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After the 14^th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party: “Aftershocks” 

Vietnams after the 14th Party Congress, still  moves forward at a remarkable pace, with shifts in who holds power, new institutional arrangements, and adventuresome development  goals all unfolding simultaneously and at a speed rarely seen since the Đổi Mới reforms of the 1980s. On the surface, Vietnam’s political–economic landscape appears stable. Beneath what is apparent, however, multiple institutional layers are experiencing tremors that are starting to reverberate across society. Decisions taken today may well shape Vietnam’s developmental trajectory for decades to come. 

This series of thoughtful essays presents writings from diverse—sometimes divergent—sources. Taken collectively, they affirm that, 1) even under increasingly constrained conditions, independent voices persist in speaking out within Vietnamese civil society t, and that 2) these voices continue to deserve attention. 

Second Essay: When a powerful Institutional Shock Hits Markets

The post–Congress convergence of intensified power centralization and highly ambitious economic growth targets has produced a distinctive institutional shock—one that is now beginning to impact the market through channels far subtler than those associated with ordinary economic cycles. 

Nguyen Xuan Nghia, PhD
Economist, Institute for Vietnamese Development Issues

After the 14th Party Congress, Vietnam has entered a phase in which the surface of economic activity appears broadly stable. Official messaging emphasizes determination to reform, to streamline the state apparatus, to promote the private sector, and to pursue exceptionally high growth targets over the coming years. From the outside—particularly through the lens of international media and analysts—Vietnam is often portrayed as a country that has “placed a large bet” on successful economic development while maintaining regime stability.

Yet it is precisely the combination of intensified power concentration with ambitious growth objectives that has generated a peculiar  kind of institutional shock, not a shock that triggers immediate disruption, but rather, a shock which alters the operating rhythm of the entire system, changes gradually transmitting to the market through new expectations, behavioral shifts, and changes in resource allocation. These new dynamics are quiet, but cumulative—and difficult to reverse over the medium to long term.

Idealized Growth Expectations 

Analysis by Joshua Kurlantzick and Annabel Richter highlight a central paradox of the post–Congress economic environment: while political power has become more consolidated and tightly controlled, expectations of possible economic achievement have expanded to the point of near idealization. Annual growth of 10 percent is no longer framed as an optimistic scenario, but as an official target tied directly to the personal credibility of top leadership and to the legitimacy of the system as a whole (1).

In economic terms, this is not an ignorable prediction. When growth becomes a measure of political success, the market no longer views it as a theoretical outcome of long-term reform, but as an immediate mandate that must be fulfilled. Expectations are thus pushed beyond the economy’s current internal capacity to achieve , creating invisible pressure on investment and production decisions. In this context, risk lies less in failing to achieve high growth and more in drawing the entire system into a race toward objectives that exceed the ability of its underlying fundamentals to deliver as so unreasonably expected.

Redefining Risk 

Another notable development emphasized by policy analysts is the encouragement of the state apparatus to “accept higher risk” when approving projects, in order to replace a long-standing bureaucratized culture of risk aversion and fear of taking personal responsibility. From an administrative perspective, this signals an attempt to unlock human decision-making capacity that has been constrained for years (2).

From a market perspective, however, the implications are ambiguous. When prudence is relaxed not through deep institutional reform but under pressure to meet growth targets, risk itself becomes difficult to calculate. Businesses cannot clearly discern where the boundary will lie between acceptable risk and punishable failure. In such an environment, economic decisions will tend to favor projects that align with policy priorities and political signals, rather than those with only economic efficacy and not political patronage. The market thus operates less according to the open-minded logic of profit and more according to calculations seeking self-preservation.

Personalizing Growth Responsibility 

The direct linkage between the top leadership’s personal credibility and long-term growth objectives—toward 2030 and further to 2045—creates another powerful mechanism transmitting contexts for entrepreneurial decision-making (3). In political economy, when economic success or failure is personalized, systems tend to prioritize short-term results to preserve system legitimacy, even at the expense of long-term development achievements.

Markets respond to such a signal with considerable rationality. Long-term investments—particularly in areas requiring high institutional stability such as core technologies, education, or corporate governance reform—become less attractive than investments in large, quickly completed projects easily associated with policy achievement goals. Investment allocations thus become channeled, not due to capital scarcity, but because the incentives for using capital have shifted.

Resource Allocation via Public Spending and Mega-Projects 

Rapidly expanding public expenditure and the rollout of large-scale infrastructure mega-projects represent the clearest manifestation of structural shake-up as it impacts the market. These projects are not only intended to stimulate demand, but also to produce tangible, measurable outcomes within political cycles, thereby reinforcing short-term political legitimacy and social confidence (4).

Development experience, however, suggests that scale does not equate to quality. When capital is injected rapidly and institutional oversight is weakened from excessive concentration of political discretion, the risks of making inefficient and diffuse investment rise sharply. The market then responds by gravitating towards acquiring assets—particularly land and infrastructure-linked real estate—rather than in productivity enhancement or technological innovation. This encourages market adaptation pursuing capital sheltering, not value creation.

Distorted Competition and “National Champion” Groups 

A key component of Vietnam’s post–Congress economic strategy is the cultivation of “national pillar conglomerates”—private-sector entities receiving strong state guidance and support. Kurlantzick and Richter note that Vietnam currently lacks sufficiently robust mechanisms to regulate the relationship between these conglomerates and political power (5).

Under the new condition of concentrated authority, the line separating policy support from political patronage becomes increasingly “flexible”. Markets quickly recognize that scale and connections may matter as much as—if not more than—pure economic efficiency. Competition weakens, small and medium enterprises are squeezed, and innovation incentives decline—undermining the very foundation upholding sustainable long-term growth.

Erosion of External Long-Term Confidence 

Although Vietnam remains an attractive investment destination amid global supply-chain restructuring, uncertainties surrounding tariffs and U.S. efforts to prevent Vietnam from serving as a “transshipment hub” for Chinese goods significantly increase policy risk (6). When combined with a domestic system operating in campaign mode, foreign investors tend to shorten commitment horizons and avoid projects which require high institutional stability for their coming to profitable fruition.

There is no immediate capital flight. Yet confidence in long-term prospects erodes. This form of market impact is particularly dangerous because it does not immediately register in macroeconomic indicators, revealing itself instead through data on capital quality, investment duration, and willingness to transfer technology.

Reversal of Roles Between Institutions and the Market 

After the 14th Congress, the core economic question is no longer whether Vietnam can achieve 10 percent growth for several years, but whether its economy is being turned towards a trajectory in which the market must adapt to the operating tempo of political institutions—rather than such institutions creating space for the market to develop according to its own logic (7).

This represents a composite transmission channel, where all prior effects converge. If sustained, the market will continues to function on its own but will grow increasingly cautious, prioritizing safety over innovation, while the economy’s self-governance in making timely corrections erodes—especially as the labor force ages rapidly.

The overall institutional shock to Vietnam’s economy following the 14th Party Congress has not produced an immediate economic crisis. Instead, it is transmitting into the market through multiple channels concerns that drive decision-making—expectations, risk calculations, investment structures, competition, and long-term confidence. These concerns interact and reinforce one another, altering how the economy actually operates without dramatic surface-level disruption.

The deeper concern lies not in ambitious growth aspirations, but in the risk that the market becomes increasingly subordinated to the short-term operational rhythm of institutions. If this trajectory is not recognized and corrected in time, short-term growth gains may be purchased at the cost of prolonged fragility in the medium and long term—a price often recognized only when corrective capacity has already declined.

References:
(1) CFR – Vietnam’s Most Important Party Congress in Years…
(2) Thanh Tra – Encouraging and Protecting Officials Who Dare to Act
(3) EVN – International Impressions of Vietnam’s Breakthrough Economic Orientation
(4) Reuters – Vietnam Targets $55 Billion in Foreign Loans…
(5) CFR – same as (1)
(6) SCMP – Why One Clause in the US–Vietnam Trade Deal Is Sparking Concern
(7) VietnamPlus – Rethinking Vietnam’s Growth Model

Introduction 

The series “Vietnam: Shocks to the System After the 14th Party Congress” is published by a group of independent analysts and observers who closely track Vietnam’s political, economic, social, foreign policy, defense, and security dynamics in the new circumstances following on the14th Party Congress. Published in installments, the series aims to identify a phase of transition—an evolution in which Vietnam will experience the most profound and comprehensive undertaking of institutional experimentation since the launch of Đổi Mới, a time characterized by high-intensity change, accelerated tempo, and unprecedented levels of risk.

These essays were formulated within the framework of the new US – Vietnam Project of the Caux Round Table, a joint venture of concerned Vietnamese thought leaders and policy experts and Americans engaged with the contemporary unfolding of Vietnamese civilization.

The first essay in the series was written by Mr. Le Than. Mr. Lê Thân is well-known for incarceration as a political prisoner in the infamous prison on Con Son Island off South Vietnam under the Saigon Government during the Vietnam War.  In his later years, he served as the Chairman of the Lê Hiếu Đằng Club, a distinguished position that demonstrated his continued and strong commitment to social engagement after the war, so that his standing was not defined solely by his past imprisonment for revolutionary activities.

That Mr. Lê Thân was entrusted with the position of Chairman of the Club reflected several important qualities: he enjoys great respect among former political prisoners and intellectuals; he holds to an independent and forthright stance, avoiding opportunism, and his spirit of “lifelong struggle” before and after 1975. In the former South Vietnam, he struggled as a prisoner in Con Son Prison. After 1975, he continued to struggle for his values and vision by raising his voice as a citizen, guided by moral integrity and conscience.

What makes Mr. Lê Thân particularly distinctive is the historical continuity of being a political prisoner during wartime and then a critical, engaged citizen in peacetime. Not everyone who was imprisoned for revolutionary activities has had the courage to continue speaking out later in life. Mr. Lê Thân has done so with dignity, moderation, and unwavering determination.

First Essay: Institutions as the Bottleneck of All Bottlenecks – How Will Power Be Deployed? 

In the aftermath of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), observers—both domestic and international—have focused not only on specific individual appointments , but on a more fundamental set of structural challenges: What power structure will govern Vietnam going forward, and can the existing institutional framework absorb, regulate, and adapt to an increasingly concentrated configuration of authority? Or, under the leadership of Tô Lâm, will Vietnam adopt a Law regulating its Communist Party?

After the 14th Party Congress, observers inside and outside Vietnam have focused not only on who was appointed to what position but, more profoundly, on  the questions of  how will authoritative power  be exercised in this new phase of Vietnam’s modern history, and how  current institutions, in response to the growing concentration of authoritative power, will be  able to bear this burden, exercise  oversight, and self-correct when necessary.  

The emphatic consolidation of authority in a central fulcrum of leadership raises not only questions about individuals, but—more importantly—about the rules of the game. As personalized authority increasingly overrides traditional mechanisms for collective leadership, where exactly is the fault line between effective governance and risks to institutions? Are the existing designs of Party, State, and oversight bodies still adequate, or are structural limits to their ability to absorb and control such centralized power being exposed?

Given these developments and  the very serious questions they bring to our minds, debates over the possible legal legitimation of the role and responsibilities of the Communist Party of Vietnam—under one legal form or another—is no longer just speculative. Such debates reflect a practical necessity: when the exercise of power changes its modality, the subordinate institutional framework must change to accommodate the new reality, or else the exercise of power itself becomes the greatest bottleneck undermining systemic accomplishment

At the center of this debate stands General Secretary Tô Lâm, increasingly portrayed by Western media as the beneficiary of a shift towards a leadership modality of “one-person only”— a sharp divergence from Vietnam’s tradition of collective leadership which, for decades, functioned as an internal risk-reduction mechanism buttressing Vietnam’s political system.

 

Yet focusing solely on institutionalization of solitary individualism risks missing a deeper reality. The shock to the political system left by the 14th Congress does not implicate any single leader, but plays out in the growing collision between the Communist Party’s actual mode of exercising power and the legal–institutional framework that the Vietnamese state officially claims to honor and implement (1).

“One butt, two chairs”:  A choice of system, not just a temporary expedient 

International media outlets such as the BBC, Reuters, Bloomberg, and the South China Morning Post have increasingly framed the prospect of Tô Lâm simultaneously holding the positions of General Secretary and State President not as a temporary expedient, but as a structural choice. Their analyses converge on one point: this is an attempt to redesign the locus of power in order to overcome fragmentation within the current system.

This interpretation is not without merit. For years, Vietnam’s political apparatus has been criticized as slow-moving, multilayered, and divided among the Party, the State, and the Government. Major decisions often fall into a “collective responsibility trap,” where accountability is diluted to better hold up the banner of collective leadership.

In this context, the “one butt, two chairs” arrangement is seen as shortening channels of decision-making and consolidating authority around a clearly defined center. The core institutional problem, however, is not whether power is centralized, but rather this: Vietnam has never designed a system of legal accountability and oversight proportionate to having power concentrated in an individual.

Put differently, power is being concentrated far more rapidly than it is being subordinated to governance.

The National Assembly: Rubber-stamping, not Decision-making 

The upcoming session of the National Assembly—expected to elect Tô Lâm as State President—is accurately perceived by international observers. It is not a forum for debate over who should have authoritative power but only serves as  procedural formality assenting to decisions already made.

This accurately reflects the Assembly’s current institutional role: it does not supervise , lacks the right to veto or to delay, and it cannot decide on the uses of power. The National Assembly neither determines who holds power nor defines the scope of that power; it merely ratifies what has been arranged by Party leaders

 

The deeper issue here is not the mere formalism of parliamentary proceedings, but a structural contradiction between constitutional principles and operational reality. While Vietnam’s Constitution proclaims the state to be “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” the actual manipulation of authoritative power occurs almost entirely within the Communist Party’s decision-making apparatus.

Thus, the National Assembly instead of activating power delegated by the people, has become a connector that legalizes decisions made by a political organization standing above the Law.

The Communist Party: From Ruling Party to an Organization Outside the Law 

After more than half a century of comprehensive control, the Vietnamese Communist Party continues to operate with many characteristics of a revolutionary party—or even a closed organization—rather than as a transparent governing party within a modern rule-of-law state.

The most consequential decisions regarding personnel, policy, and national strategy are made in closed Party forums, then subsequently legalized by state institutions. This produces a legal paradox: an organization that exercises supreme authority over the state and society does not exist as a legal entity accountable either before the law or to citizens.

Under Article 4 of the Constitution, the Communist Party leads the state; yet the Party itself cannot be sued, lacks civil legal personality, and bears neither criminal nor civil liability as an organization. When a policy leads to serious consequences, responsibility therefore can only be assigned to individuals or state agencies—while the organization that made the ultimate decision remains free of all accountability mechanisms.

For years, intellectuals have proposed expeditiously enacting a Law applicable to the activities of the Communist Party. Such proposals have never gained traction, precisely because such codification of Article 4 of the Constitution would, in principle, subject the Party to oversight by the Government, the National Assembly, and the courts.

Yet such oversight is precisely the foundational requirement of any rule-of-law society. And it is precisely why this issue remains the institutional bottleneck of all bottlenecks, with no clear indication that it will be resolved.

This unresolved “shadow” of rogue autonomy renders any concentration of power the more dangerous: the more power is centralized outside the Law, the more glaring the accountability vacuum becomes. To mitigate this risk, a Law applicable to the Communist Party would need to define, at minimum: the Party’s legal status; the basis of its legitimacy; principles governing its accountability and oversight; boundaries between Party, State, and society; internal democracy; and the Party’s relationship with civil society (2).

Administrative Restructuring and Systemic Retrenchment 

Following the 14th Congress, the important question is no longer merely who occupies which positions, but how much restructuring can the system tolerate. The growing “underground discontent” within the bureaucracy does not constitute political opposition, but rather operational frustration: unclear lines of responsibility, legal and other risks to bureaucrats even when procedures are followed, and accusations of inertia when action is avoided.

These are textbook symptoms of worrisome institutional bottlenecks. When power is centralized without clear responsibility frameworks, a subordinate bureaucratic system’s natural responses are retrenchment and risk avoidance.  But, if discipline is tightened and personnel reshuffled without addressing legal foundations, governance effectiveness will decline rather than improve, increasing the risk of administrative paralysis.

The best structure: institutions or persons? 

The key question posed by international observers is whether this appointment to two offices will apply only in the case of  Tô Lâm, or whether it will evolve into a more permanent institutional arrangement.

If it remains just a one-time scenario , the system may tolerate it as an exception. But if it marks the beginning of a new, long-term, governance model, Vietnam must confront a question it has never fully answered: who oversees the leader when power is concentrated in a single individual within a system where the Party itself stands outside all legal accountability?

To date, there have been no clear signals of constitutional revision or the creation of new oversight mechanisms. As a result, power consolidation is proceeding far faster than the creation of institutional checks and balances—a formula historically associated with the accumulation of systemic d risk.

Conclusion: An Institutional Question Without an Answer 

This article doe snot  revolve around  Tô Lâm as an individual. It revolves around a single axial development: power is being consolidated rapidly, while legitimacy, legal status, and accountability mechanisms remain stagnant—or in some respects, have regressed.

 

The “one butt, two chairs” arrangement’, the National Assembly’s role of only formalism, bureaucratic retrenchment and constitutional contradictions over the source of authority, are not isolated phenomena. They are manifestations of one signal institutional bottleneck.

The final question of this essay is therefore not whether Tô Lâm wields sufficient power, but whether the system possesses enough capacity to absorb that power without paralyzing itself—or triggering a crisis of legitimacy. And the core question beneath all others remains: will Tô Lâm dare to breakup this heavy-handed institutional bottleneck by permitting adoption of a Law governing the Communist Party of Vietnam? (3)

 

References 

(1) BBC Vietnamese: 90 Years of the CPV: What Legal Basis for Its Existence and Rule? https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam-51348557

(2) Luật Khoa Magazine: Petition 72 and the Public Constitution: Citizens and Constitutional Participation https://luatkhoa.com/2025/03/kien-nghi-72-va-hien-phap-dai-chung-khi-cong-dan-tham-gia-lap-hien/

(3) BBC Vietnamese: Challenging the State to Debate the Constitution
https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2013/11/131117_vn_constitution_petition72_aims

Coming up in Part 2:
The Economy – When Institutional Shockwaves Begin to Spill into the Market
(Author: Dr. Nguyễn Xuân Nghĩa)

Introduction

Stephen B. Young

Director, Caux Round Table U.S. – Vietnam Project

Vietnam’s recent 14th National Congress of its ruling Communist Party comes at a moment of profound transformation in both the global order and the country’s governance. As great-power competition intensifies, international norms fragment, and security once again dominates global policy thinking, Vietnam finds itself navigating an increasingly narrow passage between opportunity and constraint. The Congress therefore deserves to be recognized not merely as a milestone in the country’s internal political evolution, but as a strategic inflection point shaping how Vietnam defines its future role,  develops capacity, and experiences limits in the international system.

The two essays presented here examine this moment from complementary angles. Together, they interrogate a central paradox of contemporary Vietnamese governance: the simultaneous expansion of diplomatic ambition and the deepening subjugation of domestic political life to disciplined state oversight. On the surface, Vietnam appears more confident and capable than ever—an emerging middle power embedded in global supply chains, courted by major actors, and equipped with a dense network of strategic partnerships. Beneath this surface, however, lies a governance model increasingly oriented toward control, concentration of power, and the prioritization of regime security over institutional openness.

This tension raises a critical question for scholars and policymakers alike: can a foreign policy built on flexibility, pragmatism, and multi-alignment remain effective when its domestic foundations grow progressively closed and self-limiting? Or, put differently, does the securitization focus of internal governance impose a structural ceiling on Vietnam’s foreign policy—one that cannot be overcome by skillful diplomats action on their own?

The first essay situates the 14th Congress within a broader theoretical and historical context, examining how the expanding concept of security reshapes Vietnam’s foreign policy capacity, soft power, and strategic credibility. The second analyzes concrete diplomatic practices after the Congress—from transactional engagement with the United States to calibrated linguistic compromises with China and the rapid expansion of comprehensive strategic partnerships—arguing that these moves, while tactically adept, may be constrained by deeper institutional limits.

Taken together, these analyses suggest that Vietnam’s challenge today is not simply how to balance among competing powers, but how to reconcile external openness with internal governance choices. In an international environment where legitimacy, trust, and institutional resilience increasingly determine influence, the sustainability of Vietnam’s foreign policy may ultimately depend less on its diplomatic maneuvering than on the political and societal structures that support it.

This conversation is not about prescribing a single path forward, but about clarifying the strategic trade-offs Vietnam faces at a pivotal moment. For those seeking to understand Vietnam’s evolving role in regional and global affairs, these essays offer a rigorous and timely starting point.

THE 14TH NATIONAL CONGRESS CREATES A FOREIGN POLICY PARADOX FOR VIETNAM IN A PROPOSED ERA OF SECURITY FIRST EVERYTHING ELSE SECOND

The conceptual framework in the Political Report of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)  is internally consistent. However, when placed against current international trends and developments , it provokes a key strategic question: Is the model prioritizing domestic security based on order as the highest priority with power concentrated in a few minds sufficient for Vietnam to fully realize its foreign policy opportunities and advantages and so promote its national interests in an unusually changing global community? 

Hoàng Trường 

The 14^th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party opened as Vietnam faced a daunting paradox. On the one hand, Vietnam’s geopolitical and economic position has never before attracted as much attention from major players—from the U.S. to China, from the EU and Japan to ASEAN. But, on the other hand, the intense priority placed on disciplined stability in domestic governance risks restricting precisely the very institutional capabilities and societal conditions that deep integration into the global community and proactive diplomacy require. The 14th Congress, therefore, is not only the beginning of a new governance era for Vietnam but also provided a rigid template for how Vietnam can balance disciplined stability while expanding its international opportunities.

In his presentation of the important Political Report before the14th National Congress General Secretary Tô Lâm emphasized that maintaining an environment of peace and stability is a prerequisite for development, while sustainable development is a prerequisite for  comprehensively enhancing the strength of the nation. In that spirit, the task of building out military defense along with domestic security has core importance, requiring the formation of revolutionary, regular, elite, and modern armed forces; proactively understanding realities; improving future assessments, quickly preventing and promptly resolving situations as may be required, and resolutely avoiding passivity and the unexpected (1).

Alongside this, foreign affairs  just continues to be understood as a front line in protecting national interests – steadfastly maintaining independence and autonomy, while also being proactive, positive, and responsible as part of the international community. Foreign policy  must emphasize effectively leveraging opportunities for collaboration, strengthening partnerships, closely integrating foreign affairs with national defense, internal security, and economic development, adhering to principles while acting flexibly in specific policy initiatives. The political report also expands the concept of security in this new era, extending beyond borders and territory to encompass regime security, cultural-ideological security, and security with respect to economics, finance, data, energy, water, and food, situating sustainable development and strategic autonomy within the general duty to protect the nation quickly and on the far horizon.

The 14th Congress as a Milestone for a diplomacy  to be used in a Fragmented World

The 14th Congress took place after the post–Cold War liberal international order had rapidly degenerated. Strategic competition among major powers, particularly between the United States and China, has become increasingly systemic; international rules are challenged; and seeking security has once again taken a central position in global policy thinking. In this context, sovereign decision-making—from mobilizing powers to governance practices—directly effects a country’s position and potentials in international realities. 

International Position and the Limits of Current Capabilities

At this time of the 14th Congress, Vietnam could be considered as an emerging middle-power country, having an increasingly important role in global supply chains and in the strategic dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region. Though the Congress took place amid international uncertainty, Vietnam’s geographic location, population size, growth rate, and extensive network of  partners  give it a position few Southeast Asian countries enjoy (2).

However, this capability remains vulnerable. Most of Vietnam’s current partnerships are only transactional, based on short-term economic interests and strategic balancing rather than on deeper, stable, values and norms, or benefitting from high institutional trust. Vietnam is recognized for stability and resilience but is not yet assessed as a country capable of shaping multinational rules or leading regional initiatives. This capability deficit  arises not only from material resources but also from the country’s internal political and social structure.

The paradoxical tension between putting security first and success in foreign policy achievements, The Japan Times quoted several diplomats describing General Secretary Tô Lâm as a seasoned politician, a risk-calculator whose biggest gambles so far have yielded results (3). In his Political Report, To Lam expanded the concept of security in the direction of comprehensiveness, accurately reflecting the non-traditional challenges of the current era. However, the important issue is more how security will be achieved more than merely expanding its conceptual scope When security becomes the lens dominating governance, a paradox emerges: the more emphasis is directed to control to ensure stability, the less the importance given to soft foreign policy resources—trust, predictability, and social engagement.

In the increasingly tense U.S.–China rivalry, Vietnam’s strategy of “balancing” and “not choosing sides” faces greater resistance than before. Partners assess not only policy statements but also the sustainability of institutions and the ability to make transparent decisions during crises. The South China Sea, long only a dispute over sovereign rights, has become a test of legal, diplomatic, and societal capacity.   A too tightly closed domestic structure reduces capacity to mobilize these vital internal sources of power over the long term.

What role for Vietnam in the new Era of Putting Security First and Foremost

Given its current position, Vietnam’s most practical role is to be neither a military power nor adopt absolute neutrality but to act as a nation with modest capabilities but easily able to maintain open flexibility in its region. This will require steadfast adherence to first principles of independence and autonomy, while maintaining institutional flexibility sufficient to earn trust from a variety of

partners.

With democratization not yet having occurred, Vietnam can still expand its foreign policy options through pragmatic reforms: implementing the rule of law with scrupulous attention to its technical requirements, particularly in economics and financial investments; reducing arbitrary enforcement security laws and regulations in public and private settings.; and taking the initiative in proposing initiatives within ASEAN and other multilateral forums. However, these steps will advance foreign policy objectives only to a certain limited extent. 

Would Democratization Unlock Strategic Advantages for Vietnam?

In the long term, only democratization can fully remove the current constraints on Vietnam’s foreign policy (4). When that happens, Vietnam’s foreign policy can shift from being purely transactional, short-term, interest-based to enhancing such interests with appealing values and widely-accepted norms of beneficial reciprocity. Vietnam’s ability to join soft-power alliances and so shape regional inter-state relationships will increase; and the risk of being forced to take sides will decline due to having higher legitimacy and more respect in the global community of nations and more negotiating influence. Importantly, foreign affairs will  then no longer be the sole domain of the state but will become a strategic undertaking of Vietnamese society as a whole.

Conclusion: The 14th Congress and the Limits of Order and Public Security

The Political Report of the 14th Party Congress proposed a plausible conceptual framework: maintain peace to promote development, and development to augment national capabilities. However, in a world where good character gains respect and compliance, common norms, and trustworthiness increasingly determine national opportunities and advantages, stability based primarily on putting public security and monitoring of behaviors first and foremost cannot become a sustainable formula to achieve national aspirations. Public Security cannot replace the social capital provided by institutions, and monitoring of behaviors cannot substitute for legitimacy.

The 14th Party Congress, therefore, was more than  a redistribution of power among individuals but, much more importantly, it was a strategic test of Vietnam’s ability to choose a path of sustainable integration in the 21st century (5).

References:

1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9HN7KDLmi8 (General Secretary Tô Lâm presents the Political Report at the 14th CPV Congress | VietNamNet)
2. https://nghiencuuquocte.org/2026/01/18/dai-hoi-xiv-cua-viet-nam-quyen-luc-cai-cach-va-the-he-chinh-tri-ke-tiep/
3. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/c8j3wl4pxrlo (What the international press says about the 14th Congress and General Secretary Tô Lâm)
4. https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2024/ui-brief-no.2-20242.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com (The scope and limits of Vietnam’s unorthodox development)
5. https://en.daihoidang.vn/vietnams-effective-foreign-policy-earns-widespread-international-recognition-expert-post4317.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Foreign Policy after the 14th Party Congress: Pragmatism  with Conditions and Hitting the Ceiling in using the Paradigm of “Opening up to the Outside while Closing up on the Inside 

Recent adjustments in Vietnam’s foreign policy have reveals a concerted effort to expand strategic maneuvering opportunities through pragmatism and policy flexibility. However, as the subordination of domestic governance to the demands of security and discipline becomes the dominant organizing principle of the state, the “open to the outside – closing up the inside” model not only constrains the effectiveness of foreign policy but also undermines the very foundations required for a new foreign policy paradigm to function. In the long run, a flexible foreign policy will not be viable when anchored to an increasingly closed domestic political structure incapable of correcting its shortcomings and lack of good judgment 

Tran Dong A

The 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam was not only  a reallocation of individual leadership and factional influences   it also marked a critical step  in the reconfiguration of Vietnam’s foreign policy thinking and practice amid profound shifts in the international order. Whereas the previous period emphasized strategic balance and avoidance of entanglement in great-power competitions, now after the14th Congress, Vietnamese diplomacy has adopted a more complex approach to international affairs: the construction of a multi-layered, pragmatic, and adaptive “foreign policy ecosystem”—one that, nonetheless, contains inherent structural constraints.

1. The 14th Party Congress and the Consolidation of a New Foreign Policy Ecosystem 

The concept of a “bamboo diplomacy,” emphasized under former Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, embodied flexibility, resilience, and principled firmness. Now,  after the conclusion of the 14th Congress—particularly under the consolidation of power in the person of  General Secretary To Lam—this bending approach has not been abandoned but rather has been restructured into a broader foreign policy ecosystem, in which multiple channels, levels of decision-making, and instrumentalities  operate in parallel deployments.

This ecosystem encompasses political–security diplomacy, economic–trade diplomacy, multilateral and institutional diplomacy, and, no less importantly, symbolic diplomacy and strategic signaling. Foreign policy is no longer limited to preserving amicable relations or avoiding conflict; it has become an anticipatory and pre-emptive effort for managing strategic risks, dispersing external pressures, and maximizing policy efficacy.

But, unlike other foreign policy ecosystems grounded in strong domestic institutions and open social systems, Vietnam’s post–14th Congress ecosystem continues to depend on an intensifying the dominance  of security agencies over domestic governance, closely resembling the Chinese model of disciplined conformity from the top down. This governance reality creates a fundamental paradox: the more Vietnam opens up to the outside, the more its internal political and social spaces contract.

2. Participation in Trump’s “Peace Council”: A Transactional Breakthrough 

Vietnam’s decision to participate in the “Peace Council” proposed by U.S. President Donald Trump—at a time when China declined to join and few major European countries expressed support—constituted one of the most notable foreign policy initiatives on the eve of the 14th Congress [1].

This move did not represent a shift in alliances or values, but was rather a breakthrough in diplomatic method, reflecting the distinctly transactional pragmatism of a new period in Vietnamese international relations. Vietnam opted to engage in a political arena characterized by highly personalized power, where U.S. foreign policy operated less through institutional logic and more through the transactional calculus of President Trump himself.

Against the backdrop of impending ambassadorial changes in both Washington and Hanoi, higher U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese goods, and the risk of expanded protectionist trade measures, this step suggests that Hanoi sought to establish a direct channel between itself and  a real  center of important foreign decision-making. The objective was to negotiate tariff reductions or, at minimum, to delay and soften the impact on the Vietnamese economy of such adverse financial impositions.

At the same time, participation in a highly symbolic yet low risk initiative allowed Vietnam to reinforce its image as a responsible international actor willing to contribute to global peace, while preserving policy flexibility. This strategy maximizes reputational gains while minimizing commitment costs—a defining feature of Vietnam’s emerging foreign policy ecosystem.

Yet the high degree of transactionalism implicit in this modest alignment with an immediate priority of President Trump also entails risks. When diplomacy depends heavily on individual leaders in major powers, sudden political shifts in those partner countries can rapidly undermine or negate Hanoi’s strategic calculations.

3. Signals from Beijing: “Shared Future” as a Calculated Compromise 

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s status as the first foreign leader to congratulate To Lam on his re-election as General Secretary on January 23, 2024, carried significance well beyond diplomatic protocol [2]. It was both a strategic reassertion of patronage from Beijing and a test of Hanoi’s autonomy.

From China’s perspective, the swift reaffirmation of a “community of shared future” aimed to ensure that To Lam’s power consolidation would not lead to a strategic distancing  unfavorable to Beijing. In an era of increasingly systemic U.S.–China rivalry, China has a clear interest in keeping Vietnam stable and predictable as a trustworthy client state

For Vietnam, accepting the phrase “shared future” to define its feelings for Xi Jinping’s regime, while firmly avoiding the more deterministic term “shared destiny”—which China has successfully imposed on Laos, Cambodia, and several other ASEAN countries—represents a strategically intelligent euphemism. “Shared future” allows Hanoi interpretive flexibility of its relationship with Beijing, avoids fatalistic commitments, and prevents Vietnam’s foreign policy trajectory from being locked into only a single super-power axis.

Nevertheless, this linguistic maneuver also reflects the limits of Vietnam’s bargaining power in an asymmetric relationship with Beijing. Accepting even a softened version of Chinese terminology defining expected behaviors on the part of the Vietnamese underscores Hanoi’s continued dependence on China in critical areas such as trade, supply chains, and macroeconomic stability.

4. Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs): Rapid Execution, Shallow Digging 

Another pillar of the post–14th Congress foreign policy ecosystem is the continued expansion of Vietnam’s network of Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs). Under To Lam, CSPs have been emphasized as a flexible instrument allowing Vietnam to engage multiple major partners while avoiding ideological or value-based constraints.

In the short and medium term, this approach offers clear benefits: access to capital, technology, markets, and enhanced strategic balance in a fragmented international environment. However, the CSP framework has largely expanded horizontally at the national level, while activation by institutions and social entities has been limited in scope and depth, which limitations will be difficult to surmount.  

Most of Vietnam’s CSPs continue to exploit economic interests and short-term strategic calculations, lacking robust institutional, legal, and normative mechanisms providing in-depth association. As a result, Vietnam’s CPS relationships are vulnerable to domestic political changes in partner countries and constrain Vietnam’s ability to evolve from a “rule-taker” to a “rule-shaper” in the international system.

5. Domestic Dependence on a Security State puts a Ceiling on Foreign Policy Success

The post–14th Congress foreign policy ecosystem demonstrates Hanoi’s adaptability and resilience in an uncertain world. Yet its core internal contradiction lies in the growing dissonance between external openness and internal repression.

As national governance becomes increasingly dominated by state security priorities, critical soft-power resources for foreign policy—such as civil society, independent media, academia, and legal resources—are weakened or, under current circumstances, nearly eliminated. This creates a “ceiling on foreign policy achievement” that no amount of diplomatic agility can fully overcome.

In an international order where credibility, norms, and predictability increasingly determine national standing, foreign policy cannot rely solely on leadership flexibility, whether individual or collective, no matter how deft or clever it can be Without institutional foundations and fulsome societal open spaces, the new foreign policy ecosystem is unlikely to remain dynamic over the long term.

Conclusion 

The 14th Party Congress marks both continuity and adjustment in Vietnam’s foreign policy practice, with ambitions to shape a flexible, pragmatic, and adaptive ecosystem. Moves such as joining Trump’s “Peace Council,” maintaining strategic euphemisms in relations with China, and rapidly expanding the CSP network with dozens of countries illustrate Hanoi’s search for a “safe exit” in managing international risks, rather than anchoring itself to any single power bloc.

However, the model of “domestic repression combined with external openness” is unlikely to unlock the full potential of this ecosystem. The downward pressure on Vietnam’s “foreign policy ceiling” had already emerged in the late Nguyen Phu Trong era [3], and under To Lam, this risk has not only persisted but become more pronounced. Without timely and fundamental adjustments in institutional structures and societal space, Vietnam’s foreign policy may remain operational in the short term but will struggle to overcome strategic constraints in the long run. The 14th Party Congress thus serves not only as a political milestone, but as a critical test of Vietnam’s capacity to choose a sustainable path of beneficially integrating into the global community of the twenty-first century.

Footnotes

[1] https://mofa.gov.vn/tin-chi-tiet/chi-tiet/viet-nam-nhan-loi-moi-tham-gia-hoi-dong-hoa-binh-dai-gaza-58422-138.html

[2] https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/c78eep31plgo [ Ông Tập Cận Bình hoan nghênh ‘tương lai chung’ với Việt Nam sau khi ông Tô Lâm tái đắc cử ]

[3] https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/comment/blog/vietnam-opens-foreign-policy-closes-domestic-one-12302021095537.html