Category: Vietnam

Vietnam and the United States Confront Multidimensional Strategic Variables: some are only optics but others have resilient substance

 

Introduction by Professor Stephen Young  

Unlike September 2024—when mixed signals and discordant domestic voices accompanied Vietnam’s high-level engagement with Washington—General Secretary To Lam’s visit to Washington on February 18 – 20) unfolded with more controlled message discipline and more obvious choreography. Over two days, the Vietnamese leader not only attended the inaugural session of President Donald Trump’s Gaza Peace Board but also secured something more politically consequential: a formal meeting with the American President at the White House.

After three previously unsuccessful attempts to arrange direct talks, the doors of the White House finally opened. The handshake, the carefully worded public praise, and the optics of mutual respect were unmistakable.

 

HOÀNG TRƯỜNG (PhD)

And yet: beneath the hopeful symbolism lies a more complex strategic landscape. Vietnam–U.S. relations are not stalled—but neither have they achieved a lasting structural break with the past. Instead, they remain in a transitional phase shaped by multidimensional uncertainties: institutional tensions within the United States, geoeconomic rivalry centered on China, and internal political calibrations in Vietnam.

This review examines the strategic consequences of the meeting—not merely as a diplomatic event, but as a node within a broader matrix of power, legitimacy, trade negotiation, and geopolitical balancing.

1. The Meaning of Access:  Washington’s Recognition of Party Leadership in Vietnam 

One of the most consequential dimensions of the visit lies not in what was signed, but in who was received—and how.

To Lam arrived in Washington not as head of state, nor as prime minister, but as General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam.  He does not hold a state office. Yet in Vietnam’s political system, the General Secretary of the Party is the supreme decision-maker, positioned over the Constitution and the laws

This distinction once posed a diplomatic complication for Washington. When General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong was invited to the Oval Office in 2015 by President Barack Obama, the meeting triggered a deliberate institutional adjustment in American protocol. Former U.S. Ambassador to Hanoi, Ted Osius, later described the extensive effort required to persuade Washington bureaucrats that the Party leader—not just the state president—was Vietnam’s highest authority in fact.

That meeting marked a turning point. It established a presidential–general secretary axis in bilateral engagement.

By contrast, President Trump appeared entirely comfortable hosting To Lam. Public remarks highlighted Vietnam’s importance and conveyed personal warmth. The ease of the interaction reflects how normalized the recognition of Vietnam’s Party leadership has become in U.S. diplomacy.

Strategically, this matters in two ways:

External legitimacy: It reinforces To Lam’s status as Vietnam’s principal interlocutor with the West.

Internal authority: It allows him to demonstrate to domestic audiences that he commands direct access to the world’s leading power. For a leader consolidating his position after the 14th Party Congress—and no longer holding the presidency—such symbolism carries weight.

2. Multilateral Cover, Bilateral Priority 

Officially, To Lam’s presence in Washington centered on his participation in the inaugural session of President Trump’s Board of Peace. 

Vietnam positioned itself as an early supporter of the effort. While President Trump announced that participating countries in the new international entity had pledged over $7 billion for Gaza reconstruction, Vietnam was not publicly listed among major financial contributors. Instead, Vietnamese officials later indicated future possible contributions in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict reconstruction support.

Yet the full bilateral schedule revealed the real priority for the two leaders: trade and technology.

Meetings included discussions with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and other economic officials. The Board of Peace discussion of Gaza provided diplomatic cover for what was, for Vietnam and the United States, fundamentally a commercial and strategic negotiation.

This dual-layer approach reflected Vietnam’s general foreign policy approach: using multilateral engagement as a platform to open up opportunities  bilateral negotiations.

3. Trade Tensions: Surplus, Tariffs, and Structural Friction 

The economic relationship between Vietnam and the United States is both extensive and contentious.

Vietnam’s trade surplus with the U.S. remains substantial. Washington has imposed a 20% tariff on Vietnamese imports and up to 40% on goods deemed to be Chinese products transshipped from Vietnam. Six negotiation rounds have yet to produce a comprehensive agreement resolving American concerns

Two structural concerns dominate U.S. calculations:

• Persistent trade imbalance.
• Allegations that Vietnam serves as a conduit for Chinese goods circumventing American tariffs.

Vietnam’s response to these concerns during To Lam’s visit was clear: visible rebalancing.

Agreements reportedly totaling more than $30 billion were showcased, prominently including aircraft purchases involving Boeing:

• Sun PhuQuoc Airways agreed to buy 40 Boeing 787-9 aircraft.
• Vietnam Airlines confirmed purchases of 50 Boeing 737-8 aircraft.
• Vietjet announced financing arrangements tied to additional Boeing aircraft acquisitions.

These transactions serve a dual purpose: commercial modernization of Vietnam and political signaling.

However, industry observers note that Vietnamese carriers—particularly Vietjet—have repeatedly signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs), restructuring agreements, and phased contracts over the past decade. Public announcements often do not clarify whether such deals represent new commitments or restructured previous orders.

In political terms, however, precision may matter less than perception. Large procurement announcements reinforce the narrative that Vietnam is actively narrowing its trade gap with the United States.   And President Trump loves to announce that foreign cash is flowing into America.

Thus, President Trump publicly acknowledged Vietnam’s efforts to rebalance – who buys from whom? —a domestic political win for him, even absent a signed trade agreement with Vietnam.

 

4. Export Controls and Technology Access: A Conditional Opening 

The most concrete outcome of the White House meeting was President Trump’s pledge to direct agencies to remove Vietnam from strategic export control categories D1–D3.

If implemented, this could expand Vietnam’s access to:

• American advanced semiconductors.
• American Artificial Intelligence technologies.
• American dual-use systems critical to industrial upgrading.

For Vietnam, this aligns with its ambition to move its economy up the global value chain and integrate Vietnamese companies into next-generation supply chains.

Yet President Trump’s pledge sits awkwardly within a volatile institutional environment.

On the same day as Trump met with his Vietnamese counterpart, the U.S. Supreme Court revoked Trump’s executive authority to impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).  Trump then immediately signaled his intention to pursue alternative legal routes under the Trade Act of 1974.

This episode illustrates a broader point: U.S. trade policy is currently shaped by friction among executive ambition, judicial oversight, and congressional scrutiny.

For Vietnam, this means that any prospective commitment from the White House must pass through domestic institutional filters. Policy durability cannot be assumed.

5. The China Variable: Transshipment and Strategic Suspicion 

Vietnam’s position within the serious U.S.–China rivalry is a central strategic variable.

Washington has grown increasingly attentive to transshipment practices—where Chinese goods are routed through third countries to evade tariffs. Congressional testimony has emphasized preventing such “leakage.”

Vietnam’s geographic proximity to China and deep integration into regional supply chains make it particularly scrutinized for assisting its neighbor gain access to US customers

If Vietnam is perceived as a backdoor channel for Chinese exports, punitive tariffs could be imposed by the United States. Conversely, overly restrictive Vietnamese measures against Chinese-linked investment could strain Hanoi–Beijing ties.

Thus, a balancing act defines Vietnam’s contemporary strategic posture:

• Maintain economic interdependence with China.
• Expand strategic partnership with the United States.
• Avoid formal alignment with either.

To Lam’s White House meeting may have strengthened reciprocal trust—but such trust remains conditioned on verifiable trade compliance.

 

6. Media Strategy and Narrative Construction 

An underexamined but strategically important dimension of the visit was narrative management.

Vietnamese media prominently highlighted digital displays in Times Square and a Washington Times article praising Vietnam’s proactive diplomacy. The latter appeared under an “advertisement” label, reflecting a sponsored placement.

Such media practices are not unprecedented; Vietnam has used similar strategies during previous high-level visits. Domestically, they serve to project international recognition and prestige.

For To Lam, narrative control was especially significant. Unlike September 2024—when online commentary and dissenting voices surfaced—this visit was subject to tighter domestic messaging discipline.

In political terms, such management of optics is a form of power consolidation on To Lam’s behalf.

7. Domestic Political Implications 

The domestic implications of the visit may be as important for Vietnam as the foreign policy outcomes.

To Lam previously served briefly as Vietnam’s President before consolidating his role solely as General Secretary. His continuing to operate internationally as Vietnam’s de facto head of state reinforces a Party-centered structure of national authority for the Vietnamese.

For internal Party audiences, the White House reception strengthens To Lam’s standing. It signals that he can command Western respect without diluting Vietnam’s political model.

However, risks remain.

In Vietnam, segments of ideological conservatives and veterans—whose political identity remains shaped by the “anti-American resistance” narrative—may view deepening U.S. ties with caution. Visible warmth with Washington could prompt calls for renewed emphasis on ideological vigilance against “peaceful evolution” – the importation into Vietnam of decentralizing and democratizing reforms.

Thus, external diplomatic successes must be balanced against internal ideological counterforces.

8. From Symbolism to Structure: What Would a Breakthrough Look Like? 

What would constitute a genuine strategic breakthrough?

Three developments would signal structural transformation:

1. A comprehensive bilateral trade agreement institutionalized over and above executive discretion.
2. Formal recognition under US trade law of Vietnam as a market economy. 
3. Ending American export control restrictions backed by congressional authority.

None of these steps occurred during To Lam’s visit.

Instead, the Vietnam/US bilateral relationship remains one of incremental adjustments.

Conclusion: Transitional, Not Transformational 

The February White House meeting between President Donald Trump and General Secretary To Lam was symbolically significant and politically useful for both sides.

For Washington, it reinforced influence in Southeast Asia without formal alliance commitments.

For Hanoi, it consolidated leadership legitimacy and advanced technology access negotiations.

Yet the relationship has not entered a new structural phase.

It remains in transition—shaped by:

• Institutional tension within the U.S. political system among the Presidency, the Congress, and the courts.
• Differing Strategic needs on the part of China and the United States.
• Unresolved domestic political differences within Vietnam.

The handshake mattered. The optics mattered. The promise on export controls mattered.

But transformation requires institutionalization of mutual collaboration and respect.

Until only political commitments harden into legally resilient frameworks, Vietnam–U.S. relations will continue advancing—carefully, conditionally, and in response to the differing influences of multidimensional strategic variables.

 

Following the official trip to the United States from February 18 to 20, regardless of what the General Secretary and his inner circle may publicly declare, the fundamental question moving forward remains this: What will be the true order of priorities for the Communist Party of Vietnam? The preservation of the existing system and one-party rule? The restructuring of the national development model? Or simply the consolidation of power at the level of individuals and factions?  

Dr. Nguyễn Thế Hùng, PhD, and Professor Stephen Young, JD 

I. Hexagram Qian and the Trajectory of Political Will 

In the Yijing (I Ching), Hexagram Qian (乾) symbolizes Heaven—pure creative force, unrestrained yang energy, and the relentless ascent of will. The six lines of Qian are not merely metaphysical symbols; they constitute a structural model of political ascent.

From “Hidden dragon, do not act” (潜龙勿用) to “Flying dragon in the heavens” (飞龙在天), the hexagram outlines a process of self-construction and progressive legitimation. It depicts the journey of an individual endowed with strong political will, overcoming successive constraints to reach the apex of authority.

Yet the Yijing does not conclude at the summit. Immediately following “Flying dragon in the heavens” comes the warning: “Arrogant dragon will have regret” (亢龙有悔).

The philosophical insight here is profound: the apex is not a culmination but a new ordeal. Once at the highest point, a leader no longer confronts discrete rivals. Instead, the object of engagement becomes the totality—society, institutional structures, historical momentum, and collective expectation. Should the leader continue to operate in a mode of conquest rather than adjustment, counterforces inevitably arise. “Regret” in this sense does not signify immediate collapse, but the consequence of failing to transform one’s governing posture at the appropriate moment.

II. “Arrogant Dragon” Through the Lens of Modern Power Psychology 

“Arrogance” (亢, kang) does not merely denote opposition. At a deeper level, it describes a confrontational stance maintained after the consolidation of supreme authority.

Political psychology suggests a recurring pattern: individuals who ascend through forceful will often internalize that will as universally efficacious. Before reaching the summit, firmness and decisiveness are assets. At the summit, however, excessive rigidity risks estrangement from the broader social organism.

At the apex, the “other dragon” is no longer a faction or rival personality. It is the aggregate of complex interests: markets, media ecosystems, an expanding middle class, global strategic pressures, and transnational economic interdependence. If governance remains purely confrontational—resisting rather than harmonizing—latent opposition accumulates within the system itself.

Thus, “Arrogant dragon will have regret” is not a moral admonition but a law of equilibrium. Power unmodulated generates counterpower. Will untempered erodes its own foundation.

III. “Ultimate Intent” (Khế Lý) and “Strategic Presentation” (Khế Cơ) 

Within a modernized interpretive framework of the Yijing, we may distinguish between two analytical layers:

• Khế cơ (契機): the strategic discourse presented publicly—language of stability, development, discipline, integration, and the promise of a “new era.”
• Khế lý (契理): the ultimate intent—the deeper objective guiding political action, not necessarily disclosed in full, nor always readily decipherable.

In contemporary politics, ultimate intent is rarely articulated explicitly. It is typically obscured through three mechanisms: moralized rhetoric, incremental reform, and calibrated foreign policy balancing. Observers can infer it only through long-term behavioral patterns and policy prioritization.

In the present case, the issue is not what the General Secretary and his advisory circle state openly, but what they privilege in practice. Is the overarching goal systemic preservation? Structural transformation? Or power consolidation?

History suggests that when a leader attains authority not merely as a “product of circumstance” but through a prolonged process of self-positioning, such ascent is seldom accidental. It usually reflects a pre-formed will. The decisive question, then, is whether that will inclines toward preservation or transformation.

IV. Foreign Policy and the United States Visit: Confrontation or Harmonization? 

In an era of intensifying global strategic competition, a visit to the United States carries significance beyond diplomatic ceremony. It signals both domestic messaging and external legitimation.

At the apex of power, a leader faces a strategic bifurcation: to employ foreign policy as an instrument of internal consolidation and projection of firmness, or to leverage it as an avenue for developmental expansion.

If emphasis falls on attracting investment, deepening technological cooperation, expanding markets, and maintaining strategic balance, such actions suggest what may be termed “harmonizing the dragon”—an acknowledgment that national strength cannot rely indefinitely on internal control alone but must rest upon integrative capacity.

Conversely, if foreign engagement functions primarily as a symbolic reinforcement of domestic authority without accompanying structural reform, the logic of “confrontational dragon” remains dominant.

The distinction lies not in diplomatic protocol, but in the substantive policy trajectory that follows.

V. Success or Regret? 

Political history demonstrates that reaching the apex is seldom the most arduous task. The greater challenge lies in shifting from a posture of conquest to one of calibration.

If the ultimate intent is to reconcile competing interests, soften rigid structures, and widen the sphere of social creativity, then harmonization strengthens durability. If, however, ultimate intent is confined to preserving position through unyielding will, the equilibrium principle articulated in the Yijing will assert itself: a dragon that ascends too high without moderation will encounter regret.

The Yijing does not prophesy individuals. It delineates patterns.

Its central insight remains disarmingly simple:
When power reaches its extreme, survival no longer depends on strength, but on self-adjustment.

The inquiry into “ultimate intent,” therefore, is not a matter of personal curiosity. It is an inquiry into the trajectory of an entire historical phase.  

————————————–

 

Dr. Nguyễn Thế Hùng, with a Ph.D. in Physics, is a scholar known for his impressive scientific learning and his comprehensive analytical approach to philosophical and cultural studies. With a deep interest in exploring ancient principles, he brings a modern scientific perspective to traditional Eastern thought. His latest publication on I Ching (Kinh Dịch), one of the oldest philosophical classics of East Asia, reflects this interdisciplinary vision. An English translation of his explanations of the I Ching’s 64 hexagrams is planned.

In his book, Dr. Nguyễn seeks to interpret the I Ching—a system centered on the concepts of yin and yang, transformation, and the dynamic nature of the universe—through the lens of contemporary scientific reasoning. Rather than treating the hexagrams solely as only mystical or  for use in divination, he approaches them collectively as a symbolic framework that embodies profound insights into change, order, and human experience.

His work represents an effort to bridge modern physics and ancient wisdom, making the philosophical depth of the I Ching more accessible to today’s readers. The book serves not only as an academic contribution but also begins a cultural dialogue between science and the humanities.

Stephen B. Young, a student of jurisprudence and East Asian Law at Harvard Law School, has written The Tradition of Human Rights in China and Vietnam.  He also studied the I Ching in Vietnam with Mr. Duong Thai Ban and writes for the Caux Round Table annual commentaries each lunar New Year on what can be constructively learned from the I Ching to apply to our decision making in the coming new lunar year.  Young graduated from Harvard College and Harvard law School. He was an Assistant Dean at the Harvard Law School and Dean and Professor of Law at the Hamline School of Law.  His is Global Executive Director of the Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism.

Vietnam at a Crossroads: 

• Power, Perception, and the Future of a Strategic Partner 
• Tô Lâm Through the Lens of Western Media:  Notes of Caution about Vietnam’s path of Development 

In recent days, feature stories about Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm appearing in French and American media have gone beyond mere profiles of a top political leader. They exposed how the West views Vietnam’s coming political trajectory. A confident, reform-oriented, and more open country need not fear any proffered narrative —because when reality changes, such narratives will change accordingly. As an old Confucian saying, now part of Vietnamese wisdom, reminds us: “Both bitter medicine and the truth can hurt but also heal.” 

By: Hoang Thang Dinh (PhD), U.S.–Vietnam Project, CRT 

 

Recent coverage in major Western outlets of Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm has gone well beyond the profile of an individual leader. It reflects something larger: how Vietnam’s political evolution is being assessed at a moment when the country has become central to the geopolitical and economic recalibration of the Indo-Pacific.

 

When Courrier International portrayed Mr. Tô as a “Frankenstein hybrid of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin,” and when The New York Times emphasized his rapid consolidation of authority, the language was vivid. But the underlying concern was structural, not personal. The issue is not simply who leads Vietnam. It is how Vietnam is choosing to be governed at a time when its international importance has never been greater.

 

The United States and Vietnam elevated their relationship in 2023 to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership — Washington’s highest diplomatic tier. The upgrade reflected converging interests: supply-chain diversification away from China, maritime security in the South China Sea, semiconductor investment, and a shared desire to balance Beijing’s expanding influence. For American policymakers, Vietnam has become a pivotal state in the Indo-Pacific architecture.

 

That is precisely why Western scrutiny has intensified.

 

In open societies, concentration of power draws attention. When observers see an expanded personal role in governance and the increasing prominence of security institutions within state management, they interpret these developments through a familiar framework: centralization justified in the name of stability. The comparisons to China and Russia may be exaggerated, but they are not accidental. They stem from perceived structural similarities — the prioritization of political control, the tightening of civic space, and the central role of security organs in policymaking.

 

Yet Vietnam is not China, and it is not Russia. Unlike Beijing or Moscow, Hanoi is not positioned as a systemic adversary of the West. It is, rather, a strategic partner whose trajectory matters precisely because cooperation is expanding. This creates a paradox. Western governments pursue pragmatic engagement for geopolitical reasons, while Western media and civil society evaluate Vietnam through normative standards rooted in rule of law, institutional transparency, and political pluralism.

 

That tension will not disappear.

 

Vietnam’s economic model magnifies the stakes. The country is deeply integrated into global markets and heavily dependent on exports and foreign direct investment. It is positioning itself as an alternative manufacturing hub, a semiconductor partner, and a key node in diversified supply chains. But global capital does not evaluate only labor costs and logistics. It also assesses predictability, legal safeguards, transparency, and reputational risk.

 

Political centralization can generate short-term decisiveness — faster policy execution, tighter administrative discipline, and coherent anti-corruption campaigns. But over time, investor confidence depends on institutional reliability rather than personal authority. Multinational corporations and financial markets are less concerned with ideology than with legal clarity, dispute resolution mechanisms, and governance predictability. Strategic trust is built not merely through alignment against China, but through institutional credibility.

 

For Washington, this raises a delicate question. How does the United States deepen strategic cooperation with Vietnam — in defense, technology, and supply chains — while remaining consistent with its stated commitment to democratic norms and human rights? For Hanoi, the question is equally consequential: how to preserve political stability while reassuring global partners that institutional development will keep pace with economic ambition.

 

This is not an argument for dismantling Vietnam’s one-party system. Political systems evolve according to their own histories and social contracts. But history offers a consistent lesson: systems capable of adaptation endure longer than those that close themselves off. In a competitive global environment defined by capital mobility, technological disruption, and talent flows, legitimacy is increasingly linked to transparency and institutional resilience.

 

If Vietnam continues to expand economically while constricting political space, it risks sustaining a structural contradiction. It seeks to attract high-value investment, advanced technology, and strategic trust from democratic economies — yet perceptions of institutional opacity may complicate that effort. Over time, perception shapes policy. And policy shapes capital flows.

 

Western commentary on Mr. Tô should therefore be understood less as hostility and more as providing important points for reflection. The sharper the language, the greater the opportunity to lean. Vietnam is not being treated as an adversary. It is being treated as a consequential partner whose direction matters.

 

A confident nation does not fear scrutiny. When realities evolve, perceptions follow. If Vietnam can demonstrate that political stability and institutional modernization are not mutually exclusive — that rule of law, accountability, and openness can coexist with centralized leadership — its strategic standing will strengthen accordingly.

 

In the fierce global competition for capital, technology, and influence, concentrated power may yield immediate decisiveness. But enduring strength flows from institutions. As an old Confucian saying reminds us: bitter medicine cures illness; the truth may be difficult to hear but it too heals

References:

• https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/09/world/asia/vietnams-leader-has-new-power-and-hes-in-a-hurry.html
• https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/politique-au-vietnam-l-ambitieux-to-lam-se-reve-en-monstre-de-frankenstein-mi-xi-jinping-mi-poutine_239501
• https://dcvonline.net/2026/02/11/lanh-dao-viet-nam-nam-them-quyen-luc-va-dang-voi-va/?utm_source=chatgpt.com (Bài trên NYT)
• https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?pli=1#inbox/FMfcgzQfBkQvhJqnpHnskXtnGGZSHxWQ (“Au Vietnam, l’ambitieux To Lam se rêve en “monstre de Frankenstein” mi-Xi Jinping, mi-Poutine”, Bản lược dịch do AI Gemini thực hiện từ Tạp chí “Courrier international”)
• https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-political-shake-up-consolidates-power-2025-xx-xx/

Introduction by Professor Stephen Young

Executive Director & CEO, U.S.–Vietnam Project, Caux Round Table

At a moment when the international system is under visible strain—from protracted conflicts in the Middle East to intensifying strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific—the  future trajectory of Vietnam–U.S. relations deserves careful and serious attention. The convergence of two volatile issues— bringing peace to Gaza and resolving the questions of who must pay tariffs and making supply-chains trustworthy and reliable—has created a rare inflection point global affairs. US-Vietnam relations today are not merely another episode in a narrowly focused bilateral engagement; conditions present a strategic test of whether the relationship can evolve from symbolic superficials into having structural resilience.

Vietnam and the United States have traveled a remarkable path over the past three decades. From  a post-war normalization to a more fulsome strategic partnership, the arc of cooperation has expanded to include issues of trade, technology, education, and regional security. Yet maturity in international relations is measured not by ceremonial events but by an ability to manage frictions—particularly in areas such as trade imbalances, origin transparency, and geopolitical risk.

In the analysis that follows, Hoang Thang Dinh (PhD) argues that Vietnam’s role in emerging peace initiatives and its response to tariff pressures are interconnected dimensions of building national credibility in a fragmented global order. As middle powers gain greater relevance in a multi-polar world, Vietnam’s choices—alongside America’s—will shape not only the durability of their bilateral ties but also the broader architecture of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and even beyond.

 

By: Hoang Thang Dinh (PhD), U.S.–Vietnam Project, CRT 

 

The “Board of Peace – Gaza” initiative has emerged at a moment when the international system is increasingly ruptured by protracted conflicts and strategic misalignments among major powers. The crisis in the Middle East is not merely a humanitarian tragedy or a matter of regional security; it has become emblematic of a global order lacking effective mechanisms for  inter-state coordination and intentional collective response. In such a context, the role of middle powers like Vietnam—countries that aspire to maintain channels of dialogue with multiple sides—becomes especially significant.

 

For Vietnam, active participation in peace initiatives is more than simply a position; it is an investment in acquiring long-term strategic credibility. Hanoi’s advantages lie in having a balanced diplomacy, avoidance of military alliances, and a consistent commitment to international law. By proactively leveraging outreach from this open-ended platform, Vietnam can affirm that it is not just one link in global supply chains, but, more significantly, is also a responsible stakeholder in all global affairs. In turn, this stance sends a signal to all partners – current and potential – that Vietnam’s bilateral relationships rest on political depth and strategic substance, rather than being limited to trade flows or petty transactional diplomacy.

 

Tariffs: A Bottleneck Requiring Decisive Resolution 

 

The immediate and more tangible test of Vietnam–U.S. relations lies in the economic sphere. A substantial trade surplus and recurring suspicions of tariff circumvention have turned the issue of trade practices and regulations into a persistent source of sensitivity. As the United States tightens supply chain controls to curb China’s industrial influence, Vietnam finds itself conflicted—benefiting from manufacturing relocation from China while simultaneously risking being perceived as a transshipment hub for Chinese companies.

 

At this time, should Indonesia secure a favorable trade arrangement with Washington, new competitive pressures would impact Vietnam markedly. Then present competitive rivalries would no longer center solely on textiles or furniture; competition would revolve around access to high-value technology supply chains, including semiconductors, advanced batteries, and renewable energy systems. For the United States, the decisive factor in economic relations is no longer low labor costs but institutional transparency and systemic reliability. In this light, a high-level trade consultation mechanism, coupled with firm commitments to prevent place of origin fraud, could prove pivotal in dispelling American suspicions and establishing a stable, forward-looking framework for trade between both parties. The multiple rounds of negotiations conducted by the ten trade delegations from both sides thus far do not appear to have yielded fully satisfactory outcomes for either party.

Resolving tariff disputes in a definitive manner would not only sustain export growth but also elevate Vietnam’s role from that of a passive recipient of supply chain relocation to a creator of value added innovation in emerging product lines.

 

U.S.–China Competition: Balancing Without Standing Aside 

 

The U.S.–China strategic rivalry is reshaping the Indo-Pacific security and economic landscapes. Within this evolving environment, Vietnam neither can nor would wish to choose sides, yet equally it cannot afford to remain just a silent and passive by-stander. An autonomous, independent and diversified foreign policy would enable Hanoi to maintain stable relations with both powers.  But doing so demands increasingly sophisticated management of risks and response to developments.

From Washington’s perspective, Vietnam could become a partner of considerable geostrategic relevance having a dynamic economy. For Hanoi, ties with the United States would provide access to advanced technology, a vast consumer market, and high-quality capital flows. If properly structured, such mutually beneficial cooperation between Washington and Hanoi would never aim at confronting any third country, but only at strengthening Vietnam’s strategic resilience. In a region where trust has become an increasingly scarce asset, policy consistency and predictability will constitute a most critical competitive advantage for any nation motivated to commit to such consistency and predictability.

 

From Historical Symbolism to Durable Strategic Architecture 

 

The historic events already commemorated this past year——fifty years since the end of the war, thirty years of normalization, and those yet to come – the 250th anniversary of American independence—create a powerful symbolic backdrop for the optimal evolution of Vietnam-US relations, Such bilateral relations have been, with good faith and skill, transformed from conflict to deep and wide-ranging cooperation within barely three decades, following a trajectory that has exceeded even the expectations of the most ptimistic observers.

 

History, however, is made only through the establishment of concrete and enduring institutional frameworks. Anything less substantive is only sand blowing in the wind.  If both sides can convert high-level engagements into substantive progress on tariff resolution, enhanced supply chain transparency, and coordinated contributions to peace initiatives such as proposed for Gaza, bilateral ties between Hanoi and Washington will enter a qualitatively more mature phase. At that point, the bilateral relationship will be less vulnerable to domestic political shifts in one country or the other, or to unpredictable fluctuations in the global balance of power.

In a world increasingly polarized and fragmented, the maturity of Vietnam–U.S. relations will not be measured solely by ceremonies and diplomatic language, but by the mutual capacity to confront and resolve the most difficult issues. It is precisely at these selective and very sensitive pressure points that the strategic future of the relationship will ultimately be determined.

After the 14^th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party: “Aftershocks” 

Vietnams after the 14th Party Congress, still  moves forward at a remarkable pace, with shifts in who holds power, new institutional arrangements, and adventuresome development  goals all unfolding simultaneously and at a speed rarely seen since the Đổi Mới reforms of the 1980s. On the surface, Vietnam’s political–economic landscape appears stable. Beneath what is apparent, however, multiple institutional layers are experiencing tremors that are starting to reverberate across society. Decisions taken today may well shape Vietnam’s developmental trajectory for decades to come. 

This series of thoughtful essays presents writings from diverse—sometimes divergent—sources. Taken collectively, they affirm that, 1) even under increasingly constrained conditions, independent voices persist in speaking out within Vietnamese civil society t, and that 2) these voices continue to deserve attention. 

Second Essay: When a powerful Institutional Shock Hits Markets

The post–Congress convergence of intensified power centralization and highly ambitious economic growth targets has produced a distinctive institutional shock—one that is now beginning to impact the market through channels far subtler than those associated with ordinary economic cycles. 

Nguyen Xuan Nghia, PhD
Economist, Institute for Vietnamese Development Issues

After the 14th Party Congress, Vietnam has entered a phase in which the surface of economic activity appears broadly stable. Official messaging emphasizes determination to reform, to streamline the state apparatus, to promote the private sector, and to pursue exceptionally high growth targets over the coming years. From the outside—particularly through the lens of international media and analysts—Vietnam is often portrayed as a country that has “placed a large bet” on successful economic development while maintaining regime stability.

Yet it is precisely the combination of intensified power concentration with ambitious growth objectives that has generated a peculiar  kind of institutional shock, not a shock that triggers immediate disruption, but rather, a shock which alters the operating rhythm of the entire system, changes gradually transmitting to the market through new expectations, behavioral shifts, and changes in resource allocation. These new dynamics are quiet, but cumulative—and difficult to reverse over the medium to long term.

Idealized Growth Expectations 

Analysis by Joshua Kurlantzick and Annabel Richter highlight a central paradox of the post–Congress economic environment: while political power has become more consolidated and tightly controlled, expectations of possible economic achievement have expanded to the point of near idealization. Annual growth of 10 percent is no longer framed as an optimistic scenario, but as an official target tied directly to the personal credibility of top leadership and to the legitimacy of the system as a whole (1).

In economic terms, this is not an ignorable prediction. When growth becomes a measure of political success, the market no longer views it as a theoretical outcome of long-term reform, but as an immediate mandate that must be fulfilled. Expectations are thus pushed beyond the economy’s current internal capacity to achieve , creating invisible pressure on investment and production decisions. In this context, risk lies less in failing to achieve high growth and more in drawing the entire system into a race toward objectives that exceed the ability of its underlying fundamentals to deliver as so unreasonably expected.

Redefining Risk 

Another notable development emphasized by policy analysts is the encouragement of the state apparatus to “accept higher risk” when approving projects, in order to replace a long-standing bureaucratized culture of risk aversion and fear of taking personal responsibility. From an administrative perspective, this signals an attempt to unlock human decision-making capacity that has been constrained for years (2).

From a market perspective, however, the implications are ambiguous. When prudence is relaxed not through deep institutional reform but under pressure to meet growth targets, risk itself becomes difficult to calculate. Businesses cannot clearly discern where the boundary will lie between acceptable risk and punishable failure. In such an environment, economic decisions will tend to favor projects that align with policy priorities and political signals, rather than those with only economic efficacy and not political patronage. The market thus operates less according to the open-minded logic of profit and more according to calculations seeking self-preservation.

Personalizing Growth Responsibility 

The direct linkage between the top leadership’s personal credibility and long-term growth objectives—toward 2030 and further to 2045—creates another powerful mechanism transmitting contexts for entrepreneurial decision-making (3). In political economy, when economic success or failure is personalized, systems tend to prioritize short-term results to preserve system legitimacy, even at the expense of long-term development achievements.

Markets respond to such a signal with considerable rationality. Long-term investments—particularly in areas requiring high institutional stability such as core technologies, education, or corporate governance reform—become less attractive than investments in large, quickly completed projects easily associated with policy achievement goals. Investment allocations thus become channeled, not due to capital scarcity, but because the incentives for using capital have shifted.

Resource Allocation via Public Spending and Mega-Projects 

Rapidly expanding public expenditure and the rollout of large-scale infrastructure mega-projects represent the clearest manifestation of structural shake-up as it impacts the market. These projects are not only intended to stimulate demand, but also to produce tangible, measurable outcomes within political cycles, thereby reinforcing short-term political legitimacy and social confidence (4).

Development experience, however, suggests that scale does not equate to quality. When capital is injected rapidly and institutional oversight is weakened from excessive concentration of political discretion, the risks of making inefficient and diffuse investment rise sharply. The market then responds by gravitating towards acquiring assets—particularly land and infrastructure-linked real estate—rather than in productivity enhancement or technological innovation. This encourages market adaptation pursuing capital sheltering, not value creation.

Distorted Competition and “National Champion” Groups 

A key component of Vietnam’s post–Congress economic strategy is the cultivation of “national pillar conglomerates”—private-sector entities receiving strong state guidance and support. Kurlantzick and Richter note that Vietnam currently lacks sufficiently robust mechanisms to regulate the relationship between these conglomerates and political power (5).

Under the new condition of concentrated authority, the line separating policy support from political patronage becomes increasingly “flexible”. Markets quickly recognize that scale and connections may matter as much as—if not more than—pure economic efficiency. Competition weakens, small and medium enterprises are squeezed, and innovation incentives decline—undermining the very foundation upholding sustainable long-term growth.

Erosion of External Long-Term Confidence 

Although Vietnam remains an attractive investment destination amid global supply-chain restructuring, uncertainties surrounding tariffs and U.S. efforts to prevent Vietnam from serving as a “transshipment hub” for Chinese goods significantly increase policy risk (6). When combined with a domestic system operating in campaign mode, foreign investors tend to shorten commitment horizons and avoid projects which require high institutional stability for their coming to profitable fruition.

There is no immediate capital flight. Yet confidence in long-term prospects erodes. This form of market impact is particularly dangerous because it does not immediately register in macroeconomic indicators, revealing itself instead through data on capital quality, investment duration, and willingness to transfer technology.

Reversal of Roles Between Institutions and the Market 

After the 14th Congress, the core economic question is no longer whether Vietnam can achieve 10 percent growth for several years, but whether its economy is being turned towards a trajectory in which the market must adapt to the operating tempo of political institutions—rather than such institutions creating space for the market to develop according to its own logic (7).

This represents a composite transmission channel, where all prior effects converge. If sustained, the market will continues to function on its own but will grow increasingly cautious, prioritizing safety over innovation, while the economy’s self-governance in making timely corrections erodes—especially as the labor force ages rapidly.

The overall institutional shock to Vietnam’s economy following the 14th Party Congress has not produced an immediate economic crisis. Instead, it is transmitting into the market through multiple channels concerns that drive decision-making—expectations, risk calculations, investment structures, competition, and long-term confidence. These concerns interact and reinforce one another, altering how the economy actually operates without dramatic surface-level disruption.

The deeper concern lies not in ambitious growth aspirations, but in the risk that the market becomes increasingly subordinated to the short-term operational rhythm of institutions. If this trajectory is not recognized and corrected in time, short-term growth gains may be purchased at the cost of prolonged fragility in the medium and long term—a price often recognized only when corrective capacity has already declined.

References:
(1) CFR – Vietnam’s Most Important Party Congress in Years…
(2) Thanh Tra – Encouraging and Protecting Officials Who Dare to Act
(3) EVN – International Impressions of Vietnam’s Breakthrough Economic Orientation
(4) Reuters – Vietnam Targets $55 Billion in Foreign Loans…
(5) CFR – same as (1)
(6) SCMP – Why One Clause in the US–Vietnam Trade Deal Is Sparking Concern
(7) VietnamPlus – Rethinking Vietnam’s Growth Model

Introduction 

The series “Vietnam: Shocks to the System After the 14th Party Congress” is published by a group of independent analysts and observers who closely track Vietnam’s political, economic, social, foreign policy, defense, and security dynamics in the new circumstances following on the14th Party Congress. Published in installments, the series aims to identify a phase of transition—an evolution in which Vietnam will experience the most profound and comprehensive undertaking of institutional experimentation since the launch of Đổi Mới, a time characterized by high-intensity change, accelerated tempo, and unprecedented levels of risk.

These essays were formulated within the framework of the new US – Vietnam Project of the Caux Round Table, a joint venture of concerned Vietnamese thought leaders and policy experts and Americans engaged with the contemporary unfolding of Vietnamese civilization.

The first essay in the series was written by Mr. Le Than. Mr. Lê Thân is well-known for incarceration as a political prisoner in the infamous prison on Con Son Island off South Vietnam under the Saigon Government during the Vietnam War.  In his later years, he served as the Chairman of the Lê Hiếu Đằng Club, a distinguished position that demonstrated his continued and strong commitment to social engagement after the war, so that his standing was not defined solely by his past imprisonment for revolutionary activities.

That Mr. Lê Thân was entrusted with the position of Chairman of the Club reflected several important qualities: he enjoys great respect among former political prisoners and intellectuals; he holds to an independent and forthright stance, avoiding opportunism, and his spirit of “lifelong struggle” before and after 1975. In the former South Vietnam, he struggled as a prisoner in Con Son Prison. After 1975, he continued to struggle for his values and vision by raising his voice as a citizen, guided by moral integrity and conscience.

What makes Mr. Lê Thân particularly distinctive is the historical continuity of being a political prisoner during wartime and then a critical, engaged citizen in peacetime. Not everyone who was imprisoned for revolutionary activities has had the courage to continue speaking out later in life. Mr. Lê Thân has done so with dignity, moderation, and unwavering determination.

First Essay: Institutions as the Bottleneck of All Bottlenecks – How Will Power Be Deployed? 

In the aftermath of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), observers—both domestic and international—have focused not only on specific individual appointments , but on a more fundamental set of structural challenges: What power structure will govern Vietnam going forward, and can the existing institutional framework absorb, regulate, and adapt to an increasingly concentrated configuration of authority? Or, under the leadership of Tô Lâm, will Vietnam adopt a Law regulating its Communist Party?

After the 14th Party Congress, observers inside and outside Vietnam have focused not only on who was appointed to what position but, more profoundly, on  the questions of  how will authoritative power  be exercised in this new phase of Vietnam’s modern history, and how  current institutions, in response to the growing concentration of authoritative power, will be  able to bear this burden, exercise  oversight, and self-correct when necessary.  

The emphatic consolidation of authority in a central fulcrum of leadership raises not only questions about individuals, but—more importantly—about the rules of the game. As personalized authority increasingly overrides traditional mechanisms for collective leadership, where exactly is the fault line between effective governance and risks to institutions? Are the existing designs of Party, State, and oversight bodies still adequate, or are structural limits to their ability to absorb and control such centralized power being exposed?

Given these developments and  the very serious questions they bring to our minds, debates over the possible legal legitimation of the role and responsibilities of the Communist Party of Vietnam—under one legal form or another—is no longer just speculative. Such debates reflect a practical necessity: when the exercise of power changes its modality, the subordinate institutional framework must change to accommodate the new reality, or else the exercise of power itself becomes the greatest bottleneck undermining systemic accomplishment

At the center of this debate stands General Secretary Tô Lâm, increasingly portrayed by Western media as the beneficiary of a shift towards a leadership modality of “one-person only”— a sharp divergence from Vietnam’s tradition of collective leadership which, for decades, functioned as an internal risk-reduction mechanism buttressing Vietnam’s political system.

 

Yet focusing solely on institutionalization of solitary individualism risks missing a deeper reality. The shock to the political system left by the 14th Congress does not implicate any single leader, but plays out in the growing collision between the Communist Party’s actual mode of exercising power and the legal–institutional framework that the Vietnamese state officially claims to honor and implement (1).

“One butt, two chairs”:  A choice of system, not just a temporary expedient 

International media outlets such as the BBC, Reuters, Bloomberg, and the South China Morning Post have increasingly framed the prospect of Tô Lâm simultaneously holding the positions of General Secretary and State President not as a temporary expedient, but as a structural choice. Their analyses converge on one point: this is an attempt to redesign the locus of power in order to overcome fragmentation within the current system.

This interpretation is not without merit. For years, Vietnam’s political apparatus has been criticized as slow-moving, multilayered, and divided among the Party, the State, and the Government. Major decisions often fall into a “collective responsibility trap,” where accountability is diluted to better hold up the banner of collective leadership.

In this context, the “one butt, two chairs” arrangement is seen as shortening channels of decision-making and consolidating authority around a clearly defined center. The core institutional problem, however, is not whether power is centralized, but rather this: Vietnam has never designed a system of legal accountability and oversight proportionate to having power concentrated in an individual.

Put differently, power is being concentrated far more rapidly than it is being subordinated to governance.

The National Assembly: Rubber-stamping, not Decision-making 

The upcoming session of the National Assembly—expected to elect Tô Lâm as State President—is accurately perceived by international observers. It is not a forum for debate over who should have authoritative power but only serves as  procedural formality assenting to decisions already made.

This accurately reflects the Assembly’s current institutional role: it does not supervise , lacks the right to veto or to delay, and it cannot decide on the uses of power. The National Assembly neither determines who holds power nor defines the scope of that power; it merely ratifies what has been arranged by Party leaders

 

The deeper issue here is not the mere formalism of parliamentary proceedings, but a structural contradiction between constitutional principles and operational reality. While Vietnam’s Constitution proclaims the state to be “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” the actual manipulation of authoritative power occurs almost entirely within the Communist Party’s decision-making apparatus.

Thus, the National Assembly instead of activating power delegated by the people, has become a connector that legalizes decisions made by a political organization standing above the Law.

The Communist Party: From Ruling Party to an Organization Outside the Law 

After more than half a century of comprehensive control, the Vietnamese Communist Party continues to operate with many characteristics of a revolutionary party—or even a closed organization—rather than as a transparent governing party within a modern rule-of-law state.

The most consequential decisions regarding personnel, policy, and national strategy are made in closed Party forums, then subsequently legalized by state institutions. This produces a legal paradox: an organization that exercises supreme authority over the state and society does not exist as a legal entity accountable either before the law or to citizens.

Under Article 4 of the Constitution, the Communist Party leads the state; yet the Party itself cannot be sued, lacks civil legal personality, and bears neither criminal nor civil liability as an organization. When a policy leads to serious consequences, responsibility therefore can only be assigned to individuals or state agencies—while the organization that made the ultimate decision remains free of all accountability mechanisms.

For years, intellectuals have proposed expeditiously enacting a Law applicable to the activities of the Communist Party. Such proposals have never gained traction, precisely because such codification of Article 4 of the Constitution would, in principle, subject the Party to oversight by the Government, the National Assembly, and the courts.

Yet such oversight is precisely the foundational requirement of any rule-of-law society. And it is precisely why this issue remains the institutional bottleneck of all bottlenecks, with no clear indication that it will be resolved.

This unresolved “shadow” of rogue autonomy renders any concentration of power the more dangerous: the more power is centralized outside the Law, the more glaring the accountability vacuum becomes. To mitigate this risk, a Law applicable to the Communist Party would need to define, at minimum: the Party’s legal status; the basis of its legitimacy; principles governing its accountability and oversight; boundaries between Party, State, and society; internal democracy; and the Party’s relationship with civil society (2).

Administrative Restructuring and Systemic Retrenchment 

Following the 14th Congress, the important question is no longer merely who occupies which positions, but how much restructuring can the system tolerate. The growing “underground discontent” within the bureaucracy does not constitute political opposition, but rather operational frustration: unclear lines of responsibility, legal and other risks to bureaucrats even when procedures are followed, and accusations of inertia when action is avoided.

These are textbook symptoms of worrisome institutional bottlenecks. When power is centralized without clear responsibility frameworks, a subordinate bureaucratic system’s natural responses are retrenchment and risk avoidance.  But, if discipline is tightened and personnel reshuffled without addressing legal foundations, governance effectiveness will decline rather than improve, increasing the risk of administrative paralysis.

The best structure: institutions or persons? 

The key question posed by international observers is whether this appointment to two offices will apply only in the case of  Tô Lâm, or whether it will evolve into a more permanent institutional arrangement.

If it remains just a one-time scenario , the system may tolerate it as an exception. But if it marks the beginning of a new, long-term, governance model, Vietnam must confront a question it has never fully answered: who oversees the leader when power is concentrated in a single individual within a system where the Party itself stands outside all legal accountability?

To date, there have been no clear signals of constitutional revision or the creation of new oversight mechanisms. As a result, power consolidation is proceeding far faster than the creation of institutional checks and balances—a formula historically associated with the accumulation of systemic d risk.

Conclusion: An Institutional Question Without an Answer 

This article doe snot  revolve around  Tô Lâm as an individual. It revolves around a single axial development: power is being consolidated rapidly, while legitimacy, legal status, and accountability mechanisms remain stagnant—or in some respects, have regressed.

 

The “one butt, two chairs” arrangement’, the National Assembly’s role of only formalism, bureaucratic retrenchment and constitutional contradictions over the source of authority, are not isolated phenomena. They are manifestations of one signal institutional bottleneck.

The final question of this essay is therefore not whether Tô Lâm wields sufficient power, but whether the system possesses enough capacity to absorb that power without paralyzing itself—or triggering a crisis of legitimacy. And the core question beneath all others remains: will Tô Lâm dare to breakup this heavy-handed institutional bottleneck by permitting adoption of a Law governing the Communist Party of Vietnam? (3)

 

References 

(1) BBC Vietnamese: 90 Years of the CPV: What Legal Basis for Its Existence and Rule? https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam-51348557

(2) Luật Khoa Magazine: Petition 72 and the Public Constitution: Citizens and Constitutional Participation https://luatkhoa.com/2025/03/kien-nghi-72-va-hien-phap-dai-chung-khi-cong-dan-tham-gia-lap-hien/

(3) BBC Vietnamese: Challenging the State to Debate the Constitution
https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2013/11/131117_vn_constitution_petition72_aims

Coming up in Part 2:
The Economy – When Institutional Shockwaves Begin to Spill into the Market
(Author: Dr. Nguyễn Xuân Nghĩa)

Introduction

Stephen B. Young

Director, Caux Round Table U.S. – Vietnam Project

Vietnam’s recent 14th National Congress of its ruling Communist Party comes at a moment of profound transformation in both the global order and the country’s governance. As great-power competition intensifies, international norms fragment, and security once again dominates global policy thinking, Vietnam finds itself navigating an increasingly narrow passage between opportunity and constraint. The Congress therefore deserves to be recognized not merely as a milestone in the country’s internal political evolution, but as a strategic inflection point shaping how Vietnam defines its future role,  develops capacity, and experiences limits in the international system.

The two essays presented here examine this moment from complementary angles. Together, they interrogate a central paradox of contemporary Vietnamese governance: the simultaneous expansion of diplomatic ambition and the deepening subjugation of domestic political life to disciplined state oversight. On the surface, Vietnam appears more confident and capable than ever—an emerging middle power embedded in global supply chains, courted by major actors, and equipped with a dense network of strategic partnerships. Beneath this surface, however, lies a governance model increasingly oriented toward control, concentration of power, and the prioritization of regime security over institutional openness.

This tension raises a critical question for scholars and policymakers alike: can a foreign policy built on flexibility, pragmatism, and multi-alignment remain effective when its domestic foundations grow progressively closed and self-limiting? Or, put differently, does the securitization focus of internal governance impose a structural ceiling on Vietnam’s foreign policy—one that cannot be overcome by skillful diplomats action on their own?

The first essay situates the 14th Congress within a broader theoretical and historical context, examining how the expanding concept of security reshapes Vietnam’s foreign policy capacity, soft power, and strategic credibility. The second analyzes concrete diplomatic practices after the Congress—from transactional engagement with the United States to calibrated linguistic compromises with China and the rapid expansion of comprehensive strategic partnerships—arguing that these moves, while tactically adept, may be constrained by deeper institutional limits.

Taken together, these analyses suggest that Vietnam’s challenge today is not simply how to balance among competing powers, but how to reconcile external openness with internal governance choices. In an international environment where legitimacy, trust, and institutional resilience increasingly determine influence, the sustainability of Vietnam’s foreign policy may ultimately depend less on its diplomatic maneuvering than on the political and societal structures that support it.

This conversation is not about prescribing a single path forward, but about clarifying the strategic trade-offs Vietnam faces at a pivotal moment. For those seeking to understand Vietnam’s evolving role in regional and global affairs, these essays offer a rigorous and timely starting point.

THE 14TH NATIONAL CONGRESS CREATES A FOREIGN POLICY PARADOX FOR VIETNAM IN A PROPOSED ERA OF SECURITY FIRST EVERYTHING ELSE SECOND

The conceptual framework in the Political Report of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)  is internally consistent. However, when placed against current international trends and developments , it provokes a key strategic question: Is the model prioritizing domestic security based on order as the highest priority with power concentrated in a few minds sufficient for Vietnam to fully realize its foreign policy opportunities and advantages and so promote its national interests in an unusually changing global community? 

Hoàng Trường 

The 14^th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party opened as Vietnam faced a daunting paradox. On the one hand, Vietnam’s geopolitical and economic position has never before attracted as much attention from major players—from the U.S. to China, from the EU and Japan to ASEAN. But, on the other hand, the intense priority placed on disciplined stability in domestic governance risks restricting precisely the very institutional capabilities and societal conditions that deep integration into the global community and proactive diplomacy require. The 14th Congress, therefore, is not only the beginning of a new governance era for Vietnam but also provided a rigid template for how Vietnam can balance disciplined stability while expanding its international opportunities.

In his presentation of the important Political Report before the14th National Congress General Secretary Tô Lâm emphasized that maintaining an environment of peace and stability is a prerequisite for development, while sustainable development is a prerequisite for  comprehensively enhancing the strength of the nation. In that spirit, the task of building out military defense along with domestic security has core importance, requiring the formation of revolutionary, regular, elite, and modern armed forces; proactively understanding realities; improving future assessments, quickly preventing and promptly resolving situations as may be required, and resolutely avoiding passivity and the unexpected (1).

Alongside this, foreign affairs  just continues to be understood as a front line in protecting national interests – steadfastly maintaining independence and autonomy, while also being proactive, positive, and responsible as part of the international community. Foreign policy  must emphasize effectively leveraging opportunities for collaboration, strengthening partnerships, closely integrating foreign affairs with national defense, internal security, and economic development, adhering to principles while acting flexibly in specific policy initiatives. The political report also expands the concept of security in this new era, extending beyond borders and territory to encompass regime security, cultural-ideological security, and security with respect to economics, finance, data, energy, water, and food, situating sustainable development and strategic autonomy within the general duty to protect the nation quickly and on the far horizon.

The 14th Congress as a Milestone for a diplomacy  to be used in a Fragmented World

The 14th Congress took place after the post–Cold War liberal international order had rapidly degenerated. Strategic competition among major powers, particularly between the United States and China, has become increasingly systemic; international rules are challenged; and seeking security has once again taken a central position in global policy thinking. In this context, sovereign decision-making—from mobilizing powers to governance practices—directly effects a country’s position and potentials in international realities. 

International Position and the Limits of Current Capabilities

At this time of the 14th Congress, Vietnam could be considered as an emerging middle-power country, having an increasingly important role in global supply chains and in the strategic dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region. Though the Congress took place amid international uncertainty, Vietnam’s geographic location, population size, growth rate, and extensive network of  partners  give it a position few Southeast Asian countries enjoy (2).

However, this capability remains vulnerable. Most of Vietnam’s current partnerships are only transactional, based on short-term economic interests and strategic balancing rather than on deeper, stable, values and norms, or benefitting from high institutional trust. Vietnam is recognized for stability and resilience but is not yet assessed as a country capable of shaping multinational rules or leading regional initiatives. This capability deficit  arises not only from material resources but also from the country’s internal political and social structure.

The paradoxical tension between putting security first and success in foreign policy achievements, The Japan Times quoted several diplomats describing General Secretary Tô Lâm as a seasoned politician, a risk-calculator whose biggest gambles so far have yielded results (3). In his Political Report, To Lam expanded the concept of security in the direction of comprehensiveness, accurately reflecting the non-traditional challenges of the current era. However, the important issue is more how security will be achieved more than merely expanding its conceptual scope When security becomes the lens dominating governance, a paradox emerges: the more emphasis is directed to control to ensure stability, the less the importance given to soft foreign policy resources—trust, predictability, and social engagement.

In the increasingly tense U.S.–China rivalry, Vietnam’s strategy of “balancing” and “not choosing sides” faces greater resistance than before. Partners assess not only policy statements but also the sustainability of institutions and the ability to make transparent decisions during crises. The South China Sea, long only a dispute over sovereign rights, has become a test of legal, diplomatic, and societal capacity.   A too tightly closed domestic structure reduces capacity to mobilize these vital internal sources of power over the long term.

What role for Vietnam in the new Era of Putting Security First and Foremost

Given its current position, Vietnam’s most practical role is to be neither a military power nor adopt absolute neutrality but to act as a nation with modest capabilities but easily able to maintain open flexibility in its region. This will require steadfast adherence to first principles of independence and autonomy, while maintaining institutional flexibility sufficient to earn trust from a variety of

partners.

With democratization not yet having occurred, Vietnam can still expand its foreign policy options through pragmatic reforms: implementing the rule of law with scrupulous attention to its technical requirements, particularly in economics and financial investments; reducing arbitrary enforcement security laws and regulations in public and private settings.; and taking the initiative in proposing initiatives within ASEAN and other multilateral forums. However, these steps will advance foreign policy objectives only to a certain limited extent. 

Would Democratization Unlock Strategic Advantages for Vietnam?

In the long term, only democratization can fully remove the current constraints on Vietnam’s foreign policy (4). When that happens, Vietnam’s foreign policy can shift from being purely transactional, short-term, interest-based to enhancing such interests with appealing values and widely-accepted norms of beneficial reciprocity. Vietnam’s ability to join soft-power alliances and so shape regional inter-state relationships will increase; and the risk of being forced to take sides will decline due to having higher legitimacy and more respect in the global community of nations and more negotiating influence. Importantly, foreign affairs will  then no longer be the sole domain of the state but will become a strategic undertaking of Vietnamese society as a whole.

Conclusion: The 14th Congress and the Limits of Order and Public Security

The Political Report of the 14th Party Congress proposed a plausible conceptual framework: maintain peace to promote development, and development to augment national capabilities. However, in a world where good character gains respect and compliance, common norms, and trustworthiness increasingly determine national opportunities and advantages, stability based primarily on putting public security and monitoring of behaviors first and foremost cannot become a sustainable formula to achieve national aspirations. Public Security cannot replace the social capital provided by institutions, and monitoring of behaviors cannot substitute for legitimacy.

The 14th Party Congress, therefore, was more than  a redistribution of power among individuals but, much more importantly, it was a strategic test of Vietnam’s ability to choose a path of sustainable integration in the 21st century (5).

References:

1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9HN7KDLmi8 (General Secretary Tô Lâm presents the Political Report at the 14th CPV Congress | VietNamNet)
2. https://nghiencuuquocte.org/2026/01/18/dai-hoi-xiv-cua-viet-nam-quyen-luc-cai-cach-va-the-he-chinh-tri-ke-tiep/
3. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/c8j3wl4pxrlo (What the international press says about the 14th Congress and General Secretary Tô Lâm)
4. https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2024/ui-brief-no.2-20242.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com (The scope and limits of Vietnam’s unorthodox development)
5. https://en.daihoidang.vn/vietnams-effective-foreign-policy-earns-widespread-international-recognition-expert-post4317.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Foreign Policy after the 14th Party Congress: Pragmatism  with Conditions and Hitting the Ceiling in using the Paradigm of “Opening up to the Outside while Closing up on the Inside 

Recent adjustments in Vietnam’s foreign policy have reveals a concerted effort to expand strategic maneuvering opportunities through pragmatism and policy flexibility. However, as the subordination of domestic governance to the demands of security and discipline becomes the dominant organizing principle of the state, the “open to the outside – closing up the inside” model not only constrains the effectiveness of foreign policy but also undermines the very foundations required for a new foreign policy paradigm to function. In the long run, a flexible foreign policy will not be viable when anchored to an increasingly closed domestic political structure incapable of correcting its shortcomings and lack of good judgment 

Tran Dong A

The 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam was not only  a reallocation of individual leadership and factional influences   it also marked a critical step  in the reconfiguration of Vietnam’s foreign policy thinking and practice amid profound shifts in the international order. Whereas the previous period emphasized strategic balance and avoidance of entanglement in great-power competitions, now after the14th Congress, Vietnamese diplomacy has adopted a more complex approach to international affairs: the construction of a multi-layered, pragmatic, and adaptive “foreign policy ecosystem”—one that, nonetheless, contains inherent structural constraints.

1. The 14th Party Congress and the Consolidation of a New Foreign Policy Ecosystem 

The concept of a “bamboo diplomacy,” emphasized under former Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, embodied flexibility, resilience, and principled firmness. Now,  after the conclusion of the 14th Congress—particularly under the consolidation of power in the person of  General Secretary To Lam—this bending approach has not been abandoned but rather has been restructured into a broader foreign policy ecosystem, in which multiple channels, levels of decision-making, and instrumentalities  operate in parallel deployments.

This ecosystem encompasses political–security diplomacy, economic–trade diplomacy, multilateral and institutional diplomacy, and, no less importantly, symbolic diplomacy and strategic signaling. Foreign policy is no longer limited to preserving amicable relations or avoiding conflict; it has become an anticipatory and pre-emptive effort for managing strategic risks, dispersing external pressures, and maximizing policy efficacy.

But, unlike other foreign policy ecosystems grounded in strong domestic institutions and open social systems, Vietnam’s post–14th Congress ecosystem continues to depend on an intensifying the dominance  of security agencies over domestic governance, closely resembling the Chinese model of disciplined conformity from the top down. This governance reality creates a fundamental paradox: the more Vietnam opens up to the outside, the more its internal political and social spaces contract.

2. Participation in Trump’s “Peace Council”: A Transactional Breakthrough 

Vietnam’s decision to participate in the “Peace Council” proposed by U.S. President Donald Trump—at a time when China declined to join and few major European countries expressed support—constituted one of the most notable foreign policy initiatives on the eve of the 14th Congress [1].

This move did not represent a shift in alliances or values, but was rather a breakthrough in diplomatic method, reflecting the distinctly transactional pragmatism of a new period in Vietnamese international relations. Vietnam opted to engage in a political arena characterized by highly personalized power, where U.S. foreign policy operated less through institutional logic and more through the transactional calculus of President Trump himself.

Against the backdrop of impending ambassadorial changes in both Washington and Hanoi, higher U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese goods, and the risk of expanded protectionist trade measures, this step suggests that Hanoi sought to establish a direct channel between itself and  a real  center of important foreign decision-making. The objective was to negotiate tariff reductions or, at minimum, to delay and soften the impact on the Vietnamese economy of such adverse financial impositions.

At the same time, participation in a highly symbolic yet low risk initiative allowed Vietnam to reinforce its image as a responsible international actor willing to contribute to global peace, while preserving policy flexibility. This strategy maximizes reputational gains while minimizing commitment costs—a defining feature of Vietnam’s emerging foreign policy ecosystem.

Yet the high degree of transactionalism implicit in this modest alignment with an immediate priority of President Trump also entails risks. When diplomacy depends heavily on individual leaders in major powers, sudden political shifts in those partner countries can rapidly undermine or negate Hanoi’s strategic calculations.

3. Signals from Beijing: “Shared Future” as a Calculated Compromise 

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s status as the first foreign leader to congratulate To Lam on his re-election as General Secretary on January 23, 2024, carried significance well beyond diplomatic protocol [2]. It was both a strategic reassertion of patronage from Beijing and a test of Hanoi’s autonomy.

From China’s perspective, the swift reaffirmation of a “community of shared future” aimed to ensure that To Lam’s power consolidation would not lead to a strategic distancing  unfavorable to Beijing. In an era of increasingly systemic U.S.–China rivalry, China has a clear interest in keeping Vietnam stable and predictable as a trustworthy client state

For Vietnam, accepting the phrase “shared future” to define its feelings for Xi Jinping’s regime, while firmly avoiding the more deterministic term “shared destiny”—which China has successfully imposed on Laos, Cambodia, and several other ASEAN countries—represents a strategically intelligent euphemism. “Shared future” allows Hanoi interpretive flexibility of its relationship with Beijing, avoids fatalistic commitments, and prevents Vietnam’s foreign policy trajectory from being locked into only a single super-power axis.

Nevertheless, this linguistic maneuver also reflects the limits of Vietnam’s bargaining power in an asymmetric relationship with Beijing. Accepting even a softened version of Chinese terminology defining expected behaviors on the part of the Vietnamese underscores Hanoi’s continued dependence on China in critical areas such as trade, supply chains, and macroeconomic stability.

4. Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs): Rapid Execution, Shallow Digging 

Another pillar of the post–14th Congress foreign policy ecosystem is the continued expansion of Vietnam’s network of Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs). Under To Lam, CSPs have been emphasized as a flexible instrument allowing Vietnam to engage multiple major partners while avoiding ideological or value-based constraints.

In the short and medium term, this approach offers clear benefits: access to capital, technology, markets, and enhanced strategic balance in a fragmented international environment. However, the CSP framework has largely expanded horizontally at the national level, while activation by institutions and social entities has been limited in scope and depth, which limitations will be difficult to surmount.  

Most of Vietnam’s CSPs continue to exploit economic interests and short-term strategic calculations, lacking robust institutional, legal, and normative mechanisms providing in-depth association. As a result, Vietnam’s CPS relationships are vulnerable to domestic political changes in partner countries and constrain Vietnam’s ability to evolve from a “rule-taker” to a “rule-shaper” in the international system.

5. Domestic Dependence on a Security State puts a Ceiling on Foreign Policy Success

The post–14th Congress foreign policy ecosystem demonstrates Hanoi’s adaptability and resilience in an uncertain world. Yet its core internal contradiction lies in the growing dissonance between external openness and internal repression.

As national governance becomes increasingly dominated by state security priorities, critical soft-power resources for foreign policy—such as civil society, independent media, academia, and legal resources—are weakened or, under current circumstances, nearly eliminated. This creates a “ceiling on foreign policy achievement” that no amount of diplomatic agility can fully overcome.

In an international order where credibility, norms, and predictability increasingly determine national standing, foreign policy cannot rely solely on leadership flexibility, whether individual or collective, no matter how deft or clever it can be Without institutional foundations and fulsome societal open spaces, the new foreign policy ecosystem is unlikely to remain dynamic over the long term.

Conclusion 

The 14th Party Congress marks both continuity and adjustment in Vietnam’s foreign policy practice, with ambitions to shape a flexible, pragmatic, and adaptive ecosystem. Moves such as joining Trump’s “Peace Council,” maintaining strategic euphemisms in relations with China, and rapidly expanding the CSP network with dozens of countries illustrate Hanoi’s search for a “safe exit” in managing international risks, rather than anchoring itself to any single power bloc.

However, the model of “domestic repression combined with external openness” is unlikely to unlock the full potential of this ecosystem. The downward pressure on Vietnam’s “foreign policy ceiling” had already emerged in the late Nguyen Phu Trong era [3], and under To Lam, this risk has not only persisted but become more pronounced. Without timely and fundamental adjustments in institutional structures and societal space, Vietnam’s foreign policy may remain operational in the short term but will struggle to overcome strategic constraints in the long run. The 14th Party Congress thus serves not only as a political milestone, but as a critical test of Vietnam’s capacity to choose a sustainable path of beneficially integrating into the global community of the twenty-first century.

Footnotes

[1] https://mofa.gov.vn/tin-chi-tiet/chi-tiet/viet-nam-nhan-loi-moi-tham-gia-hoi-dong-hoa-binh-dai-gaza-58422-138.html

[2] https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/c78eep31plgo [ Ông Tập Cận Bình hoan nghênh ‘tương lai chung’ với Việt Nam sau khi ông Tô Lâm tái đắc cử ]

[3] https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/comment/blog/vietnam-opens-foreign-policy-closes-domestic-one-12302021095537.html

Article 2:

ACCUMULATING INHERENT PARADOXES: VIETNAM’S PATH FORWARD?

Đinh Hoàng Thắng

Fellow, The Caux Round Table

Summary: Vietnam faces five inherent paradoxes: rapid development with weak institutional foundations; aggressive globalization but low domestic resilience; a dynamic society with slow governance reform; growth reliant on external forces while internal capacity is fragile; and high aspirations with inefficient allocation of resources. Three development scenarios are outlined: maintaining the status quo, controlled reform, or disruptive instability. Controlled reform is deemed most feasible, requiring political consensus, institutional restructuring, and enhanced governance capacity. Lessons from other countries highlight the importance of timely reforms but with stability alongside structural transformation. Central to this scenario is system  capacity for self-adjustment: identifying problems, learning, correcting mistakes, and generating new momentum. Risks implicit in the disruptive scenario include trust crises, social fragmentation, and geopolitical pressures. Vietnam must pursue a new development trajectory that balances stability with courageous reform, aiming for sustainable growth having deeper and broader social impact.

1. Five Internal Paradoxes of Vietnam

Vietnam’s current political–economic system is confronting five profound internal paradoxes that reflect tensions between tradition and modernization. 

The first paradox lies in the divide between economics and politics: the economy functions under a socialist-oriented market mechanism, sustaining GDP growth of 6–7% over decades and attracting massive FDI from corporations such as Samsung, Intel, and Foxconn. Yet the political system maintains tight control through the Communist Party, with strategic decisions such as State Owned Enterprise leadership appointments and media censorship, creating a misalignment between economic openness and ideological constraints.

The second paradox emerges from overusing the slogan of “renovation,” repeated again and again since the 1986 Đổi Mới reforms, while substantive reform progresses slowly. Vietnam has integrated into the WTO, CPTPP, and EVFTA, but core sectors such as land, State Owned Enterprise restructuring (accounting for roughly 30% of GDP), and administrative reform remain sluggish. Despite Party Congress XIII calling for breaking the “ask–give mechanism”, bureaucratic procedures and corruption still hinder progress, making reform largely superficial.

Third, traditional ideological legitimacy—Marxism–Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought—has weakened, especially among younger generations exposed to social media and global values. In contrast, pragmatic legitimacy based on stability and economic growth has become central, with the motto “stability above all” shaping decisions from COVID-19 management to growth-focused policies despite inflation.

The fourth paradox is sustaining a powerful state apparatus with dense security and media control when society’s trust is longer an absolute. Scandals such as Formosa, Việt Á, and the Trịnh Xuân Thanh case eroded public confidence, while PAPI surveys indicate declining satisfaction with local authorities, reflecting a widening gap between the state and citizens.

Lastly, internal competition among senior cadres and officials has intensified, with factions vying for key positions in the Politburo and Central Committee. The upcoming 14th Party Congress is expected to witness behind-the-scenes struggles for top leadership, where economic interests intertwine with power, leading to the allocation of state resources through factional bargaining.

Together, these five paradoxes create a pattern of “accumulative tension”—gradual layering of contradictions beneath a seemingly stable surface. Compared with Eastern Europe before 1989, Vietnam shows similar dynamics: partial marketization generating inequality, ideological decline replaced by pragmatism, strong power but weakening trust, and factional infighting within Party and State leadership. Vietnam has avoided sudden collapse thanks to sustained growth and stronger control, but if this “accumulation” continues, similar abrupt ruptures may occur unless deep reform releases the pressure.

2. Three Future Development Scenarios

From a political–philosophical perspective, three developmental scenarios for Vietnam after the 14th Party Congress reflect tension between static stability (Aristotle’s stasis) and dialectical evolution (Hegel’s synthesis) where confronting internal contradictions may lead either to structural renewal or to collapse.

Scenario one would be to reinforce the current model which would maintain comprehensive Communist Party control while harmonizing market economics with such centralized authority. Advantages include social stability, avoidance of Soviet-style collapse, and continued 6–7% GDP growth similar to China under Xi Jinping, ensuring FDI attraction and regional stability. However, internal contradictions would continue to accumulate: outdated ideology would collide with market reality, corruption would exploit bureaucratic weaknesses, inequality would rise (Gini increasing from 0.35 to 0.43 in 15 years), and societal trust would erode, risking eventual rupture within 10–15 years. Estimated probability of implementation: 65%.

Scenario two – controlled reform – would aim to establish a new developmental orientation through internal pluralization within the Party, reduce State Owned Enterprise dominance, reform land ownership opportunities, and enhance transparency. Following Hegel, this would implement synthesis—transforming the inconsistency of ideological orthodoxy with free-market practices into a higher form of supervised democratic governance. Benefits would include productivity gains, restored trust, and a transformation similar to Đổi Mới 1986 or Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, while avoiding Gorbachev-style destabilization. Risks would include factional conflict and loss of central control. Estimated probability of implementation: 20%.

Scenario three – disorder and instability – would see an increase in ideological decline, social distrust, fragmentation of authority, inflation, and global shocks. This Marxian crisis would resemble Eastern Europe 1989—potentially enabling democratic restructuring but risking severe chaos, economic collapse, and foreign intervention. Estimated probability of implementation: 15%.

In conclusion, scenario one has the advantage but would bring on pressure; scenario two is most sustainable yet difficult; scenario three is dangerous and must be prevented.

3. Assessing the Controlled Reform Scenario

Vietnam stands at a strategic crossroads amid socio-economic transformation and geopolitical pressures. Controlled reform emerges as a feasible path to create a new developmental orientation—reducing personalized power, strengthening rule of law, enhancing political adaptability, and cautiously expanding civic space. This would not be a rupture breaking away from the revolution but an evolutionary renewal leveraging existing solid accomplishments.

Reducing personalized leadership means shifting from individual-centric authority to more collective, professional governance and to transparent merit-based leadership selection. 

Strengthening rule of law requires greater judicial independence and legal accountability across all state institutions, including the ruling party, thereby curbing abuse of power and fostering investor confidence. Enhancing self-adjusting capacity involves creating internal feedback mechanisms, dialogues with experts, and independent policy research. Controlled civic space expansion allows NGOs, social organizations, and intellectual forums to operate within legal frameworks, turning social input into governance assets.

Though difficult and requiring leadership consensus, this pathway is more sustainable than merely reinforcing the old model. Global lessons show controlled reform (Singapore, South Korea) can transition authoritarian modernizing systems into effective democratic governance. A phased 5–10 year roadmap is proposed—from legal groundwork and pilot reforms, to institutional oversight strengthening, to digital transparency integration. With decisive leadership and international cooperation, Vietnam can position itself as a new Southeast Asian development model.

A very appropriate equilibrium development model for Vietnam to emulate is Singapore.  Lee Kwan Yew and his People’s Action Party followed a blended approach to development using both dominant government priority setting and regulation and private sector self-help in education and entrepreneurship.  The PAP, with over 60% support from voting citizens and so majority control of the national assembly, built a strong state – no chewing gum allowed! – but it provided cultural, social, and market spaces for individual initiatives to innovate and create wealth, social capitals and human capitals.

4. Lessons from “Brother Nations”

Vietnam is entering a decisive historical phase marked by economic growth alongside deepening paradoxes: rising inequality, environmental degradation, bureaucratic inertia, and trust erosion due to corruption scandals. 

Lessons from Eastern Europe and China teach the danger of delaying political reform while crises deepen. In the late 1980s, regimes liberalized economically but suppressed political pluralism; accumulated tensions exploded, with Soviet Russia collapsing illustrating how rigidity destroys legitimacy.

China teaches that economic reform without governance modernization yields diminishing returns: while opening lifted millions from poverty, authoritarian rigidity, debt-driven overexpansion, youth unemployment, and overcentralization under Xi reveal vulnerability.

Vietnam shows parallels: strong growth but widening disparity, unresolved State Owned Enterprise inefficiencies, real estate vulnerabilities, leadership factionalism, and weakening institutional competitiveness. Therefore, Vietnam should: (1) institutionalize leadership succession transparency and competency criteria; (2) strengthen judicial independence and digital transparency to fight corruption; (3) cautiously expand civil society to create legitimate policy feedback channels; (4) invest in adaptive resilience with early-warning governance tools. These steps combine urgency with pragmatism, transforming paradox into opportunity.

5. The Role of Self-Adjustment Capacity

Vietnam’s central question is no longer merely growth versus stability, but whether its political system can self-adjust to survive historically. Systems endure only when they do not consider themselves absolute. True strength lies not in coercion but in acknowledging limits, listening to warning signals, and adapting proactively.

Today, legitimacy must evolve beyond economic performance toward inclusive development, transparent governance, and a renewed “social contract” recognizing citizens as active participants, not simply governed subjects.

A viable future requires lawful constraints on power, acceptance of criticism as constructive, and recognition of civil society as a governance partner. A system capable of self-adjustment transforms pressure into reform momentum, prevents accumulated paradoxes from turning into crises and instead shapes a new direction  for developmental.

6. Risks of the Instability Scenario

Vietnam may still fall into instability if it loses the capacity to adapt. Accumulated contradictions could then easily trigger combined economic, political, and social crises—slowing growth, financial vulnerabilities, unemployment, persistent corruption scandals, leadership fragmentation, and declining public trust.

External shocks—US–China rivalry, global recession, geopolitical turbulence—could intensify internal fragility, shifting away from controlling tensions to systemic disintegration. Eastern Europe’s rapid collapse illustrates the danger of delayed reform. Vietnam’s stronger control capacity offers resilience, but resilience is not immunity. If social trust weakens, inequality deepens, leadership rivalries intensify, dialogue narrows, and international confidence erodes, instability becomes a real, not hypothetical, threat.

7. Building a New Developmental Orientation for Vietnam

The heart of the matter is not GDP growth, but the duties that come with political power: securing national safety, economic prosperity, human dignity, and the future of the generations to come. Power must serve the nation, not itself. Vietnam needs a developmental orientation that balances stability with controlled reform, modern governance with societal participation, and state strength with community empowerment. Maintaining the current model would preserve stability in the short term but risks medium-term erosion of legitimacy; choosing the path of instability, conversely, would be economically and socially devastating.

Thus, the most reasonable—and most difficult—path is controlled reform: strengthening rule of law, improving governance, cautiously expanding civic space, institutionalizing leadership succession, and building trust-based legitimacy. If chosen after the 14th Congress, Vietnam can thus transform its accumulated contradictions into a foundation for renewed legitimacy, avoiding Eastern Europe’s collapse and China’s fragility, and emerging as a distinctive Southeast Asian model: stable yet adaptive, globally integrated yet culturally grounded, powerful yet accountable, and above all—governance that truly serves the Vietnamese people.

Written December 2025 for the Caux Round Table which, in 1986, was founded in Caux, Switzerland; is incorporated in the United States of America; and has its Administrative Office in, St Paul, Minnesota

In keeping with the New Year greeting of Professor Stephen Young, Director of CRT, in His grace, God has granted us the gift of the New Year within ourselves. With the strength and grace so bestowed upon us, we can become peacemakers. At any moment, we can accept responsibility and take action. God is waiting for us to stand up; He has made it possible for us to set right what has gone wrong. It is in this spirit of solidarity that, in recent years, CRT has placed particular emphasis on East–West dialogue, intercivilizational exchange, and the study of systemic transformation in post-socialist, reforming, and transitional societies, including China, Vietnam, Eastern Europe, and Russia. Presented below are the two most recent contributions to this ongoing endeavor by Dr. Đinh Hoàng Thắng, CRT Fellow.

First Essay: 

Collapse on the One Hand; Sustainability on the other: Why did the Soviet System fail in Russia and Eastern Europe but Socialism in China still exists – at least until now?

Đinh Hoàng Thắng

Fellow, The Caux Round Table

In our lifetimes, global political history has witnessed contrasting trajectories between leading socialist systems. The Soviet system in Russia and its client states in Eastern Europe rapidly collapsed while in China a socialist system of governance and economy has survived through controlled reforms under the direction of a dominant centralized Party and State authority apparatus. The question is inevitable: How could systems born from the same ideological orientation arrive at such different outcomes?

The quick answer is that history is not teleological – not in any way driven by fixed forces towards one necessary end state. Rather, history, even understood as directed by dialectical materialism, is an open-ended, unplanned process of actions and connected reactions, a never-ending process of adjustments, change and evolution.  The “now” of any moment in history has proceeded from a “past” and is shaping the “future”.

Thus, even socialism as an ideal social arrangement cannot be monolithic. Socialism in China was not destined to replicate socialism in Russia.

Thus, the inconsistent evolutions of socialism in Russia and China depended on different decision-making dynamics.  The Russian transition out of Stalinism took a different course than did the Chinese transition out of Maoism. As President Xi Jinping continually insists Chinese socialism evolved under the guidance of “Chinese Characteristics”. The two processes of transition took remnants of an established order and retained some, reorganized others, contested alternatives, and eventually re-configured governing institutions into a new politics.

We then need to consider what “Russian” characteristics” drove the evolution of socialism in Russia and what specific “Chinese” characteristics have produced the Xi Jinping model of political legitimacy and economic development in China.

1. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Failure Born from an Accumulation of errors, leading to Crisis and then to Loss of Direction

Before collapsing, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies had endured a prolonged period of economic, political and cultural stagnation. Centrally planned economies reached the limits of their regulatory capacity: an inability to provide incentives for innovation, operational inefficiency, and growing disconnection from real market demands. In parallel, ideological legitimacy evaporated, at first slowly and then dramatically. Once appealing slogans lost their power to persuade the public of what was right and what was wrong because the gap between regime propaganda and lived reality had grown too wide.  When the propaganda lost its moral power, the Soviet regimes lost their ability to command obedience and respect.

More importantly, the final phase, one of “accumulation of shortcomings and errors”, of these intertwined Soviet systems brought about not strength, but introduced self-destructive forces. Reforms came too late, or were only half-hearted. Political structures lost cohesion as rejection of their authority spread across society . Such socialism developed what could be called “existential fatigue.” Confidence in the endurance of the model decayed psychologically long before collapse arrived politically. When such internal contradictions reached a certain threshold, instead of forming a coherent and effective trajectory into the future—a directional alignment capable of holding the system together—those internal contradictions produced fragmentation, confrontation, and eventually sudden disintegration.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the Soviet states of Eastern Europe collapsed from any single political incident. Their fall came from institutional gridlock, which had taken decades of dysfunctions to accumulate system-destroying critical mass. Once legitimacy crumbled and the state lost its capacity to mobilize society, even a moderate shock was enough to bring down a structure already hollowed out from within. In other words, the Soviet–Eastern European collapse resulted from the failure of their transition out of original orthodoxy, a systemic failure to forestall the accumulation of disappointments, resentments, malingering obstructions, profiteering, and other refusals of obedience.   These Soviet regimes failed to envision and implement a new path capable of reconciling contradictions and reviving historical vitality.

We might then consider what “Russian” characteristics contributed to the failure of the Soviet regime. An obvious consideration is the Muscovite tradition of cruel rulers and compliant sycophants. Russia arose from a social structure dualism of the Tsar and the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church where no freedoms existed either in politics or religion.  Thus, Russians have carried into the present a national character of servile accommodation. Inventiveness, pragmatism, checks and balances, decentralized flexibility have never characterized Russian culture, society or politics.

2. The Chinese transition out of Maoism: Surviving Through Accumulating Power and Controlling institutional Assignments

Sharing the same socialist ideological foundation, China nonetheless chose a different transitional path when the shortcomings of Maoist orthodoxy became evident. After the traumatic disruptions of the Maoist era, China gave itself a reform program marked by strong pragmatism. Unlike the Soviet Union, China moved earlier and more decisively in restructuring its economy while still retaining a highly rigid hierarchy for its politics.

What mattered most was not just generating economic growth, but the creation of a new basis for regime legitimacy—one derived from delivering development, improving livelihoods, and utilizing nationalism as a powerful binding force. China has also advanced further than many nations in building sophisticated tools for social control, deploying security and digital technologies extensively to manage dissent.

As a result, China has formed what may be called a “directional alignment of power”: a trajectory in which the state holds absolute authority while refusing to abandon the imperative of development. Ideology has been “pragmatized”: socialism remains the rhetoric, but the underlying logic is one of power, national strategy, and economic advancement. This helps China avoid an Eastern European-style shock—at least in the short term.

This successful transition was made possible through the deployment of “Chinese” characteristics, policies borrowed from 2,000 years of imperial order, where individual dynasties might have risen to power and then collapsed but a habit of showing pragmatic concern for social order from family, to village, to district and finally the state was reinvigorated again and again.

3.  The Chinese Communist Party’s Survival Until Today Does Not Guarantee Its Future Durability

However, the continuing survival of Chinese socialism should not be mistaken for a guarantee of its sustainability. Beneath its seemingly stable surface lies mounting pressure: slowing growth, demographic decline, widening inequality, social tensions, and sustained international strategic competition. All of these dynamics create new, or exacerbate existing, contradictions within the system, contradictions which, day by day, are accumulating the power to destabilize China’s future.

Just as the Soviet Union once believed itself “too strong to fall,” China is not immune to the forces which dictate history. Chinese socialism did not escape history but began its adjustment to historical realities before the Russian Soviet leaders did.  Socialist Russian and Eastern European regimes allowed history to push them into corners where collapse was their only future.  But history is still grinding away at Chinese Socialism. More challenges to the regime are to come. 

So, if one must explain why Soviet Russia and its Eastern Europe client states disappeared while Communist China still endures, the reasons are:

• Russia and Eastern Europe accumulated dysfunctions and weaknesses, leading to, first, a loss of reform options and then collapse
• China sustained centralized ruling power through pragmatic economic reforms producing continued interim survival

But history remains open to change and new developments. The decisive question for Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China is: the coming accumulation of circumstantial realities will generate what kind of a governing regime?

Written December 2025 for the Caux Round Table which, in 1986, was founded in Caux, Switzerland; is incorporated in the United States of America; and has its Administrative Office in, St Paul, Minnesota

 

Our Vietnamese correspondent has shared with me his generally optimistic report on the political environment which will shape decisions at the forthcoming Party Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

I note with interest the discussion of traditional Vietnamese sensitivity to the signals we mere humans get from Heaven as to our fates as time and space cycle through the years.

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The Vietnamese Communist Party Today Compared with Forty Years Ago: The 14th Party Congress and the 6th Party Congress — Parallels, Divergences, and Enduring Historical Undercurrents. 

Four decades after the Sixth Party Congress—an event widely regarded as having opened a historic door toward a more flexible economic order (Đổi Mới)—Vietnam once again confronts a life-defining political moment: a critical transition of power with far-reaching consequences.

Hoàng Trường

The Fourteenth Party Congress is approaching amid intensifying economic, political, and social pressures, a visible erosion of public trust, and increasingly complex factional maneuvering among highly placed officials.

The reappearance of familiar patterns in the operation of power has led many observers to pose an unsettling question: is history repeating itself—once again moving through familiar cycles of power?

A comparison between the 14th Party Congress (2026) and the 6th Party Congress (1986) reveals notable similarities, while also exposing fundamental differences that reflect both the changing times and the evolving structure and operation of totalitarian power.

I. Parallels: When Power Becomes Trapped in Bargaining

1. Deadlock and infighting among the most prominent cadres and officials

In the lead-up to the Sixth Party Congress, Lê Đức Thọ—despite advanced age and declining health—was unwilling to step aside. Phạm Văn Đồng and Trường Chinh were forced into compromise in order to prevent factional conflict from spiraling out of control. A transitional arrangement was devised: Trường Chinh would preside over the Congress, then hand over leadership to Nguyễn Văn Linh—a new figure representing the emerging reformist tendency.

Ahead of the Fourteenth Congress, a similar pattern of “forced compromise” has once again emerged. Central Committee meetings have been postponed repeatedly (three times), and personnel lists revised again and again—clear indications that no faction has yet secured overwhelming dominance.

The crucial parallel lies here: while the overall strategic direction is widely acknowledged, personnel arrangements have become the central bottleneck.

In 1986, despite fierce debate, senior leaders recognized that the centrally planned economic model had reached its limits. Likewise, by 2026, a growing consensus has formed that growth driven by land rents, privileges, and easy capital has exhausted its momentum.

The Politburo has issued Resolution 68, effectively mandating a shift in development priorities toward the private sector. Yet disagreements over who should lead this transformation have prolonged internal division for more than a year.

2. A shared denominator: erosion of social trust

From 1975 to 1986, the subsidy-based economic model plunged everyday life into severe deprivation. Public confidence deteriorated rapidly.

Today, although surface-level material conditions have changed dramatically, the psychological parallels are unmistakable:

• Businesses are exhausted by overlapping inspections and audits;
• The business environment is obstructed by fear of making mistakes and by interference from enforcement agencies lacking accountability;
• Confidence in the future is declining as opportunities are squeezed by rent-seeking power groups intent on expanding their privileges.

As in 1986, society is fatigued, and expectations for a decisive change are once again on the rise.

II. Divergences: Reversed Regional Roles and a Transformed Power Structure

1. Southern dynamism: from reform driver to controlled subordinate

At the Sixth Party Congress, southern Vietnam was the most powerful engine of reform. The collapse of the slogan “rapid, strong, and steady advance toward socialism” had pushed the country to the brink of hunger—symbolized by nationwide dependence on sorghum imported from the Soviet Union.

Saigon and the southern region—drawing on market experience and economic dynamism—were the first to recover. “Fence-breaking” reforms in pricing, wages, production contracts, and enterprise autonomy laid the practical foundations for Đổi Mới. It was no coincidence that leaders with southern origins later played key roles during the early reform period.

Today, the regional balance of power has shifted. Northern leadership—having absorbed lessons from the post-1986 period, when the South enjoyed substantial autonomy—has narrowed the South’s room for maneuver, especially following the Nguyễn Tấn Dũng era and its controversial state-conglomerate model described as “steel fists.”

If 1986 marked northern concession to southern pragmatism, 2026 reflects a reassertion of centralized northern control.

2. Hunger and aspiration: different forms, the same political dynamic

In 1986, hunger was literal. In 2026, society “hungers” for the rule of law, while businesses hunger for economic freedom and thirst for a transparent, healthy legal environment.

Where past deprivation stemmed from a flawed economic model, today’s exhaustion arises from relentless inspections, administrative coercion by the security apparatus, and weak accountability among political leaders. New and troubling features have emerged: investigative and executive power now forms a wall that blocks capital, innovation, and production at the very moment they begin to take shape.

3. The rise of a socio-spiritual dimension

A defining feature of the current period is the strong resonance of traditional socio-spiritual sentiment: repeated natural disasters, relentless flooding, and as many as fifteen major storms have nurtured a collective sense that “heaven’s will” is turning against the system.

In East Asian political psychology, such phenomena are often interpreted as signs of dynastic or national transition. If reform-oriented forces knew how to channel this instinctive sentiment, it could become a strategic advantage.

In 1986, this psychological-political dimension was largely absent. In 2026, it has emerged as a powerful undercurrent shaping public emotion and expectation.

III. A Changed World: Globalization and the Limits of Absolute Control

1. Vietnam in 2026 is no longer Vietnam in 1986

• The private sector has become the backbone of economic growth;
• Vietnam occupies a key position in global electronics and semiconductor supply chains;
• Interwoven relations with the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China mean that senior leadership decisions now carry major geopolitical implications.

Under such conditions, a top-down model of total control is clearly ill-suited to an economy and society that demand speed, creativity, and adaptability.

2. Concentrated power—facing harsh limits

The current power structure rests primarily on:

• The expanding influence of the security apparatus;
• Strong totalitarian coercion—rule by police power rather than by the rule of law;
• Governance through repression and sophisticated extraction rather than trust-building;
• Preferential treatment for loyalist networks and obedience over institutional reform.

Meanwhile, businesses—the main drivers of growth—are increasingly constrained by legal uncertainty and intrusive security oversight.

3. “Political flooding” as a metaphor of the age

The persistence of coercive governance despite repeated natural disasters reveals a deeply troubling separation between the state and society.

At the Sixth Party Congress, economic and social crisis forced leadership change. Ahead of the Fourteenth Congress, although society is no less exhausted or gridlocked, the power structure appears more rigid and increasingly entrenched in both status and authority.

This contrast reflects a core trait of modern totalitarian systems: the survival of the system is prioritized above economic performance, social responsibility, or moral values.

Conclusion: Parallels as Reflection, Divergences as Warning

The Sixth Party Congress was a historic turning point that liberated national energy from the constraints of a failed economic model. The Fourteenth Congress could generate a similar breakthrough—or it may simply perpetuate a cycle of power consolidation if not accompanied by meaningful institutional reform.

The parallels lie in social fatigue, resolving deadlocks among the most senior cadres and officials,, and pressures for change from below.

The divergences lie in a more rigid power structure, a stronger private sector, and Vietnam’s far deeper integration into the global system.

And this time, whether acknowledged or not, socio-spiritual forces are also present as an invisible factor shaping collective sentiment.

History never repeats itself exactly. Yet patterns of power distribution, crisis dynamics, and signals from society’s foundations inevitably return—albeit in altered forms.

The Fourteenth Party Congress, therefore, is not merely about personnel appointments. It is a test of Vietnam’s entire philosophy of governance: whether its one-party system can adapt to a new stage of development, or whether it will continue to close itself off from warnings issued by society, markets—and even by nature itself.