The 14th Party Congress and the “Post-Karma” of To Lam

Nguyen Khac Mai is widely regarded as one of the leading independent intellectual voices in contemporary Vietnam. Formerly Director of the Research Department of the  Commission for Mass Mobilization under the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, he stopped working for the party-state apparatus early in order to devote his life to the study of culture, philosophy, and the enlightenment of civic consciousness. He currently serves as President of the Institute for Vietnamese Wisdom Studies, a non-governmental scholarly institution dedicated to revitalizing Vietnam’s traditional intellectual heritage and connecting it with the progressive thought of the modern world.

For decades, Mr. Mai has pursued the idea of “wisdom” (minh triết) as a foundational path toward societal renewal and the reconstruction of Vietnam’s political culture. His writings and lectures weave together the philosophical depth of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, the spirit of Western liberal thought, and the insights drawn from real political experience. With a gentle demeanor yet incisive reasoning, he is respected across the Vietnamese intellectual community—both at home and abroad—as a symbol of democratic dialogue and cultural enlightenment.

Now in his nineties, Nguyen Khac Mai continues to write, lecture, and participate in public discussion, contributing tirelessly to the search for a humane, wise, and sustainable model of development for Vietnam.

The Caux Round Table feels privileged to bring Mr. Mai’s recommendations to an international audience.

The 14th Party Congress and the “Post-Karma” of To Lam

Nguyen Khac Mai – President, Institute for Vietnamese Wisdom Studies

I draw on the Buddhist concept of karma to reflect on the political path of To Lam. Everything he has done—through body, speech, and mind—during his years as Minister of Public Security and now as the country’s top leader, remains vivid in the memory of the public. These are his past karmas: actions that, in the eyes of many, continue certain “old corruptions” that Ho Chi Minh once warned about, yet also contain elements that disrupt stagnation and generate momentum for reform. Whether these past karmas are virtuous or harmful will be judged by society and by history.

But the transformation of karma is not a solitary journey. One who wishes to transform must repent, must cultivate new and better karmas, and must accept supporting conditions—that is, criticism, oversight, and assistance from society. Without this, goodwill can easily turn into illusion.


I. Post-Karma: The Vision of a “Rising Era” and Five Strategic Pillars

To Lam’s post-karma began when he assumed the position of General Secretary, preparing for the 14th Party Congress and shaping the decisions that followed. His proposed vision—the “Rising Era”—aims for a more civilized, humane, service-oriented, and developmental Party and State. He set forth five strategic pillars:

  1. Reforming the Party: shifting from a mindset of power to a spirit of public service; the Party must be the servant of the people, not their ruler.
  2. Advancing culture, science, education, and technology: regarding these as new national capabilities—AI, digitalization, and scientific research—to elevate Vietnam’s competitiveness.
  3. Administrative reform: building a three-tiered government structure guided by performance-based governance and a citizen-centered, developmental state.
  4. Developing the private economy and civil society: creating new engines of national growth while addressing historical debts by legitimizing, respecting, and fostering civil society.
  5. Multilateral international integration: a “bamboo diplomacy” that is flexible yet principled, transforming external resources into domestic strength.

These ideas, at the conceptual level, are modern and progressive. Yet the gap between vision and implementation is always perilous: if carried out under concentrated power, opaque processes, or insufficient consultation, the post-karma may quickly distort.


II. One Year In: Recognizing Early Deviations

For post-karma to become good karma, we must confront the missteps that have emerged during To Lam’s initial period in office.

1. Localism and concentrated appointments

The accelerated appointment of officials from a single province (Hung Yen) and from the security sector to many key positions has raised concerns about regional imbalance and a closing of political space. A sustainable political system requires diversity of origin and professional background; excessive concentration risks creating the image of a closed circle of power.

2. Personalism in symbols and public projects

Proposals to name streets after family members, or to pursue sector-branded megaprojects—such as a Public Security theater, stadium, or even airport—evoke a tendency toward personalization and “sectoral branding” of state authority. In a period that demands austerity, prioritization, and public benefit, such symbols can misallocate resources and alienate public sentiment.

3. Major national decisions driven by voluntarism

Gigantic initiatives—the North–South high-speed railway, the nuclear program in Binh Thuan, or the merger of provinces—cannot be approached with haste or unilateral decision-making. These trillion-dollar, multi-generational projects require independent research, broad consultation, and rigorous socio-environmental impact assessments. A country cannot “run while lining up” on matters of its future.

These deviations are not cosmetic; they reveal a paradox: although renewal is proclaimed, the methods of implementation risk replicating old power patterns. Without timely correction, the post-karma cannot achieve long-term legitimacy.


III. Four Social Imperatives for Turning Post-Karma into Good Karma

Vietnam must not miss a historical window of opportunity. Society must act as a constructive partner setting realistic guardrails.

1. Reviving and strengthening civil society as a monitoring partner

Civil society is not an adversary of the Party but a vital mechanism of oversight and policy improvement. Vietnam must legally recognize civil society organizations and empower the press—within lawful frameworks—to monitor public affairs.

2. A citizenry aware of its opportunity and responsibility

This is a rare “window of opportunity.” Citizens must raise awareness: expressing opinions, monitoring major projects, demanding transparency. Consensus does not mean passive silence; it means active participation.

3. Independent expert consultation for all strategic projects

All megaprojects should be reviewed by independent scientific councils that publish environmental, social, and fiscal impact assessments. This prevents voluntarism and ensures the sustainability of national decisions.

4. Building a new political culture: integrity and accountability

Vietnam needs programs on public-service ethics, transparent appointment processes, assets disclosure, and mechanisms for conflict-of-interest management. A new political culture is essential to prevent distortion of reforms.


IV. Traditional Wisdom as the Foundation for Modern Reform

Figures such as To Hien Thanh and Ngo Thi Si, along with the Nho–Buddhist tradition of East Asia, left behind profound lessons in political ethics: appoint the upright, lead through moral example, and persuade before punishing. Einstein reminds us that no problem can be solved with the same mindset that created it, and Engels urges socialists to learn from the advanced nations. These teachings suggest that post-karma must synthesize ancient Vietnamese wisdom with modern scientific governance.


V. Practical Steps Toward Realizing a Meaningful Post-Karma

  • Conduct a comprehensive review of appointments through an independent oversight committee.
  • Establish a National Scientific Council for all strategic megaprojects, with mandatory public reports.
  • Codify public consultation in planning processes to ensure citizens have a voice from the outset.
  • Develop civil society and professionalized journalism—within a legal framework—as channels of public oversight.
  • Enforce asset transparency, conflict-of-interest regulations, and integrity norms throughout the public sector.

Conclusion

Past karma explains the path to power; post-karma determines whether that power serves the nation. To Lam’s post-karma can become good karma only if grounded in transparency, consultation, integrity, and societal partnership. Without these, goodwill may be swallowed by old patterns of authority.

The nation’s fate is like tangled vines, the ancients said: to untangle it requires wisdom, goodwill, and—above all—the participation of the people. A worthy post-karma is a promise to the nation: a Party and a State that serve, and a society capable of rising with its own strength.

Ну, погоди! — Just wait and see.

Forging a New Political Order for Vietnam after the Nguyen Phu Trong Era of Indecision: Power Realignment, Bargaining, Continuity or Innovation

The following commentary was received from a confidant of senior members of the Vietnamese Communist Party.  It provides an insightful view of challenges now facing the Party’s leadership.
The optimistic point is that there seems to be no faction striving to return to classical Marxism.

As Vietnam awaits the Communist Party’s Central Committee meeting in its 15th Plenum, the country enters a superficially subtle but actually very consequential phase of political readjustment.

NGUYEN PHONG

Far from the dramatic ruptures that have defined leadership transitions in other one-party systems, the leadership shifts in Hanoi today are quieter, more procedural, and often deliberately obscured. Yet these changes—small and cosmetic as they may appear to outsiders—are shaping the emerging architecture of centralized political power in the post–Nguyễn Phú Trọng era.  (Nguyen Phu Trong was Party General Secretary from 2011 to 2024)

Over the past decade, Trọng’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign reconfigured the upper tiers of the Vietnamese state more extensively than any political initiative since the economic reforms of the late 1980s. While the campaign succeeded in disciplining the bureaucracy and reaffirming Party primacy, it also produced an unanticipated side effect: unprecedented turnover among top officials, including the removal of: a president, a national assembly chair, and multiple Politburo members. This churning of who has authority has compelled the Party to search for a new internal equilibrium of power centers—one that preserves collective leadership and prevents any one governing entity from amassing unchecked influence.

Today, Vietnam’s political arena is best understood as a system undergoing recalibration. No single source of power—the security services, the military, the Party apparatus, or the government—dominates decisively. Each wields enough influence to constrain the others, creating a form of managed multipolarity within the elite. Consensus is no longer merely a normative ideal; it has become a structural necessity.

Within this dynamic of offsetting checks and balances, Defense Minister Phan Văn Giang has emerged as a surprisingly stabilizing figure. Soft-spoken, technically oriented, and lacking the overt ambition that characterizes several of his contemporaries, Giang represents a return to the military’s traditional ethos: discipline, continuity, and institutional restraint. In an environment unsettled by political purges, the military’s measured posture—and Giang’s embodiment of that restraint—has made him a credible bridge across factions. For those in the Party who seek predictability after years of interpersonal uncertainty, Giang offers the reassuring profile of a team building leader preserving consensus.

Yet alternative political outcomes are possible. Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính, whose background in the public security apparatus and reputation for tactical maneuvering have long made him a central player among top Vietnamese leaders, stands at a pivotal crossroads. His survival through successive personnel reshuffles—particularly the dramatic purges of 2023–2025—signals the resilience of his networks and the ongoing relevance of his governance priorities. But Chính’s continued influence is far from assured. His trajectory up or down will depend on whether he can sustain support from a coalition that spans technocrats, regional interests, and elements of the security apparatus—groups that do not always share compatible aims.

Economic pressures add another layer of complexity to the leadership choices which now must be made by the Party. Vietnam is navigating one of the most significant strategic openings in its modern history as global firms seek alternatives to China. The country’s appeal—political stability, policy continuity, and a disciplined labor force—has drawn investment from the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Europe. The question now is whether political turbulence at the top will undermine that reputation. Investors, accustomed to Vietnam’s steady hand, are increasingly wary of bureaucratic paralysis triggered by the anti-corruption drive, which has made officials hesitant to approve projects for fear of becoming collateral damage. This “chilling effect” on economic development has become one of the most serious structural challenges facing the country’s leadership.

Institutionally, Vietnam is transitioning toward a more diffused leadership model. The era of a dominant general secretary, embodied by Trọng, is giving way to a structure where authority is more evenly distributed across the Politburo and the Regime’s leading bodies. This shift may not be formally acknowledged, but its logic is embedded in recent developments: the inclusion of the Standing Member of the Secretariat into the category of “core leaders,” the elevation of several Party technocrats, and the deliberate balancing of regional factions and institutional interests. The result is a leadership configuration that relies less on a singular authority and more on negotiated stability.

The approaching 15th Plenum is therefore significant not for any expected dramatic pronouncements, but for the signals it will send about how the Party intends to manage its internal reorganization. Personnel decisions—long the most sensitive component of Vietnam’s political process—will reveal the contours of an emerging settlement: which factions have consolidated ground, which decision-making structures have consolidated confidence, and who will shape the policy agenda presented to the 14th Party Congress. These decisions, though often couched in bureaucratic language, carry consequences far beyond the walls of Ba Đình, home to Vietnam’s leaderships. These decisions will determine not only domestic policies but also Vietnam’s broader geopolitical posture at a time of sharpening competition among great powers.

For international observers, the Party’s key challenge lies in demonstrating that internal turbulence will not compromise its strategic coherence. Vietnam’s foreign policy—anchored in “bamboo diplomacy” and calibrated to balance China and the United States—depends on a leadership that can maintain both internal consensus and external flexibility. A prolonged period of  dysfunctional factional rivalry would complicate this balancing act, particularly as external pressures increase with Washington seeking deeper security ties and Beijing asserting its claims more forcefully in the South China Sea.

Strategically, the consequences of this leadership realignment extend beyond individual appointments. They speak to the Party’s long-term capacity to adapt to the demands of a more complex economic and geopolitical environment. Vietnam is entering a developmental stage that requires 1) more agile governance, 2) more transparent policy coordination, and 3) a political elite capable of reconciling domestic discipline with global integration. The quiet negotiations now taking place preceding the 15th Plenum are thus not merely a contest for influence. They are a test of whether the Party can evolve its internal mechanisms without destabilizing the system it has long worked to preserve.

Despite the recent turbulence, Vietnam’s political machinery has shown a remarkable ability to absorb shocks without allowing them to escalate into public crises. The “tempest in a teacup”—a phrase increasingly used by insiders—captures both the intensity of internal contestation and its limited visibility to the public. Whether such managed containment of rivalry and competition can continue will determine the next chapter of Vietnam’s political development.

For now, the Party appears committed to restoring equilibrium through bargaining, adjustment, and selective compromise. If successful, Vietnam may emerge from this transitional period with a more resilient, if more complex, model of collective leadership. If not, the uncertainties that follow could challenge not only domestic governance but Vietnam’s strategic standing at a moment when regional dynamics leave little margin for error.

Trump’s Five-Day Journey: The Quiet Earthquake in East Asia 

By Dinh Hoang Thang , Fellow the Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism

Busan — a city that smells of salt and ocean water, once defined by tides and trade — suddenly found itself at the center of a geopolitical storm. Before arriving here, Donald Trump had stopped in Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo. Five days, three capitals (October 26–30): what seemed like a restless shuttle across Asia turned out to be a cartography of power. Did the history of East Asia just quietly turn a new page? 

I. A Journey Writting a Message 

Trump’s travels were no ordinary tour. The trip implemented a strategy , scripted in three acts: beginning in Kuala Lumpur — the symbolic heart of ASEAN; moved to Tokyo — the setting of a revived alliance; and ended in Busan — where two superpowers tested each other’s resolve.

The sequence mattered. Southeast Asia is not an audience, but part of the stage. Japan is no longer just an ally, but a co-architect of global order. And Busan — that sea-wrapped arena — became host to the acting out of raw, transactional power.

In Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN — once derided as a “talking club” — suddenly looked relevant. Small nations, through the art of flexible diplomacy, managed to engage both Washington and Beijing, bargaining for space, investment, and having a voice in an age of tightening rivalry.

In Tokyo, Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae, heir to former Prime Minister Abe’s strategic realism, met Trump to discuss supply chains, defense, and technological autonomy. The U.S.–Japan alliance is no longer built only on deterrence; it now rests on industrial and technological power — an alliance of determinative capability.

And finally, in Busan, amid jet engine thrusts and the scent of the sea, Trump and Xi met in a modest room — no red carpets, no choreographed grandeur. What unfolded was a minimalist drama of power: an interim detente, not a peace; a truce defined by interests, not ideals.

II. Japan’s New Doctrine and the Shape of a Regional Order 

Shinzo Abe planted the seeds of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Takaichi Sanae is harvesting them — with less rhetoric and more resolve. Her ambition is transparent: boost defense spending, anchor security cooperation with the U.S., and weave industrial links with India, Australia, and South Korea. This is Abe 2.0 — democratic, assertive, and determined to keep East Asia’s future from being written by Beijing.

With Trump’s pragmatic America back in play, Tokyo understands that autonomy is the new loyalty. Instead of sheltering under Washington’s security umbrella, Japan needs its own raincoat — rebuilding semiconductor industries, advancing clean energy, and reimagining its role in regional supply chains. The Abe–Takaichi doctrine turns ideals into instruments: from “rules-based order” to “capabilities-based alliances.”

III. Busan: When Two Worlds Talk in Calculus 

After months of tariff battles, tech bans, and rare-earth restrictions, both Trump and Xi needed a breather. The outcome was a temporary armistice: Washington eased some tariffs; Beijing resumed U.S. soybean imports and pledged to rein in fentanyl exports. But beneath the smiles, the calculation was cold-hearted.

Trump needed stability heading into an election year. Xi needed calm to sustain his authority at home and preserve his face internationally. Each leader stepped back a few inches — without abandoning a single trenchline.

The U.S.–China rivalry has entered a new phase: managed competition. The conflict has evolved from a trade war to a war of standards — over chips, AI, finance, and energy. Two gravitational systems now coexist: not colliding, not converging, but circling in uneasy proximity. Like twin planets in an imperfect orbit, they offset the pull of — and so limit — each other’s orbit.

IV. ASEAN Awakens: From Playing Field to Power Hub 

One quiet happening during Trump’s journey was the awakening of ASEAN. As Air Force One touched down in Kuala Lumpur, Southeast Asia ceased to be a corridor between superpowers and began to act as a hinge of strategic consequence.

ASEAN’s new realism lies in “neutral pragmatism.” Its members — Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, among others — are mastering the art of balance: welcoming investment, keeping dialogue open, and leveraging great-power rivalry to augment  self-reliant autonomy.

Neutrality no longer means passivity. It’s an art of motion, not a state of immobility — the ability to maneuver between forces without being crushed. If sustained, that agility could transform ASEAN from a passive zone into a dynamic geoeconomic contributor to a multi-polar world.

V. Vietnam: From Insecure Wariness to Self-Reliant Confidence 

Vietnam stands at the confluence of two currents: commerce and security strategy. The temporary U.S.–China détente offers a breathing space — stable trade, redirected investment, supply-chain realignment — but of uncertain duration. A single tariff tweak in Washington or a military move by Beijing in the South China Sea could upend it overnight.

Vietnam’s survival strategy must therefore be double-tracked: pragmatic in action, visionary in thought.

Pragmatism means infrastructure reform, institutional modernization, human-capital investment, and advances in logistics and semiconductors — the bloodstream feeding the new global economy.

Vision means redefining “self-reliance” not through isolation, but through innovation; not by avoiding conflict, but by shaping cooperation.

“Self-reliance” today is not a slogan but a system — the ability to shift from low-cost manufacturing to high-value creation, from export dependency to endogenous value chains.

As global powers race to secure chips and critical minerals, Vietnam must secure and refine its most precious resource: people — their education, creativity, and freedom – to shape the counry’s future.

Vietnam’s strength has never been about size. It lies in self-definition — the capacity to carve a very purposeful identity and design an innovative strategy amid flux.

VI. East Asia: A Quiet Reshaping of Order 

Trump’s five-day tour did not shake the earth with thunder.  But it did trigger some quiet tectonic movements. The regional order is morphing from black-and-white confrontation to a spectrum of pragmatic competition. Japan grows firmer, South Korea more adaptive, ASEAN more flexible, and China more cautious.

This is not the collapse of an old order but the reconfiguration of one — an emerging, networked, interdependent Indo-Pacific, built less on declarations and more on interlocking actions.

The new order cannot yet neutralize Beijing’s ambitions, but it has birthed a chain reaction: middle powers linking up, industrial alliances forming, technology partnerships expanding, preventive diplomacy taking root. A soft multipolarity is emerging — not of rival empires, but of complementary capabilities.

VII. Busan: Mirror or Gateway? 

From the salty winds of Busan rises an image of contemporary East Asia — a mirror in which every nation can see itself: its possibilities, its limits. Trump’s five-day voyage did not redraw borders, but it stirred currents that may erode the old shorelines of certainty.

East Asia is entering a new phase — one of mid-sized powers asserting agency, of profitable alignments replacing rigid blocs, of competition measured not in ideology but in competence.

Vietnam, poised in the storm’s eye, has a choice: to shrink and dodge — or to reach and redefine.

In an age when power resides less in missiles or money than in ideas and intellect, any meaningful rise of Vietnam to take advantage of the new order will begin not with muscle power, but with heart/mind power – the freedom to think and the courage to create.

Trump’s five-day odyssey was but a moment. Yet history often turns on such moments — quietly, but profoundly.

Wither Vietnam?

Our fellow, Dinh Hoang Thang, keeps a close eye and ear on the evolution of Vietnam away from a traditional “socialist one-party democracy.”

After the conclusion of the recent session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, former Ambassador Thang came to certain conclusions, which you can read here.

Vietnam’s Central Committee Meetings and Tô Lâm’s Visit to Pyongyang: An Outside Perspective

By Dr. Hoang Thang Dinh, Caux Round Table Fellow

 

Summary: 

Vietnam’s political evolution entered a decisive stage with the 13th Central Committee Plenum  (early October 2025) followed by General Secretary Tô Lâm’s state visit to North Korea — political moves that revealed both a consolidation of power and a search for stability amid a rapidly shifting East Asian order. While Hanoi balances relations among major powers, the real test of its leadership will lie in transforming political symbolism into practical governance and successful economic outcomes. The forthcoming 14th Party Congress will determine (i) whether Vietnam can reform its political and economic power structures and practics without losing stability — and (ii) integrate more globally while maintaining its autonomous, self-reliant, identity.

  1. Power Shifts and the Quest for Stability 

East Asia is reconfiguring  its power dynamics — from China’s many internal challenges to Japan’s evolving defense strategies and capabilities . Against this changing regional order, Vietnam has just taken three pivotal steps in its current five-year political cycle: the 13th Central Committee Plenum, General Secretary Tô Lâm’s state visit to Pyongyang, and preparations for the 14th Plenum in mid-November.

 Each step serves two objectives: choosing leaders and advancing Vietnam’s stature in world affairs.

Before the 13th Plenum, Tô Lâm issued Regulation No. 365 (September 2025), elevating the Standing Secretariat to “core leadership” status — effectively adding a fifth pillar to the traditional tứ trụ (“four pillars”), forming what analysts call a Bộ Ngũ or “Pentarchy” [1].
Despite administrative streamlining elsewhere in governing institutions, the Central Committee remains at about 200 members strong, and the Politburo at 17–19 members. This equilibrium preserves collective leadership and the practice of internal balancing among factions [3].

2. Two Milestones, One Message 

Hanoi’s delicate balancing act – simultaneously positioning relationships with the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea, and now North Korea—demonstrates its enduring ambition for achieving what might be called “soft multilateralism.” Importantly and in addition, with the 14th Party Congress approaching, this achievement also furthers a very important domestic objective: to strengthen Tô Lâm’s legitimacy and the influence  projected by  his political base.

A Vietnamese expert told BBC News that if the Pyongyang visit (Oct 9–11) was simply “to score within the communist club,” it could backfire. But if framed as “a balancing message that Vietnam can talk to all sides,” it would be a bold yet risky diplomatic act [4].

That visit, praised as occurring in a “particularly friendly atmosphere,” emphasized the solidarity of remaining socialist states. Still, it raised a deeper question: did it demonstrate diplomatic independence — or was it a gesture of self-importance compensating for slower progress with Washington?

While both sides agreed to cooperate in several sectors, real progress now depends on overcoming institutional and sanction barriers. Reuters quoted KCNA’s assessment of To Lam’s visit as merely a reaffirmation of “traditional comradeship” [5].

3. Concentrated Power with Attentive Execution

The four Central Committee plenums convened under Tô Lâm’s leadership — from the 10th to the 13th — illustrate a subtle governance model of “centralization with fine tuning” [6]. Introducing confidential voting within the Politburo — an unusual move — signals an attempt to have both firm control and participatory consensus [7].

However, system performance remains uneven. Despite administrative reforms, the hesitant response to recent typhoons exposed weak coordination among agencies and responsible officials. Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính’s public scolding of absent provincial leaders became emblematic of widespread personal inefficiency and irresponsibility in the apparatus of government[8]. The gap between having political authority and delivering good results has become Vietnam’s “Achilles Heel”.

4. Diplomacy: Symbolism delivering limited results 

Tô Lâm’s Pyongyang trip symbolized ideological loyalty and political steadiness on his part [9]. Yet, with North Korea under heavy sanctions, the scope for cooperation benefiting Vietnam is narrow.

 

While domestic media stressed the visit’s symbolic value, such public imagery has limited practical effect as Vietnam seeks investment and deeper integration into CPTPP and RCEP. In an increasingly pragmatic world, only invoking “socialist friendship” does not impress those potential partners who prioritize performance over ideology [10].

The muted global response to Vietnam’s appeal for disaster aid after the recent typhoons highlights this gap between “socialist solidarity” and money provided when it is needed.

5. Administrative Mergers and the Two-Level Governance Test 

Domestically, reforms such as consolidation of some provinces one with another and administrative streamlining were designed to cut costs and boost efficiency — but outcomes have not met expectations. Bigger, consolidated, administrative units do not guarantee better, more effective, governance.

High restructuring costs and cultural disparities have generated pushback where the reforms have been imposed. Experts suggest that true efficiency will come only through capacity-buildingdigital governance, and empowered local autonomy, not with just consolidation alone [11].

Ironically, once-efficient disaster-response systems slowed down after the mergers of provincial administrations. Hanoi’s decision not to release typhoon casualty figures, while appealing for aid, underscored a paradox: centralized power does not guarantee accountability or good results [12].

6. Institutional Credibility and the Implementation Gap 

A political system is judged by its ability to implement, not by its scope of control. Its strength grows out of good results, not from the sweep of its legally authorized span of control.  Regional surveys (2024–2025) show declining public trust in local governments due to poor crisis response and service delivery [13].

The widening gap between “political rhetoric” and “administrative outcomes” now defines Vietnam’s foundational political dilemma — reforming the system without precipitating instability.

7. Between Reform and Stability 

The political landscape following the 13th Central Committee plenum reflects a model of “conditional stability”: political power remains concentrated, yet must adapt to the demands of modern governance; diplomacy remains largely symbolic, yet needs to shift gradually toward pragmatism. To what extent will the concept of “liuzhi”—a key framework for understanding how Beijing integrates Party discipline with state authority—be adopted in Hanoi’s political system? [14] Or, as analyst David Brown once observed, Vietnam’s new regime is still finding its footing—caught between freedom and discipline, stability and innovation, expectation and reform. [15]

The country now faces a dual adjustment process: consolidating political legitimacy while enhancing institutional capacity. The success of this strategy depends on whether the system can turn political symbolism into practical effectiveness—whether administrative reform can genuinely improve governance, and whether symbolic diplomacy can open new economic frontiers.

On the eve of the 14th National Congress, these questions remain unanswered. The upcoming Congress will not merely be a personnel reshuffle—it will be a test of Vietnam’s governance model: can the country remain stable while pursuing reform, and integrate globally while preserving its own identity? How can it reinforce central authority without neglecting the balance of power with local institutions? [16]

References 

[1 & 3] https://fulcrum.sg/to-lam-is-institutionalising-politics-again/
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z128gPCvTnY
[4] https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/cge2e1ywd4go
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-vietnam-agree-cooperate-defence-other-fields-kcna-says-2025-10-11/
[6] https://fulcrum.sg/to-lam-is-institutionalising-politics-again/
[7] https://youtu.be/9dWd3-s1KB4?si=6LvXedt8YbOpL_Sg
[8] https://youtu.be/AioD65l4nyE?si=F3xl9pmrJLQGZs0-
[9] https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/10/10/the-message-of-the-visit-to-north-korea-that-vietnam-wants-to-send-to-major-countries/
[10] https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3328310/vietnams-leader-heads-north-korea-first-visit-18-years-rebalance-relations
[11] https://asiatimes.com/2025/08/to-lam-consolidating-hard-fast-and-forceful-rule-in-vietnam/
[12] https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/enablers-and-barriers-implementing-effective-disaster-risk-management-according-good
[13] https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/0c2ba150-f410-4cb0-994e-ad1ea812642c

[14] https://youtube.com/watch?v=B18pzEYjdwM&si=9DZCTxEq-Hbm57D9

[15] https://www.eurasiareview.com/16012025-vietnams-new-regime-finds-its-footing-analysis/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[16] https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/09/03/vietnam-redraws-its-administrative-map/

Even the Powerless Have a Voice

Recently in Hanoi, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam met to prepare for next year’s party conference.  On the internet, one can become aware of a deep chasm between the party and the Vietnamese people.  I was sent a link to a short essay by an anonymous writer on the voice of the “powerless.”  The essay is attached here.

This emotionally compelling comment on power puts in high relief the Caux Round Table Principles for Government.  These principles, in part, affirm:

Just as the Principles for Business, these Principles for Government derive from two ethical ideals: “kyosei” and “human dignity.”  The Japanese concept of “kyosei” looks to living and working together for the common good, while the moral vision of “human dignity” refers to the sacredness or value of each person as an end, not simply as a means to the fulfillment of others’ purposes or even of majority demands.

The state is the servant and agent of higher ends.  It is subordinate to society.  Public power is to be exercised within a framework of moral responsibility for the welfare of others.  Governments that abuse their trust shall lose their authority and may be removed from office.

My correspondent made three points in his cover letter:

First, the most consequential task of the forthcoming Party Congress is to pick Vietnam’s leaders. Which individuals will rise to the top of the country’s power structure and who will be passed over?  From personalities will come policy.  From policy will come weal or woe for the people.

More and more in Vietnam, the thought is to decentralize control of the economy, politics, education, culture and the press.

Secondly, the references by Party General Secretary To Lam to a “new era” or to “newness” for Vietnam and the Vietnamese are not supported by specific ideas or recommendations.

Thirdly, is there a deadlock within the party leadership between those who see the value in and the wisdom of “newness” leading to reform of the system of concentrated power and control of people’s lives and those who prefer the status-quo, which privileges them as the “powerful?”

From Ba Đình 1945 to Ba Đình 2025: The Promise and the Gap

Stephen B. Young,

Former Dean and Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law

Executive Summary

Eighty years after the 1945 Declaration of Independence, the ideals of freedom and democracy remain unfulfilled. In his September 2, 2025 speech at Ba Đình Square, General Secretary Tô Lâm projected both nationalist rhetoric and ideological loyalty. This duality underscores the enduring disconnect between promises and realities in Vietnam’s governance. The address reflected Vietnam’s structural crises: political mistrust, social disintegration, and geopolitical dependence. Absent genuine reform, Vietnam risks further entrenchment within authoritarian blocs and the erosion of its long-claimed independence.

1. A Tô Lâm “Walking Two Roads” or “standing at a crossroads”?

At the outset, Tô Lâm surprised observers by employing language rarely used by senior Communist leaders: “the sacred spirit of the nation,” “the nation’s eternity,” “my people,” “my fatherland.” His repeated use of the pronoun “I” rather than “we” or “our Party” lent his speech a veneer of intimacy. It created the impression of a leader speaking as part of the national community rather than as the faceless embodiment of Party machinery. 

Later in his National Day speech, To Lam also spoke of “Vietnameseness” – “dân tộc ta trường tồn”; “Đất nước Việt Nam trường tồn”

This intentional use of “Vietnameseness” established a moral foundation for elevating the Vietnamese people as the heart and soul of Vietnam.  Most auspiciously, To Lam spoke of “đặt lợi ích … của Nhân dân lên trên hết, trước hết” (put benefiting the people first and above all else); “sức mạnh lòng dân” strength from the hearts of the people; and “Vinh quang mãi mãi thuộc về Nhân dân.” (forever and ever honor belongs to the people).

By elevating the importance of the Vietnamese people, General Secretary To Lam implies that the duty of the Party and the Government is to serve the people by delivering prosperity, peace, democracy, and equality.

For many listeners, this rhetorical shift offers a meaningful signal of potential change—a glimmer of hope that leadership thinking might evolve.

Yet the more significant feature was his indecision – which road should he take – the old, familiar one, or the new progressive one. The General Secretary recognized public exhaustion with lifeless slogans, and thus may have turned to populist phrasing to capture goodwill. But populism at the top, absent concrete policy, is hollow. If limited to pronouns and decorative words, it is merely a fresh coat of paint on a wall already crumbling from within.

2. Repeating the Old Formulas

After this novel opening, the address quickly defaulted to familiar ideological templates: “National independence must be tied to socialism” and “steadfast adherence to Marxism–Leninism and Hồ Chí Minh Thought.” The backbone of the speech was therefore the same outdated ideology—despite eight decades of evidence that such a model has not delivered liberty, democracy, or prosperity for the Vietnamese nation as revered Ho Chi Minh had promised 80 years ago.

Here the contradiction is most evident: invoking “my fatherland” and “my people” while simultaneously clinging to the mantra “the Party above all, ideology above all.”

This invites an unavoidable question: which socialism is still being defended? Beijing’s authoritarian centralism, Pyongyang’s stagnation, or the democratic socialism of Scandinavia? Vietnam’s reality—one-party dominance, a pervasive security apparatus, an economy dependent on external powers, and systemic corruption—suggests an uncomfortable hybrid: the ambition to govern in Beijing’s mold, mixed with cheap populist appeals.  Or is this socialism – even in China – not much more than a crony capitalism?

3. Why This Dual Messaging?

The answer lies in Vietnam’s present crises. In an open letter to Tô Lâm, a civil society representative identified three interconnected breakdowns :

  • Political trust crisis: Public confidence in leadership has eroded. Corruption trials, factional struggles, and opaque personnel decisions have alienated citizens.
  • Moral and social crisis: The wealth gap continues to widen. Officials live in extravagance while workers endure hardship. Moral values erode, faith falters, and social cohesion weakens.
  • Foreign policy crisis: Vietnam is squeezed between the U.S. and its Western allies on one side, and China and Russia on the other. It lacks both the independence to stand alone and the clarity to select a reliable strategic partner.

In such circumstances, Tô Lâm must “walk two roads”: appealing to domestic audiences with nationalist terms like “Vietnameseness” and “people,” while reassuring Party cadres with slogans of Marxism–Leninism. 

But such dual messaging will not end the crises of political trust or moral and social discontent.

Yet a strategy of dual messaging, if prolonged, risks self-deception and inaction, leaving the country more vulnerable to missteps and deeper crises.

4. Diplomatic Personnel as a Strategic Signal  Unresolved: the Diplomatic Crisis

On the eve of National Day, Vietnam quietly changed its foreign minister. At first glance, this appeared a technical adjustment. In reality, it was a decision with potentially far-reaching implications for Tô Lâm’s tenure. Diplomacy has become Vietnam’s principal tool for survival in an increasingly polarized international environment, and the individual at its helm often shapes life-saving foreign policy trajectories.

Both outgoing minister Bùi Thanh Sơn and his successor Lê Hoài Trung were educated in the United States. But their political orientations differ. Trung, a more enigmatic figure, has long been rumored to enjoy favor from Beijing. If such assessments are correct, this personnel shift was not merely an exchange of officials but a signpost of Vietnam’s potential drift toward the China–Russia orbit—despite rhetorical commitments to “diversification and multilateralism.”

Placed alongside the tepid welcome Tô Lâm has received from Washington, and Beijing’s open embrace—underscored by the nearly simultaneous appearances of President Lương Cường and Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính in China—this adjustment reads as sends a warning signal. Vietnam’s balancing act increasingly tilts toward one pole, one not  very eager to promote Vietnameseness.

5. Pressure from China–Russia and the BRICS Dilemma

One day before National Day, Beijing accorded Prime Minister Chính an elaborate reception, sending an unmistakable message: China seeks Vietnam’s alignment within its anti-Western bloc. Russia, increasingly isolated after the Ukraine war, is likewise pressing Vietnam toward BRICS.

The central question follows: if Vietnam were to join BRICS, what would remain of “multilateralism”? Such a step would close off paths of integration with the U.S., Japan, and Europe. Economic dependence on China and Russia would soon translate into diminished political independence.

This is the “headband of control” Beijing seeks to tighten around Vietnam’s leadership. Even if Tô Lâm wishes to innovate, the pressure from abroad is immense and the room for maneuver extremely limited.

6. An Imaginary Dialogue: Party Rhetoric and Civil Society

Viewed together, Tô Lâm’s speech and the civil society open letter put two sides of an historic national dialogue before the Vietnamese people:

  • The official speech offered phrases such as “I—my people—my fatherland—the eternal nation,” but which, despite their novel tone, were coupled with familiar ideological formulae.
  • The open letter reminded us all: “Power endures only when it builds trust. Legitimacy cannot be imposed; it must be conferred by the people.”
  • While Tô Lâm struggles to balance Party factions and foreign pressures, civil society underscores a different measure: legitimacy derives solely from the citizenry. That truth has yet to be realized—whether in 1945 or in 2025.

7. Conclusion: The Persistent Gap

The 80th anniversary of National Day should have been a moment to celebrate national achievements and, more importantly, to realize the unfinished promise of the 1945 Declaration: “Vietnam has the right to be free and independent, and in fact has become a free and independent country.”

Instead of freedom and democracy, citizens witnessed a tightening power structure. Instead of independence, the country faces mounting dependence on Beijing. Instead of reconciliation, society is increasingly divided.

Tô Lâm’s September 2, 2025, speech simultaneously revealed a desire for renewal and the inability to escape the constraints of ideology and foreign pressure. He sought to “say something different,” but remained too tethered to tired and ineffective old formulas.

From Ba Đình 1945 to Ba Đình 2025, the gap between ideal and reality has remained unchanged: promises on one side, hard facts on the other. Unless Vietnam breaks free from authoritarian alliances and undertakes democratic reform, history will not remember Tô Lâm as the leader who opened a new era, but rather as one who squandered a unique opportunity to lead the nation out of darkness.

An Open Letter to General Secretary Tô Lâm, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam

On the 80th Anniversary of Vietnam’s Independence, September 2, 2025

 Introduction

Stephen B. Young,

Global Executive Director

In a most unusual open letter, Mr. Lê Thân – once an activist who was tried and imprisoned by the former Republic of Vietnam government in Saigon – has, on this National Day, set forth new standards for the leadership role of today’s head of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

These standards reflect the moral foundations of the Caux Round Table’s Principles for Responsible Governance. Mr. Lê Thân also points to the essential foundations for living a life of integrity and decency:

“The strength of a nation does not lie only in weapons or wealth, but in honor. And honor is not won through violence, but through fairness; not through power, but through justice; not through command, but through respect for one’s own people…”

“Seize this moment! Seize this opportunity! Let power be transformed into service, and let service become greatness.”

The Caux Round Table Principles for Responsible Governance hold that state power is a trust granted by the people. It is not meant to satisfy personal ambition, accumulate wealth, or secure privileges, but to act on behalf of the community in serving the public good.

Public power always comes with responsibility; to hold power is to bind one’s actions to the welfare of others. Public office is not private property, but a temporary trust to serve the common good.

Those who hold public office must be accountable to the people for their actions. If they act wrongly, neglect responsibility, or abuse their power, they may be removed. And it is upon them to prove their own integrity.

The state exists only as a servant and instrument for higher purposes of society, not as its master. Public power must be exercised within the bounds of moral responsibility, for the well-being of the people. Any government that betrays this trust will lose legitimacy and can be replaced.

I am reminded of the words of Nguyễn Trãi – the great thinker and statesman of the 15th century – who helped establish the Lê dynasty after defeating Chinese invaders. Nguyễn Trãi wrote of nhân nghĩa – humane righteousness – as the foundation of politics. Only on such a basis can a government deserve the people’s support.

You can check out the Vietnamese version here, on one of the most popular social media sites in Vietnam: https://boxitvn.blogspot.com/2025/09/thu-ngo-goi-ong-to-lam-tong-bi-thu-csvn.html

________________________

Dear General Secretary,

On September 2, 1945, at Ba Đình Square, President Hồ Chí Minh declared the birth of a free Vietnam. From that square rose not only a republic, but a promise—a promise of independence, of freedom, of a people governing themselves.

Eighty years have passed. We have endured trial and triumph. We have suffered wounds and built anew. We have achieved much. Yet the Revolution remains unfinished. For as Karl Marx reminded us, no revolution is truly won until the people enjoy abundance, a sound culture, and democratic rule. By this measure, our task is still before us.

The duty of leadership today is not merely to guard the past. It is to raise it higher. To advance does not mean to betray; it means to carry forward, to complete what history began but could not finish. We have progress, yes. But we also have decline in morals, division of wealth, and doubt in the hearts of the people. These are not small matters. They cut to the core. They demand renewal—deep, honest, and whole.

You hold great power. But power endures only when it wins trust. The strong leader is not the one who speaks last, but the one who listens first. Not the one who commands alone, but the one who unites. Not the one who rules over, but the one who awakens the conscience of a nation. Legitimacy cannot be forced. It is given—freely, proudly—by the people when they believe.

This year marks eighty years of independence. But it may also mark your place in history. The August Revolution gave us sovereignty. Your leadership can give us liberty, democracy, and prosperity. Rarely does history open such a door: a chance to bind past to future, to meet the present with courage, and to shape the destiny of generations.

In the world beyond, Vietnam must be steadfast yet supple—holding fast to principle, yet never trapped by rigidity. The strength of a nation is not only in arms or wealth, but in its honor. And honor is won not by force, but by fairness; not by power, but by justice; not by command, but by respect for its own people.

Seize this hour. Take this chance. Let power become service, and service become greatness. Do this, and history will not remember you as one who merely preserved order, but as one who carried Vietnam into a new age—an age of freedom, of democracy, of prosperity.

With solemn respect, I place these words before you, dear General Secretary. May the spirit proclaimed on September 2, 1945—independence, freedom, sovereignty of the people—live not only in memory, but in the daily life of our nation, here and now.

Ho Chi Minh City, August 25, 2025


Lê Thân

Former Political Prisoner, Côn Đảo
Chairman, Lê Hiếu Đằng Club

“When Life Pours Tears, Heaven Pours Rain” – A Dire Warning from Heaven, Earth, and Humanity

By Prof. Nguyễn Đình Công

Introduction

Stephen B. Young,

Global Executive Director

Writing under the pen-name of Prof. Nguyen Dinh Cong, our commentator collapses history and current events into one lived experience.  He  draws from Vietnam’s cultural past, its core values which can be carried forward into our present – in our minds and hearts, to animate thinking today, right now – just as if Vietnamese from the 15th or 18th centuries were to appear among us and speak to us, unmoved by modernity and firmly committed to a Vietnamese moral and intellectual heritage.

The decision-making frame that arises for Vietnamese when their moral heritage is recalled is how to choose – modernity and the West or tradition and Vietnameseness?  Or, what Prof. Cong suggests a blend of the two. Not a rejection of heritage but an appreciation as appropriate. Not a rejection of the West to live in the past, but an appreciation and an appropriation which is fit and becoming for “modern” Vietnamese.

Finding such a point of balance – an alloy with proper temper and resilience and a high melting point – has been a challenge for all non-Western cultures after the era of Western expansion and exportation of its rationality, its science, its economic dynamism, its technologies. For some like an angry and resentful Frantz Fanon, the choice has been zero-sum – one or the other; no compromise; no blend. One is either of the “West”, the colonialists, or one is “native” enclosed by tradition and so subject to their disdain and condescension.

Here Prof. Cong draws on psycho-socially powerful insights from his people’s past into the meaning and purpose of life and nature so that he can with authority and determination advocate for a new order in the Vietnam of 2025.

(The Vietnamese text can be read here:  https://phongtraoduytan.com/chinh-tri/chinh-tri-viet-nam/3087/ )

Prof. Cong writes:

In the old days, emperors held sacred “manuals” for the Rites of Sacrifice to Heaven at the Nam Giao Altar — solemn ceremonies to repent before Heaven and Earth. Now, in the midst of catastrophic natural disasters, the communist regime distributes a “pocket manual” for the September 2nd military parade (!?) [6][7]

A Nation Weeping Amid Storms

As August fades into September, the land writhes under violent tempests.

Rain falls like torrents; floods spread without end. Roofs of red tile are torn away, fields vanish under oceans of water. The cries of fathers losing sons, mothers losing husbands, the wailing of peasants stripped of all they owned — all these laments blend with the mournful roar of storm and rain [1].

And yet — amidst this tragic scene, where “life pours tears, and heaven pours rain” — proclamations blare from the capital: parades, processions, fireworks to celebrate the 80th National Day.

One side: blinding fireworks above Ba Đình Square. The other: a flickering oil lamp in a peasant’s flooded shack. That contrast is not merely material. It is a fracture in the sacred triad of Heaven – Earth – Humanity.

Heaven – Earth – Humanity in Ruin: A Nation in Peril

Eastern philosophy has long taught that Heaven, Earth, and Humanity form the three pillars that uphold both the universe and the fate of nations [2].

• Heaven — the will of nature, of fate.

• Earth — the land, the resources, the homeland itself.

• Humanity — the people’s hearts, and the virtue of those who rule.

When the three stand in harmony, peace endures. When one falters, dynasties fall.

These storms are no mere weather. They are warnings. Two years in a row, since Tô Lâm “ascended the throne,” Vietnam has been struck by devastating storms: in 2024 the super-typhoon Yagi, now in 2025 the great storm number 5 [1]. Natural disaster upon natural disaster — is this not Heaven’s rebuke against how men govern the land?

Heaven rages. Earth lies broken. The people seethe with anger. The triad is fractured. It is an omen.

While the People Weep,  the Ba Đình Elite Banquets

Storm number 5 has ravaged the provinces: hundreds of homes unroofed, thousands of hectares of crops destroyed, countless lives lost. In Hanoi, streets drowned in 40cm of water; in Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh, villages are completely isolated [1].

Yet in the capital, the regime trumpets its parade plans: 30,000 participants, foreign armies invited, high-altitude fireworks in multiple sites, LED screens across the city [3]. The costs — billions upon billions of đồng, drawn from the sweat of farmers, from the meager wages of workers.

What if those billions rebuilt homes, schools, and barns for the poor? What if they bought new buffaloes and cows — a farmer’s only wealth — instead of fleeting fireworks?

Fireworks blaze for minutes, then die. But the tears of the poor last a lifetime. This extravagance is not celebration. It is a wound — a moral wound in the soul of the nation.

Tradition Once Understood: Disasters Are Warnings, Not Occasions for Showing off

In the past, rulers saw disasters as Heaven’s rebuke. They would issue edicts of self-blame, reduce taxes, curb luxury, focus on relief.

The Nguyễn dynasty built the Nam Giao Altar to pray for Heaven’s favor [4]. The Tây Sơn did likewise in Bình Định [5]. These rites were not superstition — they were acts of humility, reminders that rulers must serve Heaven and care for the people.

But now those rites are gone. The communist regime scoffs at them as “superstition,” replacing them with hollow parades [6][7]. By denying the spiritual, they sever the bridge between ruler, people, and Heaven. In its place, only cold fireworks flare — light without warmth, spectacle without soul.

The Treachery of Courtiers: A Greater Peril Than Storms

A storm can drown a village, but treacherous ministers can destroy an entire nation.

If Tô Lâm seeks to be remembered, let him beware. Flatterers will paint illusions, urging parades and fireworks, dressing his power in false glory. But history teaches: dynasties do not collapse from storms alone, but from rulers who hearken to sycophants and abandon Heaven and the people.

If Heaven – Earth – Humanity already teeters towards regime collapse, then letting traitors reign is to dig the grave of the nation.

A Chance to Re-Found the Nation?

Hồ Chí Minh founded the Democratic Republic in 1945, but with his death in 1969, his era ended. Lê Duẩn and his heirs built the Socialist Republic — a model that has clearly failed.

Now, Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm stands at a crossroads. He could, if he has true courage, ignite a second founding of the nation. Not to split the land into “socialist” and “capitalist” Vietnams — but to change the very principle of rule: to abandon repression and indifference, and instead establish a governance that reveres Heaven, honors the People, fears treachery, and truly serves the nation.

The upcoming 14th Party Congress — this is the golden moment. Persist in the old ways, and storms, the people, and history will sweep everything away. But dare to change, and a new destiny may be born.

The Hour of Choice

Disasters will come and go, but how rulers respond reveals their moral worth. A just government halts pageantry to save its people. A wise government honors Heaven with humility, not parades.

Tô Lâm — “Throne without Crown” — you stand at a grand crossroads. Will you choose the sound of drums and fireworks, or the cries of your people drowned in tears and rain? The choice is yours — and with it, the fate of the nation.

Beware! Heaven, Earth, and Humanity have spoken. Fireworks cannot silence the fire of a people’s wrath. If you refuse to change, history itself will render its verdict — and so will Heaven and Earth.

To change, or to perish. There is no other path.

Note & References:

[1] https://nhandan.vn/bao-so-5-gay-thiet-hai-nang-tai-nhieu-dia-phuong-post903648.html

[2] https://www.chungta.com/nd/tu-lieu-tra-cuu/thien-dia-nhan.html

[3] https://xaydungchinhsach.chinhphu.vn/lich-trinh-chi-tiet-le-dieu-binh-dieu-hanh-danh-sach-cac-diem-ban-phao-hoa-ky-niem-80-nam-quoc-khanh-2-9-2025-119250812122817399.htm

[4] https://www.homepaylater.vn/blog/tim-hieu-le-te-troi-o-dan-nam-giao/

[5] https://haloquynhon.com/tin-tuc/dan-te-troi-tay-son–di-tich-lich-su-tai-binh-dinh

[6] https://mia.vn/cam-nang-du-lich/le-te-troi-o-dan-nam-giao-van-hoa-cung-dinh-doc-dao-tu-thoi-nha-nguyen-2341

[7] https://thuvienphapluat.vn/phap-luat/ho-tro-phap-luat/cam-nang-di-xem-dieu-binh-dieu-hanh-292025-concert-quoc-gia-a80-sap-toi-the-nao-le-quoc-khanh-29-du-230246.html

Timely Recommendation on a New Direction for Vietnam

Our distinguished new fellow, former Vietnamese ambassador and advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dinh Hoang Thang, has written for our website in the context of strategic choices now before the Vietnamese government and people an insightful approach to change.  He draws on Asian approaches to change as the rule of life and so as deserving our respect and analysis.  He notes the role of balance, equilibrium, as the most appropriate sustaining and life-enhancing stance for us to manage as we respond to the changes coming our way.  He implies that since change is a rule of life, it behooves us to think about what causes change?  How can we best adjust to and “profit” from change?

You may read Mr. Thang’s commentary here.

Living in the Gray Zone: Navigating Vietnam’s Path to Strategic Autonomy in an Uncertain World

Đinh Hoàng Thắng

Fellow of the Caux Round Table 

Summary: The article outlines a new strategic orientation for an era advancing a “Red River Renaissance”, a strategy based on five pillars: repositioning national identity, mastering complexity through analysis and forecasting, creating value rooted in the ideology of cultural continuity, reforming the Communist Party of Vietnam into a constructive, service-oriented organization, and steering soft diplomacy to proactively exert influence. The paper concludes: in today’s gray-zone environment, the capacity for Vietnam’s survival and development does not stem from hard power alone, but grows out of wisdom, observational acuity, and the ability to build consensus.

“What secret charm leads me toward the God I adore,

Who frees me from the world and casts off all my chains,

What bliss is there for love so fair,

If not to fashion dreams amid the madness,

With a mortal heart and secular love!”

(Adapted from Pierre Corneille, Polyeucte, 1642) [1]

Introduction

In the contemporary world of deep uncertainty, the lines between war and peace, ally and adversary, order and chaos are increasingly blurred. There is no longer a single straight road to the future — only bends, detours, and gray zones — where strategic nerve and political wisdom become existential assets.

The U.S.–Russia summit in Alaska (August 16, 2025) offered a warning sign: if Moscow can legitimize territory it occupies in Ukraine through an agreement brokered by two major powers, might Beijing be tempted to apply the same “precedent” to Taiwan or the South China Sea? [2] If an international order grounded in the rule of law, human rights, and sovereign equality gives way to a new order where strength decides everything, then is the message not clear: middle and small powers will have their fate imposed on them unless they can determine it for themselves?

Standing in that vulnerable gray swath of history, it would be catastrophic for Vietnam to remain a bystander. To avoid that fate, we must shed doctrinaire thinking and have the courage to build a new cognitive paradigm — one based on rooted wisdom, analytical judgment, an acceptance that flux is the norm, urgent institutional reform, and a timely, forward-looking diplomacy.

1.⁠ ⁠Repositioning National Identity to Shape National Strategy

What identity should serve as the foundation for strategy? [3] Vietnam must answer this core question: who are we in an era when the international legal order is weakening and coercive power is reasserting itself as the author of history?

Traditionally, the Vietnamese have not treated chaos as meaningless. I Ching teaches that disorder is a kind of dynamic order, governed by changeable laws that can be discovered by the wise among us. From that insight, wisdom becomes a precondition for survival: recognize trends, and preserve the immutable amidst the mutable. It is precisely thanks to such insight that our predecessors were able to assert their identity amidst the whirl of global power.

Today’s national strategy therefore cannot be mere reactive improvisation. It must begin with repositioning identity: Vietnam is a country that loves peace but will not accept subjugation — a middle power that refuses to let its future be determined by others.

2.⁠ ⁠Mastering Disorder — Building Analytical and Predictive Capacity

The current turning point of the post-modern world tempts people to abandon both reason and faith, strips order of higher purpose, and glorifies unbounded chaos as freedom. In such disorder, any people without analytical and predictive capacity is easily swept away.

Vietnamese tradition includes a habit of “reading” chaos to find a way forward. Systems of knowledge and observational methods — emerging from different philosophical schools —  helped our ancestors find levers of support when times are uncertain. Phan Bội Châu studied the I Ching (Dịch) to reflect on the path of struggle. [4] That is evidence that even if the international legal framework collapses, a people can rely on powers of observation, analysis, and foresight to survive.

Today, that analytical skill must be modernized into a suitable methodology for strategic-analysis: reading the trends of coercive power, forecasting global risks, and proactively “moving one step ahead” of predictable events. This is not occultism; it is a form of systemic, modern knowledge built from Vietnamese intellect and global analytic and forecasting science. We cannot change the global chessboard, but we can understand it and so more effectively engage with the pieces as placed and as they might move. 

3.⁠ ⁠From Reaction to Creation — A New Doctrine of Enduring Vietnameseness

For too long Vietnam has tended to react to events. But perpetual reaction only trails history. An uncertain world forces us to shift from reaction to creative initiative — from defensive postures to building enduring strengths.

Vietnam needs a new commitment to an enduring Vietnameseness, which precisely would be the moral courage to not fear flux but rather to treat it as a constant. In the interplay of yin and yang, order and disorder, opportunities for creative construction are always present.

This requires a change of mentality: instead of an inward, short-term calculus for preservation, Vietnam must commit to creation — create standards, create value, create influence. This is not merely survival; it is the living expression in today’s world of a many generational commitment to Vietnameseness. [5]

4.⁠ ⁠Institutional Reform — From Revolutionary Party to Party of Service

The Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] can continue to lead if it transforms from a revolutionary party into a party of service. The 14th National Congress is not merely a milestone; it should be the starting point. To retain a central role, the Party needs to move beyond a “centralized leadership” model and become the “architect of sub-systems.”

Institutional reform can follow the “The Principle of Accumulation and Dispersion” (Tích – Tản) [6]. Pooling resources: from knowledge and trust to social innovation. Decentralizing administration: delegating authority to localities, civil society, businesses, and the press; making state governance transparent. Moving from totalizing control to constructive design, the Party must learn to delegate and to adjust its policies taking accurate data into consideration. The Party should first “accumulate” resources (talent, knowledge, trust), then design the operating architecture (laws, norms, feedback), and, third, “disperse” —empowering  all sectors of society.

The governing party of a modern state must be accountable through performance, operate on data, and engage in dialogue rather than impose. The center of institutional reform is not enlarging central power but redesigning systems to aggregate and then apply strength from below — from individuals, firms, and localities. Only when the people are treated as the primary actors to be served — not merely objects to be controlled — can the Party become a force for the creation of solutions and prosperity.

To sustain leadership, the CPV cannot rely on political-economic formulas frozen in the previous century. To be a creative, service-oriented Party, it must lead in forecasting, adapt to open dialogue with citizens and the world, and show flexibility. It must be willing to change when circumstances so require, while remaining steadfast on the immutable core goals— national interest and sovereignty. This is not a renunciation of revolutionary heritage but a transformation from revolution toward constructive governance. [7]

An urgent further demand of institutional reform is national reconciliation and social healing. Reform is not merely an administrative technique; it must be an act of mending and opening. If we have been able to establish “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with former adversaries, why have we not achieved full reconciliation at home and between the homeland and the overseas Vietnamese community? Only by removing the scars of the past can social energy be fully deployed so that, through togetherness, the future can be well built.

5.⁠ ⁠Timely Diplomacy — From Defense to Building Soft Influence

Vietnamese diplomacy in the new era must go beyond mere defense. The tradition of “keeping the immutable in order to respond to the mutable” should be upgraded: do not merely respond — transform to shape influence. [8]

The spirit of the new cognitive paradigm asserts that yin and yang are always in motion, transforming within a complementary, oppositional relationship. Vietnamese diplomacy must mirror that: flexible in detail, firm in principle; willing to cooperate when needed, restrained when necessary. Whether “pausing” or “winning hearts strategy,” every posture is a means to protect the national self-determination and sovereignty.

To achieve this, Vietnam must develop diplomacy on three levels: national, regional, and global. In rule-making — at tactical or technical levels — compromises may be possible, but at the strategic level we must not “straddle two sides” and so cling to the dangerous rationale of “neither side, but choose what is right…” [9]

Done well, diplomacy will not only keep the country secure, but also turn Vietnam into a voice of influence—a player, not a passive actor.

6.⁠ ⁠“Red River Renaissance”: Leveraging East Asian Wisdom

Based on the five pillars of the new cognitive paradigm, why shouldn’t Hanoi aspire to launch a “Red River Renaissance” to help build durable security and long-term prosperity for East Asia in this era of cascading instability?

Uncertainty also opens doors to achievement when we act with virtue and wisdom. The 42nd hexagram in the I Ching suggests that if a leader dares to “cross the great river,” fill what is empty, and guide events with foresight, great results will follow.

At the core of East Asian wisdom is balance. China has Taoism and the Doctrine of the Mean. In Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, Buddhism teaches the Middle Way that leads to prosperity and wellbeing; Buddhism has left a profound imprint on this region for centuries. In Japan, Shinto seeks harmony between humans and nature. In Malaysia and Indonesia, the Qur’an instructs respect for balance. 

Conclusion

Vietnam can certainly host an annual gathering of government leaders, thinkers, scholars, and philosophers — an “East Asian DAVOS,” for example — to seek wise responses to the transformations facing the global community.

Concretely, Vietnam can act as a trusted friend and broker, promoting consensus between Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN. This would help form a reassuring balance of power to the benefit of middle and small powers in a peaceful, culturally rich, East Asia.

Vietnam has already made contributions beyond its borders. Professor Võ Tòng Xuân achieved notable success in Sierra Leone and several African countries by introducing high-yield rice varieties that helped build irrigated rice agriculture. [10] In the United States, France, Australia, Canada, and elsewhere, Vietnamese diasporas have also achieved remarkable success in economics, culture, and politics. These examples confirm that even in distant lands, Vietnam is not forgotten.

The world has entered a gray zone of history. But grayness is not a dead end — it is open space where any choice can become a turning point. To be strategically autonomous amid uncertainty, Vietnam must reposition identity, master disorder, create value, reform institutions, and expand soft influence. Above all, it must nurture a new cognitive paradigm — deeply Vietnamese in character but connected to humanity’s intellect: a paradigm capable of forging an “East Asian consensus.”

Interpretation of “order” and “uncertainty” goes beyond Dr. Kissinger’s conclusions. [11] More important in standing at the threshold of a new order is to validate the five pillars implementing the above proposed cognitive paradigm. [12] And as East Asian wisdom has long taught: change is eternal. Yet amidst change, people who possess wisdom are the people who survive intact.

 

Author’s note: Dr. Đinh Hoàng Thắng is a former Ambassador of Vietnam to the The Royal Netherlands, former Head of the Leadership Advisory Group at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, and a current Fellow of CRT. 

References:

[1] https://suckhoedoisong.vn/cao-thom-lan-gio-cormeille-nghi-gi-169124712.htm

Pierre Corneille, Polyeucte (1606–1684) is a foundational figure of classical French tragedy. Polyeucte centers on a martyr figure and the force of Christian faith. The stanza above is an adapted translation from the French: “Quel charme me conduit vers le Dieu que j’adore? / Je triomphe du monde, et je sors de ses fers / Heureux qui peut aimer d’une amour toute pure, / Mais malheureux celui qui fonde son bonheur.” — Adapted from Pierre Corneille, Polyeucte (1642)

[2] https://www.facebook.com/… [Beijing will observe the Trump–Putin summit] (access link as provided)

[3] https://nhandan.vn/khang-dinh-vi-the-van-hoa-viet-nam-trong-ky-nguyen-moi-thuong-hieu-van-hoa-gia-tang-uy-tin-quoc-gia-post889560.html

[4] https://www.chungta.com/nd/tu-lieu-tra-cuu/phan_boi_chau-nha_van_hoa.html

[5] https://www.voatiengviet.com/a/co-mot-chu-nghia-truong-ton-viet-nam/7961206.html

[6] TS. Nguyễn Thế Hùng: Tích Tản – Một nguyên lý, một tầm nhìn, một con đường (Information Publishing House, 2025)

[7] https://tuoitrethudo.vn/chuyen-doi-trang-thai-sang-kien-tao-chu-dong-phuc-vu-nhan-dan-280478.html

[8] https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/cdx5v0448wyo — “Vietnam and ‘timely diplomacy’: from the bamboo metaphor to national strategy”

[9] https://boxitvn.online/?p=94713 — “’Not choosing sides, choosing righteousness…’ — a dangerous diplomatic philosophy!”

[10] https://siwrp.org.vn/tin-tuc/giao-su-vo-tong-xuan-va-tam-nhin-cay-lua-xuyen-bien-gioi_4333.html

[11] https://www.academia.edu/118015198/Kissinger_Henry_World_Order_New_York_Penguin_Press_2014 — Henry Kissinger, World Order (Penguin Books, 2015) synthesizes centuries of diplomatic thought and geopolitical structure through historical case studies. Foundational, but only a starting point for strategic reflection.

[12] https://tapchithoidai.diendan.org/ThoiDai36/201736_DinhHoangThang.pdf — Đinh Hoàng Thắng (2017), “Vietnam and the Pre-Threshold of a New World Order,” Thời Đại No. 36. The author highlights the fluidity of both Vietnam and the evolving global order and proposes a conceptual framework (the “P&DOWN” paradigm) for navigating transformation.