Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism
We make the case for Moral Capitalism.
Two hundred and fifty years ago today, March 9, 1776, Adam Smith’s most influential book, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (more commonly known as The Wealth of Nations), was published.
To mark the anniversary and to honor the almost miraculous intellectual and so indirectly, the policy contributions of a great mind, the Caux Round Table has published, with De Gruyter Brill, a book of essays on the book:
To learn more and/or purchase a copy, please click here.
Here are several more short videos on relevant and timely topics. They include:
–New Book: Adam Smith and Modern Economics
–Media Freedom Lowers Corruption
–Trump, Tariffs and the Meaning of Words
–Trump and Norman Vincent Peale
All our videos can be found on our YouTube page here. We recently put them into 9 playlists, which you can find here.
If you aren’t following us on Twitter or haven’t liked us on Facebook, please do so. We update both platforms frequently.
The last few years, I have sought to globalize cultural analysis of the forces which move events – are they moral in any sense? To do this, I have consulted the ancient Chinese Yijing – 64 hexagrams each of which has six lines, each representing a yin force or a yang force. The arrangements of the lines offer a prediction as to the direction of events. So, the hexagram associated with a particular year gives us a coherent sense of what will have effect during the year and what will be of little effect or even suffer reverse or failure during those 12 lunar months.
As midnight Monday was the end of lunar year 2025, this notice is a report on the accuracy of my predictions for that year. I will shortly consult the Yijing again for its wisdom on what is to come during the current lunar year of 2026.
Last January, I made the following observations as to what would likely happen during 2025. The relevant hexagram was #44. It called things pretty much as they would happen over the year.
Here is some of what I concluded:
The fissiparous nature of the world order will frustrate the emergence of leaders with the necessary yang energies to respond to the times with alliances and collaborations. We can expect petty squabbles, petulance, disobliging, stubborn, recalcitrant, beggar-thy-neighbor policies and decision from all quarters. This will hinder ending the wars in Ukraine and between the Palestinians and the Jews of Israel.
In the U.S., President Trump, personally in line with yang energies, will find himself checked internationally by an unwillingness to see things his way or meet his demands. He would be better served if he backed away from threats and punitive responses which use yin and spread his concern and compassion for others far and wide, being a partner, not a boss. He should think of himself as a kind and gentle wind blowing freely everywhere to bring hope of change through team spirit to everyone. He should think big and wholesomely about moving Heaven and Earth for the good of all.
In a very consequential mistake, going against this lunar year’s auspicious energy flows, was Trump’s decision in early February 2025 to impose tariffs on American imports from Canada and Mexico. The Canadians and Mexicans immediately retaliated, setting off a trade war that will raise hard feelings, provoke anger and resentment and prevent collaboration. Going against the yin/yang balance of this Year of the Snake will make it harder for Trump to get his way and so confront him with a loss of power and influence.
Domestically, Trump will achieve more, as he has a team in place and he engages with them, allocating responsibilities for results to others. He is taking advantage of their willingness to work together on an agenda. His opponents – symbolized by the first line denoting yin energy – will be unable to obstruct him. The more he reaches out and engages (“couples,” as the hexagram says) with others, the more he will be successful. The more he tries to impose his will on others, the less he will accomplish. It is a year set to reward coalition building and finding the middle ground, giving advantages to all parties.
The Democratic Party, resting in the first line of the hexagram, will not get its act together. They are out of sync with the times. They have lost sight of Heaven and Earth and are so prevented from using the great powers of those realms to further their aspirations and their efficacy. As Proverbs 28:19 tells us, “Where there is no vision, the people perish.”
The advantage will be to the small, the innovative, the trusting and the trustworthy, in the economy – not the behemoths of the great corporations. Artificial intelligence will assist collaborations, as it makes useful for small businesses and entrepreneurs data multiplied by data. Those who stand aside or refuse to align their efforts will stagnate or fail. The flow of forces should moderate inflation and keep equity markets optimistic. However, there will be no success in reducing debt levels.
I do not see reforms in American education, reversing recent trends of declining competence in reading, writing, mathematics and the ability to think rationally and effectively. Fixations on “my truths” and lack of respect for merit will prevent schools, colleges and universities from engaging with and inspiring their students to benefit from primal energies and soar in their ability and their aspirations. Those institutions, too, are stuck in the first line of the hexagram – a yin-bounded view towards life, cut off from greater yang possibilities.
Please join us at 9:00 am (CDT) on Monday, March 9 on Zoom to celebrate the release of our new book, Adam Smith and Modern Economics: Reclaiming the Moral High Ground!
The book was planned to commemorate one of the most significant steps forward in Western intellectual history and in its political and economic production of modern civilization – the publication of Adam Smith’s book, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (more commonly known as The Wealth of Nations) 250 years ago this March 9, 2026.
To register, please email jed@cauxroundtable.net.
Event will last about an hour.
Not often do notable events impacting the royal family of the United Kingdom and the president of the United States happen nearly simultaneously. But both the police questioning of Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor and the U.S. Supreme Court’s invalidating national and international policies of President Trump vindicate the moral integrity of the Caux Round Table’s Principles for Moral Government.
My reassurance on this validation of our principles is as follows:
First, the Caux Round Table ethical principle that public office is a public trust was just vindicated in the United Kingdom, when the police took in for questioning Andrew Windsor-Mountbatten, former Prince of the Realm. He was questioned on his conduct as a government official for possible misconduct in public office.
The Caux Round Table Principles for Moral Government demand that a public office is a public trust. Therefore, every public official is a trustee held to fiduciary duties of service and selflessness:
Fundamental Principle: Public power is held in trust for the community
Power brings responsibility. Power is a necessary moral circumstance in that it binds the actions of one to the welfare of others.
Therefore, the power given by public office is held in trust for the benefit of the community and its citizens. Officials are custodians only of the powers they hold. They have no personal entitlement to office or the prerogatives thereof.
Holders of public office are accountable for their conduct while in office. They are subject to removal for malfeasance, misfeasance or abuse of office. The burden of proof that no malfeasance, misfeasance or abuse of office has occurred lies with the officeholder.
The state is the servant and agent of higher ends. It is subordinate to society. Public power is to be exercised within a framework of moral responsibility for the welfare of others. Governments that abuse their trust shall lose their authority and may be removed from office.
And:
Public servants shall refrain from abuse of office, corruption and shall demonstrate high levels of personal integrity.
Public office is not to be used for personal advantage, financial gain or as a prerogative manipulated by arbitrary personal desire. Corruption – financial, political and moral – is inconsistent with stewardship of public interests. Only the rule of law is consistent with a principled approach to use of public power.
This standard of conduct for public officials we get from Cicero in his De Officiis (On Duties). He wrote:
For the administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one’s care, not of those to whom it is entrusted. Now, those who care for the interests of a part of the citizens and neglect another part, introduce into the civil service a dangerous element – dissension and party strife. (Book I, XXV, 85)
Secondly, last Friday, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the rule of law governing the Presidency, not the arbitrary and capricious whim of a president.
According to the Caux Round Table Principles of Moral Government:
Only the rule of law is consistent with a principled approach to use of public power.
Chief Justice John Roberts for the Court wrote that President was not authorized by the Congress to declare national emergencies and pursuant to such declarations impose and then willfully modify tariffs on goods purchased by Americans. The court declared the law to be that the Constitution gave the power to impose taxes only to the Congress and that tariffs were taxation of the American people.
Robert’s opinion said:
“Based on two words separated by 16 others in Section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA – “regulate” and “importation” – the President asserts the independent power to impose tariffs on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for any amount of time. Those words cannot bear such weight.”
Thus, the Court’s opinion for a majority of justices turned on “wording,” on the rightful understanding of “words,” not just any “my truth” interpretation of words to suit an official’s pleasure, ambition, corrupt purpose or stupidity.
Roberts, thereby, refuted the Nietzschean arrogance of Humpty Dumpty when instructing Alice on the meaning of words:
“And only one for birthday presents, you know. There’s glory for you!”
“I don’t know what you mean by “glory,” Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t – till I tell you. I meant “there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!”
“But “glory” doesn’t mean “a nice knock-down argument,” Alice objected.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s all.”
To use Humpty Dumpty’s logic, we can reframe what the Supreme Court did, using its authority given by Article III of the Constitution, when it decided what was to be the meaning of certain words in a statute passed by Congress, was to assume the right to be “master.”
As far as his tariffs were concerned, President Trump was not “master” of defining legislative language.
The Supreme Court held that, in a case about taxation of the people, President Trump was ruled by law, not his individual arbitrary and capricious will. He has no authority to impose taxes:
“,,, the Framers gave Congress “alone . . . access to the pockets of the people.” The Federalist No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison); see also Declaration of Independence ¶19. They required “All Bills for raising Revenue [to] originate in the House of Representatives.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §7, cl. 1. And in doing so, they ensured that only the House could “propose the supplies requisite for the support of government,” thereby reducing “all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches.” The Federalist No. 58, at 359 (J. Madison). They did not vest any part of the taxing power in the Executive Branch. See Nicol, 173 U. S., at 515 (“[T]he whole power of taxation rests with Congress”).
No quibbling possible here; no lawyering that black can mean white or that white can mean black.
The Court ruled that the President’s authority under Article II of the Constitution to manage the nation’s foreign affairs did not include any authority at all to override a separate constitutional provision on taxation.
Placing executive officials under the rule of law has long been the rule of governance in England. Writing of English constitutional law around 1250, Henry De Bracton stated that, “The king must not be under man, but under God and under the law because law makes the king. … for there is no king where will rules rather than law.” … The king has a superior, namely God. Also, the law by which he is made king. Also, his council, namely the earls and barons because if he is without bridle, that is without law, they ought to put a bridle on him.”
In 1399, Richard II, King of England, was deposed as king. Article 33 of the articles presented to justify his being deposed said this about his not following the rule of law, of not having the law as a bridle:
The king did not wish to preserve or protect the just laws and customs of this kingdom, but to do what struck his fancy according to his arbitrary will. When frequently the justices and others of the council explained and declared the laws of the realm to him and when according to those laws he was to grant justice to those seeking it, he said expressly with a hard and a bold countenance that the laws were in his mouth and sometimes he said that they were in his heart and that he alone could change and establish the laws of the realm. Following that opinion, he did not grant justice to many of his liegemen, but through threats and terrors he compelled many to cease asking for common justice.
In an interview with the New York Times last month, President Trump said that the only constraint to his power as president is “my own morality, my own mind.”
“It’s the only thing that can stop me,” Trump said, adding: “I’m not looking to hurt people.” He went on to concede “I do” in regards to whether his administration needed to adhere to international law, but said: “It depends on what your definition of international law is.”
Trump, who spoke to the newspaper as his administration looks into “a range of options” in attempts to gain control of Greenland, also emphasized the importance of ownership.
“Ownership is very important,” Trump said, adding: “Because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do with, you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.”
Note that to be an owner makes you a “master.”
Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will to power, which legitimated ungoverned mastery dripping with arrogance and intolerance, would not tolerate any subordination of the individual to the rule of law.
Trump’s response to the Supreme Court’s decision to deny him the power to impose taxes on the American people was Humpty Dumpty-ish, putting labels on the justices who refused to accept his way of thinking:
“I’m ashamed of certain members of the court, absolutely ashamed for not having the courage to do what’s right for our country.” The justices in the majority are a “disgrace to our nation” and “very unpatriotic and disloyal to the Constitution.” “They’re just being fools and lapdogs for the RINOs and the radical left Democrats.” “It’s an embarrassment to their families, to one another.”
A little belatedly, here is January Pegasus.
Two hundred and fifty years ago this coming March 9, Adam Smith’s most influential book, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (more commonly known as The Wealth of Nations), was published. To mark that anniversary and to honor the almost miraculous intellectual and so indirectly, the policy contributions of a great mind, the Caux Round Table is publishing, with De Gruyter Brill, a book of essays on the book. As the editor, I wrote the introduction, part of which we include in this month’s issue.
Secondly, Michael Hartoonian writes about another monumental event which will be commemorated later this year – the 250th anniversary of the U.S. Declaration of Independence – and how it relates to Smith’s work.
Lastly, we include our 2025 year in review (annual report).
As always, I would be most interested in your thoughts and feedback.
Vietnam and the United States Confront Multidimensional Strategic Variables: some are only optics but others have resilient substance
Introduction by Professor Stephen Young
Unlike September 2024—when mixed signals and discordant domestic voices accompanied Vietnam’s high-level engagement with Washington—General Secretary To Lam’s visit to Washington on February 18 – 20) unfolded with more controlled message discipline and more obvious choreography. Over two days, the Vietnamese leader not only attended the inaugural session of President Donald Trump’s Gaza Peace Board but also secured something more politically consequential: a formal meeting with the American President at the White House.
After three previously unsuccessful attempts to arrange direct talks, the doors of the White House finally opened. The handshake, the carefully worded public praise, and the optics of mutual respect were unmistakable.
HOÀNG TRƯỜNG (PhD)
And yet: beneath the hopeful symbolism lies a more complex strategic landscape. Vietnam–U.S. relations are not stalled—but neither have they achieved a lasting structural break with the past. Instead, they remain in a transitional phase shaped by multidimensional uncertainties: institutional tensions within the United States, geoeconomic rivalry centered on China, and internal political calibrations in Vietnam.
This review examines the strategic consequences of the meeting—not merely as a diplomatic event, but as a node within a broader matrix of power, legitimacy, trade negotiation, and geopolitical balancing.
1. The Meaning of Access: Washington’s Recognition of Party Leadership in Vietnam
One of the most consequential dimensions of the visit lies not in what was signed, but in who was received—and how.
To Lam arrived in Washington not as head of state, nor as prime minister, but as General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam. He does not hold a state office. Yet in Vietnam’s political system, the General Secretary of the Party is the supreme decision-maker, positioned over the Constitution and the laws
This distinction once posed a diplomatic complication for Washington. When General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong was invited to the Oval Office in 2015 by President Barack Obama, the meeting triggered a deliberate institutional adjustment in American protocol. Former U.S. Ambassador to Hanoi, Ted Osius, later described the extensive effort required to persuade Washington bureaucrats that the Party leader—not just the state president—was Vietnam’s highest authority in fact.
That meeting marked a turning point. It established a presidential–general secretary axis in bilateral engagement.
By contrast, President Trump appeared entirely comfortable hosting To Lam. Public remarks highlighted Vietnam’s importance and conveyed personal warmth. The ease of the interaction reflects how normalized the recognition of Vietnam’s Party leadership has become in U.S. diplomacy.
Strategically, this matters in two ways:
External legitimacy: It reinforces To Lam’s status as Vietnam’s principal interlocutor with the West.
Internal authority: It allows him to demonstrate to domestic audiences that he commands direct access to the world’s leading power. For a leader consolidating his position after the 14th Party Congress—and no longer holding the presidency—such symbolism carries weight.
2. Multilateral Cover, Bilateral Priority
Officially, To Lam’s presence in Washington centered on his participation in the inaugural session of President Trump’s Board of Peace.
Vietnam positioned itself as an early supporter of the effort. While President Trump announced that participating countries in the new international entity had pledged over $7 billion for Gaza reconstruction, Vietnam was not publicly listed among major financial contributors. Instead, Vietnamese officials later indicated future possible contributions in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict reconstruction support.
Yet the full bilateral schedule revealed the real priority for the two leaders: trade and technology.
Meetings included discussions with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and other economic officials. The Board of Peace discussion of Gaza provided diplomatic cover for what was, for Vietnam and the United States, fundamentally a commercial and strategic negotiation.
This dual-layer approach reflected Vietnam’s general foreign policy approach: using multilateral engagement as a platform to open up opportunities bilateral negotiations.
3. Trade Tensions: Surplus, Tariffs, and Structural Friction
The economic relationship between Vietnam and the United States is both extensive and contentious.
Vietnam’s trade surplus with the U.S. remains substantial. Washington has imposed a 20% tariff on Vietnamese imports and up to 40% on goods deemed to be Chinese products transshipped from Vietnam. Six negotiation rounds have yet to produce a comprehensive agreement resolving American concerns
Two structural concerns dominate U.S. calculations:
Vietnam’s response to these concerns during To Lam’s visit was clear: visible rebalancing.
Agreements reportedly totaling more than $30 billion were showcased, prominently including aircraft purchases involving Boeing:
These transactions serve a dual purpose: commercial modernization of Vietnam and political signaling.
However, industry observers note that Vietnamese carriers—particularly Vietjet—have repeatedly signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs), restructuring agreements, and phased contracts over the past decade. Public announcements often do not clarify whether such deals represent new commitments or restructured previous orders.
In political terms, however, precision may matter less than perception. Large procurement announcements reinforce the narrative that Vietnam is actively narrowing its trade gap with the United States. And President Trump loves to announce that foreign cash is flowing into America.
Thus, President Trump publicly acknowledged Vietnam’s efforts to rebalance – who buys from whom? —a domestic political win for him, even absent a signed trade agreement with Vietnam.
4. Export Controls and Technology Access: A Conditional Opening
The most concrete outcome of the White House meeting was President Trump’s pledge to direct agencies to remove Vietnam from strategic export control categories D1–D3.
If implemented, this could expand Vietnam’s access to:
For Vietnam, this aligns with its ambition to move its economy up the global value chain and integrate Vietnamese companies into next-generation supply chains.
Yet President Trump’s pledge sits awkwardly within a volatile institutional environment.
On the same day as Trump met with his Vietnamese counterpart, the U.S. Supreme Court revoked Trump’s executive authority to impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Trump then immediately signaled his intention to pursue alternative legal routes under the Trade Act of 1974.
This episode illustrates a broader point: U.S. trade policy is currently shaped by friction among executive ambition, judicial oversight, and congressional scrutiny.
For Vietnam, this means that any prospective commitment from the White House must pass through domestic institutional filters. Policy durability cannot be assumed.
5. The China Variable: Transshipment and Strategic Suspicion
Vietnam’s position within the serious U.S.–China rivalry is a central strategic variable.
Washington has grown increasingly attentive to transshipment practices—where Chinese goods are routed through third countries to evade tariffs. Congressional testimony has emphasized preventing such “leakage.”
Vietnam’s geographic proximity to China and deep integration into regional supply chains make it particularly scrutinized for assisting its neighbor gain access to US customers
If Vietnam is perceived as a backdoor channel for Chinese exports, punitive tariffs could be imposed by the United States. Conversely, overly restrictive Vietnamese measures against Chinese-linked investment could strain Hanoi–Beijing ties.
Thus, a balancing act defines Vietnam’s contemporary strategic posture:
To Lam’s White House meeting may have strengthened reciprocal trust—but such trust remains conditioned on verifiable trade compliance.
6. Media Strategy and Narrative Construction
An underexamined but strategically important dimension of the visit was narrative management.
Vietnamese media prominently highlighted digital displays in Times Square and a Washington Times article praising Vietnam’s proactive diplomacy. The latter appeared under an “advertisement” label, reflecting a sponsored placement.
Such media practices are not unprecedented; Vietnam has used similar strategies during previous high-level visits. Domestically, they serve to project international recognition and prestige.
For To Lam, narrative control was especially significant. Unlike September 2024—when online commentary and dissenting voices surfaced—this visit was subject to tighter domestic messaging discipline.
In political terms, such management of optics is a form of power consolidation on To Lam’s behalf.
7. Domestic Political Implications
The domestic implications of the visit may be as important for Vietnam as the foreign policy outcomes.
To Lam previously served briefly as Vietnam’s President before consolidating his role solely as General Secretary. His continuing to operate internationally as Vietnam’s de facto head of state reinforces a Party-centered structure of national authority for the Vietnamese.
For internal Party audiences, the White House reception strengthens To Lam’s standing. It signals that he can command Western respect without diluting Vietnam’s political model.
However, risks remain.
In Vietnam, segments of ideological conservatives and veterans—whose political identity remains shaped by the “anti-American resistance” narrative—may view deepening U.S. ties with caution. Visible warmth with Washington could prompt calls for renewed emphasis on ideological vigilance against “peaceful evolution” – the importation into Vietnam of decentralizing and democratizing reforms.
Thus, external diplomatic successes must be balanced against internal ideological counterforces.
8. From Symbolism to Structure: What Would a Breakthrough Look Like?
What would constitute a genuine strategic breakthrough?
Three developments would signal structural transformation:
None of these steps occurred during To Lam’s visit.
Instead, the Vietnam/US bilateral relationship remains one of incremental adjustments.
Conclusion: Transitional, Not Transformational
The February White House meeting between President Donald Trump and General Secretary To Lam was symbolically significant and politically useful for both sides.
For Washington, it reinforced influence in Southeast Asia without formal alliance commitments.
For Hanoi, it consolidated leadership legitimacy and advanced technology access negotiations.
Yet the relationship has not entered a new structural phase.
It remains in transition—shaped by:
The handshake mattered. The optics mattered. The promise on export controls mattered.
But transformation requires institutionalization of mutual collaboration and respect.
Until only political commitments harden into legally resilient frameworks, Vietnam–U.S. relations will continue advancing—carefully, conditionally, and in response to the differing influences of multidimensional strategic variables.
But more than just wealth creation, Smith’s capitalism gave rise to modern society – mass everything – sewers and flush toilets, running hot water, longer lifespans, literacy, compound growth in scientific knowledge and productivity per person, better food, less disease, middle classes upholding constitutional democracies and the rule of law, airplanes (and tanks and bombs), computers, cell phones, Talor Swift and Blackpink providing entertainment for global audiences, etc. etc. etc.
To celebrate the 250th anniversary of the publication of Wealth of Nations, the Caux Round Table is releasing, next month, a book on Adam Smith’s thinking.
Most importantly, the book, published by De Gruyter Brill, opens a new vision of Smith’s achievement by integrating, with his observations on wealth creation, his equally insightful observations on our moral nature – his first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, a magisterial treatise overlooked by economists, policy makers and most academics for those same 250 years – a gross error in judgment.
Here is the cover:
Chapter 1: The Challenge for Leaders in an Uncertain World: The Only Way Out is the Way In (by Karel J. Noordzy)
Chapter 2: Starting a Conversation with Adam Smith (by John Little)
Chapter 3: Towards a Renewed European Capitalism (by Jan Peter Balkenende and Govert Buijs)
Chapter 4: From the Pin-Factory to the Concert Hall (by Herman Mulder)
Chapter 5: What Would Adam Smith say About Resolving Today’s Higher Education Crisis in America? (by Orn Bodvarsson)
Chapter 6: Capitalism 2.0: Sustainable Economics, Ethical Challenges for Government, Business, and Civic Leaders (by Michael LaBrosse)
Chapter 7: An Inquiry into the Causes of Poverty (by Michael Hartoonian)
Chapter 8: How Adam Smith Foreshadowed Modern Social Capital Theory (by Stephen Jordan)
Chapter 9: Capitalism at Scale (by Thomas Fisher)
Chapter 10: Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations: A Discursive Convergence Towards Moral Capitalism (by José Luis Fernández-Fernández)
Chapter 11: Adam Smith – Fundamentalist or Optimist: Self-interest, Sympathy and a Smithian Middle Way (by Patrick O’Sullivan)
Chapter 12: Between Adam Smith’s Self-Love and the Impartial Spectator: Ādamiyyah as a Moral Bridge in Human Conscience (by Recep Şentürk, Fatma Nur Aysan, Ahmet Faruk Aysan and Seda Özalkan)
Chapter 13: Adam Smith, the Moral Criteria of “Self-interest” and the Universal Ethics of the Noahide Laws (by Shimon Cowen)
Chapter 14: Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and Pope Francis’ Encyclical Laudato si’: Economics, Religion, Morality, Ethics, or… What? (by Louis DeThomasis)
Chapter 15: The Buddha and Adam Smith: A Dialogue Across Time on Wealth, Happiness and Sustainability (by Venerable Anil Sakya and Stephen B. Young)
They are authored by Caux Round Table fellows and other supporters of ours.
Additional information about the book is included in January Pegasus, which will be available early next week.
You may pre-order it here and can be found on Amazon here.
Please purchase a copy and help celebrate some great thinking on moral capitalism.
Following the official trip to the United States from February 18 to 20, regardless of what the General Secretary and his inner circle may publicly declare, the fundamental question moving forward remains this: What will be the true order of priorities for the Communist Party of Vietnam? The preservation of the existing system and one-party rule? The restructuring of the national development model? Or simply the consolidation of power at the level of individuals and factions?
Dr. Nguyễn Thế Hùng, PhD, and Professor Stephen Young, JD
I. Hexagram Qian and the Trajectory of Political Will
In the Yijing (I Ching), Hexagram Qian (乾) symbolizes Heaven—pure creative force, unrestrained yang energy, and the relentless ascent of will. The six lines of Qian are not merely metaphysical symbols; they constitute a structural model of political ascent.
From “Hidden dragon, do not act” (潜龙勿用) to “Flying dragon in the heavens” (飞龙在天), the hexagram outlines a process of self-construction and progressive legitimation. It depicts the journey of an individual endowed with strong political will, overcoming successive constraints to reach the apex of authority.
Yet the Yijing does not conclude at the summit. Immediately following “Flying dragon in the heavens” comes the warning: “Arrogant dragon will have regret” (亢龙有悔).
The philosophical insight here is profound: the apex is not a culmination but a new ordeal. Once at the highest point, a leader no longer confronts discrete rivals. Instead, the object of engagement becomes the totality—society, institutional structures, historical momentum, and collective expectation. Should the leader continue to operate in a mode of conquest rather than adjustment, counterforces inevitably arise. “Regret” in this sense does not signify immediate collapse, but the consequence of failing to transform one’s governing posture at the appropriate moment.
II. “Arrogant Dragon” Through the Lens of Modern Power Psychology
“Arrogance” (亢, kang) does not merely denote opposition. At a deeper level, it describes a confrontational stance maintained after the consolidation of supreme authority.
Political psychology suggests a recurring pattern: individuals who ascend through forceful will often internalize that will as universally efficacious. Before reaching the summit, firmness and decisiveness are assets. At the summit, however, excessive rigidity risks estrangement from the broader social organism.
At the apex, the “other dragon” is no longer a faction or rival personality. It is the aggregate of complex interests: markets, media ecosystems, an expanding middle class, global strategic pressures, and transnational economic interdependence. If governance remains purely confrontational—resisting rather than harmonizing—latent opposition accumulates within the system itself.
Thus, “Arrogant dragon will have regret” is not a moral admonition but a law of equilibrium. Power unmodulated generates counterpower. Will untempered erodes its own foundation.
III. “Ultimate Intent” (Khế Lý) and “Strategic Presentation” (Khế Cơ)
Within a modernized interpretive framework of the Yijing, we may distinguish between two analytical layers:
In contemporary politics, ultimate intent is rarely articulated explicitly. It is typically obscured through three mechanisms: moralized rhetoric, incremental reform, and calibrated foreign policy balancing. Observers can infer it only through long-term behavioral patterns and policy prioritization.
In the present case, the issue is not what the General Secretary and his advisory circle state openly, but what they privilege in practice. Is the overarching goal systemic preservation? Structural transformation? Or power consolidation?
History suggests that when a leader attains authority not merely as a “product of circumstance” but through a prolonged process of self-positioning, such ascent is seldom accidental. It usually reflects a pre-formed will. The decisive question, then, is whether that will inclines toward preservation or transformation.
IV. Foreign Policy and the United States Visit: Confrontation or Harmonization?
In an era of intensifying global strategic competition, a visit to the United States carries significance beyond diplomatic ceremony. It signals both domestic messaging and external legitimation.
At the apex of power, a leader faces a strategic bifurcation: to employ foreign policy as an instrument of internal consolidation and projection of firmness, or to leverage it as an avenue for developmental expansion.
If emphasis falls on attracting investment, deepening technological cooperation, expanding markets, and maintaining strategic balance, such actions suggest what may be termed “harmonizing the dragon”—an acknowledgment that national strength cannot rely indefinitely on internal control alone but must rest upon integrative capacity.
Conversely, if foreign engagement functions primarily as a symbolic reinforcement of domestic authority without accompanying structural reform, the logic of “confrontational dragon” remains dominant.
The distinction lies not in diplomatic protocol, but in the substantive policy trajectory that follows.
V. Success or Regret?
Political history demonstrates that reaching the apex is seldom the most arduous task. The greater challenge lies in shifting from a posture of conquest to one of calibration.
If the ultimate intent is to reconcile competing interests, soften rigid structures, and widen the sphere of social creativity, then harmonization strengthens durability. If, however, ultimate intent is confined to preserving position through unyielding will, the equilibrium principle articulated in the Yijing will assert itself: a dragon that ascends too high without moderation will encounter regret.
The Yijing does not prophesy individuals. It delineates patterns.
Its central insight remains disarmingly simple:
When power reaches its extreme, survival no longer depends on strength, but on self-adjustment.
The inquiry into “ultimate intent,” therefore, is not a matter of personal curiosity. It is an inquiry into the trajectory of an entire historical phase.
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Dr. Nguyễn Thế Hùng, with a Ph.D. in Physics, is a scholar known for his impressive scientific learning and his comprehensive analytical approach to philosophical and cultural studies. With a deep interest in exploring ancient principles, he brings a modern scientific perspective to traditional Eastern thought. His latest publication on I Ching (Kinh Dịch), one of the oldest philosophical classics of East Asia, reflects this interdisciplinary vision. An English translation of his explanations of the I Ching’s 64 hexagrams is planned.
In his book, Dr. Nguyễn seeks to interpret the I Ching—a system centered on the concepts of yin and yang, transformation, and the dynamic nature of the universe—through the lens of contemporary scientific reasoning. Rather than treating the hexagrams solely as only mystical or for use in divination, he approaches them collectively as a symbolic framework that embodies profound insights into change, order, and human experience.
His work represents an effort to bridge modern physics and ancient wisdom, making the philosophical depth of the I Ching more accessible to today’s readers. The book serves not only as an academic contribution but also begins a cultural dialogue between science and the humanities.
Stephen B. Young, a student of jurisprudence and East Asian Law at Harvard Law School, has written The Tradition of Human Rights in China and Vietnam. He also studied the I Ching in Vietnam with Mr. Duong Thai Ban and writes for the Caux Round Table annual commentaries each lunar New Year on what can be constructively learned from the I Ching to apply to our decision making in the coming new lunar year. Young graduated from Harvard College and Harvard law School. He was an Assistant Dean at the Harvard Law School and Dean and Professor of Law at the Hamline School of Law. His is Global Executive Director of the Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism.
Recently, I suggested that Donald Trump indulges in “cudgel capitalism.”
An example of just this was provided last week by the Editorial Board of the Wall Street Journal in “Trump’s Crony Canadian Bridgegate.”
You can read it here.