementary angles. Together, they interrogate a central paradox of contemporary Vietnamese governance: the simultaneous expansion of diplomatic ambition and the deepening subjugation of domestic political life to disciplined state oversight. On the surface, Vietnam appears more confident and capable than ever—an emerging middle power embedded in global supply chains, courted by major actors, and equipped with a dense network of strategic partnerships. Beneath this surface, however, lies a governance model increasingly oriented toward control, concentration of power, and the prioritization of regime security over institutional openness.

This tension raises a critical question for scholars and policymakers alike: can a foreign policy built on flexibility, pragmatism, and multi-alignment remain effective when its domestic foundations grow progressively closed and self-limiting? Or, put differently, does the securitization focus of internal governance impose a structural ceiling on Vietnam’s foreign policy—one that cannot be overcome by skillful diplomats action on their own?

The first essay situates the 14th Congress within a broader theoretical and historical context, examining how the expanding concept of security reshapes Vietnam’s foreign policy capacity, soft power, and strategic credibility. The second analyzes concrete diplomatic practices after the Congress—from transactional engagement with the United States to calibrated linguistic compromises with China and the rapid expansion of comprehensive strategic partnerships—arguing that these moves, while tactically adept, may be constrained by deeper institutional limits.

Taken together, these analyses suggest that Vietnam’s challenge today is not simply how to balance among competing powers, but how to reconcile external openness with internal governance choices. In an international environment where legitimacy, trust, and institutional resilience increasingly determine influence, the sustainability of Vietnam’s foreign policy may ultimately depend less on its diplomatic maneuvering than on the political and societal structures that support it.

This conversation is not about prescribing a single path forward, but about clarifying the strategic trade-offs Vietnam faces at a pivotal moment. For those seeking to understand Vietnam’s evolving role in regional and global affairs, these essays offer a rigorous and timely starting point.

THE 14TH NATIONAL CONGRESS CREATES A FOREIGN POLICY PARADOX FOR VIETNAM IN A PROPOSED ERA OF SECURITY FIRST EVERYTHING ELSE SECOND

The conceptual framework in the Political Report of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)  is internally consistent. However, when placed against current international trends and developments , it provokes a key strategic question: Is the model prioritizing domestic security based on order as the highest priority with power concentrated in a few minds sufficient for Vietnam to fully realize its foreign policy opportunities and advantages and so promote its national interests in an unusually changing global community? 

Hoàng Trường 

The 14^th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party opened as Vietnam faced a daunting paradox. On the one hand, Vietnam’s geopolitical and economic position has never before attracted as much attention from major players—from the U.S. to China, from the EU and Japan to ASEAN. But, on the other hand, the intense priority placed on disciplined stability in domestic governance risks restricting precisely the very institutional capabilities and societal conditions that deep integration into the global community and proactive diplomacy require. The 14th Congress, therefore, is not only the beginning of a new governance era for Vietnam but also provided a rigid template for how Vietnam can balance disciplined stability while expanding its international opportunities.

In his presentation of the important Political Report before the14th National Congress General Secretary Tô Lâm emphasized that maintaining an environment of peace and stability is a prerequisite for development, while sustainable development is a prerequisite for  comprehensively enhancing the strength of the nation. In that spirit, the task of building out military defense along with domestic security has core importance, requiring the formation of revolutionary, regular, elite, and modern armed forces; proactively understanding realities; improving future assessments, quickly preventing and promptly resolving situations as may be required, and resolutely avoiding passivity and the unexpected (1).

Alongside this, foreign affairs  just continues to be understood as a front line in protecting national interests – steadfastly maintaining independence and autonomy, while also being proactive, positive, and responsible as part of the international community. Foreign policy  must emphasize effectively leveraging opportunities for collaboration, strengthening partnerships, closely integrating foreign affairs with national defense, internal security, and economic development, adhering to principles while acting flexibly in specific policy initiatives. The political report also expands the concept of security in this new era, extending beyond borders and territory to encompass regime security, cultural-ideological security, and security with respect to economics, finance, data, energy, water, and food, situating sustainable development and strategic autonomy within the general duty to protect the nation quickly and on the far horizon.

The 14th Congress as a Milestone for a diplomacy  to be used in a Fragmented World

The 14th Congress took place after the post–Cold War liberal international order had rapidly degenerated. Strategic competition among major powers, particularly between the United States and China, has become increasingly systemic; international rules are challenged; and seeking security has once again taken a central position in global policy thinking. In this context, sovereign decision-making—from mobilizing powers to governance practices—directly effects a country’s position and potentials in international realities. 

International Position and the Limits of Current Capabilities

At this time of the 14th Congress, Vietnam could be considered as an emerging middle-power country, having an increasingly important role in global supply chains and in the strategic dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region. Though the Congress took place amid international uncertainty, Vietnam’s geographic location, population size, growth rate, and extensive network of  partners  give it a position few Southeast Asian countries enjoy (2).

However, this capability remains vulnerable. Most of Vietnam’s current partnerships are only transactional, based on short-term economic interests and strategic balancing rather than on deeper, stable, values and norms, or benefitting from high institutional trust. Vietnam is recognized for stability and resilience but is not yet assessed as a country capable of shaping multinational rules or leading regional initiatives. This capability deficit  arises not only from material resources but also from the country’s internal political and social structure.

The paradoxical tension between putting security first and success in foreign policy achievements, The Japan Times quoted several diplomats describing General Secretary Tô Lâm as a seasoned politician, a risk-calculator whose biggest gambles so far have yielded results (3). In his Political Report, To Lam expanded the concept of security in the direction of comprehensiveness, accurately reflecting the non-traditional challenges of the current era. However, the important issue is more how security will be achieved more than merely expanding its conceptual scope When security becomes the lens dominating governance, a paradox emerges: the more emphasis is directed to control to ensure stability, the less the importance given to soft foreign policy resources—trust, predictability, and social engagement.

In the increasingly tense U.S.–China rivalry, Vietnam’s strategy of “balancing” and “not choosing sides” faces greater resistance than before. Partners assess not only policy statements but also the sustainability of institutions and the ability to make transparent decisions during crises. The South China Sea, long only a dispute over sovereign rights, has become a test of legal, diplomatic, and societal capacity.   A too tightly closed domestic structure reduces capacity to mobilize these vital internal sources of power over the long term.

What role for Vietnam in the new Era of Putting Security First and Foremost

Given its current position, Vietnam’s most practical role is to be neither a military power nor adopt absolute neutrality but to act as a nation with modest capabilities but easily able to maintain open flexibility in its region. This will require steadfast adherence to first principles of independence and autonomy, while maintaining institutional flexibility sufficient to earn trust from a variety of

partners.

With democratization not yet having occurred, Vietnam can still expand its foreign policy options through pragmatic reforms: implementing the rule of law with scrupulous attention to its technical requirements, particularly in economics and financial investments; reducing arbitrary enforcement security laws and regulations in public and private settings.; and taking the initiative in proposing initiatives within ASEAN and other multilateral forums. However, these steps will advance foreign policy objectives only to a certain limited extent. 

Would Democratization Unlock Strategic Advantages for Vietnam?

In the long term, only democratization can fully remove the current constraints on Vietnam’s foreign policy (4). When that happens, Vietnam’s foreign policy can shift from being purely transactional, short-term, interest-based to enhancing such interests with appealing values and widely-accepted norms of beneficial reciprocity. Vietnam’s ability to join soft-power alliances and so shape regional inter-state relationships will increase; and the risk of being forced to take sides will decline due to having higher legitimacy and more respect in the global community of nations and more negotiating influence. Importantly, foreign affairs will  then no longer be the sole domain of the state but will become a strategic undertaking of Vietnamese society as a whole.

Conclusion: The 14th Congress and the Limits of Order and Public Security

The Political Report of the 14th Party Congress proposed a plausible conceptual framework: maintain peace to promote development, and development to augment national capabilities. However, in a world where good character gains respect and compliance, common norms, and trustworthiness increasingly determine national opportunities and advantages, stability based primarily on putting public security and monitoring of behaviors first and foremost cannot become a sustainable formula to achieve national aspirations. Public Security cannot replace the social capital provided by institutions, and monitoring of behaviors cannot substitute for legitimacy.

The 14th Party Congress, therefore, was more than  a redistribution of power among individuals but, much more importantly, it was a strategic test of Vietnam’s ability to choose a path of sustainable integration in the 21st century (5).

References:

1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9HN7KDLmi8 (General Secretary Tô Lâm presents the Political Report at the 14th CPV Congress | VietNamNet)
2. https://nghiencuuquocte.org/2026/01/18/dai-hoi-xiv-cua-viet-nam-quyen-luc-cai-cach-va-the-he-chinh-tri-ke-tiep/
3. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/c8j3wl4pxrlo (What the international press says about the 14th Congress and General Secretary Tô Lâm)
4. https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2024/ui-brief-no.2-20242.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com (The scope and limits of Vietnam’s unorthodox development)
5. https://en.daihoidang.vn/vietnams-effective-foreign-policy-earns-widespread-international-recognition-expert-post4317.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Foreign Policy after the 14th Party Congress: Pragmatism  with Conditions and Hitting the Ceiling in using the Paradigm of “Opening up to the Outside while Closing up on the Inside 

Recent adjustments in Vietnam’s foreign policy have reveals a concerted effort to expand strategic maneuvering opportunities through pragmatism and policy flexibility. However, as the subordination of domestic governance to the demands of security and discipline becomes the dominant organizing principle of the state, the “open to the outside – closing up the inside” model not only constrains the effectiveness of foreign policy but also undermines the very foundations required for a new foreign policy paradigm to function. In the long run, a flexible foreign policy will not be viable when anchored to an increasingly closed domestic political structure incapable of correcting its shortcomings and lack of good judgment 

Tran Dong A

The 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam was not only  a reallocation of individual leadership and factional influences   it also marked a critical step  in the reconfiguration of Vietnam’s foreign policy thinking and practice amid profound shifts in the international order. Whereas the previous period emphasized strategic balance and avoidance of entanglement in great-power competitions, now after the14th Congress, Vietnamese diplomacy has adopted a more complex approach to international affairs: the construction of a multi-layered, pragmatic, and adaptive “foreign policy ecosystem”—one that, nonetheless, contains inherent structural constraints.

1. The 14th Party Congress and the Consolidation of a New Foreign Policy Ecosystem 

The concept of a “bamboo diplomacy,” emphasized under former Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, embodied flexibility, resilience, and principled firmness. Now,  after the conclusion of the 14th Congress—particularly under the consolidation of power in the person of  General Secretary To Lam—this bending approach has not been abandoned but rather has been restructured into a broader foreign policy ecosystem, in which multiple channels, levels of decision-making, and instrumentalities  operate in parallel deployments.

This ecosystem encompasses political–security diplomacy, economic–trade diplomacy, multilateral and institutional diplomacy, and, no less importantly, symbolic diplomacy and strategic signaling. Foreign policy is no longer limited to preserving amicable relations or avoiding conflict; it has become an anticipatory and pre-emptive effort for managing strategic risks, dispersing external pressures, and maximizing policy efficacy.

But, unlike other foreign policy ecosystems grounded in strong domestic institutions and open social systems, Vietnam’s post–14th Congress ecosystem continues to depend on an intensifying the dominance  of security agencies over domestic governance, closely resembling the Chinese model of disciplined conformity from the top down. This governance reality creates a fundamental paradox: the more Vietnam opens up to the outside, the more its internal political and social spaces contract.

2. Participation in Trump’s “Peace Council”: A Transactional Breakthrough 

Vietnam’s decision to participate in the “Peace Council” proposed by U.S. President Donald Trump—at a time when China declined to join and few major European countries expressed support—constituted one of the most notable foreign policy initiatives on the eve of the 14th Congress [1].

This move did not represent a shift in alliances or values, but was rather a breakthrough in diplomatic method, reflecting the distinctly transactional pragmatism of a new period in Vietnamese international relations. Vietnam opted to engage in a political arena characterized by highly personalized power, where U.S. foreign policy operated less through institutional logic and more through the transactional calculus of President Trump himself.

Against the backdrop of impending ambassadorial changes in both Washington and Hanoi, higher U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese goods, and the risk of expanded protectionist trade measures, this step suggests that Hanoi sought to establish a direct channel between itself and  a real  center of important foreign decision-making. The objective was to negotiate tariff reductions or, at minimum, to delay and soften the impact on the Vietnamese economy of such adverse financial impositions.

At the same time, participation in a highly symbolic yet low risk initiative allowed Vietnam to reinforce its image as a responsible international actor willing to contribute to global peace, while preserving policy flexibility. This strategy maximizes reputational gains while minimizing commitment costs—a defining feature of Vietnam’s emerging foreign policy ecosystem.

Yet the high degree of transactionalism implicit in this modest alignment with an immediate priority of President Trump also entails risks. When diplomacy depends heavily on individual leaders in major powers, sudden political shifts in those partner countries can rapidly undermine or negate Hanoi’s strategic calculations.

3. Signals from Beijing: “Shared Future” as a Calculated Compromise 

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s status as the first foreign leader to congratulate To Lam on his re-election as General Secretary on January 23, 2024, carried significance well beyond diplomatic protocol [2]. It was both a strategic reassertion of patronage from Beijing and a test of Hanoi’s autonomy.

From China’s perspective, the swift reaffirmation of a “community of shared future” aimed to ensure that To Lam’s power consolidation would not lead to a strategic distancing  unfavorable to Beijing. In an era of increasingly systemic U.S.–China rivalry, China has a clear interest in keeping Vietnam stable and predictable as a trustworthy client state

For Vietnam, accepting the phrase “shared future” to define its feelings for Xi Jinping’s regime, while firmly avoiding the more deterministic term “shared destiny”—which China has successfully imposed on Laos, Cambodia, and several other ASEAN countries—represents a strategically intelligent euphemism. “Shared future” allows Hanoi interpretive flexibility of its relationship with Beijing, avoids fatalistic commitments, and prevents Vietnam’s foreign policy trajectory from being locked into only a single super-power axis.

Nevertheless, this linguistic maneuver also reflects the limits of Vietnam’s bargaining power in an asymmetric relationship with Beijing. Accepting even a softened version of Chinese terminology defining expected behaviors on the part of the Vietnamese underscores Hanoi’s continued dependence on China in critical areas such as trade, supply chains, and macroeconomic stability.

4. Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs): Rapid Execution, Shallow Digging 

Another pillar of the post–14th Congress foreign policy ecosystem is the continued expansion of Vietnam’s network of Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs). Under To Lam, CSPs have been emphasized as a flexible instrument allowing Vietnam to engage multiple major partners while avoiding ideological or value-based constraints.

In the short and medium term, this approach offers clear benefits: access to capital, technology, markets, and enhanced strategic balance in a fragmented international environment. However, the CSP framework has largely expanded horizontally at the national level, while activation by institutions and social entities has been limited in scope and depth, which limitations will be difficult to surmount.  

Most of Vietnam’s CSPs continue to exploit economic interests and short-term strategic calculations, lacking robust institutional, legal, and normative mechanisms providing in-depth association. As a result, Vietnam’s CPS relationships are vulnerable to domestic political changes in partner countries and constrain Vietnam’s ability to evolve from a “rule-taker” to a “rule-shaper” in the international system.

5. Domestic Dependence on a Security State puts a Ceiling on Foreign Policy Success

The post–14th Congress foreign policy ecosystem demonstrates Hanoi’s adaptability and resilience in an uncertain world. Yet its core internal contradiction lies in the growing dissonance between external openness and internal repression.

As national governance becomes increasingly dominated by state security priorities, critical soft-power resources for foreign policy—such as civil society, independent media, academia, and legal resources—are weakened or, under current circumstances, nearly eliminated. This creates a “ceiling on foreign policy achievement” that no amount of diplomatic agility can fully overcome.

In an international order where credibility, norms, and predictability increasingly determine national standing, foreign policy cannot rely solely on leadership flexibility, whether individual or collective, no matter how deft or clever it can be Without institutional foundations and fulsome societal open spaces, the new foreign policy ecosystem is unlikely to remain dynamic over the long term.

Conclusion 

The 14th Party Congress marks both continuity and adjustment in Vietnam’s foreign policy practice, with ambitions to shape a flexible, pragmatic, and adaptive ecosystem. Moves such as joining Trump’s “Peace Council,” maintaining strategic euphemisms in relations with China, and rapidly expanding the CSP network with dozens of countries illustrate Hanoi’s search for a “safe exit” in managing international risks, rather than anchoring itself to any single power bloc.

However, the model of “domestic repression combined with external openness” is unlikely to unlock the full potential of this ecosystem. The downward pressure on Vietnam’s “foreign policy ceiling” had already emerged in the late Nguyen Phu Trong era [3], and under To Lam, this risk has not only persisted but become more pronounced. Without timely and fundamental adjustments in institutional structures and societal space, Vietnam’s foreign policy may remain operational in the short term but will struggle to overcome strategic constraints in the long run. The 14th Party Congress thus serves not only as a political milestone, but as a critical test of Vietnam’s capacity to choose a sustainable path of beneficially integrating into the global community of the twenty-first century.

Footnotes

[1] https://mofa.gov.vn/tin-chi-tiet/chi-tiet/viet-nam-nhan-loi-moi-tham-gia-hoi-dong-hoa-binh-dai-gaza-58422-138.html

[2] https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/c78eep31plgo [ Ông Tập Cận Bình hoan nghênh ‘tương lai chung’ với Việt Nam sau khi ông Tô Lâm tái đắc cử ]

[3] https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/comment/blog/vietnam-opens-foreign-policy-closes-domestic-one-12302021095537.html

Article 2:

ACCUMULATING INHERENT PARADOXES: VIETNAM’S PATH FORWARD?

Đinh Hoàng Thắng

Fellow, The Caux Round Table

Summary: Vietnam faces five inherent paradoxes: rapid development with weak institutional foundations; aggressive globalization but low domestic resilience; a dynamic society with slow governance reform; growth reliant on external forces while internal capacity is fragile; and high aspirations with inefficient allocation of resources. Three development scenarios are outlined: maintaining the status quo, controlled reform, or disruptive instability. Controlled reform is deemed most feasible, requiring political consensus, institutional restructuring, and enhanced governance capacity. Lessons from other countries highlight the importance of timely reforms but with stability alongside structural transformation. Central to this scenario is system  capacity for self-adjustment: identifying problems, learning, correcting mistakes, and generating new momentum. Risks implicit in the disruptive scenario include trust crises, social fragmentation, and geopolitical pressures. Vietnam must pursue a new development trajectory that balances stability with courageous reform, aiming for sustainable growth having deeper and broader social impact.

1. Five Internal Paradoxes of Vietnam

Vietnam’s current political–economic system is confronting five profound internal paradoxes that reflect tensions between tradition and modernization. 

The first paradox lies in the divide between economics and politics: the economy functions under a socialist-oriented market mechanism, sustaining GDP growth of 6–7% over decades and attracting massive FDI from corporations such as Samsung, Intel, and Foxconn. Yet the political system maintains tight control through the Communist Party, with strategic decisions such as State Owned Enterprise leadership appointments and media censorship, creating a misalignment between economic openness and ideological constraints.

The second paradox emerges from overusing the slogan of “renovation,” repeated again and again since the 1986 Đổi Mới reforms, while substantive reform progresses slowly. Vietnam has integrated into the WTO, CPTPP, and EVFTA, but core sectors such as land, State Owned Enterprise restructuring (accounting for roughly 30% of GDP), and administrative reform remain sluggish. Despite Party Congress XIII calling for breaking the “ask–give mechanism”, bureaucratic procedures and corruption still hinder progress, making reform largely superficial.

Third, traditional ideological legitimacy—Marxism–Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought—has weakened, especially among younger generations exposed to social media and global values. In contrast, pragmatic legitimacy based on stability and economic growth has become central, with the motto “stability above all” shaping decisions from COVID-19 management to growth-focused policies despite inflation.

The fourth paradox is sustaining a powerful state apparatus with dense security and media control when society’s trust is longer an absolute. Scandals such as Formosa, Việt Á, and the Trịnh Xuân Thanh case eroded public confidence, while PAPI surveys indicate declining satisfaction with local authorities, reflecting a widening gap between the state and citizens.

Lastly, internal competition among senior cadres and officials has intensified, with factions vying for key positions in the Politburo and Central Committee. The upcoming 14th Party Congress is expected to witness behind-the-scenes struggles for top leadership, where economic interests intertwine with power, leading to the allocation of state resources through factional bargaining.

Together, these five paradoxes create a pattern of “accumulative tension”—gradual layering of contradictions beneath a seemingly stable surface. Compared with Eastern Europe before 1989, Vietnam shows similar dynamics: partial marketization generating inequality, ideological decline replaced by pragmatism, strong power but weakening trust, and factional infighting within Party and State leadership. Vietnam has avoided sudden collapse thanks to sustained growth and stronger control, but if this “accumulation” continues, similar abrupt ruptures may occur unless deep reform releases the pressure.

2. Three Future Development Scenarios

From a political–philosophical perspective, three developmental scenarios for Vietnam after the 14th Party Congress reflect tension between static stability (Aristotle’s stasis) and dialectical evolution (Hegel’s synthesis) where confronting internal contradictions may lead either to structural renewal or to collapse.

Scenario one would be to reinforce the current model which would maintain comprehensive Communist Party control while harmonizing market economics with such centralized authority. Advantages include social stability, avoidance of Soviet-style collapse, and continued 6–7% GDP growth similar to China under Xi Jinping, ensuring FDI attraction and regional stability. However, internal contradictions would continue to accumulate: outdated ideology would collide with market reality, corruption would exploit bureaucratic weaknesses, inequality would rise (Gini increasing from 0.35 to 0.43 in 15 years), and societal trust would erode, risking eventual rupture within 10–15 years. Estimated probability of implementation: 65%.

Scenario two – controlled reform – would aim to establish a new developmental orientation through internal pluralization within the Party, reduce State Owned Enterprise dominance, reform land ownership opportunities, and enhance transparency. Following Hegel, this would implement synthesis—transforming the inconsistency of ideological orthodoxy with free-market practices into a higher form of supervised democratic governance. Benefits would include productivity gains, restored trust, and a transformation similar to Đổi Mới 1986 or Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, while avoiding Gorbachev-style destabilization. Risks would include factional conflict and loss of central control. Estimated probability of implementation: 20%.

Scenario three – disorder and instability – would see an increase in ideological decline, social distrust, fragmentation of authority, inflation, and global shocks. This Marxian crisis would resemble Eastern Europe 1989—potentially enabling democratic restructuring but risking severe chaos, economic collapse, and foreign intervention. Estimated probability of implementation: 15%.

In conclusion, scenario one has the advantage but would bring on pressure; scenario two is most sustainable yet difficult; scenario three is dangerous and must be prevented.

3. Assessing the Controlled Reform Scenario

Vietnam stands at a strategic crossroads amid socio-economic transformation and geopolitical pressures. Controlled reform emerges as a feasible path to create a new developmental orientation—reducing personalized power, strengthening rule of law, enhancing political adaptability, and cautiously expanding civic space. This would not be a rupture breaking away from the revolution but an evolutionary renewal leveraging existing solid accomplishments.

Reducing personalized leadership means shifting from individual-centric authority to more collective, professional governance and to transparent merit-based leadership selection. 

Strengthening rule of law requires greater judicial independence and legal accountability across all state institutions, including the ruling party, thereby curbing abuse of power and fostering investor confidence. Enhancing self-adjusting capacity involves creating internal feedback mechanisms, dialogues with experts, and independent policy research. Controlled civic space expansion allows NGOs, social organizations, and intellectual forums to operate within legal frameworks, turning social input into governance assets.

Though difficult and requiring leadership consensus, this pathway is more sustainable than merely reinforcing the old model. Global lessons show controlled reform (Singapore, South Korea) can transition authoritarian modernizing systems into effective democratic governance. A phased 5–10 year roadmap is proposed—from legal groundwork and pilot reforms, to institutional oversight strengthening, to digital transparency integration. With decisive leadership and international cooperation, Vietnam can position itself as a new Southeast Asian development model.

A very appropriate equilibrium development model for Vietnam to emulate is Singapore.  Lee Kwan Yew and his People’s Action Party followed a blended approach to development using both dominant government priority setting and regulation and private sector self-help in education and entrepreneurship.  The PAP, with over 60% support from voting citizens and so majority control of the national assembly, built a strong state – no chewing gum allowed! – but it provided cultural, social, and market spaces for individual initiatives to innovate and create wealth, social capitals and human capitals.

4. Lessons from “Brother Nations”

Vietnam is entering a decisive historical phase marked by economic growth alongside deepening paradoxes: rising inequality, environmental degradation, bureaucratic inertia, and trust erosion due to corruption scandals. 

Lessons from Eastern Europe and China teach the danger of delaying political reform while crises deepen. In the late 1980s, regimes liberalized economically but suppressed political pluralism; accumulated tensions exploded, with Soviet Russia collapsing illustrating how rigidity destroys legitimacy.

China teaches that economic reform without governance modernization yields diminishing returns: while opening lifted millions from poverty, authoritarian rigidity, debt-driven overexpansion, youth unemployment, and overcentralization under Xi reveal vulnerability.

Vietnam shows parallels: strong growth but widening disparity, unresolved State Owned Enterprise inefficiencies, real estate vulnerabilities, leadership factionalism, and weakening institutional competitiveness. Therefore, Vietnam should: (1) institutionalize leadership succession transparency and competency criteria; (2) strengthen judicial independence and digital transparency to fight corruption; (3) cautiously expand civil society to create legitimate policy feedback channels; (4) invest in adaptive resilience with early-warning governance tools. These steps combine urgency with pragmatism, transforming paradox into opportunity.

5. The Role of Self-Adjustment Capacity

Vietnam’s central question is no longer merely growth versus stability, but whether its political system can self-adjust to survive historically. Systems endure only when they do not consider themselves absolute. True strength lies not in coercion but in acknowledging limits, listening to warning signals, and adapting proactively.

Today, legitimacy must evolve beyond economic performance toward inclusive development, transparent governance, and a renewed “social contract” recognizing citizens as active participants, not simply governed subjects.

A viable future requires lawful constraints on power, acceptance of criticism as constructive, and recognition of civil society as a governance partner. A system capable of self-adjustment transforms pressure into reform momentum, prevents accumulated paradoxes from turning into crises and instead shapes a new direction  for developmental.

6. Risks of the Instability Scenario

Vietnam may still fall into instability if it loses the capacity to adapt. Accumulated contradictions could then easily trigger combined economic, political, and social crises—slowing growth, financial vulnerabilities, unemployment, persistent corruption scandals, leadership fragmentation, and declining public trust.

External shocks—US–China rivalry, global recession, geopolitical turbulence—could intensify internal fragility, shifting away from controlling tensions to systemic disintegration. Eastern Europe’s rapid collapse illustrates the danger of delayed reform. Vietnam’s stronger control capacity offers resilience, but resilience is not immunity. If social trust weakens, inequality deepens, leadership rivalries intensify, dialogue narrows, and international confidence erodes, instability becomes a real, not hypothetical, threat.

7. Building a New Developmental Orientation for Vietnam

The heart of the matter is not GDP growth, but the duties that come with political power: securing national safety, economic prosperity, human dignity, and the future of the generations to come. Power must serve the nation, not itself. Vietnam needs a developmental orientation that balances stability with controlled reform, modern governance with societal participation, and state strength with community empowerment. Maintaining the current model would preserve stability in the short term but risks medium-term erosion of legitimacy; choosing the path of instability, conversely, would be economically and socially devastating.

Thus, the most reasonable—and most difficult—path is controlled reform: strengthening rule of law, improving governance, cautiously expanding civic space, institutionalizing leadership succession, and building trust-based legitimacy. If chosen after the 14th Congress, Vietnam can thus transform its accumulated contradictions into a foundation for renewed legitimacy, avoiding Eastern Europe’s collapse and China’s fragility, and emerging as a distinctive Southeast Asian model: stable yet adaptive, globally integrated yet culturally grounded, powerful yet accountable, and above all—governance that truly serves the Vietnamese people.

Written December 2025 for the Caux Round Table which, in 1986, was founded in Caux, Switzerland; is incorporated in the United States of America; and has its Administrative Office in, St Paul, Minnesota

In keeping with the New Year greeting of Professor Stephen Young, Director of CRT, in His grace, God has granted us the gift of the New Year within ourselves. With the strength and grace so bestowed upon us, we can become peacemakers. At any moment, we can accept responsibility and take action. God is waiting for us to stand up; He has made it possible for us to set right what has gone wrong. It is in this spirit of solidarity that, in recent years, CRT has placed particular emphasis on East–West dialogue, intercivilizational exchange, and the study of systemic transformation in post-socialist, reforming, and transitional societies, including China, Vietnam, Eastern Europe, and Russia. Presented below are the two most recent contributions to this ongoing endeavor by Dr. Đinh Hoàng Thắng, CRT Fellow.

First Essay: 

Collapse on the One Hand; Sustainability on the other: Why did the Soviet System fail in Russia and Eastern Europe but Socialism in China still exists – at least until now?

Đinh Hoàng Thắng

Fellow, The Caux Round Table

In our lifetimes, global political history has witnessed contrasting trajectories between leading socialist systems. The Soviet system in Russia and its client states in Eastern Europe rapidly collapsed while in China a socialist system of governance and economy has survived through controlled reforms under the direction of a dominant centralized Party and State authority apparatus. The question is inevitable: How could systems born from the same ideological orientation arrive at such different outcomes?

The quick answer is that history is not teleological – not in any way driven by fixed forces towards one necessary end state. Rather, history, even understood as directed by dialectical materialism, is an open-ended, unplanned process of actions and connected reactions, a never-ending process of adjustments, change and evolution.  The “now” of any moment in history has proceeded from a “past” and is shaping the “future”.

Thus, even socialism as an ideal social arrangement cannot be monolithic. Socialism in China was not destined to replicate socialism in Russia.

Thus, the inconsistent evolutions of socialism in Russia and China depended on different decision-making dynamics.  The Russian transition out of Stalinism took a different course than did the Chinese transition out of Maoism. As President Xi Jinping continually insists Chinese socialism evolved under the guidance of “Chinese Characteristics”. The two processes of transition took remnants of an established order and retained some, reorganized others, contested alternatives, and eventually re-configured governing institutions into a new politics.

We then need to consider what “Russian” characteristics” drove the evolution of socialism in Russia and what specific “Chinese” characteristics have produced the Xi Jinping model of political legitimacy and economic development in China.

1. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Failure Born from an Accumulation of errors, leading to Crisis and then to Loss of Direction

Before collapsing, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies had endured a prolonged period of economic, political and cultural stagnation. Centrally planned economies reached the limits of their regulatory capacity: an inability to provide incentives for innovation, operational inefficiency, and growing disconnection from real market demands. In parallel, ideological legitimacy evaporated, at first slowly and then dramatically. Once appealing slogans lost their power to persuade the public of what was right and what was wrong because the gap between regime propaganda and lived reality had grown too wide.  When the propaganda lost its moral power, the Soviet regimes lost their ability to command obedience and respect.

More importantly, the final phase, one of “accumulation of shortcomings and errors”, of these intertwined Soviet systems brought about not strength, but introduced self-destructive forces. Reforms came too late, or were only half-hearted. Political structures lost cohesion as rejection of their authority spread across society . Such socialism developed what could be called “existential fatigue.” Confidence in the endurance of the model decayed psychologically long before collapse arrived politically. When such internal contradictions reached a certain threshold, instead of forming a coherent and effective trajectory into the future—a directional alignment capable of holding the system together—those internal contradictions produced fragmentation, confrontation, and eventually sudden disintegration.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the Soviet states of Eastern Europe collapsed from any single political incident. Their fall came from institutional gridlock, which had taken decades of dysfunctions to accumulate system-destroying critical mass. Once legitimacy crumbled and the state lost its capacity to mobilize society, even a moderate shock was enough to bring down a structure already hollowed out from within. In other words, the Soviet–Eastern European collapse resulted from the failure of their transition out of original orthodoxy, a systemic failure to forestall the accumulation of disappointments, resentments, malingering obstructions, profiteering, and other refusals of obedience.   These Soviet regimes failed to envision and implement a new path capable of reconciling contradictions and reviving historical vitality.

We might then consider what “Russian” characteristics contributed to the failure of the Soviet regime. An obvious consideration is the Muscovite tradition of cruel rulers and compliant sycophants. Russia arose from a social structure dualism of the Tsar and the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church where no freedoms existed either in politics or religion.  Thus, Russians have carried into the present a national character of servile accommodation. Inventiveness, pragmatism, checks and balances, decentralized flexibility have never characterized Russian culture, society or politics.

2. The Chinese transition out of Maoism: Surviving Through Accumulating Power and Controlling institutional Assignments

Sharing the same socialist ideological foundation, China nonetheless chose a different transitional path when the shortcomings of Maoist orthodoxy became evident. After the traumatic disruptions of the Maoist era, China gave itself a reform program marked by strong pragmatism. Unlike the Soviet Union, China moved earlier and more decisively in restructuring its economy while still retaining a highly rigid hierarchy for its politics.

What mattered most was not just generating economic growth, but the creation of a new basis for regime legitimacy—one derived from delivering development, improving livelihoods, and utilizing nationalism as a powerful binding force. China has also advanced further than many nations in building sophisticated tools for social control, deploying security and digital technologies extensively to manage dissent.

As a result, China has formed what may be called a “directional alignment of power”: a trajectory in which the state holds absolute authority while refusing to abandon the imperative of development. Ideology has been “pragmatized”: socialism remains the rhetoric, but the underlying logic is one of power, national strategy, and economic advancement. This helps China avoid an Eastern European-style shock—at least in the short term.

This successful transition was made possible through the deployment of “Chinese” characteristics, policies borrowed from 2,000 years of imperial order, where individual dynasties might have risen to power and then collapsed but a habit of showing pragmatic concern for social order from family, to village, to district and finally the state was reinvigorated again and again.

3.  The Chinese Communist Party’s Survival Until Today Does Not Guarantee Its Future Durability

However, the continuing survival of Chinese socialism should not be mistaken for a guarantee of its sustainability. Beneath its seemingly stable surface lies mounting pressure: slowing growth, demographic decline, widening inequality, social tensions, and sustained international strategic competition. All of these dynamics create new, or exacerbate existing, contradictions within the system, contradictions which, day by day, are accumulating the power to destabilize China’s future.

Just as the Soviet Union once believed itself “too strong to fall,” China is not immune to the forces which dictate history. Chinese socialism did not escape history but began its adjustment to historical realities before the Russian Soviet leaders did.  Socialist Russian and Eastern European regimes allowed history to push them into corners where collapse was their only future.  But history is still grinding away at Chinese Socialism. More challenges to the regime are to come. 

So, if one must explain why Soviet Russia and its Eastern Europe client states disappeared while Communist China still endures, the reasons are:

• Russia and Eastern Europe accumulated dysfunctions and weaknesses, leading to, first, a loss of reform options and then collapse
• China sustained centralized ruling power through pragmatic economic reforms producing continued interim survival

But history remains open to change and new developments. The decisive question for Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China is: the coming accumulation of circumstantial realities will generate what kind of a governing regime?

Written December 2025 for the Caux Round Table which, in 1986, was founded in Caux, Switzerland; is incorporated in the United States of America; and has its Administrative Office in, St Paul, Minnesota

Our Vietnamese correspondent has shared with me his generally optimistic report on the political environment which will shape decisions at the forthcoming Party Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

I note with interest the discussion of traditional Vietnamese sensitivity to the signals we mere humans get from Heaven as to our fates as time and space cycle through the years.

The Vietnamese Communist Party Today Compared with Forty Years Ago: The 14th Party Congress and the 6th Party Congress — Parallels, Divergences, and Enduring Historical Undercurrents. 

Four decades after the Sixth Party Congress—an event widely regarded as having opened a historic door toward a more flexible economic order (Đổi Mới)—Vietnam once again confronts a life-defining political moment: a critical transition of power with far-reaching consequences.

Hoàng Trường

The Fourteenth Party Congress is approaching amid intensifying economic, political, and social pressures, a visible erosion of public trust, and increasingly complex factional maneuvering among highly placed officials.

The reappearance of familiar patterns in the operation of power has led many observers to pose an unsettling question: is history repeating itself—once again moving through familiar cycles of power?

A comparison between the 14th Party Congress (2026) and the 6th Party Congress (1986) reveals notable similarities, while also exposing fundamental differences that reflect both the changing times and the evolving structure and operation of totalitarian power.

I. Parallels: When Power Becomes Trapped in Bargaining

1. Deadlock and infighting among the most prominent cadres and officials

In the lead-up to the Sixth Party Congress, Lê Đức Thọ—despite advanced age and declining health—was unwilling to step aside. Phạm Văn Đồng and Trường Chinh were forced into compromise in order to prevent factional conflict from spiraling out of control. A transitional arrangement was devised: Trường Chinh would preside over the Congress, then hand over leadership to Nguyễn Văn Linh—a new figure representing the emerging reformist tendency.

Ahead of the Fourteenth Congress, a similar pattern of “forced compromise” has once again emerged. Central Committee meetings have been postponed repeatedly (three times), and personnel lists revised again and again—clear indications that no faction has yet secured overwhelming dominance.

The crucial parallel lies here: while the overall strategic direction is widely acknowledged, personnel arrangements have become the central bottleneck.

In 1986, despite fierce debate, senior leaders recognized that the centrally planned economic model had reached its limits. Likewise, by 2026, a growing consensus has formed that growth driven by land rents, privileges, and easy capital has exhausted its momentum.

The Politburo has issued Resolution 68, effectively mandating a shift in development priorities toward the private sector. Yet disagreements over who should lead this transformation have prolonged internal division for more than a year.

2. A shared denominator: erosion of social trust

From 1975 to 1986, the subsidy-based economic model plunged everyday life into severe deprivation. Public confidence deteriorated rapidly.

Today, although surface-level material conditions have changed dramatically, the psychological parallels are unmistakable:

• Businesses are exhausted by overlapping inspections and audits;
• The business environment is obstructed by fear of making mistakes and by interference from enforcement agencies lacking accountability;
• Confidence in the future is declining as opportunities are squeezed by rent-seeking power groups intent on expanding their privileges.

As in 1986, society is fatigued, and expectations for a decisive change are once again on the rise.

II. Divergences: Reversed Regional Roles and a Transformed Power Structure

1. Southern dynamism: from reform driver to controlled subordinate

At the Sixth Party Congress, southern Vietnam was the most powerful engine of reform. The collapse of the slogan “rapid, strong, and steady advance toward socialism” had pushed the country to the brink of hunger—symbolized by nationwide dependence on sorghum imported from the Soviet Union.

Saigon and the southern region—drawing on market experience and economic dynamism—were the first to recover. “Fence-breaking” reforms in pricing, wages, production contracts, and enterprise autonomy laid the practical foundations for Đổi Mới. It was no coincidence that leaders with southern origins later played key roles during the early reform period.

Today, the regional balance of power has shifted. Northern leadership—having absorbed lessons from the post-1986 period, when the South enjoyed substantial autonomy—has narrowed the South’s room for maneuver, especially following the Nguyễn Tấn Dũng era and its controversial state-conglomerate model described as “steel fists.”

If 1986 marked northern concession to southern pragmatism, 2026 reflects a reassertion of centralized northern control.

2. Hunger and aspiration: different forms, the same political dynamic

In 1986, hunger was literal. In 2026, society “hungers” for the rule of law, while businesses hunger for economic freedom and thirst for a transparent, healthy legal environment.

Where past deprivation stemmed from a flawed economic model, today’s exhaustion arises from relentless inspections, administrative coercion by the security apparatus, and weak accountability among political leaders. New and troubling features have emerged: investigative and executive power now forms a wall that blocks capital, innovation, and production at the very moment they begin to take shape.

3. The rise of a socio-spiritual dimension

A defining feature of the current period is the strong resonance of traditional socio-spiritual sentiment: repeated natural disasters, relentless flooding, and as many as fifteen major storms have nurtured a collective sense that “heaven’s will” is turning against the system.

In East Asian political psychology, such phenomena are often interpreted as signs of dynastic or national transition. If reform-oriented forces knew how to channel this instinctive sentiment, it could become a strategic advantage.

In 1986, this psychological-political dimension was largely absent. In 2026, it has emerged as a powerful undercurrent shaping public emotion and expectation.

III. A Changed World: Globalization and the Limits of Absolute Control

1. Vietnam in 2026 is no longer Vietnam in 1986

• The private sector has become the backbone of economic growth;
• Vietnam occupies a key position in global electronics and semiconductor supply chains;
• Interwoven relations with the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China mean that senior leadership decisions now carry major geopolitical implications.

Under such conditions, a top-down model of total control is clearly ill-suited to an economy and society that demand speed, creativity, and adaptability.

2. Concentrated power—facing harsh limits

The current power structure rests primarily on:

• The expanding influence of the security apparatus;
• Strong totalitarian coercion—rule by police power rather than by the rule of law;
• Governance through repression and sophisticated extraction rather than trust-building;
• Preferential treatment for loyalist networks and obedience over institutional reform.

Meanwhile, businesses—the main drivers of growth—are increasingly constrained by legal uncertainty and intrusive security oversight.

3. “Political flooding” as a metaphor of the age

The persistence of coercive governance despite repeated natural disasters reveals a deeply troubling separation between the state and society.

At the Sixth Party Congress, economic and social crisis forced leadership change. Ahead of the Fourteenth Congress, although society is no less exhausted or gridlocked, the power structure appears more rigid and increasingly entrenched in both status and authority.

This contrast reflects a core trait of modern totalitarian systems: the survival of the system is prioritized above economic performance, social responsibility, or moral values.

Conclusion: Parallels as Reflection, Divergences as Warning

The Sixth Party Congress was a historic turning point that liberated national energy from the constraints of a failed economic model. The Fourteenth Congress could generate a similar breakthrough—or it may simply perpetuate a cycle of power consolidation if not accompanied by meaningful institutional reform.

The parallels lie in social fatigue, resolving deadlocks among the most senior cadres and officials,, and pressures for change from below.

The divergences lie in a more rigid power structure, a stronger private sector, and Vietnam’s far deeper integration into the global system.

And this time, whether acknowledged or not, socio-spiritual forces are also present as an invisible factor shaping collective sentiment.

History never repeats itself exactly. Yet patterns of power distribution, crisis dynamics, and signals from society’s foundations inevitably return—albeit in altered forms.

The Fourteenth Party Congress, therefore, is not merely about personnel appointments. It is a test of Vietnam’s entire philosophy of governance: whether its one-party system can adapt to a new stage of development, or whether it will continue to close itself off from warnings issued by society, markets—and even by nature itself.

The 14th Party Congress and the “Post-Karma” of To Lam

Nguyen Khac Mai – President, Institute for Vietnamese Wisdom Studies

I draw on the Buddhist concept of karma to reflect on the political path of To Lam. Everything he has done—through body, speech, and mind—during his years as Minister of Public Security and now as the country’s top leader, remains vivid in the memory of the public. These are his past karmas: actions that, in the eyes of many, continue certain “old corruptions” that Ho Chi Minh once warned about, yet also contain elements that disrupt stagnation and generate momentum for reform. Whether these past karmas are virtuous or harmful will be judged by society and by history.

But the transformation of karma is not a solitary journey. One who wishes to transform must repent, must cultivate new and better karmas, and must accept supporting conditions—that is, criticism, oversight, and assistance from society. Without this, goodwill can easily turn into illusion.

I. Post-Karma: The Vision of a “Rising Era” and Five Strategic Pillars

To Lam’s post-karma began when he assumed the position of General Secretary, preparing for the 14th Party Congress and shaping the decisions that followed. His proposed vision—the “Rising Era”—aims for a more civilized, humane, service-oriented, and developmental Party and State. He set forth five strategic pillars:

1. Reforming the Party: shifting from a mindset of power to a spirit of public service; the Party must be the servant of the people, not their ruler.
2. Advancing culture, science, education, and technology: regarding these as new national capabilities—AI, digitalization, and scientific research—to elevate Vietnam’s competitiveness.
3. Administrative reform: building a three-tiered government structure guided by performance-based governance and a citizen-centered, developmental state.
4. Developing the private economy and civil society: creating new engines of national growth while addressing historical debts by legitimizing, respecting, and fostering civil society.
5. Multilateral international integration: a “bamboo diplomacy” that is flexible yet principled, transforming external resources into domestic strength.

These ideas, at the conceptual level, are modern and progressive. Yet the gap between vision and implementation is always perilous: if carried out under concentrated power, opaque processes, or insufficient consultation, the post-karma may quickly distort.

II. One Year In: Recognizing Early Deviations

For post-karma to become good karma, we must confront the missteps that have emerged during To Lam’s initial period in office.

1. Localism and concentrated appointments

The accelerated appointment of officials from a single province (Hung Yen) and from the security sector to many key positions has raised concerns about regional imbalance and a closing of political space. A sustainable political system requires diversity of origin and professional background; excessive concentration risks creating the image of a closed circle of power.

2. Personalism in symbols and public projects

Proposals to name streets after family members, or to pursue sector-branded megaprojects—such as a Public Security theater, stadium, or even airport—evoke a tendency toward personalization and “sectoral branding” of state authority. In a period that demands austerity, prioritization, and public benefit, such symbols can misallocate resources and alienate public sentiment.

3. Major national decisions driven by voluntarism

Gigantic initiatives—the North–South high-speed railway, the nuclear program in Binh Thuan, or the merger of provinces—cannot be approached with haste or unilateral decision-making. These trillion-dollar, multi-generational projects require independent research, broad consultation, and rigorous socio-environmental impact assessments. A country cannot “run while lining up” on matters of its future.

These deviations are not cosmetic; they reveal a paradox: although renewal is proclaimed, the methods of implementation risk replicating old power patterns. Without timely correction, the post-karma cannot achieve long-term legitimacy.

III. Four Social Imperatives for Turning Post-Karma into Good Karma

Vietnam must not miss a historical window of opportunity. Society must act as a constructive partner setting realistic guardrails.

1. Reviving and strengthening civil society as a monitoring partner

Civil society is not an adversary of the Party but a vital mechanism of oversight and policy improvement. Vietnam must legally recognize civil society organizations and empower the press—within lawful frameworks—to monitor public affairs.

2. A citizenry aware of its opportunity and responsibility

This is a rare “window of opportunity.” Citizens must raise awareness: expressing opinions, monitoring major projects, demanding transparency. Consensus does not mean passive silence; it means active participation.

3. Independent expert consultation for all strategic projects

All megaprojects should be reviewed by independent scientific councils that publish environmental, social, and fiscal impact assessments. This prevents voluntarism and ensures the sustainability of national decisions.

4. Building a new political culture: integrity and accountability

Vietnam needs programs on public-service ethics, transparent appointment processes, assets disclosure, and mechanisms for conflict-of-interest management. A new political culture is essential to prevent distortion of reforms.

IV. Traditional Wisdom as the Foundation for Modern Reform

Figures such as To Hien Thanh and Ngo Thi Si, along with the Nho–Buddhist tradition of East Asia, left behind profound lessons in political ethics: appoint the upright, lead through moral example, and persuade before punishing. Einstein reminds us that no problem can be solved with the same mindset that created it, and Engels urges socialists to learn from the advanced nations. These teachings suggest that post-karma must synthesize ancient Vietnamese wisdom with modern scientific governance.

V. Practical Steps Toward Realizing a Meaningful Post-Karma

• Conduct a comprehensive review of appointments through an independent oversight committee.
• Establish a National Scientific Council for all strategic megaprojects, with mandatory public reports.
• Codify public consultation in planning processes to ensure citizens have a voice from the outset.
• Develop civil society and professionalized journalism—within a legal framework—as channels of public oversight.
• Enforce asset transparency, conflict-of-interest regulations, and integrity norms throughout the public sector.

Conclusion

Past karma explains the path to power; post-karma determines whether that power serves the nation. To Lam’s post-karma can become good karma only if grounded in transparency, consultation, integrity, and societal partnership. Without these, goodwill may be swallowed by old patterns of authority.

The nation’s fate is like tangled vines, the ancients said: to untangle it requires wisdom, goodwill, and—above all—the participation of the people. A worthy post-karma is a promise to the nation: a Party and a State that serve, and a society capable of rising with its own strength.

Ну, погоди! — Just wait and see.

By Dinh Hoang Thang , Fellow the Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism

Busan — a city that smells of salt and ocean water, once defined by tides and trade — suddenly found itself at the center of a geopolitical storm. Before arriving here, Donald Trump had stopped in Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo. Five days, three capitals (October 26–30): what seemed like a restless shuttle across Asia turned out to be a cartography of power. Did the history of East Asia just quietly turn a new page? 

I. A Journey Writting a Message 

Trump’s travels were no ordinary tour. The trip implemented a strategy , scripted in three acts: beginning in Kuala Lumpur — the symbolic heart of ASEAN; moved to Tokyo — the setting of a revived alliance; and ended in Busan — where two superpowers tested each other’s resolve.

The sequence mattered. Southeast Asia is not an audience, but part of the stage. Japan is no longer just an ally, but a co-architect of global order. And Busan — that sea-wrapped arena — became host to the acting out of raw, transactional power.

In Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN — once derided as a “talking club” — suddenly looked relevant. Small nations, through the art of flexible diplomacy, managed to engage both Washington and Beijing, bargaining for space, investment, and having a voice in an age of tightening rivalry.

In Tokyo, Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae, heir to former Prime Minister Abe’s strategic realism, met Trump to discuss supply chains, defense, and technological autonomy. The U.S.–Japan alliance is no longer built only on deterrence; it now rests on industrial and technological power — an alliance of determinative capability.

And finally, in Busan, amid jet engine thrusts and the scent of the sea, Trump and Xi met in a modest room — no red carpets, no choreographed grandeur. What unfolded was a minimalist drama of power: an interim detente, not a peace; a truce defined by interests, not ideals.

II. Japan’s New Doctrine and the Shape of a Regional Order 

Shinzo Abe planted the seeds of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Takaichi Sanae is harvesting them — with less rhetoric and more resolve. Her ambition is transparent: boost defense spending, anchor security cooperation with the U.S., and weave industrial links with India, Australia, and South Korea. This is Abe 2.0 — democratic, assertive, and determined to keep East Asia’s future from being written by Beijing.

With Trump’s pragmatic America back in play, Tokyo understands that autonomy is the new loyalty. Instead of sheltering under Washington’s security umbrella, Japan needs its own raincoat — rebuilding semiconductor industries, advancing clean energy, and reimagining its role in regional supply chains. The Abe–Takaichi doctrine turns ideals into instruments: from “rules-based order” to “capabilities-based alliances.”

III. Busan: When Two Worlds Talk in Calculus 

After months of tariff battles, tech bans, and rare-earth restrictions, both Trump and Xi needed a breather. The outcome was a temporary armistice: Washington eased some tariffs; Beijing resumed U.S. soybean imports and pledged to rein in fentanyl exports. But beneath the smiles, the calculation was cold-hearted.

Trump needed stability heading into an election year. Xi needed calm to sustain his authority at home and preserve his face internationally. Each leader stepped back a few inches — without abandoning a single trenchline.

The U.S.–China rivalry has entered a new phase: managed competition. The conflict has evolved from a trade war to a war of standards — over chips, AI, finance, and energy. Two gravitational systems now coexist: not colliding, not converging, but circling in uneasy proximity. Like twin planets in an imperfect orbit, they offset the pull of — and so limit — each other’s orbit.

IV. ASEAN Awakens: From Playing Field to Power Hub 

One quiet happening during Trump’s journey was the awakening of ASEAN. As Air Force One touched down in Kuala Lumpur, Southeast Asia ceased to be a corridor between superpowers and began to act as a hinge of strategic consequence.

ASEAN’s new realism lies in “neutral pragmatism.” Its members — Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, among others — are mastering the art of balance: welcoming investment, keeping dialogue open, and leveraging great-power rivalry to augment  self-reliant autonomy.

Neutrality no longer means passivity. It’s an art of motion, not a state of immobility — the ability to maneuver between forces without being crushed. If sustained, that agility could transform ASEAN from a passive zone into a dynamic geoeconomic contributor to a multi-polar world.

V. Vietnam: From Insecure Wariness to Self-Reliant Confidence 

Vietnam stands at the confluence of two currents: commerce and security strategy. The temporary U.S.–China détente offers a breathing space — stable trade, redirected investment, supply-chain realignment — but of uncertain duration. A single tariff tweak in Washington or a military move by Beijing in the South China Sea could upend it overnight.

Vietnam’s survival strategy must therefore be double-tracked: pragmatic in action, visionary in thought.

Pragmatism means infrastructure reform, institutional modernization, human-capital investment, and advances in logistics and semiconductors — the bloodstream feeding the new global economy.

Vision means redefining “self-reliance” not through isolation, but through innovation; not by avoiding conflict, but by shaping cooperation.

“Self-reliance” today is not a slogan but a system — the ability to shift from low-cost manufacturing to high-value creation, from export dependency to endogenous value chains.

As global powers race to secure chips and critical minerals, Vietnam must secure and refine its most precious resource: people — their education, creativity, and freedom – to shape the counry’s future.

Vietnam’s strength has never been about size. It lies in self-definition — the capacity to carve a very purposeful identity and design an innovative strategy amid flux.

VI. East Asia: A Quiet Reshaping of Order 

Trump’s five-day tour did not shake the earth with thunder.  But it did trigger some quiet tectonic movements. The regional order is morphing from black-and-white confrontation to a spectrum of pragmatic competition. Japan grows firmer, South Korea more adaptive, ASEAN more flexible, and China more cautious.

This is not the collapse of an old order but the reconfiguration of one — an emerging, networked, interdependent Indo-Pacific, built less on declarations and more on interlocking actions.

The new order cannot yet neutralize Beijing’s ambitions, but it has birthed a chain reaction: middle powers linking up, industrial alliances forming, technology partnerships expanding, preventive diplomacy taking root. A soft multipolarity is emerging — not of rival empires, but of complementary capabilities.

VII. Busan: Mirror or Gateway? 

From the salty winds of Busan rises an image of contemporary East Asia — a mirror in which every nation can see itself: its possibilities, its limits. Trump’s five-day voyage did not redraw borders, but it stirred currents that may erode the old shorelines of certainty.

East Asia is entering a new phase — one of mid-sized powers asserting agency, of profitable alignments replacing rigid blocs, of competition measured not in ideology but in competence.

Vietnam, poised in the storm’s eye, has a choice: to shrink and dodge — or to reach and redefine.

In an age when power resides less in missiles or money than in ideas and intellect, any meaningful rise of Vietnam to take advantage of the new order will begin not with muscle power, but with heart/mind power – the freedom to think and the courage to create.

Trump’s five-day odyssey was but a moment. Yet history often turns on such moments — quietly, but profoundly.

Our fellow, Dinh Hoang Thang, keeps a close eye and ear on the evolution of Vietnam away from a traditional “socialist one-party democracy.”

After the conclusion of the recent session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, former Ambassador Thang came to certain conclusions, which you can read here.

Vietnam’s Central Committee Meetings and Tô Lâm’s Visit to Pyongyang: An Outside Perspective

By Dr. Hoang Thang Dinh, Caux Round Table Fellow

Summary: 

Vietnam’s political evolution entered a decisive stage with the 13th Central Committee Plenum  (early October 2025) followed by General Secretary Tô Lâm’s state visit to North Korea — political moves that revealed both a consolidation of power and a search for stability amid a rapidly shifting East Asian order. While Hanoi balances relations among major powers, the real test of its leadership will lie in transforming political symbolism into practical governance and successful economic outcomes. The forthcoming 14th Party Congress will determine (i) whether Vietnam can reform its political and economic power structures and practics without losing stability — and (ii) integrate more globally while maintaining its autonomous, self-reliant, identity.

1. Power Shifts and the Quest for Stability 

East Asia is reconfiguring  its power dynamics — from China’s many internal challenges to Japan’s evolving defense strategies and capabilities . Against this changing regional order, Vietnam has just taken three pivotal steps in its current five-year political cycle: the 13th Central Committee Plenum, General Secretary Tô Lâm’s state visit to Pyongyang, and preparations for the 14th Plenum in mid-November.

 Each step serves two objectives: choosing leaders and advancing Vietnam’s stature in world affairs.

Before the 13th Plenum, Tô Lâm issued Regulation No. 365 (September 2025), elevating the Standing Secretariat to “core leadership” status — effectively adding a fifth pillar to the traditional tứ trụ (“four pillars”), forming what analysts call a Bộ Ngũ or “Pentarchy” [1].
Despite administrative streamlining elsewhere in governing institutions, the Central Committee remains at about 200 members strong, and the Politburo at 17–19 members. This equilibrium preserves collective leadership and the practice of internal balancing among factions [3].

2. Two Milestones, One Message 

Hanoi’s delicate balancing act – simultaneously positioning relationships with the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea, and now North Korea—demonstrates its enduring ambition for achieving what might be called “soft multilateralism.” Importantly and in addition, with the 14th Party Congress approaching, this achievement also furthers a very important domestic objective: to strengthen Tô Lâm’s legitimacy and the influence  projected by  his political base.

A Vietnamese expert told BBC News that if the Pyongyang visit (Oct 9–11) was simply “to score within the communist club,” it could backfire. But if framed as “a balancing message that Vietnam can talk to all sides,” it would be a bold yet risky diplomatic act [4].

That visit, praised as occurring in a “particularly friendly atmosphere,” emphasized the solidarity of remaining socialist states. Still, it raised a deeper question: did it demonstrate diplomatic independence — or was it a gesture of self-importance compensating for slower progress with Washington?

While both sides agreed to cooperate in several sectors, real progress now depends on overcoming institutional and sanction barriers. Reuters quoted KCNA’s assessment of To Lam’s visit as merely a reaffirmation of “traditional comradeship” [5].

3. Concentrated Power with Attentive Execution

The four Central Committee plenums convened under Tô Lâm’s leadership — from the 10th to the 13th — illustrate a subtle governance model of “centralization with fine tuning” [6]. Introducing confidential voting within the Politburo — an unusual move — signals an attempt to have both firm control and participatory consensus [7].

However, system performance remains uneven. Despite administrative reforms, the hesitant response to recent typhoons exposed weak coordination among agencies and responsible officials. Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính’s public scolding of absent provincial leaders became emblematic of widespread personal inefficiency and irresponsibility in the apparatus of government[8]. The gap between having political authority and delivering good results has become Vietnam’s “Achilles Heel”.

4. Diplomacy: Symbolism delivering limited results 

Tô Lâm’s Pyongyang trip symbolized ideological loyalty and political steadiness on his part [9]. Yet, with North Korea under heavy sanctions, the scope for cooperation benefiting Vietnam is narrow.

While domestic media stressed the visit’s symbolic value, such public imagery has limited practical effect as Vietnam seeks investment and deeper integration into CPTPP and RCEP. In an increasingly pragmatic world, only invoking “socialist friendship” does not impress those potential partners who prioritize performance over ideology [10].

The muted global response to Vietnam’s appeal for disaster aid after the recent typhoons highlights this gap between “socialist solidarity” and money provided when it is needed.

5. Administrative Mergers and the Two-Level Governance Test 

Domestically, reforms such as consolidation of some provinces one with another and administrative streamlining were designed to cut costs and boost efficiency — but outcomes have not met expectations. Bigger, consolidated, administrative units do not guarantee better, more effective, governance.

High restructuring costs and cultural disparities have generated pushback where the reforms have been imposed. Experts suggest that true efficiency will come only through capacity-building, digital governance, and empowered local autonomy, not with just consolidation alone [11].

Ironically, once-efficient disaster-response systems slowed down after the mergers of provincial administrations. Hanoi’s decision not to release typhoon casualty figures, while appealing for aid, underscored a paradox: centralized power does not guarantee accountability or good results [12].

6. Institutional Credibility and the Implementation Gap 

A political system is judged by its ability to implement, not by its scope of control. Its strength grows out of good results, not from the sweep of its legally authorized span of control.  Regional surveys (2024–2025) show declining public trust in local governments due to poor crisis response and service delivery [13].

The widening gap between “political rhetoric” and “administrative outcomes” now defines Vietnam’s foundational political dilemma — reforming the system without precipitating instability.

7. Between Reform and Stability 

The political landscape following the 13th Central Committee plenum reflects a model of “conditional stability”: political power remains concentrated, yet must adapt to the demands of modern governance; diplomacy remains largely symbolic, yet needs to shift gradually toward pragmatism. To what extent will the concept of “liuzhi”—a key framework for understanding how Beijing integrates Party discipline with state authority—be adopted in Hanoi’s political system? [14] Or, as analyst David Brown once observed, Vietnam’s new regime is still finding its footing—caught between freedom and discipline, stability and innovation, expectation and reform. [15]

The country now faces a dual adjustment process: consolidating political legitimacy while enhancing institutional capacity. The success of this strategy depends on whether the system can turn political symbolism into practical effectiveness—whether administrative reform can genuinely improve governance, and whether symbolic diplomacy can open new economic frontiers.

On the eve of the 14th National Congress, these questions remain unanswered. The upcoming Congress will not merely be a personnel reshuffle—it will be a test of Vietnam’s governance model: can the country remain stable while pursuing reform, and integrate globally while preserving its own identity? How can it reinforce central authority without neglecting the balance of power with local institutions? [16]

References 

[1 & 3] https://fulcrum.sg/to-lam-is-institutionalising-politics-again/
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z128gPCvTnY
[4] https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/cge2e1ywd4go
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-vietnam-agree-cooperate-defence-other-fields-kcna-says-2025-10-11/
[6] https://fulcrum.sg/to-lam-is-institutionalising-politics-again/
[7] https://youtu.be/9dWd3-s1KB4?si=6LvXedt8YbOpL_Sg
[8] https://youtu.be/AioD65l4nyE?si=F3xl9pmrJLQGZs0-
[9] https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/10/10/the-message-of-the-visit-to-north-korea-that-vietnam-wants-to-send-to-major-countries/
[10] https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3328310/vietnams-leader-heads-north-korea-first-visit-18-years-rebalance-relations
[11] https://asiatimes.com/2025/08/to-lam-consolidating-hard-fast-and-forceful-rule-in-vietnam/
[12] https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/enablers-and-barriers-implementing-effective-disaster-risk-management-according-good
[13] https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/0c2ba150-f410-4cb0-994e-ad1ea812642c

[14] https://youtube.com/watch?v=B18pzEYjdwM&si=9DZCTxEq-Hbm57D9

[15] https://www.eurasiareview.com/16012025-vietnams-new-regime-finds-its-footing-analysis/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[16] https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/09/03/vietnam-redraws-its-administrative-map/